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III ABSTRACT 
ABSTRACT 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are capable of sensing, processing and carrying out 
wireless communication, all through a tiny embedded device. Now, the availability of low-
cost cameras, along with complementary metallic oxide semiconductor (CMOS )  image 
sensors and microphones, that have a wide range of ubiquitous applications in capturing 
multimedia content from different environments, has led to the development of Wireless 
Multimedia Sensor Networks (WMSNs), i.e., networks of interconnected, wireless devices 
that allow the retrieval of not just scalar sensor data and still images but also audio and 
video streams from the environment. However, since information in WMSNs is 
multimedia in nature, and uses a wireless link as the mode of communication, this poses a 
serious security threat to WMSNs, making them vulnerable to different types of intentional 
network attacks, e.g., eavesdropping, modification, routing attack, camouflages adversaries 
and  man-in-the-middle attack. Besides, WMSNs also suffer from bad stem as some sensor 
nodes have video cameras along with high computation abilities, due to which the 
authenticity of the data transmitted cannot be ensured. Further, man-in-the middle attack 
can cause modification in the transmitted data (alter or delete data, or insert extraneous or 
false data) while a bad network channel may introduce noise into the signal, causing data 
damage. It is important to address these challenges to make WMSNs secure and 
trustworthy. Watermarking techniques are among the ways currently being investigated to 
address some of these challenges, like broadcast monitoring, copyright protection, 
tampering and ownership attacks, as attractive alternatives to traditional techniques, 
because of their light resource requirements. A watermark adds a second line of defence to 
ensure that the data is valid, even if someone cracks the encryption. 
 
This research investigates different watermarking techniques to address the issue of 
copyright protection of the scalar data in WSNs and image data in WMSNs, in order to 
ensure that the proprietary information remains safe between the sensor nodes in both. The 
first objective of the research was to develop a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) and 
Kolmogorov Rule (LKR) watermarking technique for the copyright protection of scalar 
data in WSNs. The LKR watermarking technique developed can protect the copyright data 
from deletion, packet replication and multiple data identities (data Sybil attack ), although 
it is ineffective against false data insertion, data modification and selective forwarding. The 
second objective of the research was to develop a Gaussian Pyramid Kolmogorov Rule 
(GPKR) watermarking technique for copyright protection of image data in WMSN. The 
GPKR watermarking technique developed can protect the copyright image data in WMSNs 
from insertion and replication, although it cannot protect them from deletion and 
modification. 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
IV ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I take great pleasure in thanking all those who have helped me in successfully completing 
this dissertation. In particular, I express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Dr. 
Vidyasagar Potdar and Dr Song Han, who continually encouraged and guided me during 
all these years of strenuous research. Their own enthusiasm, inspiration and 
encouragement, patient effort in explain things clearly and simply, sound advice and 
teaching, elevating company and numerous ideas, have been of invaluable help to me. I 
would simply have been lost without them. 
 
I also take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to my co-supervisor, Dr. Jaipal 
Singh, for his invaluable critiques, insights and suggestions that went a long way in 
improving the research and the thesis. 
 
My specials thanks are due to Prof Elizabeth Chang for her continued assistance during the 
whole period of my study. Her constant guidance and encouragement throughout my PhD 
program were of really great help. I do pray for her to be always blessed with joy and 
happiness. My special thanks also extended to thank to Prof Kate Wright and Peter Dell for 
their  supporting and helping the whole periode of my study.  
  
Many of my colleagues have obliged me with their peer reviews and helpful suggestions. 
In particular, I would like to mention Dr. Hai Dong, and my best friends, Zia Ur Rahman, 
Sazia, and Dinusha.  
 
I am heavily indebted and deeply thankful to my wife, Rini Prasetyowati, and my two sons, 
Miftah Nafi Hisyam and Faishal Tsaqib Khoiry, who kept their faith in me, and allowed 
my ambitions to soar as high as they could. It were their watchful eyes and loving 
encouragement, whenever they perceived any slackness, that kept me motivated, 
committed, and able to tackle challenges head on. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank the Government of Indonesia and the Directorate of Higher 
Education (DIKTI) for their financial support during the entire period of my study; my 
institution, Sebelas Maret University; and all the people of Indonesia; whose love inspired 
me to undertake this research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
V TABLE OF  CONTENTS 
TABLE OF  CONTENTS 
 
DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................... II 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................... III 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................. IV 
TABLE OF  CONTENTS .................................................................................................................. V 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................................... XI 
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... XV 
LIST OF ALGORITHMS ............................................................................................................ XVII 
LIST OF ABBREVATION AND CRONYMS .......................................................................... XVIII 
LIST APPENDICES ..................................................................................................................... XIX 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Wireless Sensor Network – An Overview ................................................................................ 2 
1.2.1 WSNs Architecture ............................................................................................................ 3 
1.2.2 Sensor Node Hardware Architecture .................................................................................. 4 
1.2.3 Sink and Gateway Nodes ................................................................................................... 5 
1.2.4 Sensor Networks Management ........................................................................................... 6 
1.2.5 WSN Applications .............................................................................................................. 7 
1.3 Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks - An Overview .......................................................... 13 
1.3.1 WMSN architecture .......................................................................................................... 13 
1.3.2 Multimedia Sensor Node Hardware Architecture ............................................................ 14 
1.3.3 WMSNs Applications ...................................................................................................... 17 
1.4 Digital Watermarking – An Overview .................................................................................... 20 
1.4.1 Digital Watermarking Applications ................................................................................. 22 
1.4.2 Digital Watermarking Process.......................................................................................... 24 
1.5 Digital Watermarking Techniques for WSNs ......................................................................... 29 
1.6 Digital Watermarking Technique for WMSNs ....................................................................... 31 
1.7 Research Motivations .............................................................................................................. 33 
1.7.1 Copyright Protection of Scalar data ................................................................................. 33 
1.7.2 Copyright Protection of Images ....................................................................................... 34 
1.8 Research Objectives ................................................................................................................ 34 
1.8.1 Developing Digital Copyright Protection of Scalar Data in WSNs using 
Watermarking Technique ................................................................................................ 35 
1.8.2 Developing Digital Copyright Protection of Multimedia Data in WMSNs using 
Watermarking Technique ................................................................................................ 35 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
VI TABLE OF  CONTENTS 
1.9 Significance of the Research ................................................................................................... 36 
1.9.1 Social Significance ........................................................................................................... 36 
1.9.2 Economic Significance ..................................................................................................... 37 
1.9.3 Scientific Significance ...................................................................................................... 37 
1.10 Structure of the Dissertation .................................................................................................. 38 
1.11 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 39 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................................. 40 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 40 
2.2 Theoretical Background .......................................................................................................... 41 
2.2.1 Atomic Trilateration ......................................................................................................... 41 
2.2.2 Linear Feedback Shift Register ( LFSR ) ......................................................................... 44 
2.2.3 Kolmogorov Complexity Rule ......................................................................................... 45 
2.2.4 The Gaussian Pyramids .................................................................................................... 46 
2.3 Security in WSNs and WMSNs .............................................................................................. 49 
2.3.1 Security Requirements in WSNs and WMSNs ................................................................ 49 
2.3.2 Types of Attacks in WSNs and WMSNs ......................................................................... 53 
2.4 Digital Watermarking Technique ............................................................................................ 60 
2.4.1 Classification of Watermarks ........................................................................................... 61 
2.4.2 Watermark Embedding Strategies .................................................................................... 63 
2.4.3 Watermark Extraction Strategies ...................................................................................... 65 
2.4.4 Watermark Detecting Strategies ....................................................................................... 66 
2.4.5 Security Requirements for Digital Watermarking Technique .......................................... 67 
2.4.6 Attacks on Digital Watermarking Techniques ................................................................. 69 
2.4.7 Working of Digital Watermarking Technique in WSNs .................................................. 72 
2.4.8 Working of Digital Watermarking Technique in WMSNs .............................................. 73 
2.5 Evaluation Framework for Digital Watermarking Techniques in WSNs ............................... 75 
2.6 Survey of Literature on Digital Watermarking Technique in WSNs ...................................... 76 
2.6.1 Cover Medium.................................................................................................................. 77 
2.6.2 Watermark Message ......................................................................................................... 78 
2.6.3 Sensed Data ...................................................................................................................... 80 
2.6.4 Type of Watermarks ......................................................................................................... 82 
2.6.5 Watermark Key ................................................................................................................ 83 
2.6.6 Watermark Generator ....................................................................................................... 85 
2.6.7 Watermark Embedding Technique ................................................................................... 87 
2.6.8 Watermark Detecting Technique...................................................................................... 89 
2.6.9 Noise ................................................................................................................................ 90 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
VII TABLE OF  CONTENTS 
2.6.10 Vulnerability Attacks ..................................................................................................... 91 
2.7 Survey of Literature on Digital Watermarking Technique in WMSNs .................................. 93 
2.7.1 Cover Medium.................................................................................................................. 94 
2.7.2 Sensed Data ...................................................................................................................... 96 
2.7.3 Type of Watermarks ......................................................................................................... 97 
2.7.4 Watermark Key ................................................................................................................ 99 
2.7.5 Transform Domain ......................................................................................................... 101 
2.7.6 Watermark Generator ..................................................................................................... 101 
2.7.7 Watermark Embedding Technique ................................................................................. 102 
2.7.8 Watermark Detection Technique.................................................................................... 105 
2.7.9 Noise .............................................................................................................................. 106 
2.7.10 Vulnerability  Attacks .................................................................................................. 107 
2.8 Summary of Issues in Digital Watermarking  for WSNs and WMSNs ................................ 108 
2.9 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 113 
CHAPTER THREE 
PROBLEM DEFINITION .............................................................................................................. 114 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 114 
3.2 Problem definition ................................................................................................................. 115 
3.2.1 Problems with copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs ......................................... 116 
3.2.2 Problem with copyright protection of images in WMSNs ............................................. 118 
3.3 Research Issues ..................................................................................................................... 121 
3.3.1 Research Issue 1: Developing Copyright Protection of Scalar data in WSNs using 
Watermarking Technique .............................................................................................. 121 
3.3.2 Research  Issue 2: Developing Copyright Protection of Images in WMSNs using 
Watermarking Technique .............................................................................................. 122 
3.4 Research Methodology .......................................................................................................... 123 
3.4.1 Problem definition .......................................................................................................... 123 
3.4.2 Conceptual solution ........................................................................................................ 124 
3.4.3 Implementation, test and evaluation ............................................................................... 124 
3.5 The Objective of the Research .............................................................................................. 124 
3.6 Summary the problem Definition   & Research Issues ......................................................... 125 
3.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 126 
CHAPTER FOUR 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE  SOLUTION AND THE  CONCEPTUAL PROCESS ....................... 127 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 127 
4.2 The Proposed Solution : Overview ....................................................................................... 127 
4.3 Solution Description .............................................................................................................. 129 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
VIII TABLE OF  CONTENTS 
4.3.1 LFSR and Kolmogorov Rule for Copyright Protection of Scalar Data  in WSNs (LKR 
Watermarking Technique)............................................................................................. 130 
4.3.2 Gaussian Pyramids and Kolmogorov Rule for Copyright Protection of Images in 
WMSNs               (GPKR Watermarking Technique) ................................................... 131 
4.4 Conceptual process ................................................................................................................ 133 
4.4.1 Requirements, Elicitation and Prioritization .................................................................. 134 
4.4.2 Design rationale.............................................................................................................. 134 
4.4.3 Theoretical foundation ................................................................................................... 134 
4.4.4 Prototype Implementation .............................................................................................. 135 
4.4.5 Experimental Setting ...................................................................................................... 135 
4.4.1 Results and Observations ............................................................................................... 135 
4.4.2 Validation and Comparative Analysis ............................................................................ 136 
4.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 136 
CHAPTER FIVE 
LKR  WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE ...................................................................................... 137 
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 137 
5.2 Proposed LKR Watermarking Technique ............................................................................. 138 
5.2.1 General overview of LKR .............................................................................................. 138 
5.2.2 Requirements .................................................................................................................. 138 
5.2.3 Design Rationale ............................................................................................................ 139 
5.3 Theoretical Foundation for LKR Watermarking Technique ................................................. 141 
5.3.1 Cover Medium Generation ............................................................................................. 143 
5.3.2 Watermark Generation ................................................................................................... 145 
5.3.3 Watermark Embedding Algorithm ................................................................................. 152 
5.3.4 Watermark Extraction & Detection Algorithm .............................................................. 154 
5.4 Implementation of the Prototype ........................................................................................... 159 
5.4.1 Source Code : Network Set-Up Generation ................................................................... 160 
5.4.2 Source Code:  Cover Medium Generation ..................................................................... 160 
5.4.3 Soure Code : Watermark Generation ............................................................................. 161 
5.4.4 Source Code : Embedding Watermark Signal ................................................................ 161 
5.4.5 Source Code: Extracting Watermark .............................................................................. 162 
5.4.6 Source Code: Attacks ..................................................................................................... 163 
5.5 Experimental Setting ............................................................................................................. 164 
5.5.1 Network Set -Up............................................................................................................. 164 
5.5.2 Parameters ...................................................................................................................... 173 
5.5.3 Attacks Characterization ................................................................................................ 174 
5.6 Results and Observations ...................................................................................................... 179 
5.7 Validation and discussion...................................................................................................... 196 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
IX TABLE OF  CONTENTS 
5.8 Comparative analysis ............................................................................................................ 198 
5.9 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 200 
CHAPTER SIX 
GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE .................................................................................... 201 
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 201 
6.2 The Proposed GPKR Watermarking Technique ................................................................... 201 
6.2.1 A General Overview of GPKR Watermarking Technique ............................................. 202 
6.2.2 Requirements .................................................................................................................. 202 
6.2.3 Design Rationale ............................................................................................................ 203 
6.3 Theoretical Foundation for  GPKR Watermarking  Technique. ........................................... 205 
6.3.1 Cover Medium Generation ............................................................................................. 206 
6.3.2 Watermark Generation ................................................................................................... 209 
6.3.3 Watermark Embedding Algorithm ................................................................................. 216 
6.3.4 The  Process of Extraction and Detection of the Watermark ......................................... 218 
6.4 Implementation of the Prototype ........................................................................................... 224 
6.4.1 Source Code : Network Set -Up Generation .................................................................. 226 
6.4.2 Source Code : Cover Medium Generation ..................................................................... 226 
6.4.3 Source Code : Watermark Generation ............................................................................ 226 
6.4.4 Source Code : Embedding Watermark ........................................................................... 228 
6.4.5 Source Code : Extracting and Detecting ........................................................................ 228 
6.5 Experimental Setting ............................................................................................................. 230 
6.5.1 Network Set-Up.............................................................................................................. 231 
6.5.2 Parameters ...................................................................................................................... 243 
6.5.3 Attack Characterization .................................................................................................. 244 
6.6 Results and Observations ...................................................................................................... 250 
6.7 Validation and Discussion ..................................................................................................... 259 
6.8 Comparative Analysis ........................................................................................................... 261 
6.9 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 262 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK ........................................................................................ 263 
7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 263 
7.2 Problems and Issues .............................................................................................................. 264 
7.2.1 Problems with Copyright Protection of Scalar Data in WSNs ....................................... 264 
7.2.2 Problems with Copyright Protection of Images in WMSNs .......................................... 265 
7.3 Contributions of the Thesis ................................................................................................... 265 
7.4 Future Works ......................................................................................................................... 268 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................... 270 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
X TABLE OF  CONTENTS 
APPENDIX  I .................................................................................................................................. 280 
APPENDIX  II ................................................................................................................................ 297 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
XI LIST OF FIGURES 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks Architecture ........................................................................... 3 
Figure 1.2   General hardware architecture of a sensor node (Akyildiz, Melodia and Chowdhury, 
2007) ............................................................................................................................... 4 
Figure 1.3  Network management architecture of WSN .................................................................... 6 
Figure 1.4  How drones work (BBC and Asia 2012 ) ........................................................................ 9 
Figure 1.5 a. Repackaging sensor node  b. Placement of nodes within a tree  (Gilman, Joseph and 
Kevin, 2005) ................................................................................................................. 10 
Figure 1.6 Sensor network for flood detection (Elizabeth, Sai, and Daniela 2008) ......................... 12 
Figure 1.7 Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks architecture ....................................................... 14 
Figure 1.8 General Hardware architecture of multimedia sensor node (Akyildiz, Melodia, and 
Chowdhury 2008) ......................................................................................................... 15 
Figure 1.9  (a)  SparkFun CMUcam4 (Xiao, 2006)     b. Stargate (Akan, Pascal Zhang and Qian 
Jayant, 2008) ................................................................................................................. 17 
Figure 1.10 Watermark embedding process ..................................................................................... 21 
Figure 1.11 Watermark detection process ........................................................................................ 22 
Figure 1.12  Key components digital watermarking system ............................................................ 25 
Figure 1.13 An example of the use of watermark in WSNs ............................................................. 30 
Figure 1.14   An Example of the use of watermark in WMSNs ...................................................... 32 
Figure 2.1   Atomic trilateration process .......................................................................................... 41 
Figure 2.2  Block of Linear Feed Back Shift Register ..................................................................... 45 
Figure 2.3  A graphical representation of the process in one dimension ......................................... 47 
Figure 2.4  An example of reducing an image ................................................................................. 48 
Figure 2.5 An example of expanding the reduced image to the size of the original ........................ 49 
Figure 2.6 General classification of security  attacks (Lingxuan and Evans 2003) ......................... 54 
Figure 2.7  Classification of security attacks on WSNs and WMSNs (Lingxuan and Evans 2003) 55 
Figure 2.8 Classification of digital watermarks ............................................................................... 62 
Figure 2.9 NLSP used as the cover medium .................................................................................... 64 
Figure 2.10 Watermark constraints .................................................................................................. 64 
Figure 2.11 Watermark constraints added to the cover medium ...................................................... 64 
Figure 2.12 A broad classification of currently known attacks on digital watermarking techniques
 ...................................................................................................................................... 70 
Figure 2.13 A perceptual  remodulating attack ................................................................................ 71 
Figure 2.14 Working of digital watermarking technique in WSNs.................................................. 73 
Figure 2.15 Working of digital watermarking technique in WMSNs .............................................. 74 
Figure 2.16 The 10 parameters for evaluation of digital watermarking in WSNs ........................... 76 
Figure 2.17 Cover medium............................................................................................................... 77 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
XII LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.18 Watermark message ...................................................................................................... 79 
Figure 2.19 Encoded watermark message ........................................................................................ 79 
Figure 2.20 An example of sensed data encoded by hash function .................................................. 81 
Figure 2.21 Types of watermarks used in WSN .............................................................................. 82 
Figure 2.22 Type of watermark keys ............................................................................................... 84 
Figure 2.23    The 10 parameters for the evaluation of digital watermarking techniques in WMSNs
 ...................................................................................................................................... 94 
Figure 2.24 Cover media used in WMSN literature ......................................................................... 95 
Figure 2.25 Types of watermarks for WMSNs ................................................................................ 98 
Figure 2.26 Types of watemark keys used in WMSNs .................................................................. 100 
Figure 2.27 (a) The two adaptive threshold (Honggang et al. 2008), (b) the weight coefficient of the 
watermark in DCT (Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009) and (c) Orthogonal 
Frequency Davison Multiplexing (OFDM) in FFT (Masood, Haider, and Sadiq-ur 
2010) ........................................................................................................................... 104 
Figure 3.1  Copyright protection of scalar data between sensor nodes in WSNs........................... 115 
Figure 3.2 Copyright protection of images between multimedia sensor nodes in WMSNs .......... 115 
Figure 3.3  Copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs .............................................................. 117 
Figure 3.4 The architecture of CMOS image sensor system performing in the transform. ........... 119 
Figure 4.1  An overview of the conceptual solution ...................................................................... 129 
Figure 4.2 Working  LKR Watermarking technique for copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs
 .................................................................................................................................... 131 
Figure 4.3 Working GPKR Watermarking technique for  copyright protection of  images  in 
WMSNs ...................................................................................................................... 132 
Figure 4.4 Conceptual process followed in  this thesis .................................................................. 133 
Figure 5.1 Theoretical foundation of LKR watermarking technique in WSNs ............................. 140 
Figure 5.2 The process of the creation of message sensed data ..................................................... 141 
Figure 5.3  Flowchart of the generation of Cover Medium ............................................................ 145 
Figure 5.4 Flowchart for conversion of decimal data into binary digits ........................................ 147 
Figure 5.5 Flowchart for generation of watermark signal .............................................................. 149 
Figure 5.6  Flowchart for the generation of watermark constraints ............................................... 150 
Figure 5.7  Flowchart for the generation of message sensed data .................................................. 151 
Figure 5.8  Flowchart for watermark embedding algorithm .......................................................... 154 
Figure 5.9 Flowchart for extraction of message sensed data ......................................................... 156 
Figure 5.10  Flowchart for the process of detection of watermark signal ...................................... 158 
Figure 5.11  Screenshot of the cover medium generation process using MATLAB code ............. 160 
Figure 5.12  Screenshot of the process of generating watermark signal and water,arl constraints 
using MATLAB code ................................................................................................. 161 
Figure 5.13 Screenshot of the process of embedding watermark signal using MATLAB code .... 162 
Figure 5.14 Screenshot of the process of extracting watermark signal using MATLAB code ...... 163 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
XIII LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 5.15 Flowchart for seting up LKR watermarking technique .............................................. 166 
Figure 5.16  Screenshot of the network setting for LKR Watermarking Technique using MATLAB 
Code ............................................................................................................................ 167 
Figure 5.17    The 75 nodes randomly deployed within a 500 meter square area .......................... 167 
Figure 5.18  Screenshot of generating watermark signal MATLAB Code .................................... 171 
Figure 5.19 Screenshot of generating and extracting the signal using MATLAB Code ................ 173 
Figure 5.20 The categorization of attacks that affect communication. .......................................... 175 
Figure 5.21 Insertion of false watermark constraints into the cover medium ................................ 176 
Figure 5.22 Deletion of watermark constraint data from the cover medium ................................. 177 
Figure 5.23 Watermark constraints data replication attack in the cover medium .......................... 178 
Figure 5.24  Watermark constraints in the cover medium in Sybil data attack .............................. 179 
Figure 5.25 Screenshot of watermark embedding process Matlab Code ....................................... 180 
Figure 5.26 The value of error in the cover medium  process ........................................................ 182 
Figure 5.27 The value of error in watermark constraints embedding process ............................... 184 
Figure 5.28 The value of error for false data attack in WSNs ........................................................ 186 
Figure 5.29 The value of error data deletion attack in WSNs ........................................................ 189 
Figure 5.30 The value of error data replication  attack in WSNs ................................................... 192 
Figure 5.31 The value of error of Sybil data attack in WSNs ........................................................ 195 
Figure 5.32  All watermark constraint attacks ............................................................................... 197 
Figure 6.1 The general model of GPKR watermarking technique for copyright protection of images 
in WMSNs .................................................................................................................. 204 
Figure 6.2 Flowchart for generation of cover medium in GPKR watermarking technique ........... 209 
Figure 6.3   Flowchart for getting the reduced image using the Gaussion pyramids ..................... 212 
Figure 6.4 Flowchart for converting the reduced image to binary matrix ...................................... 213 
Figure 6.5  Flowchart for generating watermark constraints ......................................................... 216 
Figure 6.6 Watermark constraints and digital message image embedding process ....................... 218 
Figure 6.7 Flowchart for extraction process ................................................................................... 221 
Figure 6.8 Flow chart for the detection process of the GPKR watermarking  technique ............... 224 
Figure 6.9 Screenshot of cover medium generation using MATLAB Code .................................. 226 
Figure 6.10 Screenshot of cover medium generation using MATLB Code ................................... 227 
Figure 6.11  Screenshot of the process of embedding watermark constraints ............................... 228 
Figure 6.12 Screenshot of the process of extracting the reduced  image ....................................... 229 
Figure 6.13 Screenshot of the process of detecting the watermark constraints .............................. 229 
Figure 6.14 Flowchart for network set-up of GPKR watermarking technique .............................. 233 
Figure 6.15 Screenshot of network setting for GPKR watermarking technique using  MATLAB 
Code ............................................................................................................................ 234 
Figure 6.16 50 nodes randomly deployed within a 200 meter length and 100 meter width .......... 234 
Figure 6.17  The Lena figure  (http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~chuck/lennapg/lenna.shtml) .................. 238 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
XIV LIST OF TABLES 
Figure 6.18  The process of reducing the Lena image ................................................................... 239 
Figure 6.19  The Lena image expansion process ........................................................................... 242 
Figure 6.20 The value of error in watermark constraint embedding process ................................. 255 
Figure 6.21  Value of the error of data deletion attack ................................................................... 256 
Figure 6.22 Value of the error of false data insertion attack .......................................................... 257 
Figure 6.23 Value of the error of data modification attack ............................................................ 258 
Figure 6.24 Value of the error of replication attack ....................................................................... 259 
Figure 6.25 All watermark constraint attacks ................................................................................ 260 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
XV LIST OF TABLES 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1 Various types of attacks in WSN and WMSNs ................................................................ 58 
Table 2.2 Classification of digital watermarking techniques ........................................................... 60 
Table 2.3 Cover media used in literature ......................................................................................... 78 
Table 2.4  Watermark messages used in literature ........................................................................... 80 
Table 2.5 Sensed data used in literature ........................................................................................... 81 
Table 2.6  Types of watermark used in literature ............................................................................. 83 
Table 2.7 Watermark keys used in literature .................................................................................... 84 
Table 2.8 Watermark generatortors used in literature ...................................................................... 86 
Table 2.9 Watermark embedding techniques used in literature ....................................................... 88 
Table 2.10 Watermarking detection techniques used in literature ................................................... 90 
Table 2.11 Different types of noise in literature .............................................................................. 91 
Table 2.12 Attack used in literature ................................................................................................. 92 
Table 2.13  Cover media used in literature ...................................................................................... 95 
Table 2.14 Sensed data used in literature ......................................................................................... 97 
Table 2.15 Types of watermark data used in literature .................................................................... 99 
Table 2.16 The watermark keys used in literature ......................................................................... 100 
Table 2.17 Transform domains used in literature........................................................................... 101 
Table 2.18 Watermark generators used in literature ...................................................................... 102 
Table 2.19 Watermarking embedding technique used in literature ................................................ 104 
Table 2.20  Watermark detecting technique used in literature ....................................................... 106 
Table 2.21 Different types of noise used in literature .................................................................... 107 
Table 2.22  Different types of attack used in literature .................................................................. 108 
Table 2.23 Comparison of different issues in secure communication between sensor nodes for 
WSNs ................................................................................................................................ 108 
Table 5.1 The particular of the Kolmogorov rule .......................................................................... 149 
Table 5.2  Coordinate positions of  75 nodes ................................................................................. 168 
Table 5.3 32 experiments of the positions of 
  ),(,, BBAA yxyx ,  cC yx ,  and 32 experiments of time 
measurement using Gaussian distribution [0,1], 32 experiments of temperature randomly 
between [0,75] and the values of 4321  and ,,,  generated using normal distribution [0,1].
 ........................................................................................................................................... 171 
Table 5.4 Parameter and its associated values used in the LKR watermarking technique ............. 174 
Table 5.5 The results of error for message sensed data in WSN .................................................... 182 
Table 5.6 The results of error for message sensed data and watermark constraints in WSNs ....... 184 
Table 5.7 The results of error for false data attack in WSNs ......................................................... 186 
Table 5.8 The results of error for data deletion attack in WSNs .................................................... 189 
Table 5.9 The results of the error data replication attack in WSNs ............................................... 192 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
XVI LIST OF TABLES 
Table 5.10 The results of error of Sybil data attack in WSNs ........................................................ 195 
Table 5.11 A comparative analysis with other approaches copyright protection in WSNs ........... 199 
Table .6.1 The expanded Kolmogorov rule .................................................................................... 214 
Table 6.2 Coordinate positions of 50 nodes ................................................................................... 235 
Table 6.3  32 experiments of the positions of   ),(,, BBAA yxyx , ),( CC yx  and 32 experiments time 
measurement by using Gaussian distribution [0,1], 32 experiment of temperature random 
between [0,50] and the values of 4321  and ,,,   generated by using normal distribution 
[0,1]. .................................................................................................................................. 238 
Table 6.4  Parameters and their associated values used in the GPKR watermarking technique .... 243 
Table 6.5   Results of data deletion attack ...................................................................................... 244 
Table 6.6 Results of false data insertion attack .............................................................................. 245 
Table 6.7 New results of false data insertion ................................................................................. 246 
Table 6.8 Results of  data modification attack ............................................................................... 247 
Table 6.9  Results of new data modification attack ....................................................................... 248 
Table 6.10  Results of data replication attack ................................................................................ 248 
Table 6.11 Results of new data replication .................................................................................... 249 
Table 6.12 The three positions, exact time and temperature .......................................................... 250 
Table 6.13 Results of cover medium generation process ............................................................... 251 
Table 6.14  The three positions, exact time and temperature, and feasibility of the value ............ 252 
Table 6.15 Results of watermark constraint embedding  process .................................................. 254 
Table 6.16 A  comparative analysis with other approaches to copyright protection in WMSNs .. 262 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
XVII LIST OF ALGORITHMS 
LIST OF ALGORITHMS 
 
Pseudo Code  5.1  Generating cover medium ................................................................................ 143 
Pseudo Code  5.2  Converting sensitive data into binary sequences .............................................. 146 
Pseudo Code  5.3 Generating watermark signal ............................................................................. 148 
Pseudo Code  5.4  Generating watermark constraints .................................................................... 150 
Pseudo Code  5.5  Generating message sensed data ...................................................................... 151 
Pseudo Code  5.6 Embedding watermark constraints .................................................................... 152 
Pseudo Code  5.7 The process of extracting watermark signal ...................................................... 155 
Pseudo Code  5.8 The process of detecting watermark signal ....................................................... 157 
Pseudo Code  5.9 Network Set-up for LKR Watermarking Technique ......................................... 164 
Pseudo Code  6.1  Generating cover medium ................................................................................ 207 
Pseudo Code  6.2  Reduction of image by Gaussian Pyramid Transforms .................................... 210 
Pseudo Code  6.3 Converting the reduced image to binary ........................................................... 212 
Pseudo Code  6.4  Generating watermark constraints .................................................................... 214 
Pseudo Code  6.5 Embedding watermark constraints .................................................................... 216 
Pseudo Code  6.6   Expanding the reduced image by the pyramid transforms to get the sensory 
image ..................................................................................................................... 219 
Pseudo Code  6.7  The process of detecting watermark constraints .............................................. 222 
Pseudo Code  6.8   Network set-up for GPKR watermarking technique ....................................... 231 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
XVIII LIST OF ABBREVATION AND CRONYMS 
 
LIST OF ABBREVATION AND CRONYMS 
 
 
ICT  Information 
Communication and 
Technology 
 GPS   Global Positioning System 
SN   Sensor Node  DoS   Denial of Service 
WSNs   Wireless Sensor Networks  OSI   Open System International  
ADC   Analogue to Digital 
Converter 
 NC   Normalized Correlation 
UAVs  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles  SM   similarity measurements 
AUV   Autonomous Underwater 
Vehicle 
 IDWT   Invers Discrete Wavelet Transform 
WSSNs  Wireless Scalar Sensor 
Networks 
 LSB  Least Significant Bits 
CMOS   Complementary Metallic 
Oxide Semiconductor 
 MSB   Most Significant Bits 
WMSNs  Wireless Multimedia 
Sensor Nodes 
 DSSS  Direct  Sequence Spread Spectrum  
RSA  Rivest Shamir Adleman   MAC   Media Control Access  
MD5  Message Digest 5  MSE   Mean Squared Error  
RC4  Rivest Chiper 4  PSNR   Peak Signal  Noise Ratio  
SEC   State Electricity Company   IFFT   Invers Fast Fourier Transform  
MCB   Mini Circuit Breaker   IDCT  Invers Discrete Cosines Transform 
CCTV   Closed Circuit Television  DFT  Discrete Fourier Transform 
PGP  Pretty   Good Privacy  FFT   Fast Fourier Transform 
JPEG  Joint Photographic Experts 
Group 
 OFDM   Orthogonal Frequency Davison 
Multiplexing 
DCT  Discrete Cosines 
Transform 
    
DWT   Discrete Wavelet 
Transform 
    
LFSR   Linear Feedback Shift 
Register  
    
KR   Kolmogorov Rule      
LKR  Linear FSR Kolmogorov 
Rule  
    
MSD   Message Sensed Data      
GPT  Gauss Pyramid Transform      
GPKR   Gauss Pyramids 
Kolmogorov Rule  
    
NLSP  Non Linear System 
Programming 
    
MATLAB   Matrix Laboratory      
TOMLAB       
TDoA  Time Differences of 
Arrival  
    
RF   Radio Frequency      
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
XIX LIST APPENDICES 
 
LIST APPENDICES  
 
APPENDIX  I ................................................................................................................................. 280 
APPENDIX I  A  :  LKR Watermarking Technique  Matlab Code ............................................... 280 
APPENDIX I  B  : GPKR Watermarking Technique  Matlab Code .............................................. 290 
APPENDIX  II ............................................................................................................................... 297 
List Publication .............................................................................................................................. 297 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 1   
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter:  
► introduces Wireless Sensor Networks,  
► introduces Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks, 
► introduces Digital Watermarking,  
► explains the significance and importance of  Digital Watermarking  for WSNs and 
WMSNs, 
► explains the motivation and objectives of the research, 
► outlines the structure of the dissertation. 
1.1  Introduction 
The rapid growth in information technology, and computer networks represented by the Internet, 
has brought about great changes in the lives of the people today. Moreover, the new developments 
in micro-electronic mechanical technology, computing technology and wireless communication 
technology have given rise to a whole new generation of large sensor networks with tiny sized 
sensor nodes that can integrate data collection, processing, wireless communication and much 
more (Raghu, Jayachandran Haiyun and Luo Tarek, 2006). Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are 
deployed in the test area in the form of a large number of huge sensors nodes connected through 
wireless communication to form a multi-hop network of a self-organizing system (Yick, 
Mukherjee and Ghosal, 2008). These sensor nodes collaborate with each other to perceive, acquire 
and process the perceivable data and information in the network coverage area, and send these to 
the users (Pister 2003). A sensor network has three elements, i.e., sensors, the process of sensing 
the object, and the observer. If the Internet can be called a world of logically arranged information 
that has revolutionized the way people communicate with each other, a wireless sensor network 
can be called a world of logically arranged information that has revolutionized the way people 
communicate with the physical world.  
CHAPTER ONE 
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Having introduced the sensor technology and pointed out its basic function, the next section gives 
an overview of the Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). 
1.2  Wireless Sensor Network – An Overview  
During the last few years, computing and communication technology have taken a quantum leap 
owing to the vastly improved miniaturisation (Pister, 2003). This development has made it possible 
to fabricate small electronic components that can sense, gather, process and communicate data to 
other nodes (Pister 2003). These small electronic components, called sensor nodes (SN), can sense 
and gather many types of data from different environments, including temperature, humidity, light 
intensity, wind velocity and vibrations, etc. Moreover, the wireless nature of communication makes 
it possible for these nodes to exchange information with other nodes or the outside world, without 
any physical connection with other such devices. WSNs provide economically viable solutions for 
a diverse range of monitoring and tracking applications, which is making them increasingly 
popular as data gathering, monitoring and tracking are crucial to the success of many critical 
missions and applications in the modern times (Yick, Mukherjee and Ghosal, 2008). Since WSNs 
can sense, process and communicate data wirelessly through just a tiny embedded component, they 
have increasingly drawn the interest of the research community in the recent past. This interest has 
been driven by their potential in tackling the practical and theoretical problems with embedded 
operating systems, wireless communication networks and network protocols, and distributed signal 
processing. 
WSNs are primarily meant to collect and distribute critical data regarding various physical 
phenomena in the targeted area. They are composed of hundreds, or even thousands, of low-
powered sensor nodes deployed at strategic locations, at low costs. These sensor nodes are capable 
of sensing, gathering and measuring different types of environmental data from the targeted area, 
such as temperature, pressure, humidity, sounds, vibrations, motions and pollutants. Moreover, 
they are capable of collaborating with other sensor nodes deployed in the area to tally their data 
and pass them on through the network to the main processing location. They can also transmit the 
sensed and gathered data directly to the user (Yick, Mukherjee and Ghosal, 2008; Potdar, Sharif 
and Chang, 2009). Modern WSNs are bi-directional, allowing the sensor activity to be controlled 
from the main processing location. Wireless sensor networks were primarily developed for military 
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applications, e.g. battlefield surveillance (Tatiana Bokareva, 2006; Durresi, 2008). However, today 
they have found use in many consumer as well as industrial applications, e.g., machine health 
monitoring, industrial process monitoring and control, and so on.  
After this overview of WSNs, the next section moves on to WSN architecture.  
1.2.1  WSNs Architecture  
A typical WSN architecture can be seen in Figure 1.1. A common WSN architecture consists  of 
many randomly deployed sensor nodes over the targeted field to measure environmental 
phenomena, such as temperature, pressure, humidity, motions, or even dissolved oxygen (Wen-bo, 
Hai-feng and Pei-gen, 2010). The sensor network system consists of sensor nodes, a sink and a 
sensor network management system (Ruiz, Nogueira and Loureiro, 2003; Wen-bo, Hai-feng and 
Pei-gen, 2010). Data from the nodes are processed by hopping via a number of routes, transferred 
to the sink, and finally put up on the Internet. Users can not only manage the sensor network node 
configuration but also monitor and publish the data 
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Figure 1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks Architecture 
After the description of this generic WSN architecture, the next section explains the sensor node 
hardware architecture.  
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1.2.2 Sensor Node Hardware Architecture  
A sensor node, which can also be referred to as a mote, is a node in a WSN that gathers and 
processes sensory information, and communicates with other nodes in the network (Yick, 
Mukherjee and Ghosal, 2008). Thus, a sensor node is a component of a larger network of sensors 
that collects data from the environment where it is deployed, and sends it to the main processing 
location of the network (Ruiz, Nogueira and Loureiro, 2003). 
Figure 1.2 shows the architecture of a wireless sensor node, along with its major components, 
which are: sensing unit, processing unit, communication unit, and power unit. Additional units can 
be incorporated in a sensor node, depending on the application it is meant for. 
 
Figure 1.2   General hardware architecture of a sensor node (Akyildiz, Melodia and Chowdhury, 
2007) 
The major components of a sensor node have been described below:  
 Sensing Unit: Sensing unit is the main component performing sensing operations of the node. 
The main difference between the sensing unit of a node and that of other embedded 
communication systems is that a sensing unit generally includes several sensors to enhance its 
ability to gather various types of data from the environment, e.g., temperature, pressure, etc. 
Apart from a sensing unit, each sensor includes an analogue-to-digital converter (ADC). 
While the sensing unit senses various environmental phenomena and produces analogue 
signals based on them, the analogue-to-digital converter converts these to digital signals for 
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further processing and communicating (Potdar, Sharif and Chang, 2009; Healy, Newe and 
Lewis, 2008).  
 Processing Unit: The main component that controls the sensor node is the processing unit, 
consisting of a microcontroller and a small storage unit (Fengchao, 2011; Healy, Newe and 
Lewis, 2008). The microcontroller processes the data sensed by the node and also controls the 
functioning of its other components. It manages the procedures crucial for the node to be able 
to carry out sensing operations, run algorithms associated with these operations, and 
collaborate with other nodes in wireless mode. For example, Imote2 uses Intel‟s processor 
(Intel PXA271, with operating frequency of 400 MHz, 32MB program memory and RAM) 
mode (Potdar, Sharif and Chang 2009). 
 Communication Unit: The communication unit provides a wireless interface to handle 
transmission and reception of data packets, e.g., transceiver, Bluetooth or Zigbee. The 
transceiver carries out the necessary procedures required to convert the bits into radio 
frequency, to enable them to be transmitted to, and then recovered, at the other end. It allows 
any two sensor nodes in the wireless network to communicate with each other. The radio in 
the transceiver of a sensor node can be used to operate it in four different modes: (i) idle, (ii) 
transmit, (iii) receive, and (iv) sleep (Gungor and Hancke, 2009). 
 Power unit The power unit provides the sensor node with energy to work. Usually, it uses a 
battery but other energy sources, such as AC/DC and filtering, can also be used. The unit 
powers all the components of the sensor node and, in the view of its limited capability, its 
energy sources need to be energy efficient to enable all the components to perform their tasks 
(Fengchao, 2011; Xuejun, 2010; Healy, Newe and Lewis. 2008). For example, Atmega128 
(Mica2Dot, Mica2) consumes 8mW (Mica2Dot consumes 1.08 nJ/instruction) and 33mW 
(Mica2 consumes 4.459 nJ/instruction) during active mode  (Potdar, Sharif and Chang, 2009) . 
While this section explained the sensor node hardware architecture, the next will elaborate the 
working of the sink node in a WSN.   
1.2.3 Sink and Gateway Nodes 
A WSN basically has three types of nodes: common, sink, and gateway nodes (Ruiz, Nogueira and 
Loureiro, 2003). While common nodes collect the sensed data and sink nodes receive, store and 
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process these data, gateway nodes connect the sink nodes to the external entities known as 
observers (Ruiz, Nogueira and Loureiro, 2003). The sink node may be called the head node as it 
gathers and controls the data collected by other nodes, as shown in Figure 1.1. Therefore, the sink 
node is more powerful with more capabilities than the common and the gateway nodes.   
Having explained the sink node, the next section goes on to explain sensor node management in 
WSNs.  
1.2.4 Sensor Networks Management  
 
Sensor nodes are often deployed at remote and inaccessible geographical locations, making 
network maintenance or reconfiguration, or recovery from technical problems or failure, rather 
impractical. Therefore, a sensor node management system that can work continuously without 
needing too much human intervention, is of great importance for the successful working of a WSN 
(Ruiz, Nogueira and Loureiro, 2003). Figure 1.3 shows the network management architecture for a 
typical WSN. 
Sink 
Stargate
 gateways 
Stargate
 gateways 
Stargate
 gateways 
Sink Sink 
Central Manager 
 
Figure 1.3  Network management architecture of WSN 
On the basis of their network architecture, sensor network management systems are usually 
categorized into three types:  centralized, distributed, and hierarchical.  
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 Centralized management systems have a base station acting as the managing station to 
collect data from all the nodes and control the entire network. However, this approach 
suffers from three disadvantages. One, the large volume of data pooling gives it a high 
message overhead, which limits its scalability. Two, the central server becomes the only 
point for data traffic concentration, increasing the possibility of failure of the network. 
Three, if the network is partitioned, the nodes that lose access to the central server, have no 
access to any management functionality either (Vivas, Fernández-Gago and Benjumea, 
2010).   
 Distributed management systems have multiple managing stations. Apart from managing 
their own sub-networks, the managing stations also collaborate with each other to perform 
various managing functions in the network. However, this approach is complicated. 
Besides, the distributed management algorithms are often computationally too expensive 
to be used by the resource-constrained sensor network nodes (W Wang, 2008) (Wenjing 
and Younggoo, 2006). 
 Hierarchical management system may be said to be a combination of the centralized and 
the distributed approaches. It has intermediate managing stations to delegate management 
functions, with no direct communication among them. Each managing station manages the 
nodes of its own sub-network and passes on the data to the next higher-level managing 
station, while, delegating the management functions given to it by the higher-level 
managing station to its sub-network. Thus, this type of architecture brings in the benefits of 
centralized as well as distributed management approaches, and therefore, is the most 
suitable for a WSN (Vivas, Fernández-Gago and Benjumea, 2010).   
After the background information about sensor network management systems, the next section 
discusses some of the real life applications of WSNs.  
1.2.5 WSN Applications 
A WSN is a network of many different types of sensors: e.g., magnetic, seismic, visual, thermal, 
radar, and acoustic sensors. As such, these sensors can monitor a broad range of environmental 
conditions: e.g. temperature and humidity, wind movement, speed and direction, light intensity, 
noise level, and certain  kinds of objects present in the environment (Wen-bo, Hai-feng and Pei-
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gen, 2010) (Potdar, Sharif and Chang, 2009). Therefore, WSNs can be employed in a wide variety 
of applications which can be broadly categorized into two types: Monitoring and Tracking. 
Monitoring applications can be used to monitor indoor as well as outdoor environmental 
conditions; health and wellness in the healthcare sector; power, inventory location and process 
automation in the industrial sector; and seismicity and structures in the construction sector (Yick, 
Mukherjee and Ghosal, 2008). Tracking applications, on the other hand, include the tracking of 
vehicles, human beings, animals, and many other different kinds of objects (Yick, Mukherjee and 
Ghosal, 2008). The following sections give a few of the many different applications of WSN that 
have been successfully tested in real, practical conditions:   
 Smart Dust: One of the earliest projects in which the WSN found application was the 
Smart Dust (Pister, 2003; Warneke, 2001). The project aimed at providing sensing 
technologies for the military to be used in hostile environments. The use of the WSN 
extended the reach of these technologies, as it could be deployed in areas too dangerous to 
continuously operate in by the humans. A lot of critical information can be obtained for 
military uses by dropping a sturdy, self-configuring and self-organizing WSN in the war 
zone. Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly called drones, are the 
examples of such WSNs. As shown in Figure 1.4, a drone is an aircraft with no human 
pilots on board. The flight of a drone can be controlled in two ways: through computers on 
board the drone itself, or through a pilot based on the ground or flying in another vehicle, 
using remote control (Yick, Mukherjee and Ghosal, 2008).  
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Figure 1.4  How drones work (BBC and Asia 2012 ) 
Since drones are agile, fast moving, and can keep in constant motion, they have an enormous 
potential for use in the futuristic war systems (Abdul Hadi Fikri Bin Abdul Hamid, 2009). A 
drone has an elaborate imaging subsystem consisting of a number of enabling technologies, 
that include sensors and computing devices, apart from a wireless communication system. A 
typical drone has multiple digital cameras on board, with interfaces to a geospatial 
processor. A data networking system distributes the georeferenced imaging data, allowing 
for a simple and flexible system configuration. The control computer triggers the camera, 
stores images, prepares them for transmission, and also records data like camera setting, 
altitude and position. These data are attached to the images as metadata and then released to 
the ground station controlling the drone, through a state-of-the-art wireless network that can 
retrieve wireless data, including large files, real time  (Ahmad and Samad, 2010). Drones 
can capture and stream multi-megapixel images in large formats, as well as the meta data. 
MQ-1B Predator and MQ-9 Reaper are two such drones currently being used in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan by the US (BBC and Asia 2012 ).  
 Another example of the application of WSNs is the Redwood Microscope, a WSN case study 
to monitor and record the growth of redwood trees in the Sonoma area of California (Gilman, 
Joseph and Kevin, 2005). It uses a sensor node platform of a repackaged Crossbow Mica2 
mote, with a form factor diameter of 1 inch. The mote had an Atmel ATmega128 
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microcontroller with a frequency of 4 MHz, a Chipcon radio with a frequency of 433 MHz 
and speed of 40Kbps, and a flash memory of 512KB, as illustrated in Figure 1.5 a. Each 
sensor node measures atmospheric temperature and humidity, as well as solar radiation that is 
photo synthetically-active. The sensor nodes are placed at different heights on the trees, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.5.b. The Redwood Microscope project aimed at helping plant biologists 
to track changes in the spatial gradients of the microclimate of a redwood tree, in order to 
validate the biological theories. 
 
(a)  
 
(b)  
Figure 1.5 a. Repackaging sensor node  b. Placement of nodes within a tree  (Gilman, Joseph and 
Kevin, 2005) 
 Akyildiz, Pompili and Melodia (2005) have investigated several key aspects of the 
underwater acoustic communication system. Further, Vasilescu, Kotay and D. Rus (2005) 
have developed an underwater platform for a sensor network system that can monitor 
fisheries and coral reefs in the long term. The system includes static as well as mobile 
sensor nodes placed underwater. The static system is underwater sensor node Aquafleck 
while the mobile system is autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). The system is 
connected to an ultrasonic as well as an optical communication networking modality. 
Ultrasonic communication has long been used in underwater applications, especially in 
autonomous underwater vehicles. The AUV is used to dock and transport the Aquaflecks 
with a matching optical communication link, while the Aquaflecks themselves can be used 
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for data mulling. The data collection experiments were carried out at Starbug, in Moreton 
Bay, Brisbane. 
 WSNs have been used for early flood detection and warning systems in several developing 
countries of Central America, particularly Honduras (Elizabeth, Sai and Daniela, 2008). 
The existing systems mainly aim at helping the personnel in continuous river bed 
monitoring. The system was developed at MIT and first deployed for tests in Honduras, 
where the urban life is significantly affected by frequent floods. For flood monitoring, 
sensors have to be deployed over a large area. The system network has a two-tier topology, 
as elaborated in Figure 1.6  There are three different sensors, to measure the atmospheric 
temperature, rainfall and water flow data respectively, in the lower tier of the network 
topology. The closely located sensors are grouped together, and connected to the second-
tier of computation nodes. The computation nodes carry out data collection and processing. 
The results of the computation are then released to the third tier, i.e., the flood control 
centres. The system uses four different kinds of nodes which, along with their functions, 
have been described below: 
- Sensing Node: This node measures the variables required to detect and predict the 
events of interest, such as atmospheric temperature, and rainfall and water flow data. 
This node collects data over a short frequency of time, e.g. minute to minute, and 
transmits them through a 900 MHz transceiver to the computation node.   
- Computation Node: This node basically serves two purposes. First, it feeds the data-
set sent by the sensing node for prediction. Second, it communicates from the sensing 
nodes to the control centre via a 144 MHz transceiver.  
- Government Offices Interface Mode: It provides the users an interface to interact with 
the network through visualized data, and also enables network maintenance.  
- Community Interface Mode: This node receives the flood prediction data from the 
computation node or the government offices interface node, and informs the 
community under threat about the predictions.   
  
12 INTRODUCTION 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Government
 Office 
Community interface
 node 
Sensing node 
Sensing node 
Sensing node 
Computatition node  
Computatition node  
Computatition node  
Sensing node 
Computatition
 node  
 
Figure 1.6 Sensor network for flood detection (Elizabeth, Sai, and Daniela 2008)  
 WSNs have also found use in extreme terrains or conditions which are inaccessible to the 
humans. Volcanic monitoring (Werner-Allen, Lorincz and Ruiz, 2006) is one such example, 
carried out through a network of sensor nodes. WSNs can easily be deployed, installed and 
maintained for volcanic monitoring (Adrian, Szewczyk, J. D. Tygar Victor and Wen David, 
2002) as equipment are small, light and power-efficient. However, a WSN application faces 
many challenges in volcanic data collection. These include reliability in event detection, 
efficiency in data collection, and ensuring high data rates in spite of sparse node deployment. 
To test the concept application, two cases studies were conducted in an Ecuadorian volcano 
during 2004-2005  (Werner-Allen, Lorincz and Ruiz, 2006), by running 16 nodes for a 19 day 
test. The nodes measured seismic and acoustic data, transmitting to each other at 2.4 GHz and 
back to the base station through a single repeater node at 900 MHz. The application aimed at 
collecting seismic information on the basis of the earthquakes occurring near the volcano.  
WSN applications having been explained, the next section moves over to explaining Wireless 
Multimedia Sensor Networks (WMSNs).  
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1.3  Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks - An 
Overview 
Depending on their applications, WSNs can be classified into two types: Wireless Scalar Sensor 
Networks (WSSNs) and Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks (WMSNs) (Manel Guerrero-
Zapata, 2009). A WMSN is basically a network of audio and video sensors, commonly referred to 
as ASN, that are wirelessly interconnected and allow the retrieval of still images as well as audio 
and video streams, in addition to scalar data. The development of WMSNs has been greatly 
fostered because of their vast application opportunities based on their ubiquitous ability to capture 
multimedia content from diverse environments, as well as store, process real-time, correlate and 
fuse such content, received from heterogeneous sources. The easy availability of inexpensive 
microphones, image sensors and CMOS cameras has further accelerated this trend. The WMSNs 
have greatly enhanced the capabilities of the existing WSNs, and opened up new vistas of targeted 
applications, like environmental surveillance, industrial process control, and even traffic 
monitoring and rule enforcement, through the networks of multimedia surveillance sensors (Potdar, 
Sharif and Chang, 2011; Sharif, Potdar and Chang, 2009).  
After this brief overview, the next section will explain the WMSN architecture. 
1.3.1 WMSN architecture  
In general, WMSNs have an architecture similar to that of WSNs, as described in Section 1.2.1, the 
only difference being in the kind of sensors. WMSNs consist of networks of heterogeneous 
multimedia sensors (video, audio, low image, and scalar sensors) with different data processing 
and transmission capabilities. Figure 1.7 shows a typical WMSN architecture. It senses multimedia 
data through multimedia sensor nodes and relays them through multimedia processing gateways 
that fuse and process the data. The multi-tier architecture approach uses heterogeneous sensors, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.7. The multi-tier architecture enables the sensors to process data at different 
levels, based on their memories, and computation and bandwidth capabilities (Akyildiz, Melodia, 
and Chowdhury 2007). The star gate gateway collects the multimedia data and transfers them to a 
sink. After the sink transfers these multimedia data, the users can manage them through satellite 
networks, or through the internet, and can even publish them or carry out data monitoring tasks.    
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Figure 1.7 Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks architecture 
After this brief overview of WMSN architecture, the next section explains the Multimedia Sensor 
Node hardware architecture.  
1.3.2 Multimedia Sensor Node Hardware Architecture  
A multimedia sensor node device consists of a number of basic components, including sensing 
unit, central processing unit, communication subsystem, coordination subsystem, memory, and 
optional mobility/actuation unit, as depicted in Figure 1.8.  
The major components of a multimedia sensor node have been described below in detail:  
 Sensing Unit: As already explained in Section 1.2.2., a sensor node is capable of sensing 
scalar data. Going a step further, the sensing unit in a multimedia sensor node is capable of 
sensing not only scalar data but also video and audio streams. A sensor in a multimedia unit 
consists of two subunits: a sensor, which may be in the form of a camera or audio and/or 
scalar sensor, and an analogue-to digital converter (ADC). While the audio sensor captures 
sounds in the sensed event, the camera captures still or moving images. The typical 
resolutions for the camera are in terms of pixel/inch, and for the audio sensor in DB. The 
function of the ADC is to convert the analogue signals produced by the sensor, on the basis of 
the observed phenomenon, into digital signals. 
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Figure 1.8 General Hardware architecture of multimedia sensor node (Akyildiz, Melodia, and 
Chowdhury 2008) 
 Central Processing Unit: As mentioned in section 1.2.2, the Imote2 uses Intel‟s processor, 
Intel PXA271, which is the central processing unit (CPU) of Imote2, working as the principal 
controller of this wireless sensor node. However, the main controller of a multimedia sensor 
node also the system software. For example, the Stargate board, designed and produced by 
Intel and Crossbow respectively, uses Intel‟s PXA-255 XScale RISC processor operating at 
400 MHz, with 32 Mbyte of flash memory and 64 Mbyte of SDRAM. This CPU, interfaced 
with a memory, coordinates the sensing and communication tasks by executing the system 
software in charge of this function. On the whole, compared to a scalar sensor node, a 
multimedia sensor node is substantially more powerful, and capable of sensing and retrieving 
audio and video streams.  
 Memory Unit: The memory unit of a multimedia sensor node usually consists of  both flash 
memory and RAM. For example, the Stargate board has 32 Mbyte of flash memory with 64 
Mbyte of SDRAM (Sharif, Potdar and Chang, 2009). The flash memory contains the program 
code for the multimedia node while the RAM stores any information or data required for 
computation. Some of the memory units also have non-volatile storage for off-line data 
capture, to be retrieved later.   
 Power Unit: As mentioned in Section 1.2.2, the power unit of a sensor node is the most 
important part of the hardware as it powers the whole system. It is supported by an energy 
generating unit, such as a battery of solar cells. The sensing arrays, such as the CCDs, or the 
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multimedia sensors (Akyildiz, 2007), such as the CMOS image sensors, generally require a lot 
of power. The amount of power consumed in the sensing subsystem of a multimedia sensor 
node is considerably higher than in an ordinary, scalar sensor. For example, a scalar 
temperature sensor consumes 6μW in sensing the environmental temperature. However, for 
image capturing, Cyclops consumes 42 μW, CMU-Cam consumes 42 μW and High-end PTZ 
camera consumes 1W (Akyildiz, Melodia and Chowdhury, 2008).  
 Communication Unit: The device is interfaced to the network through a communication 
subsystem which consists of a transceiver and communication software, including the 
communication protocol stack and the system software, for example an operating system and 
a middleware.  
 The Coordination unit: The functioning of the different network devices is coordinated by a 
coordinating subsystem, carrying out operations like location management and motion 
control. 
 Mobility Actuation unit: An optional unit in multimedia sensor node, this unit enables the 
node to move or manipulate the object, as per the requirements. A scalar sensor node has no 
actuator. 
WMSNs use their various internal nodes to harvest not only scalar data, such as humidity, 
temperature, air pressure, light intensity, and various acoustic data, from the environment, but also 
multimedia information, such as audios/videos and digital images (Akyildiz, Melodia and 
Chowdhury, 2007). Thus, a WMSN has the imager as its main sensor, e.g. SparkFun CMUcam4, 
which can be seen in Figure 1.9 a. The main processor in SparkFun CMUcam4  is Parallax 
P8X32A (Propeller Chip) which is connected to an OmniVision 9665 CMOS camera sensor 
module, with a VGA resolution (640x480) RGB565/YUV655 color sensor, and an Onboard Image 
Processing system (QQVGA 160x120). The CMUcam open-source programmable embedded color 
vision sensors are low-cost, low-powered sensors, meant for mobile robots (Xiao, 2006). The 
Stargate 2, as shown in Figure 1.9 b, is a small form factor (3.5” × 2.5”), designed and produced 
by Intel and Crossbow respectively. It has Intel‟s PXA-255 Scale 400 MHz RISC processor with 
32 Mbytes of flash memory, 64 Mbytes of SDRAM, and an on-board connector to connect it to 
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Crossbow‟s MICA2 mote, in addition to PCMCIA Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11 cards. It also has 
high processing ability along with more on board resources.  
The visual data handled by a WMSN puts its sensor network under severe constraints. Collecting, 
processing and disseminating visual data is a process intensive activity and requires high 
bandwidth. However, WMSNs boast of many novel features as they have sensor nodes with video 
cameras, as well as high computation abilities.   
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 1.9  (a)  SparkFun CMUcam4 (Xiao, 2006)     b. Stargate (Akan, Pascal Zhang and Qian 
Jayant, 2008) 
This section described multimedia sensor node hardware architecture. The next section will shed 
light on some applications of WMSNs. 
1.3.3 WMSNs Applications 
Most of the existing and potential WMSN applications require the paradigms of the sensor 
networks to be rethought in order to arrive at a mechanism that can deliver multimedia content at 
the predetermined Quality of Service level. WMSNs have several existing applications and are 
expected to enable several other new applications, all of which can be classified into five 
categories (Akyildiz, Melodia and Chowdhury, 2008). A few examples of each deployed and tested 
in real life applications have been described below:   
 Personal and Health Care: WMSNs can deliver, and enhance the quality of, resuscitative care 
by collecting and automatically integrating the patient‟s vital signs into patient care record, to 
be used real-time, as well as correlating them with the hospital records and the long term 
observations (Tao, Jingchun and Yonglei, 2001). A 3G multimedia network, incorporated into 
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a telemedicine sensor network (Fei and Sunil, 2003), is one such example that can provide 
health care services with a wide reach. Patients carry medical sensors that monitor different 
health parameters, such as blood pressure, breathing rate and body temperature. Going further, 
advanced remote monitoring can also be performed by medical centres using audio sensors, 
motion/activity sensors and cameras, all fitted in a wrist device worn by the patient (Fei and 
Sunil, 2003). Moreover, patients‟ behavioural practices can also be studied through 
multimedia sensor networks in order to pinpoint the cause of the illness. For example, the 
elderly people‟s behaviour can be studied to identify the triggers of conditions like dementia 
(Reeves, 2005). 
 Multimedia Surveillance: WMSNs are, in fact, networks of interconnected video cameras that 
are battery-powered and miniature in size. Each audio/video sensor is connected to a low 
powered wireless transceiver that can sense, process and transmit video signals. This 
integration of sensor network and video technology forms the basis for a new generation, 
multimedia surveillance system (Sharif, Potdar and Chang, 2009), which allows the use of 
many different media (sensor signals, texts, images, audio and video) for a complete 
automatic analysis and interpretation of an environment on a real time basis, which can 
complement and enhance the existing surveillance systems for better protection against crime 
and terrorist attacks (Lin, Ming-Hua and Hsieh Tseng, 2009). 
 Traffic Monitoring and Enforcement: The transport system is one of the many sectors that are 
expected to benefit from the enhanced monitoring and surveillance enabled by WMSNs. For 
example, Kansas City began a pilot project on an intelligent transport system in September 
2004 (NRI, 2012), which monitors around 75 miles of highways in the city. Such WMSN 
based systems can be immensely helpful in avoiding traffic jams, reducing emissions and 
saving fuel. Such systems can monitor vehicular traffic on highways or busy roads in big 
cities, and be integrated with services to offer alternative routing advice, avoiding congestion. 
Such monitoring of vehicular traffic can also be used to get useful information for the 
traffic system, such as number of cars and their average speed. Further, these systems 
can detect violations of traffic norms and transmit the relevant video streams to the 
law enforcement agencies. 
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 Environmental and Industrial Applications: WMSNs, equipped with acoustics sensors are 
ideal for identifying, investigating the causes of, and resolving circumstances, like 
unaccounted for variations in product quality in industries, or unusual noises or vibrations, or 
similar other signs of environmental problems. For example, oceanographers have used an 
array of video sensors and various image processing techniques to determine the process of 
evolution of sandbars (García Villalba, Javier and Sandoval Orozco, 2009). Multimedia 
content like imaging, apart from scalar data like temperature and pressure, can 
be used in time-critical process control in industries. For example, in the quality control 
process in manufacturing, the final products have to be inspected through an automated 
system to find defects. Another common industrial process that profits from WMSNs is the 
monitoring of machines for the purposes of diagnosis and preventative maintenance. For 
example, the pulp and paper industry employs complex mechanisms in its massive rolling 
machines, and even small variations in the alignment, temperature or speed of the roller can 
seriously affect the operation or the quality. 
 Gaming: Networked gaming has emerged as a popular entertainment activity today. WMSNs 
have been used in the prototypes of some futuristic games involving virtual reality, to enhance 
the gaming experience of the player, by incorporating sight and touch input, making the player 
respond to it as if live (Mauricio, Radenkovic Steve and Oppermann Adam, 2005). However, 
in gaming, there are strict constraints on multimedia data return, as the WMSN application 
heavily depends on the placement of the sensors, and it is not easy for the player to carry them 
without interfering with his gaming experience. However, the pace at which the popularity of 
these games is growing, there is little doubt that there will be further researches in designing 
and deploying pervasive WMSN systems that would make possible a richer interaction of the 
players with the game environment. Can You See Me Now (CYSMN) (Kundur, Unoma and 
William, 2006)  is one such game utilizing WMSN, which integrates online and physical 
gaming. 
Having described the applications of WMSNs in this section, the next section explains the 
proposed digital watermarking technique for secure communication between two sensor nodes, 
both in WSNs and WMSNs..  
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1.4  Digital Watermarking – An Overview  
The rapid developments in communication technology, and especially the World Wide Web, have 
also increased the risk of piracy considerably. A situation has arisen when any kind of reproduction 
results in copies that are nothing more than degraded versions of the original object or the cover 
medium. The multimedia data are available on the Internet in digital form, which makes it very 
easy to reproduce the exact copies of the original. Moreover, the copying devices are quite low cost 
and efficient, and therefore, almost anyone can afford them. In addition to these factors, there are 
already many complex requirements for managing the illegal distribution of cover medium that 
financially damage the legal owner of the object.  
Cryptography is not adequate to protect the cover medium which is publicly available but whose 
redistribution is unauthorized. However, digital watermarking is a technique that has the potential 
to solve this problem. Digital watermarking refers to the process whereby information such as 
hidden copyright notices or verification messages are added to the cover medium like digital 
audio/video, image signals, or documents, to protect the ownership rights (Potdar, Han and Chang, 
2005; Wang, Xu and Yang; 2009). These hidden messages consist of a group of bits giving 
information about the signal or the author of the signal.  
There are many different situations where the digital watermarking technique can be applied. The 
first of these that comes to the mind is the need to provide the proof of ownership (Jian and 
Xiangjian, 2005). When the cover medium is published on the web through open communication 
channels but the owners want to retain the copyright, they need to have a means of proving their 
ownership in case of a dispute. In general, a digital signature or watermark signal is embedded in 
the cover medium in a way that only the owner can extract it. If the pirates want to steal the cover 
medium property, they would have to extract the original watermark signal from the cover 
medium, and maybe, insert their own. As it is not easy to do so for them, the watermark comes in 
handy to verify that a certain copy of the cover medium is indeed copy, and that it has not been 
changed to an extent that “critically” alters its contents.   
The digital watermarking techniques are designed to insert the watermark directly into the original 
signal or into some transformed version of the cover medium, in order to take the benefit of the 
perceptible properties or robustness of a particular signal manipulation. The digital watermarking 
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technique has two basic stages: stage one embeds a watermark signal using an embedding 
algorithm and an embedding key. Stage two uses a detection algorithm and an appropriate 
watermark detection key to retrieve the watermark signal. In most techniques, the embedding and 
detection keys are kept secret.  
Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11 show the watermark embedding and detection process respectively.  
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EMBEDDER  
Embedding key
101010010
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Cover medium 
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10101010
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Figure 1.10 Watermark embedding process 
As illustrated in Figure 1.10 , the watermark signal is embedded, together with the embedding key, 
in the original cover medium. The watermarked cover medium is generated by a watermark 
embedder.  
As further illustrated in Figure 1.11, the distorted watermarked cover medium, together with the 
original cover medium and the embedding key, is fed into the watermark detector, which recovers 
the watermarked  cover medium and the original cover medium at the receiving end. The detection 
key is used to extract the watermark signal. 
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Figure 1.11 Watermark detection process 
After this overview of the digital watermarking technique, the next section describes some 
applications of digital watermarking. 
1.4.1 Digital Watermarking Applications  
In general, the digital watermarking technique is divided into two types: robust and fragile. Robust 
watermarking can survive attacks, allowing the watermark signal to be detected when required. On 
the other hand, fragile watermarking breaks easily, even with slight modification in the cover 
medium. The subsequent sections describe the applications of both robust and fragile 
watermarking techniques: 
Robust Watermarking 
The main applications of robust watermarking include:  
 Broadcast Monitoring: Broadcast monitoring is a technique to cross-verify, using 
watermarks, whether the content supposed to have been broadcast has really been, or not. 
The time and place of the broadcast are found out in this technique by detecting and 
recognizing the watermarks embedded in the object which is broadcast. It can thus help an 
artist or an organization find out the dishonest broadcast stations, or ensure that the work is 
not being broadcast by a pirate station (Potdar, Han and Chang, 2005). 
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 Copyright Protection: While producing a new work, the copyright information can be 
embedded as watermark. In cases of disputes regarding ownership, this watermarked 
copyright information can always be retrieved and provided as evidence (Jian and Xiangjian, 
2005). 
 Digital Fingerprinting: The digital fingerprinting technique can be used to identify the 
rightful owner of a digital content. Just like human beings who have unique fingerprints, the 
digital content owners too can create unique digital fingerprints on their content through 
watermarking. Even though a digital object has many different user fingerprints, it can only 
have one unique owner fingerprint in the form of the watermark for copyright (Potdar, Han 
and Chang, 2005). This watermark is generated by using some individual, user identifiable 
parameter as input.  
 Copy Control: As the name implies, this application controls the number of copies that can 
be made from a cover medium. It is controlled by the recording equipment that reads the 
watermark and acts according to the watermarked instructions. For example, if the 
instruction is “copy one more”, the content will be copied and the new instruction will be 
“copy no more”. In case somebody tries to copy the content again, the command will be 
rejected by the recorder because the instruction now is “copy no more” (Jian and Xiangjian, 
2005). 
 Fragile Watermarking 
The main applications of fragile watermarking include:  
 Content and Integrity Authentication: In many multimedia applications, there is a need to 
authenticate an object that might have been tampered with (Jian and Xiangjian, 2005). For 
example, in an image of a scene of crime, changing anything in the image, such as the car 
number plate, will mislead the investigation into suspecting someone other than the real 
criminal. Watermarking technique can be used to embed a particular message in the digital 
media, in order to indicate the author of the content, and authenticate its integrity (Noury, 
Mercier and Porcheron, 2000).   
 Content Archiving: The process of archiving digital content, e.g. still images, audios or 
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videos, can also benefit from watermarking through the insertion of a serial number or a 
digital object identifier into the content. The same process can also help classify and organize 
the digital content better. Normally, digital contents are identified by their file names which, 
however, is a very unreliable way of identification as a file name can be changed very easily. 
Embedding a serial number or an object identifier into the object itself minimizes the 
possibility of tampering with (Potdar, Han and Chang, 2005). 
 Tampering Detection: Watermarking can help detect tampering with digital content through 
fragile watermarks. Destruction or degradation of the fragile watermark would indicate that 
the content has been tampered with, and cannot be trusted. Detection of tempering is of crucial 
importance in applications dealing with highly sensitive data, e.g. medical or satellite imagery. 
Similarly, fragile watermarking can detect tempering with digital images presented in courts 
of law as proofs, and thus can be used as a forensic tool (Potdar, Han and Chang, 2005). 
After this overview of the applications of digital watermarking, the next section moves on to 
explain the digital watermarking process. 
1.4.2 Digital Watermarking Process 
As discussed previously, digital watermarking refers to the process whereby information, such as 
hidden copyright notices or verification messages, are added to the cover medium, like digital 
audio/video, image signals, or documents, to protect the ownership rights (Wang, Xu and Yang, 
2009). These hidden messages are in the form of a group of bits giving information regarding the 
signal or its author. The signals are in the form of still images, audios or videos and, if they are 
copied, the message, or group of bits, is also copied along with them. The key processes of a 
generic digital watermarking system can be seen in Figure 1.12. 
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Figure 1.12  Key components digital watermarking system 
As shown in Figure 1.12, a digital watermarking system as a communication task, involves four 
main processes, viz. watermark generation, embedding, communication and detection. The 
communication process includes blocking possible attacks, while the detection process includes 
watermark retrieval. The subsequent sections describe each of the processes shown in Figure 1.12. 
1.4.2.1 Watermark Generation Process 
Watermark generation process is the first and, a very critical, step in the watermarking process 
becauseo of its unique and complex requirements. The information contained in the watermark 
message, whether text or sensed data, must be unique. The watermark key must also be unique. e.g. 
in the form of a binary stream, integer or amplitude, in order to keep it secret. Both the watermark 
message and the watermark key generator act as inputs, and are then processed in the watermark 
generator to produce a watermark signal. The hash function (Kamel and Juma, 2011) and  the 
modulation pulse (Zhang, Liu and Das, 2008) can be cited as examples of watermark generators. 
The watermark signal is a kind of signal or pattern that can be embedded into the cover medium. 
There are two types of watermark signals, meaningful and meaningless watermark signals. 
Examples of meaningful watermarks are image logos, spread spectrum sequences, and 
permutations of watermarks. On the other hand, pseudo random sequences, M-sequences and 
chaotic sequences are meaningless watermark signals (Bai, Harms and Li, 2008). Now, we explain 
the watermark generation process, shown in Figure Figure 1.12  in greater detail:  
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1. Watermark Message: The information which the watermark signal carries is called the 
watermark message. It is usually communicated from the sender to the receiver. In some 
cases, there is a need to communicate only one bit (on-off signalling), but in others, usually an 
array of watermark messages has to be transmitted.   
2. Watermark Key: A key is used to construct a watermark signal, which is then inserted into the 
cover medium. The watermark message, such as the signature of the owner, can be encoded 
using the standard cryptographic techniques, such as Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA), Message 
Digest 5 (MD5) and Rivest Chiper 4 (RC4), in order to construct a watermark signal that is 
resilient against the statistical and pattern recognition attacks (Jessica and Potkonjak, 2003) 
(Koushanfar and Potkonjak, 2007).  
3. Watermark Generator: It is the system that generates high quality watermark signals. The 
process uses both the watermark message and the key. A hash function, a modulation pulse or 
a median filter are examples of watermark generators (Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya and 
Kalaivani, 2010). 
1.4.2.2 Embedding Process 
The second stage of a watermarking system is the embedding process, undertaken by an embedder. 
The embedder combines the cover medium, the watermark signal, the sensed data, and the 
embedding key, and creates a watermarked cover medium. The watermarked cover medium, which 
is perceptibly identical to the cover medium, is then transmitted by the sender through the unsecure 
communication channels, such as wireless and radio channels. The subsequent sections will 
explain the watermark embedding process, as shown in Figure 1.12, in detail:  
1. Cover Medium: The cover medium is the medium which a watermark signal is embedded in. 
Different kinds of data, images, audio/video signals and texts are examples of cover media. As 
explained earlier, the content providers want to insert watermarks into a cover medium for 
several reasons, such as copyright protection, broadcast monitoring, digital fingerprinting, 
copy control, content authentication, tampering detection, etc. (Potdar, Han and Chang, 2005). 
To take an example, commercial advertisements  can be monitored through their watermarks 
to confirm their timing and count. Sometimes, images with a copyright registration symbol ©, 
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have their watermark removed by specialized software. In such cases, invisible watermarks 
can be used to overcome the problem. 
2. Embedding Key: The embedding process requires a secret key to be used. This key must equal 
the detecting key, because it is this key which is known to both the sender and the receiver.  
3. Watermark Embedder: Watermark embedding is the process of inserting a watermark signal 
into a cover medium. One of the characteristics of watermark embedding is imperceptibility 
which is one of its most important requirements, as the watermark has to be perceptibly 
transparent. Another name for this perceptible transparency is fidelity, referring to the extent 
of similarly between a cover medium with watermark and one without watermark. Although 
the watermarking system is based on the imperfection of the human eye (I. Cox, M. Miller 
and Bloom, 2002), in some watermarking systems the watermarks can be made visible to 
serve some purpose.   
1.4.2.3 Communication Process 
During transmission, if there is anything that interferes with the communication process, resulting 
in deterioration of the quality of transmission, such as noise, a watermarked cover medium may be 
lost. The other thing to reckon with are attacks, such as modification, tampering, and manipulation 
attacks. The aim of these attacks is to modify, delete or remove the watermark signal from the 
watermarked cover medium. More intricate details of the communication process, shown in Figure 
1.12, are explained below:   
1. Communication Channel: In the context of digital watermarking process, the process of 
embedding and extraction of the watermark is modeled as communication channel, whereby 
the watermark signal is distorted because of strong interference and channel effects. Strong 
interference is caused by the presence of the channel effects corresponding to the signal 
processing operations (Akan, Pascal Zhang and Qian Jayant, 2008). 
2. Noise: From the embedding to the extracting stages in the watermarking process, there can be 
many things interfering with the communication channel, all of which are referred to as noise. 
Noise can be external or internal, and can disrupt the communication process at any point by 
affecting the incoming data rate, causing the channel to drop packets and lowering the quality 
of data transmitted (Akan, Pascal Zhang and Qian Jayant, 2008).  
  
28 INTRODUCTION 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
3. Watermark Attack: Any action meant to harm a watermark signal is referred to as a watermark 
attack. Such attacks aim to remove or destroy all watermark signals from the cover medium, 
e.g. by modifying data, adding false data, replicating data, disturbing data sampling, 
tampering with data packets, and so on (Kamel and Juma, 2011).  
1.4.2.4  Detection Process  
The end of the watermarking system is the detection and extraction process, which is a very crucial 
process as the sender identifies and provides information to the intended receiver at this stage. The 
detection and extraction are undertaken by a detector. An extraction unit first extracts the 
watermark signal, and later compares it with the cover medium to detect the same. The extraction 
process consists of two phases: detection of the watermark information and extraction of the same. 
Depending on the requirement of the cover medium in the detection process, it can be of two types: 
if the original cover medium is required, it is called informed detection, and if not, it is called blind 
detection (Potdar, Han and Chang, 2005). A watermarking system with an informed detection 
process is also known as private watermarking, whereas a watermarking system with a blind 
detection process is also known as public watermarking. The watermark detection process, as 
shown in Figure 1.12, is described in detail below: 
1. Watermarked Signal: The process of extracting the watermarked signal is undertaken in a 
watermark detector. The result of this process is a watermarked signal. This watermarked 
signal differs from the original watermarked signal since it has already gone through 
unsecure channels, which might have interfered with it by causing noise or possible 
watermark attacks. 
2. Detection Key: The detection process requires a secret key to be used. This key is usually 
kept equal to the key used in the embedding process, if secrecy is  required (Jian and 
Xiangjian, 2005). A watermark system normally uses three types of keys: public key, 
private key, and detection key. While the public can extract the watermark signal using the 
public key, only the author can extract it using the private key, which can, therefore, be 
likened to the product author‟s signature.  
3. Watermark Detector: The process of extracting and detecting a watermarked signal from a 
cover medium is termed watermark detector. In some applications, the watermarked object 
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is compared with the unwatermarked object to authenticate the presence of a watermark, 
and to isolate the watermark signal. This type of watermark system uses informed 
detection (Potdar, Han and Chang, 2005). On the other hand, using a correlation measure 
to find out the strength of the extracted watermark signal requires blind detection (Potdar, 
Han and Chang, 2005). 
After this description of the digital watermarking process, the next section explains the digital 
watermarking techniques for WSNs.. 
1.5  Digital Watermarking Techniques for WSNs 
To explain how digital watermarking technique works in WSNs, we take a scenario of the 
integration of WSN and digital watermarking in a real life application. Basically, the aim will be to 
show how the scalar data captured by a WSN node is protected from various data attacks through 
watermark, embedded using the digital watermarking technique.  
Recently, the State Electricity Company (SEC), the monopolistic electricity distribution company 
of the Government of Indonesia, suffered financial losses to the tune of 2.1 billion Indonesian 
rupiah (IDR) due to rampant electricity theft, both in the capital city of Jakarta (Detik News, 2012) 
and the rural areas, such as Surakarta (Harianjoglosemar News, 2012). Electricity theft is done by 
mounting electrical instruments on illegal electricity installations. The Mini Circuit Breaker 
(MCB), an illegal instrument used by the thieves, can hide the additional resources used by the 
customer. Therefore, the SEC needs to detect the use of this instrument and monitor energy 
consumption of the consumers, and also convince the consumers about the quantity of electricity 
supplied, in order to prevent electricity theft. By deploying WSNs, i.e. wireless networks of 
autonomous sensor devices, distributed over a space to collaboratively monitor physical 
phenomena, the SEC can monitor the amount of electrical energy used by its consumers,  and 
substantially reduce the financial losses.  
For example, consider a scenario in which WSN nodes are deployed in a residential area suspected 
of stealing electricity, to automatically report the cases of theft to the SEC, as illustrated in Figure 
1.13. 
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Figure 1.13 An example of the use of watermark in WSNs 
Each sensor node senses the object and then sends the data object wirelessly to the Xbee-PRO.  
The objects are voltage, current frequency and phase difference between some points, which are 
sensed in the distribution channel, with each point in the channel giving electrical energy to some 
house. Voltages and currents are sensed at the ADC input of the internal WSN node. Data from the 
ADC, i.e. the frequency and the phase difference, along with time of storage, is stored on an SD 
Card. After collection, the data are sent wirelessly to the gateway using the Xbee-PRO. 
Furthermore the data sent to the sink through the stargate gateway are stored on a SEC server. The 
data are published by the SEC on the Internet to let the consumers know the quality of the 
electrical energy supplied, via mobile phone. To prevent the theft of electricity by the consumers 
suspected of stealing, the SEC hires a commercial entity that provides original data from them.  
Let us assume that the WSN node and the Xbee-PRO are managed by a commercial entity with a 
commercial intent, i.e. to provide the original data to the SEC. This commercial intent induces the 
entity to maintain the original data in a way to prove its authenticity as and when the need arises. 
Hence, it embeds watermarks into the data.   
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Suppose an attacker manipulates the watermarked data during the transmission process and sends 
the manipulated data to the SEC through the Internet. The commercial entity can still prove that the 
data is tampered with using the watermark.  The scenario can be depicted in Figure 1.13. 
With this explanation of the digital watermarking technique for WSNs, the next section moves on 
to explaining the digital watermarking technique for WMSNs.  
1.6  Digital Watermarking Technique for WMSNs 
Similarly, to explain how the digital watermarking technique works for WMSNs, we take a 
scenario of the integration of WMSN and digital watermarking in a real life application. Again, the 
aim will be to show how the image captured by a WMSN node is protected from various kinds of 
attacks through watermark, embedded using the digital watermarking technique.   
Lately, crime statistics pertaining to mini-supermarket thefts have increased in Indonesia, both in 
the capital city of Jakarta and the rural areas, such as Surakarta. A supermarket works through the 
day, and remains open till late night, without adequate security. In addition, most of the 
supermarkets in Indonesia have no Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras making it all the 
more easy for the thieves. The Indonesian police have recommended using CCTV cameras for 
surveillance and monitoring by the supermarkets. If they are installed, these surveillance and 
remote monitoring systems can be deployed using WMSNs at critical locations, apart from 
businesses, such as airports, railway stations, military compounds and airbases.  
Further, let us consider a scenario in which WMSN nodes are deployed in the Central Business 
Area on Slamet Riyadi Road (as shown in  
Figure 1.14) to monitor and control crime by automatically reporting such events to the governing 
authority. Let us also assume that the WMSN is managed by a commercial entity with commercial 
interests, so that when a criminal activity is recorded by the WMSN nodes, the commercial entity 
has a strong incentive to ensure that it owns the footage, to prove its case in the court of law. 
Hence, it embeds watermarks to prove the ownership of the content. The advantage of 
watermarking is that every recorded footage has an invisible/visible footprint of ownership which 
is difficult to remove. Additionally, the commercial entity can also add fragile watermarks to 
protect against tampering. If attacks are targeted during the transmission, the fragile watermarking 
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will be destroyed, indicating that the video footage is tampered with. The scenario has been 
illustrated in Figure 1.14. 
.
Slamet Riyadi Road 
Slamet Riyadi Road 
Slamet Riyadi Road 
Slamet Riyadi Road 
Slamet Riyadi Road 
 Attacker 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.14   An Example of the use of watermark in WMSNs 
The development of WMSNs has received a boost because of the availability of inexpensive 
CMOS image sensors and microphones these days, along with the wide range of their application 
opportunities based on their ubiquitous ability to capture multimedia data from different 
environments. In coming years, WMSNs are expected to not only enhance application 
opportunities of the existing sensors, such as environmental monitoring or tracking (Leigh, 
Renambot and Johnson, 2006), but also lead to the development of many new applications, e.g., in 
telemedicine and healthcare of the elderly or disabled, by pinpointing the causes of their illnesses, 
such as dementia (Reevesm, 2005). Other such applications can be recognition and localization of 
services provided to the users, and process control in manufacturing industry. 
WMSNs undoubtedly possess many novel features, mainly because their sensor nodes are 
equipped with video cameras and have high computation abilities. However, they have also 
brought new security challenges in their wake. Security is an important issue with WMSNs 
because they are prone to several types of intentional network attacks, like man-in-the-middle 
attack (Kamel and Juma, 2011), and also because they suffer from the effects of bad network 
channels (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng and Wei Wang, 2008). As a result, the authenticity of 
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the data transmitted cannot be verified. The man-in-the-middle attack can modify the transmitted 
data in various ways, e.g. by altering or deleting it, or by inserting extraneous data to it, while a bad 
network channel may introduce noises into the signal causing data damage. Addressing the 
challenge of these attacks is important to ensure a secure and trustworthy WMSN network. 
However, a WMSN node has very limited power supply in the view of its high computational 
ability, and hence, using a strong cryptographic algorithm is difficult. Therefore, watermarking 
techniques have become the most sought after ways to address these challenges , like preventing 
tampering and proving ownership.  
Hence, research in the area of watermarking in WMSNs is becoming increasingly important.  With 
the emergence of the concept of cyber-physical systems, i.e., on the web of things, this research 
has come to the main stream and has assumed a manifold significance. 
1.7  Research Motivations 
The main motivation for this study of digital watermarking technique for both WSNs and WMSNs 
comes from the fact that it can address the challenge of a secure communication between the 
sensor nodes of both WSNs and WMSNs. Digital Watermarking techniques have been shown to be 
useful in addressing issue copyright protection. The main stimulus for studying digital 
watermarking techniques for both WSNs and WMSN networks, therefore, is provided by its 
potential in addressing the issues,  
1. Need for copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs. 
2. Need for copyright protection of images in WMSNs. 
1.7.1  Copyright Protection of Scalar data 
The application of WSNs in sensitive areas, such as military surveillance,  health and wellness in 
the healthcare sector, inventory location and process automation in the industrial sector, and 
seismicity and structures in the construction sector (Yick, Mukherjee and Ghosal, 2008), has a 
fundamental requirement of a secure scalar data transmission mechanism. As seen in in sub section 
1.5, the SEC is becoming increasingly concerned about the rampant electricity theft in certain 
areas. To automatically report the cases of theft to the SEC, WSN nodes are required to be 
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deployed over the area to collaboratively monitor the physical phenomena. However, unlike the 
wired networks, malicious intruders have a high possibility of accesing the valuable sensor scalar 
data in wireless networks.  The pirates can easily and limitlessly copy the digital data. Therefore, 
the copyright protection problem of the wireless sensor networks is a matter of concern while 
sending data in wireless transmission environments. Digital watermarking is a favourable 
technique to protect digital information and has widely been used in many secure applications. 
However, the copyright protection problems of WSNs are not sufficiently studied. The available 
solutions may not protect the copyright of the sensed scalar data. For instance, a malicious intruder 
may duplicate segments of the valuable sensor data for profit. Therefore, copyright protection 
becomes urgent and necessary. 
1.7.2 Copyright Protection of Images  
In sensitive areas, such as traffic monitoring and enforcement, or personal and health care, there is 
a fundamental requirement of a WMSN application to make the image transmission mechanism 
secure, as malicious attackers can easily access the sensitive multimedia content from the wireless 
network and make limitless copies of it. The digital watermarking technique has been widely 
deployed to secure many such applications and protect their digital information. For example, 
Pingping, Yao Jiangtao and Zhang Ye (2009) have devised a watermark algorithm for wireless 
sensor networks to provide real time copyright protection to JPEG images. Their method utilizes a 
CMOS image sensing system to embed the watermark in DCT domain. 
However, at present, the existing solutions for copyright protection of images in WMSNs through 
digital watermarking are still fragmented, making more research an urgent requirement. 
1.8  Research Objectives 
This research primarily aims at proposing a conceptual model for copyright protection of scalar 
and multimedia data communicated through sensor networks, using digital watermarking. This will 
require an evaluation of the related literature, the development of solutions to specific research 
issues, the construction of models for these solutions, and the validation of one of the models using 
real-world data. This main aim of the research gives rise to two objectives as follows:   
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Objective 1: Developing a digital copyright protection system for scalar data in WSNs, using 
digital watermarking technique. 
Objective 2: Developing a digital copyright protection system for multimedia data in WMSNs, 
using digital watermarking technique. 
1.8.1 Developing Digital Copyright Protection of Scalar 
Data in WSNs using Watermarking Technique 
This is the first objective of the research and specifically aims at developing a solution to address 
the issue of copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs.  There are several open issues with 
copyright data protection in WSNs. The current secure copyright data protection models use Pretty 
Good Privacy (PGP) that contains public key encryption, hash function, and MD5, to provide a 
signature. The PGP requires a vast amount of computing resources in order to perform its 
operations. However, as sensors are resource constrained, the PGP algorithm is not well-suited for 
WSNs. A watermark adds a second line of defence to ensure that the data is valid, even if someone 
cracks the encryption. This thesis is going to develop a watermarking technique for copyright 
protection of data, based on the Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) and Kolmogorov Rule 
(KR). LFSR is one of the methods of forming binary sequences for generating watermarks, and KR  
attempts to determine the length of the shortest binary computer program for the sequences.   
1.8.2 Developing Digital Copyright Protection of 
Multimedia Data in WMSNs using Watermarking 
Technique 
This is the second objective of the research and specifically aims at developing a solution to 
address the issue of copyright multimedia data protection in WMSNs. Again, there are several 
open issues with copyright multimedia data protection in WMSNs. The current secure copyright 
protection system for Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG)  images uses the Discrete Cosines 
Transform (DCT) model, which is a feature of DCT coefficients produced through experiments. 
Watermark is embedded into low-frequency coefficients of the DCT. However, there is no system 
of copyright protection of images in WMSNs. Therefore, this thesis develops a watermarking 
technique for copyright protection of images, based on the Gaussian Pyramids (GP) and 
Kolmogorov rule (KR).  GP is a method used in image processing that creates a stack of 
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successively smaller images when used multiple times. KR also attempts to determine the length of 
the shortest description of the sequences. 
1.9  Significance of the Research 
The significance of the issues addressed in this research is three-fold and the benefits resulting 
from it encompass the social, economic and technical (scientific) aspects. 
1.9.1 Social Significance  
1.9.1.1 Improvement in Theft Prevention 
WSN nodes can be used in residential areas where theft of electricity is suspected to prevent such 
thefts, by automatically reporting the cases to the electricity distribution company. Placing WSN 
nodes can not only prevent theft of electricity but also convince the consumers about the quality of 
electricity.  With LKR watermarking technique  which is resulted from this theses, for WSNs being 
used by the commercial entity involved, the SEC  need not fear theft of electricity.   
1.9.1.2 Improvement in Societal Safeguarding  
WMSN nodes can be deployed at critical locations, such as airports and railway stations. Placing 
WMSN nodes for surveillance and remote monitoring can help check crime and terrorist attacks to 
a great extent. With GPKR watermarking technique, which is resulted from this theses, for 
WMSNs being used by the commercial entity involved, the people at such critical locations will 
also feel safe as constant surveillance and monitoring will significantly reduce criminal activities 
1.9.1.3 Improvement in Copyright Protection  
Applying GPKR watermarking technique, which is resulted from this theses,  for WMSNs can 
ensure ownership safety between nodes. By inserting watermarks, like invisible or visible 
footprint, the ownership to every multimedia record can be protected, with a commercial entity 
undertaking the WMSN operation with a commercial intent in proving the ownership. Thus, the 
attackers who modify and remove watermarks will be detected, and there will be no doubt as to the 
ownership of an image captured by a WMSN node during the the image transmission between the 
multimedia nodes 
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1.9.2 Economic Significance  
1.9.2.1 Reducing Financial Losses   
The SEC has already suffered financial losses to the tune of 2.1 billion rupiah, due to electricity 
theft.  In order to reduce such financial losses, the WSN can be equipped and deployed over the 
area where theft is suspected, with the aim of preventing electricity theft and convincing the 
consumers about the quality of electricity. The LKR  watermarking technique for WSNs will be 
operated by a commercial entity which will monitor electricity used by the consumers and give 
authentic data to the SEC, so that it can reduce its financial losses due to electricity theft 
1.9.2.2 Creating Financial Advantage   
WMSN nodes can be deployed in Central Business Areas and operated by a commercially entity. 
These nodes can capture the images of criminals or perpetrators of terrorist activities. The images 
can then be inserted with a watermark by using GPKR watermarking techniquety, in order to prove 
the ownership of the content. The commercial entity can then either report or sell it to the 
governing authorities. If attacks are targeted during the transmission, the fragile watermarking will 
be destroyed, indicating that the video footage is tampered with.  
1.9.3 Scientific Significance 
Many existing studies on digital watermarking technique in both WSNs and WMSNs have focused 
on the availability, confidentially, authentication, and integrity of the copyright protection of data. 
This research aims at facilitating secure multimedia data communication and copyright data 
protection between sensor nodes in WMSNs, emphasizing the basic design principles that are 
expected to survive the currently going on rapid changes in WMSN technology. 
a. To the best our knowledge, this research is the only one of its type using the Linear Feedback 
Shit Register (LFSR), Kolmogorov Rule and Non Linear System Programming (NLSP) for 
copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs. The LFSR creates a binary stream by using a 
particularly key, which is then synchronized by applying the Kolmogorov Rule, resulting in the 
watermark constraints embedded in the Non Linear System Programming (NLSP). The 
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TOMLAB is used to solve the NLSP that creates the watermarking solutions for copyright 
protection in WSNs.  
b. Again, to the best our knowledge, this research is the only one of its type using the Gaussian 
Pyramids (GP) Transform for the image sensory and Kolmogorov Rule (KR) for copyright 
protection of multimedia data (images) in WMSNs. The GPT is used to reduce the image, to 
get the reduced image, and then also to expand the reduced image. The reduced image is 
synchronized by applying the Kolmogorov Rule, resulting in a watermark constraint. These 
watermark constraints are embedded in the NLSP. The TOMLAB is used to solve the NLSP 
that creates the watermarking solutions for copyright protection in WMSNs. 
1.10  Structure of the Dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation follows the following structure:  
Chapter 2: provides the mathematical background to the preliminary digital watermarking 
techniques, together with security requirements and types of attacks, for both WSNs 
and WMSNs, and presents a comprehensive survey of the recent related research on 
digital watermarking for WSNs and WMSNs. 
Chapter 3: defines the two research problems, based on the insights gained from the literature 
         review.                       
Chapter 4: gives an overview of the solution and the conceptual process.  
Chapter 5: presents the LKR watermarking technique for copyright protection of the scalar sensed 
data in WSNs.  
Chapter 6: presents the GPKR watermarking technique for copyright protection of images in 
WMSNs. 
Chapter 7 : brings the thesis to a conclusion by summarising its achievements and major benefits, 
identifying the work that still needs to be done, and laying down the lines for the future 
work in this research field. 
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1.11  Conclusion 
This thesis covers areas in advanced ICT (Information Communication and Technology) which are 
not very well-known, and therefore, there are many concepts, terms and phrases that have to be 
introduced. Therefore, this chapter provided a brief introduction to the concepts related to the 
applications of digital watermarking technique for both WSNs and WMSNs, and the three 
technical fields namely WSNs, WMSNs, and the digital watermarking technique. It illustrated how 
these digital watermarking techniques for both WSNs and WMSNs can be used for copyright 
protection, content ownership management, secure and confidential communication, and tempering 
detection. It also highlighted the differences between the digital watermarking technique and the 
traditional security techniques, such as cryptography. Finally, it listed the main objectives and 
advantages of the proposed research and ended with the outline of the thesis. The next chapter 
provides a mathematical background to the preliminary digital watermarking techniques, together 
with the security requirements and types of attacks for both WSNs and WMSNs. It also surveys the 
literature relevant to digital watermarking technique for both WSNs and WMSNs, and gathers all 
the knowledge required to form a solid conceptual foundation and help the readers understand the 
technology proposed in the thesis.  
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Chapter 2   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter covers 
► preliminary concepts, 
► security requirements for WSNs and WMSNs, 
► attack models for WSNs and WMSNs,  
► security requirements for digital watermarking, 
► attack model for digital watermarking, 
► copyright protection of WSN and WMSN data, 
► survey and evaluation of   digital watermarking techniques in WSNs, and 
► survey and and evaluation of digital watermarking techniques in WMSNs 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter explains the work done previously to address the issues outlined in Chapter 1. It also 
explains some  theoretics  in order to understand these works. These theoretics are atomic 
trilateration, Linear Feedback Shift  Register, Kolmogorov Rule, and Gaussian Pyramid. The 
security requirements of WSNs and WMSNs, including their attack models, as also the preliminary 
digital watermarking techniques, together with their security requirements and attack models, have 
also been presented with the same end in view. The importance of the chapter lies in the fact that it 
gives an overview of the literature relevant to the field, and evaluates currently the most advanced 
digital watermarking techniques for both WSNs and WMSNs. Substantial progress has been made 
in the direction of providing a practical basis for the solution of a number of problems associated 
with copyright protection and content authentication. Nevertheless, there are several issues that 
need further investigation.   
CHAPTER TWO  
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2.2  Theoretical Background 
This section provides the theoretical background to this study of the copyright protection of scalar 
and multimedia data using  digital watermarking to help facilitate a better understanding of the 
thesis.  
2.2.1 Atomic Trilateration  
Atomic trilateration can be used to generate a Non Linear System Programming (NLSP), also 
called a cover medium. With atomic trilateration in a two-dimensional sensor network, a 
multimedia sensor node in the network can be used to determine it‟s position, by using the 
positions of, and distances to, at least three other multimedia sensor nodes of a known location. 
From these distances and positions, a multimedia sensor node trying to determine its location can 
generate a non-linear system equation. A typical scenario of atomic trilateration has been shown in 
Figure 2.1. Here, the sensor node D trilaterates with three other sensor nodes A, B and C. The 
coordinates of these nodes are   ),(,, BBAA yxyx  and  cycx , . 

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Figure 2.1   Atomic trilateration process  
The distance is computed using the time differences of arrival (TDoA) between the acoustic signals 
emitted simultaneously from a multimedia sensor node and received at the node D, and the radio 
frequency (RF). The multimedia sensor node D turns on a timer upon receiving the RF signal from 
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a sensor node to measure the difference between the arrival of the RF and the acoustic signals from 
that multimedia sensor node. However, the timer measurements have an error. The speed of the 
acoustic signal is a function of the temperature of the propagation media. The relationship between 
the speed of the acoustic signal Vs (m/s) and the temperature cT  is as follows:  
cTsV 6.04.331   
( 2.1) 
Assuming that the exact timer measurements between the node D and the sensor nodes are ,DAt  
,DBt and ,DCt  the distances of the sensor nodes with the node D, i.e. DAd , DBd  and DCd  can be 
measured using TDoA as follows: 
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Computing sV from equation (2.1) and then replacing the values of the distances from equation 
(2.2) in equations (2.3), yields the coordinates ),( DD yx . However, there are errors in measuring 
cT  
in equation (2.1), and in measuring DBDA tt ,  and DCt  in equation 2.2. These inaccuracies 
change the nature of the problem from a non-linear system of equations with a unique solution, to a 
problem of optimization where the objective is to reduce the errors in the system of equations to 
the minimum.  
The next step is the formulation of equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) as a non-linear optimization 
problem, in terms of  ),,,,,,( 321 DCDBDAt  . The terms DCDBDAt  ,,,  denote the 
errors in the measurement of DCDBDAc tttT  and ,,, respectively. Also, the variables 321 ,,   are the 
errors in the Euclidean distances measured in Equation (2.3) and the TDoA distances 
,,, DCDBDA ddd  measured in equation (2.2) respectively. The objective of the function is to 
minimize the overall error in the system, and can be stated as shown in equation (2.4). This system 
is called an NLSP.   
Objective function:  
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    ( 2.4) 
To make it clearer, atomic trilateration is the process used by the Global Positioning System (GPS) 
to map the co-ordinates. We know that the formula of distance between two GPS nodes requires 
speed and time. GPS signals travel with the velocity of light. In order to keep the system informed 
of the time when a signal is relayed from the satellite, eavery satellite in the GPS system has an 
atomic clock keeping accurate time. The GPS receivers too keep record of the time to monitor 
when the signal reaches the receiver, although their records are not as accurate as those of the 
satellites using atomic clocks. The distance is, therefore, obtained by multiplying the velocity of 
light, and the difference between the time of the satellite relaying the signal and that of the receiver 
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receiving it. Each satellite relays not only its identity and position but also the time of transmission. 
Besides, it also relays information on the location of other satellites. Comparisons between satellite 
signals in GPS systems are made by carrying out calculations shown above. The principle of 
trilateration (the determination of a distance from three points) is then used to calculate the 
distances between the satellite and the receiver. 
This section explained atomic trilateration which is used to generate NLSP. The next section 
explains the Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). 
2.2.2 Linear Feedback Shift Register ( LFSR )  
Applying a linear feedback shift register (LFSR), whose characteristic polynomial is primitive, is 
one method of forming binary sequences for generating watermarks (Jian and Xiangjian, 2005; 
Harjito, 2003). LFSR can be seen as a shift register with its input bit being its previous state‟s 
linear function. Single bits can only have the exclusive-or (xor), as their linear function. Therefore, 
LFSR is a shift register with its input bit being driven by the xor function of some bits from the 
overall value of the shift register:  

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Associated with such a recurrence relation is a binary polynomial 
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called the characteristic polynomial of the LFSR. The coefficients ci  are feedback constants. Such 
sequences can be mechanized by using a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) whose tap settings 
are defined by the feedback constants. 
The sequence ut defined by the recurrence relation 5416 
 ttttt uuuuu  has characteristic 
polynomial    
6541)( xxxxxf    for this sequence, with  
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( 2.7)
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Figure 2.2 shows an LFSR for this sequence: 
 
Figure 2.2  Block of Linear Feed Back Shift Register 
If the initial state vector is ( 0,1,0,1,1,0), the first period of the sequence will be:  
0100010 0001011 0010101 0010011 
A seed is the initial value of an LFSR. Since the register has a deterministic operation, it is its 
current (or previous) state that determines the stream of values it produces. As the possible states 
for a register are finite, it eventually has to enter a repeatition cycle. However, a sequence of bits 
with a very long cycle, appearing randomly, can also be produced by an LFSR having a well-
chosen feedback function. 
With this introductory discussion on LFSR, the next section goes on to explain the Kolmogorov 
Rule.  
2.2.3 Kolmogorov Complexity Rule  
According to Andrew Nikolaevich Kolmogorov, an object‟s complexity corresponds to the length 
of the shortest computer program required to reproduce it (Li and Vitanyi, 2008). Kolmogorov 
complexity is defined as a probability distribution under which the worst-case and the average-case 
running times are the same.   
The Kolmogorov complexity of the string x with respect to a universal computer U, is defined as  
the minimum length over all the programs that print x and halt.  
This is a short description length of x over all descriptions interpreted by the computer U.  
Consider the following two strings: 
1
st
 string: 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 
2
nd
 string : 100011111011010110001110000000100110111111101111101010000000000000 
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It can easily be shown that the first string is simply a sequence of 33 couples of 01. The second 
string looks like a random one but is not; it is the beginning of the binary expansion of the decimal 
part of 01. Therefore, the second string also has a simple description. 
Kolmogorov complexity rule is used for numbering the variables of a linear combination in the 
optimization objective function, and the set of constraints (Jessica and Potkonjak, 2003), 
(Koushanfar and Potkonjak, 2007).   
We know that the Kolmogorov complexity rule is the short description length of the overall 
description interpreted by the computer. Two  papers (Jessica and Potkonjak, 2003), (Koushanfar 
and Potkonjak, 2007) have used the Kolmogorov complexty rule constraints for numbering the 
variables of a linear combination in the optimization objective function and a set of constraints. 
After this introduction of Kolmogorov complexity rule, the next section introduces the Gaussian 
Pyramids.  
2.2.4 The Gaussian Pyramids 
This section explains the process of reducing and expanding an image, using the Gaussian image 
pyramid technique (Adelson, Anderson and Burt, 1984; Choudhary, Sinha and Shanker, 2012). 
This technique can be used for detecting a target pattern. It can also be used to design a data 
structure that supports an efficiently scaled convolution. This, it does by reducing the dimensions 
of the image, leading to a series of copies of the original image. The sample density as well as 
resolution of the image are decreased in this series of copies in regular steps. Now the process of 
reducing an image and expanding the reduced image will be explained 
The Process of Reducing Image  
The first step in Gaussian pyramid generation begins with an original image og  which is then low-
pass filtered to get a „reduced‟ image 1g . The operation can be continued to obtain a set of images  
no ggg ,...,, 1  forming a pyramidal image structure, with each „reduced‟ image having less 
resolution and sample density than the corresponding previous image. The low-pass filtering is 
done using a procedure that can be equated to the process of convolution by a set of local and 
symmetric weighing functions. The image sequence no ggg ,...,, 1  is referred to as a Gaussian 
pyramid.  
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A fast algorithm outlining the process of generation of a Gaussian pyramid is given below and 
illustrated in Figure 2.3:  
 The array og  represents the image consisting of R rows and C columns of pixels, denoting 
the zero level in the Gaussian pyramid. 
 Level 1 of the pyramid consists of the image 1g , which is a reduced, or low-pass filtered, 
version of og . At this level, each value is a weighted average of the values at level 0.  
 The level 2 is represented by 2g . The values at this level are obtained from the values at 
level 1, by following the same weightage pattern. 
. 
 
Figure 2.3  A graphical representation of the process in one dimension 
The function PYR _REDUCE performs the process of level-to-level averaging, as follows: 
)(_ 1 kk gREDUCEPYRg  which means that, for level nl 0 , ml 0  and 
nodes iCiji 0  ,, , pRj 0  
the pyramid generation process can be represented as:
  
)2,2().(),( 1
2
2
2
2
njmignmwjig i
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i  
 
             ( 2.8) 
where n is the number of levels in the pyramid, while pR and jC represent the dimensions. 
Figure 2.4 shows the process of reducing an image. 
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Figure 2.4  An example of reducing an image 
The Process of Expanding the Reduced Image   
Along with the Gaussian process of pyramid generation, there is also the reverse process of 
pyramid generation that expands a reduced image to its original scale. For the purpose, the function 
PYR_EXPAND is used, which is the reverse of the function PYR_REDUCE. It expands an (M + 
1)-by-(N + 1) array into a (2M + 1)-by-(2N + 1) array. This is achieved through the interpolation of 
the new node values. Therefore, when the function PYR_EXPAND is applied to the array 1g  of a 
Gaussian pyramid, it forms the array 1,lg  whose size is the same as that of the array 1lg .  
Suppose that expanding ig  by 
n times results in nlg  . Now, 10, gg l   and 
)1,(_,  ngEXPANDPYRg lnl . The function PYR_REDUCE applies to the levels Nl 0 , 
N0 and nodes iCiji 0  ,,  , pRj 0   
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The function PYR_EXPAND, applied once to the image lg  yields llg ,  whose size is the same as 
that of the original image og  (Adelson, Anderson and Burt, 1984).  
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The Figure 2.5  shows the process of expanding the reduced image to the original image  
 
Figure 2.5 An example of expanding the reduced image to the size of the original 
After this introduction of the preliminary concepts required to understand the related literature, the 
next section introduces the security issues in WSNs and WMSNs.  
2.3  Security in WSNs and WMSNs 
As pointed out in Chapter 1, WSNs face severe resource constraints. This is because their nodes 
are very small in size and have limited energy, resulting in low storage space, and limited 
processing ability as well as communication bandwidth. On the other hand, the video cameras and 
high computation abilities of the nodes give rise to new security challenges in WMSNs. Therefore, 
the security system, whether in WSNs or in WMSNs, must be able to protect the resources as well 
as the information communicated through the network, from both attacks and the misbehaviour of 
the nodes themselves. Therefore, this section discusses the security requirements for WSNs and 
WMSNs.  
2.3.1 Security Requirements in WSNs and WMSNs 
In order to be able to devise an appropriate security mechanism to ensure the protection of data and  
safety of the system, it is essential to understand the requirements of security in WMSNs in greater 
depth. In case of WSNs, the more critical are the constraints imposed by the limitations of 
memory, energy resources, and computational capacity. On the other hand, in case of WMSNs, 
complex algorithms need to be combined with the privacy and security policies so that the 
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multimedia content can be processed, compressed and distributed. If WMSN-based services are to 
be widely deployed in real life applications, it is imperative to reformulate the whole WMSN 
paradigm by incorporating a privacy and security policy as a fundamental requirement, which 
every sensor application must strictly adhere to, so that an adequate security level can be achieved. 
The following sections delineate these security requirements for WMSNs: 
2.3.1.1 Confidentiality 
In the context of WSNs and WMSNs, confidentiality means protecting the content communicated 
between the sink(s) and the sensors, e.g. commands, reports, or other multimedia data gathered by 
the sensors. Confidentiality here implies that any adversary with the priviledge of access to the 
content must not be able to decipher or decode the messages exchanged in the network. 
Being confidential here means protecting sensitive information contained in the data, so that no 
unauthorized third party can read it. The chances of a third party accessing and reading such data 
arise while the data travelling between two sensor nodes of a network, or between the sensor nodes 
and the receiving station. Confidentiality is essential in both WSNs and WMSNs, as an adversary 
with suitable resources can access and read sensitive data during these stages, in both types of 
networks, including many different types of sensed data or routing information. Such stolen data 
can be used for illegal purposes causing severe dmage. Therefore, confidentiality conceals the data 
from a passive or an active attacker, so that any information communicated through a WSN or a 
WMSN remains protected. 
2.3.1.2 Availability  
Various threats to both WMNs and WMSNs may damage parts of a network, disable some of its 
functions or discontinue the services it provides, making it unavailable to the authorized users. The 
requirement of availability means ensuring that the essential functions of a WSN or WMSN, or the 
services it provides, remain unaffected even when they are attacked.  
The requirement of availability makes sure that a multimedia node can use the resources, and that 
the network can be used to communicate data or information, making it possible to use the services 
or access the data when required. Sensor networks are vulnerable to many types of risks impairing 
availability, e.g. capture of a sensor node or denial of service attack. An impaired availability can 
make many critical operations and real time applications redundant. Hence, it is of crucial 
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importance to make WSNs and WMSNs resilient to any attack targeting their availability and keep 
alternatives ready in case of capture or disabling a node, for example by transferring its functions 
to another pre-determined node in the network. 
2.3.1.3 Integrity 
Integrity in the context of WSNs and WMSNs means that, if the data sent by the sensor nodes or 
the content sent by one user to another, has undergone any alteration, the receivers can detect it. It 
also means ensuring that such content or data are not lost, or they are not counterfeit, stale, or 
replicated old data. 
Although the requirement of availability ensures that the data can always be accessed when 
desired, it cannot ensure that these data are complete and authentic. They might well have been 
changed, or some part of them might have been deleted, during transmission over the network. It is 
the requirement of integrity which ensures that these things do not happen. Integrity is a very 
important requirement as the use of wrong data or information may lead to disastrous results; in 
healthcare sector, for example, endangering lives. Therefore, implementing integrity controls is of 
critical importance to a WSN or WMSN. In short, it is required to rule out any tampering with, or 
alteration of, data or information, and ensure that it is reliable.   
2.3.1.4 Authentication  
The requirement of authentication in a WSN or WMSN means ensuring that the communication 
over the network is genuine. Authentication controls in such a nework verify whether the data or 
information being communicated has emanated from a legitimate user. This is important because a 
malicious entity may have injected counterfeit data or resent the same data over the network. This 
may happen, for example, in case of a compromised node.  
The X.800 (Castelluccia, Mykletun, and Tsudik 2005) guidelines recommend two layers of 
authentication, authenticating the peer entity and authenticating data origins. Authenticating peer 
entity means authenticating all the nodes participating in the communication. It can apply to two 
nodes that communicate with each other, or one node (e.g., the cluster head) that communicates 
with many other nodes around it (i.e, broadcast authentication) (Adrian, Szewczyk J. D. Tygar 
Victor, and Wen David 2002). Broadcast authentication can be done at the sink or at an 
intermediary node where data is aggregated. 
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In attcks on communication networks, eavesdropers can also inject data. Therefore, it is imperative 
for the receiver to ensure that the data going into decision-making processes has originated from 
the right sources, and hence the importance of authenticating data origins.  Data authentication 
mechanism should be able to prevent unauthorized users to use the networks by detecting their 
messages and rejecting them. Appropriate data authentication controls are of critical importance 
for a WSN or WMSN to behave correctly (Grieco, Boggia, and Sicari 2009). To sum up, data 
authentication ensures reliability of data or information by identifying its origin, and verifying the 
sender and the receiver. It can be ensured by using symmetrical or asymmetrical mechanisms, 
whereby the sending and the receiving node have shared secret keys. However, ensuring data 
authentication is an extremely challenging task because of the distributed nature of WSNs and 
WMSNs. 
2.3.1.5 Non repudiation 
Non-repudiation in WSNs and WMSNs means ensuring that a node receiving a particular message 
cannot deny having received it, nor can the node sending it deny having sent it. The X.800 
(Castelluccia, Mykletun, and Tsudik 2005) recommendations term the former as destination non-
repudiation and the latter as origin non-repudiation.  
In the context of information security, non-repudiation mechanism ensures that a transferred 
message has actually been sent by the party that claims to have sent it, and received by the party 
that claims to have received it, and both of them do not deny their actions of sending and receiving 
later on. 
2.3.1.6 Data Freshness  
Data freshness mechanism in a WSN or WMSN checks how old the data captured and sent by the 
nodes are. Data freshness is important as, even if data integrity and confidentiality are assured, the 
data need to be recent to be useful. Data freshness mechanism verifies it, and ensures that the data 
received are not old data resent by an attacker.  
Data freshness may be strong or weak. A strong freshness mechanism provides  total message 
order on a request-response pair wih an estimation of delay. It is used for time synchronization 
within a network. On the other hand, weak freshness mechanisms provide only partial order, 
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without estimation of delay, to be used by sensor nodes (Adrian, Szewczyk J. D. Tygar Victor, and 
Wen David 2002) . 
2.3.1.7 Privacy  
The requirement of privacy recognizes that the data being transmitted are sensitive and need to be 
suffiently safeguarded. Such data usually come from telemedicine or military surveillance systems.  
Both WSNs and WMSNs deal with a large amount of varied data. Some of these may directly or 
indirectly reveal some personal or otherwise sensitive information pertaining to the users. If 
malicious entities gain access to these data, they may use them in ways that violate or offend 
individual privacy. In the view of its sensitive nature, privacy is a prerequisite fo many WSN and 
WMSN applications. No wonder it has attracted a lot more research than other requirements. 
Examples of works on privacy are „A Security and Privacy Survey for WSNs in e-Health 
Applications‟ (de los Angeles Cosio Leon 2009), „Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Sensor 
Networks for Healthcare Applications‟ (Al Ameen, Liu, and Kwak 2012), and „Security and 
Privacy Issues with Health Care Information Technology‟ (Meingast, Roosta, and Sastry 2006). A 
number of privacy solutions and policies have been suggested, such as secure data cloaking 
(Kundur, Unoma, and William 2006), secure communication channel (Douglas, Fidaleo, and 
Nguyen 2004), (Adrian, Szewczyk J. D. Tygar Victor, and Wen David 2002), and definition of 
privacy policies (Karlof, Sastry, and Wagner 2004). However, they all cater to some specific 
aspects of privacy and none of them provides a complete privacy solution for WSNs and WMSNs.   
This section explained the aspects of security in both WSNs and WMSNs that need to be taken 
care of in case of any attack. The next section will discuss different types of attack possible in both 
WSNs and WMSNs.   
2.3.2 Types of Attacks in WSNs and WMSNs  
WSNs and WMSNs are susceptible to many different kinds of attack which can take place in many 
ways. The most notable is the Denial of Service (DoS) attack, but attacks may also take the form of 
physical capture or destruction, violation of privacy, and so forth. DoS attacks can also take many 
different forms, ranging from jamming the network‟s communication channels to more advanced 
attacks against any other aspect of security. The general category attacks are classified as shown in 
Figure 2.6.  
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Figure 2.6 General classification of security  attacks (Lingxuan and Evans 2003) 
Potential asymmetry in power and computational constraints often makes it almost impossible to 
guard a network against DoS attack, if the attack is well planned and sophistically carried out. A 
sensor node can be easily jammed by a more powerful node, effectively preventing the network 
from carrying out its functions. Moreover, DoS attacks are not the only types of attack on WSNs, 
they include many other types of attack, e.g. attack on sensor nodes, or routing protocol, or even on 
the physical security of a node. Many studies have been done on various types of attacks on sensor 
networks and the corresponding security mechanisms. For example: 
 Han et al. (Han, Chang, and Gao 2006) present various attacks on WSNs in a systematic way.  
 Roosta et al. (Roosta, Shieh, and Sastry 2006) present a comprehensive taxonomy of security 
attacks on WSNs and provide solutions for each set of attack.  
 Hasan et al. (Tahir and Shah 2008) analyze sensor networks from a security perspective by 
pointing out vulnerabilities in, and give a summary of, the threat models and security 
benchmarks.  
 Xiangqian et al. (Chen, Makki, and Yen 2009) identify various threats and vulnerabilities for 
WSNs and give a summary of the defence mechanisms based on networking protocol layer.   
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 Deva et al. (Sarma and Kar 2006) identify different types of security threats possible for a 
sensor network setting.  
Various securiy attacks on WSNs and WMSNs have been classified in Figure 2.7 
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Figure 2.7  Classification of security attacks on WSNs and WMSNs (Lingxuan and Evans 2003)   
In WMSNs, the multimedia sensor nodes often have to be deployed in inaccessible or hostile areas. 
As such, they also have the risk of being physically attacked. Some of the security solutions 
available for WSNs can also be adapted for use in WMSNs. However, with WMSNs, some otehr 
considerations also come into play, e.g. higher computation abilities and presence of video cameras 
on some or all of their nodes (Manel Guerrero-Zapata 2009). Therefore, the issue of ensuring 
security in WMSNs acquires greater complexity. Moreover, the solutions chosen have to be 
application oriented. Additionally, they will also depend on environmental conditions. For 
example, in case of video surveillance and monitoring, all the initially trusted multimedia nodes 
can later on be compromised and become susceptible to DoS attacks. Compromised nodes may 
give rise to several other problems, e.g. resistance to traffic analysis.  
Many researchers have identified different types of attacks faced by both WSNs and WMSNs, such 
as:   
 Xing Kai et al. (Xing, Srinivasan, and Li 2010) present a review of possible attacks and 
counter measures for WSNs based on the layering model of open system international (OSI). 
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The physical layer is susceptible to three types of attacks, i.e., jamming, eavesdropping, and 
device tampering. Traffic manipulation and spoofing are the two types of attack on the MAC 
layer. On the network layer, six types of attack can be launched. i.e false routing, packet 
replication, black hole, sinkhole, selective forwarding, and wormhole. On the application 
layer, there are three kinds of attack, data aggregation distortion, selective forwarding, and 
clock skewing. This review of possible attacks and solutions can also be used to detect the 
type of attack in WMSNs (Xing, Srinivasan, and Li 2010) (Ren and Yu 2006).  
 Manel et al.  (Manel Guerrero-Zapata 2009) give a review, and carry out an analysis of, issues 
related to security. which a WMSN platform design and protocol need to take into account. 
According to them, there is no strict boundary between WSNs and WMSNs as far as security 
is concerned. However, because of higher computation abilities of, and presence of video 
cameras on, some of the nodes, WMSNs do present some new security challenges as well as 
some new protection opportunities. 
Some of the security challenges in WMSNs are as follows:  
• As WMSNs support snapshots and audio and video streaming, the digital streams used 
distinguish their signals from other regular messages. 
• Images, audio and video typically contain more sensitive information than scalar data. 
Therefore, enhancement of privacy through mechanisms, like source location, hiding, and 
distributed visual secret-sharing, becomes more crucial in WMSNs. 
• It is possible to reduce the amount of data in WMSNs using multimedia in-network processing 
and compression technique. 
On the other hand, some of the opportunities in WMSNs are as follows:  
• The powerful WMSN sensor nodes can easily meet the demands of computation and 
communication required to deal with multimedia data. 
• WMSN sensor nodes have larger storage spaces than WSN nodes. This additional storage 
ability can be used to develop new security solutions that would not be possible in WSNs. 
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• The video cameras on WMSNs give them a unique advantage of detecting and identifying the 
attackers.  
Manel Guerrero-Zapata (2009) sums up possible attacks on WMSNs as eavesdropping, sink 
location and location detection, compromised nodes, collusion attacks, tampering attacks and 
jamming attacks. Pointing at the direction of future research in WMSN security, Grieco  et al. 
(Grieco, Boggia, and Sicari 2009) state that the research on secure WMSNs depends on how the 
application in question satisfies the requirements of quality, privacy and security of the data being 
transmitted, in addition to that of energy consumption. Privacy and authentication in WMSNs are 
not compartmentalized. Attacks on privacy exploiting different vulnerabilities can broadly be 
divided into two macro-types, eavesdropping and masquerading. Eavesdropping means sniffing the 
data and discovering the message being exchanged over the network. Masquerading means 
misrouting the data packets and retrieving the data by some malicious nodes that have masked their 
real nature. According to Lian et al. (Lian, Kanellopoulos, and Ruffo 2009), security issues arise 
because of the sensivities of the information being transmitted in multimedia communication. With 
respect to the information system‟s complexity, there are still more attacks, e.g. eavesdropping 
(surreptitiously getting hold of private communication), intrusion (undesired attempt to access 
data), forgery (making or adapting objects with the intention of deceiving), piracy (unauthorized 
use of material protected under copyright law) and manipulating the computing system. 
Based on the information given above, it can be concluded that WMSNs based on the OSI model 
are vulnerable to a variety of threats, as shown in  
Table 2.1: 
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Table 2.1 Various types of attacks in WSN and WMSNs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, we will only consider attacks at the network layer as we are basically concerned with 
attacks that take place in the communication channel between the processes of watermark 
embedding and watermark detection. WMSNs involve collaboration of sensor nodes and 
multimedia nodes for routing, which, however, is vulnerable to malicious attacks, like 
manipulation. Attackers can access the routing path to redirect the communication or broadcast 
false information, thus misleading the routing direction, acting as a black hole to swallow all the 
received messages, selectively forwarding data packets, and so on.  We discuss attacks on the 
network layer below:  
2.3.2.1 Altered Routing Information 
This is the most pointed attack against a routing protocol, targeting the routing information itself at 
the stage of routing information exchange between the multimedia nodes. The attackers may create 
routing loops, extend or shorten the route, generate fake error information, partition the network, or 
increase end-to-end delay latency (Karlof 2003). 
Layer Type of attacks 
 
Application layer Eavesdropping 
Masquerading 
Repudiation 
Modification   
Impersonation 
Data aggregation distortion 
Clock skewing 
Selective forwarding 
Networks layer False routing 
Packet replication 
Black hole 
Sinkhole 
Selective forwarding 
Wormhole 
Neglect and greed,  
MAC layer Traffic manipulation 
Identify spoofing 
Physical layer Jamming 
Device tempering 
Eavesdropping 
Forgery  
Privacy  
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2.3.2.2 Selective Forwarding 
Selecting forwarding occurs when some malicious nodes do not forward all the messages. While 
some messages are forwarded, some others drop, and the dropped messges do not propagate any 
further in the network. This attack is possible only when the attacker lies directly on the route of 
data packets in the network (Lorincz, Malan, and Fulford-Jones 2004). It is of two types, selective 
message forwarding and selective multimedia node forwarding. In the former, the attacker 
forwards selected information from a particular node, while in the latter, the attacker drops all the 
information from selected nodes. The former is considered an application layer attack, while the 
latter is a network layer attack.  
2.3.2.3 Sinkhole 
In this attack, an attacker tries to take control of the whole traffic from an area by compromising a 
node and creating a sinkhole, with the attacker in the center. Because of either imagined or real 
high quality route via the compromised node, all the neighbouring nodes of the compromised node 
forwards data packets to the base station through it. Since all data packets are destined to the same 
base station, all a compromised node has to do to influence a large number of nodes is to provide a 
single high quality route to the base station. This makes selective forwarding rather easy, as all the 
traffic from the area now flows through the compromised node controlled by the attacker. 
2.3.2.4 Sybil Attack  
In this attack, a single node presents many identities to other nodes in the network (Karlof 2003). It 
can easily affect some protocols and algorithms, like fault-tolerant schemes, distributed storage, 
and network-topology maintenance, as, in this attack, the attacker can be in more than place at the 
same time.   
2.3.2.5 Packet Replication 
In this attck, attackers replicate some packets received previously from other nodes, and then 
broadcast them through the entire network even when the sender has not sent any new packets 
(Karlof 2003). This makes the network relay a large number of packets needlessly, causing 
unnecessary strain on both the power of the nodes and the bandwidth of the network. This 
unltimately causes network operations to terminate prematurely. 
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2.3.2.6 Wormhole 
This attack is carried out by two or more attackers (Karlof 2003) with better communication 
resources than normal multimedia nodes in terms of power and bandwidth, consequently 
establishing a better communication channel between them. Thus, contrary to many other attacks 
on the network layer, this attack involves real channel. When the channel is powerful enough, other 
nodes end up incorporating it in their communication path, laying open their data for the scrutiny 
of the attackers. 
This section explained the security requirements of both WSNs and WMSNs along with different 
types of attacks possible. The next section discusses digital watermarking process along with 
security requirements for, and types of attack on, this technique. 
2.4  Digital Watermarking Technique  
This section introduces the digital watermarking technique. The digital watermarking technique is 
the process of embedding a watermark into a digital media, such as image, or audio or video file, to 
identify the file's copyright information (Wang, Xu and Yang, 2009). Digital watermarking can be 
classified on the basis of different factors, like the embedding and detecting processes, the 
availability of the watermark signal for extraction, or the techniques used to modify the data to 
encode the watermark. Table 2.2  gives a detailed classification of digital watermarking techniques. 
Table 2.2 Classification of digital watermarking techniques 
Classification Properties 
Embedding and detecting  Spatial, Discreate Cosinus Transform (DCT) and 
Discreate Wavelet Transform (DWT) 
Availability of the watermark signal  
 
Blind and non-blind  
Techniques used to modify data  Additive embedding  
Data and image fusion 
Applications for  
a. Robust watermarking 
 
b. Fragile watermarking  
 
Broadcast monitoring, Copyright protection, Digital 
fingerprinting and copy control.  
Content authentication and integrity, Content 
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archiving,  Tamper detection 
 
Cover medium  Packet data, signal, binary stream, image  
 
Before carrying out a survey and evaluation of digital watermarking techniques applicable to both 
WSNs and WMSNs, it would be pertinent to explain some preliminary concepts pertaining to 
digital watermarking technique. This explanation will cover:   
 classification of watermarks 
 watermark embedding  
 watermark extraction  
 watermark detection  
2.4.1 Classification of Watermarks  
A watermark can be considered as a kind of signal or pattern inserted into a cover medium, such as 
binary stream, watermark bit, watermark constraint, text, image, signal or video. A watermark 
usually carries copyright information of the file.  
Digital watermarks can be divided into two groups – visible and invisible. Figure 2.8  gives the 
classification of digital watermarks.  
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Figure 2.8 Classification of digital watermarks 
A visible watermark consists of a text or image which overlies the cover medium and can be seen, 
but is semi-transparent, thus allowing the cover medium also to be seen. It marks the cover 
medium as the property of the owner of the watermark, thus providing copyright protection to it. 
Visible watermarks, such as logos and paper watermarks, especially when overlying the whole 
cover medium, are difficult to remove or tamper with, and are, therefore, robust. This makes them 
preferable when a digital content needs strong intellectual property protection.   
An invisible watermark, on the other hand, is embedded in the cover medium and, therefore, 
cannot normally be seen. Information contained in these watermarks can only be extracted by 
electronic devices, in order to identify or prove ownership. These watermarks are used to 
authenticate specialized digital content which may be text, images, audio or video. Invisible 
watermarks can be either fragile or robust. A fragile watermark is used to verify whether the 
protected object was tempered with or not. This type of watermark is designed to be as fragile as 
possible, so that even the slightest modification of the cover medium destroys it, indicating that the 
cover medium was tampered with. On the other hand, a robust watermark is used to resist non-
malicious distortions. These distortions usually include common image processing, geometrical 
transforms, and image compression.   
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2.4.2 Watermark Embedding Strategies 
As mentioned in Section 1.4.2.2, watermark embedding is the process of combining the cover 
medium, the watermark signal, the sensed data and the embedding key to produce the watermarked 
cover medium. There are two different strategies for watermark embedding – linear additive 
embedding, and addition of watermark constraints into a nonlinear system equation.   
The linear additive embedding strategy embeds a watermark signal by introducing linear 
modification in the cover medium. Here, the watermarking algorithm embeds a binary stream or 
binary bit of length N by modifying a subset of the cover medium coefficients. The general 
formula used for additive embedding is  based on that given by Cox, Kilian, and Leighton (1997), 
as follows: 
iow WCC          ( 2.10) 
where  is the scaling parameter used to control the strength of the embedded watermark (Cox, 
Kilian, and Leighton 1997), oC is the set of cover medium coefficient, iW is the coefficient 
watermark, and wC  is the set of watermarked cover medium coefficient. An alternative formula 
given by is: 
)1( iow WCC  ( 2.11) 
The benefit of equation 2.8  is that the coefficient wC  
is small, the watermark energy is also small, 
and that when wC  is large, the watermark energy increases for robustness.  
This thesis will use the second approach, i.e., embedding watermark constraints into the NLSP, 
based on the work of Koushanfar and Potkonjak (2007). NLSP, used as the cover medium, is 
shown in Figure 2.9, while Figure 2.10 shows an example of watermark constraints that are to be 
embedded into the cover medium. 
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Figure 2.9 NLSP used as the cover medium 
Figure 2.10 Watermark constraints 
Figure 2.11 Watermark constraints added to the cover medium 
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DC
d
DB
d
DA
d ,, can be seen in subsection  2.2.1, and  21   and     are  the values of the 
feasibility of the solution  space.  oC is  the set of the cover medium, iW is the watermark 
constraint and wC  is the watermarked cover medium. 
NLSP consists of the objective function used to find the value of a minimum of three non-linear 
constraints. The watermark constraints are added to the cover medium as shown in  Fig 2.11.  
2.4.3 Watermark Extraction Strategies  
Watermark extraction is a process of decoding (or extracting) the watermark from the watermarked 
cover medium for the objective of identifying copyright (A. Herner, S. March, and J. Park 2004). 
There are three different approaches to decode the watermark from the watermarked cover medium 
– informed  approach, semi-blind approach and blind approach.  
The informed approach requires the cover medium in order to extract the watermark signal, 
whereas in the blind approach, a secret key is used to identify the location and extract the water 
mark. The semi-blind approach does not require the cover medium, but needs some additional 
information used during embedding. A watermark embedded using the linear additive embedding 
technique can be extracted using the cover medium. The formula to extract the watermark from the 
watermarked cover medium is as follows:    

ow
i
CC
W

                                   ( 2.12) 
where 'iW  is the extracted watermark sequence and wC  is the possibly altered watermark image 
coefficient. Based on equation 2.6, we can recover the watermark sequence from the watermarked 
cover medium.  
Watermarks with additional watermark constraints embedded in a non-linear system equation can 
be extracted using the cover medium. The formula to extract the watermark from the watermarked 
cover medium is as follows:    
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oCwCi
W '           ( 2.13) 
where 'iW is the extracted watermark constraint and wC  is the possibly altered watermark 
constraint. Based on equation 2.7, we can recover the watermark constraints from the watermarked 
cover medium.  
2.4.4 Watermark Detecting Strategies 
Watermark detection is the process of measuring the correlation of the extracted watermark with 
the original watermark. If this correlation is higher than a specific threshold, the watermark  is 
considered to be present, otherwise not (A. Herner, S. March, and J. Park 2004). Here, we use the 
objective detection approach using correlation calculation for detecting the watermark‟s  presence. 
In the objective detection approach, particularly in case of non-blind watermarking, the original 
watermark sequence iW and the extracted watermark sequence 
'
iW are compared in order to detect 
the watermark‟s presence. The formula to calculate normalized correlation is given as:  
i
ii
ii
ii
WW
WW
WWNC
.
.
),(
'
'           ( 2.14) 
Correlation can also be calculated by similarity measurements given as follows
 
'
'
'
.
.
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ii
ii
ii
WW
WW
WWSM          ( 2.15)  
The value of  NC varies between [-1, 1]. A value which is greater than 0 and close to 1 strongly 
indicates the watermark‟s presence; however, a lower value indicates the watermark‟s absence.  
The detection approach using correlation calculation can also be implemented in case of additional 
watermark constraints embedded in the cover medium. Let X be the error of the optimal 
solution oC  and 
'X  the error of the optimal solution wC . Then, X and 
'X  are compared to detect 
the watermark constraints‟ presence. The error of X is a set of },,,,,,{ 321  DCDBDAt and the 
errors of 'X is a set of },,,,,,{ '3
'
2
'
1
''''  DCDBDAt . The formula to calculate similarity is given 
as:   
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The value of similarity varies between [-1, 1 ].  
This concludes the discussion of watermark classification and watermarks embedding, extraction 
and detection processes. The next section explains the security requirements for digital 
watermarking technique.  
2.4.5 Security Requirements for Digital Watermarking 
Technique  
Most digital watermarking applications have particular security requirements of their own and no 
general set of requirements can be given that would apply to all digital watermarking techniques. 
Yet, some general indications can be made for a large number of applications. For example, one 
fundamental requirement is imperceptibility which applies to all applications irrespective of their 
purposes. These requirements have been discussed beow. 
2.4.5.1 Imperceptibility  
As mentioned above, imperceptibility, or perceptual transparency of the watermark, is a 
fundamental requirement for all digital watermarking applications. This means that the embedded 
watermark should not degrade the quality of the cover medium to any significant degree and 
should not interfere with the user's interaction with it. A digital watermark is imperceptible if 
watermarked cover medium cannot be distinguished from the original cover medium by human 
users. On comparing the watermarked cover medium with the original cover medium, slight 
modifications may be apparent. However, normally, the users can‟t compare the two as the original 
cover medium is not accessible to them. Therefore, it is often sufficient for fulfilment of the 
requirement of imperceptibility that the modifications in the watermarked cover medium, if any, 
are not noticed by the users as long as they do not have the opportunity to compare it with the 
original cover medium. 
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2.4.5.2 Robustness  
Robustness of a watermark is its ability to resist any intentional alteration or removal by either 
standard or malicious processing or attacks. The standard processing usually includes common 
image processing, geometrical transformation, and image compression. The common image 
processing operations include noise insertion, contrast adjustment, and cropping. The geometrical 
transforms include rotation, scaling and translation. A watermark is said to be robust against 
compression if it can be detected even after the image is compressed. Among the standard 
processing operations mentioned, geometric transformation can be undertaken by using an image 
processing software and defeating the purpose of the watermark by making it undetectable. A 
watermark is termed robust if it can resist such intentional alterations or removal. If it cannot, it is 
termed fragile. A robust watermark is designed to resist normal processing caused during common 
image processing operations. Fragile watermarks, on the other hand, are easily destroyed by slight 
distortions.   
2.4.5.3 Blind or Informed Detection 
In some digital watermarking applications, like copyright protection and data monitoring, the 
original, un-watermarked cover medium is available during the detection process. In other digital 
watermarking applications, such as copy protection and indexing, the detection process has to be 
carried out without the original cover medium. The detectin process in the former watermarking 
system is known as informed detection while, in the latter case, it is blind detection. The literature 
on digital watermarking systems also calls informed detection private watermarking system, and 
blind detection public watermarking system. Fragile watermarking certainly requires public 
watermarking, but it also increases the chances of malicious attacks. 
2.4.5.4 Security    
 A secure digital watermarking technique can survive many hostile attacks that try to defeat the 
purpose of the watermark. These attacks include unauthorized removal, modification, manipulation 
or detection of the watermark. Security in digital watermarking can be compared to security in 
encryption techniques. The most direct approach to make the watermark information secure is to 
apply Kirchhoff‟s Principle in cryptography (Massey 1992). This principle assumes that the data 
encryption method used is known to unauthorized parties and, therefore, security lies in the choice 
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of a key. This means that, to ensure secrecy, it is imperative to use a secret key in the process of 
embedding and detection. Thus, a watermark will really be secure only if unauthorized parties 
cannot detect the watermark‟s presence, nor remove it, even if they know the exact algorithm for 
embedding and extracting the watermark.  
This concludes the discussion of security requirements for digital watermarking technique. The 
next section elaborates differnet kinds of attacks on digital watermarking technique. 
2.4.6 Attacks on Digital Watermarking Techniques 
Potentially, digital watermarking encompasses a number of applications, including copyright 
protection, broadcast monitoring, authenticating content and ensuring its integrity, and providing 
authorized access and covert communication control. However, a watermark embedded in a cover 
medium may become vulnerable, or may be unintentionally impaired during processing. 
Sometimes processing may intentionally aim at obstructing watermark reception. In digital 
watermarking, any processing that impairs watermark detection or communication of watermark 
information is known as attack (Sherekar 2011, Voloshynovskiy, Pun, and Eggers 2001).  
To serve its purpose, a digital watermarking technique must be robust against these attacks. A 
watermark is called robust if, even after an attack on the data, it is not impaired in any way. 
Criteria like bit error probability or channel capacity can be used to measure impairment of a 
watermark. A simultaneous consideration of watermark impariment and data distortion as a result 
of the attack can be used to evaluate the robustness of a digital watermarking technique. 
Following is a classification of a wide range of currently known attacks, followed by a discussion 
of each. Broadly, these attacks can be classified into removal, geometric, cryptographic, and 
protocol attacks (Sherekar 2011, Voloshynovskiy, Pun, and Eggers 2001), as shown in Figure 2.12. 
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The watermarking attacks
Removal attacks Geometric attacks Cryptography attacks Protocol attacks attacks
 
Figure 2.12 A broad classification of currently known attacks on digital watermarking techniques 
A discussion on each follows: 
2.4.6.1 Removal Attack 
This attack aims at completely removing the watermark from the watermarked cover medium, so 
that no amount of processing, howsoever complex, can recover it from the attacked cover medium. 
This attack is not used to crack the security algorithm, like the watermark embedding key. It 
includes processes like quantization, demodulation, denoising, and collusion attacks. Not all these 
processes are always able to completely remove the watermark, yet they may cause irraparable 
damage to the watermark information. For example, in collusion attack, illustrated in Figure 2.13, 
an attacker or  group of attackers may obtain several copies of a given data set, each of which will 
be signed with a different key or watermark, and then average all the copies or use small parts of 
each copy, to achieve their objective. 
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Figure 2.13 A perceptual  remodulating attack 
2.4.6.2 Geometric Attack 
Instead of removing the watermark, this attack aims at distorting the synchronization of the 
watermark detector with the embedded information. Unintentional geometric attacks include 
image-processing manipulations, such as scaling images, printing and scanning  marked 
documents, changing a digital video‟s aspect ratio, and cropping an image to extract a region of 
interest (Licks and Jordan 2005). Every geometric attack is defined by a set of parameters that 
determines the operation performed over the target image, for example, a rotation angle applied to 
the sampling grid characterizes a rotation attack (Licks and Jordan 2005). 
However, on regaining perfect synchronization, the watermark detector can recover the embedded 
information. Further, most newer digital watermarking techniques use special synchronization 
techniques to thwart these attacks. An invariant transform domain or an additional template, 
enabling the geometric distortion to be estimated, is used to make digital watermarking robust 
against general geometric distortions  (Sherekar 2011, Voloshynovskiy, Pun, and Eggers 2001).  
2.4.6.3 Cryptographic Attack 
This type of attack attempts to crack the security algorithm in the digital watermarking technique 
used, and thus find a way of either removing the embedded information or embedding misleading 
information, which is usually computationally a highly complex watermark. For example, the 
brute-force search technique is one of the techniques used to crack the embedded secret 
information. On the other hand, Oracle attack is another technique used to create non-watermarked 
signals, if a watermark detector is available. Pratically, however, the Oracle attack has only a 
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limited scope to be used because it is computationally very complex (Sherekar 2011, 
Voloshynovskiy, Pun, and Eggers 2001).  
2.4.6.4 Protocol Attack 
This type of attack aims to hijack the whole concept of watermarked application. Copy attack is 
one such attack which aims at estimating a watermark from the watermarked cover medium and 
then copying it to some other cover medium, rather than destroying it. The attackers adapt the 
estimated watermark to the local features of the targeted recipients to fulfil the requirement of 
imperceptibility. The copy attack can succeed only when it is possible to embed a valid watermark 
in the targeted cover medium without the knowledge of either the watermark key or the algorithm 
the watermarking technology has used. Depending on signals, watermarks may resist copy attacks, 
or the attacker may obtain different watermarks. For example, an attack can be successfully carried 
out by averaging all the different copies (Sherekar 2011, Voloshynovskiy, Pun, and Eggers 2001). 
This section discussed the digital watermarking process along with their security requirements and 
types of possible attacks. The next section specifically discusses the security requirements of 
digital watermarking for both WSNs and WMSNs with different types of attacks.  
2.4.7 Working of Digital Watermarking Technique in 
WSNs 
This section explains how digital watermarking technique can be used for WSNs‟ security. The 
different ways to do so are implanting the specific name or message of the owner for copyright 
data protection in WSNs. To accomplish this, a usual encoder in a WSN requires: the original 
sensed data od , the watermark message w and the watermark key k . The watermark message w 
and watermark key k are inserted into the watermark generator to produce the watermark signal 'w . 
The input parameters mentioned above are taken by an embedding function F which gives the 
watermarked data ),,( ' kwdFd oembedw   as output. This watermark key k  is used for both 
embedding and detection process. If the key is not used, the watermarking algorithms have to be 
kept secret, but this is normally not the case. In the process of detection, the input parameters for 
the watermarking detector are: the watermarked data wd , the original sensed data od , the 
watermark signal w , and the watermark key k , and the watermark detection process is defined as 
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),,,( 'det owecte dwkdFw  . The process of extraction does not need the original sensed data od  and 
the watermark w because the detection algorithm can usually retrieve the hidden information even 
if the original signal is not known. The procedure gives the estimated watermark ew as the output. 
In the process of extraction, the watermark ew is extracted by using the watermark key k to get the 
watermark  signal 'w  and the sensed data d .  
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Figure 2.14 Working of digital watermarking technique in WSNs 
As described in Section 1.5, there is a very pressing need to address the problem of copyright 
protection of data in WSNs. Digital watermarking technique can be used for the purpose, as shown 
in Figure 2.14. 
With this explanation of the working of digital watermarking technique in WSNs, the next section 
moves to explaining the working of digital watermarking technique in WMSNs. 
2.4.8  Working of Digital Watermarking Technique in 
WMSNs  
This section explains how WMSNs and digital watermarking technique can work together. It will 
show that the technique can be used to implant the specific name or information of the owner in 
WMSNs. For the purpose, a usual encoder for WMSNs requires: the original image i obtained by 
the video sensor, which is then sent to the multimedia sensor node. The WMSN is managed by a 
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laptop that captures this image. Now, the watermark message is inserted into it. The process of 
embedding is as follows: first the image is decomposed into several bands, then the pseudo-random 
sequences are added to the larger coefficients which are not located in the lowest resolution. The 
DWT watermark inserted algorithm consists of four parts, namely original image, calculation of 
multilevel threshold, watermark embedding process, and inverse discrete wavelet transform 
(IDWT). The watermarked image obtained after the embedding process is sent to the multimedia 
sensor node by a laptop. This image then transmits through a communication channel to a sink. 
The watermarked image is again managed by the user with the laptop.  The process of detecting or 
extracting is the inverse procedure of the watermark insertion process. It requires the watermarked 
image and the key.  
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Figure 2.15 Working of digital watermarking technique in WMSNs 
  
75 LITERATURE REVIEW 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
As described in Section 1.6, there is a very pressing need to address the problem of content 
ownership detection in WMSNs. This cannot be done by using cryptography, because 
cryptography protects information only during communication and cannot prove content 
ownership. Thus we need to study the possibility of using watermarking technique to address the 
problem. Digital watermarking technique and WMSNs can work together, as shown in Figure 2.15. 
This section discussed how digital watermarking technique and WMSNs can work together. The 
next section will explain the evaluation framework for digital watermarking techniques in WSNs. 
2.5  Evaluation Framework for Digital 
Watermarking Techniques in WSNs 
This section carries out a survey of the available literature on WSNs and digital watermarking 
technique. To adequately analyse the algorithms proposed in the existing literature, we evaluate all 
the WSN digital watermarking algorithms across 10 parameters. These include: cover medium, 
watermark message, sensed data, type of watermark signal, watermark key, watermark generator, 
watermark embedding technique, watermark detection technique, type of detection, noise, and 
attacks. Figure 2.16 shows these 10 parameters for evaluation of digital watermarking techniques 
in WSNs. The main idea behind adopting this approach is to ensure an independent and thorough 
evaluation of each algorithm, by clearly studying each aspect independently. In all, 11 different 
algorithms will be evaluated on these 10 parameters. Table 2.2 gives comprehensive details of 
these 11 algorithms.  
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Figure 2.16 The 10 parameters for evaluation of digital watermarking in WSNs 
This section presented the 10 parameters used for evaluation of digital watermarking in WSNs. 
The next section will carry out an in-depth survey of the literature on digital watermarking in 
WSNs.  
2.6  Survey of Literature on Digital Watermarking 
Technique in WSNs 
This section evaluates each of the 11 algorithms mentioned above on each of the 10 parameters 
individually. The purpose is to identify the similarity and differences among these 11 algorithms 
and try to understand the rationale behind the authors‟ selection of a particular value for each 
parameter in their procedural solution. We begin the discussion with cover medium.  
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Figure 2.17 Cover medium 
Cover medium is one of the key components of watermarking technique. Examples of cover 
medium include sensory data, packet data, texts, images, audio signals, video signals, and the Non 
Linear Programming System (NLSP), as shown in Figure 2.17. Among all these cover media, 
NLSP and sensory data are slightly different. While all other media are covers in themselves, 
NLSP is the process of generating a cover medium and then using it. Similarly, the sensory data 
consists of sensor nodes that capture the data. These sensor nodes are deployed in 2-D coordinates 
and use this sensory data.    
NLSP is produced by using the atomic trilateration process. This is a process by which the position 
of a sensor node can be determined, using the positions of, and its distances from, at least three 
other sensor nodes in the WSN. The watermark constraints are embedded during this process 
(Jessica and Potkonjak 2003), (Koushanfar and Potkonjak 2007).  
Following is a comparative evaluation of different cover media used in watermarking techniques in 
WSNs. All these different approaches have been presented in  
Table 2.1. Most of these use „packet data‟ as the cover medium (Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 2004), 
(Xiangqian 2009), (Xuejun 2010), (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Xiaomei and Xiaohua 
2009), (Juma, Kamel, and Kaya 2008, Ren 2011).  One of these has used sensory data (Zhang, Liu, 
and Das 2008) while two have used NLSP (Jessica and Potkonjak 2003), (Koushanfar and 
Potkonjak 2007). 
Packet data have been found to be better than sensory data by us as they form the basic unit of 
communication over digital networks. The packet data are parts of the whole data. For 
transmission, the whole data are first broken down into smaller chunks, called packets 
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(Wuyungerile, Bandai, and Watanabe 2010). The advantage of using packet data is that, with them, 
the sensor nodes consume network resources only when data are actually being transferred. This 
makes the data transfer process sutiatble to wireless sensor nodes as these nodes work under severe 
energy and resource constraints. 
Table 2.3 Cover media used in literature 
Author  Year  Cover medium 
Feng et al.  2003 Non Linear Programming System  
Sion et al.   2004 Packet data 
Koushanfar et al.  2007 Non Linear Programming System 
 Albath et al. 2007 Packet data   
Zhang  et al.  2008 Sensory data   
Juma et al.  2008 Packet data  
Xiao et al.   2008 Packet data  
Xiaomei et al.    2009 Packet data   
Xuejun  2010 Packet data   
Wang  et al.  2011 Packet data   
Kamel et al.   2011 Packet data   
 
This thesis uses NLSP as cover medium for its algorithem, because the type of watermark used in 
it can only be embedded in this cover medium. The watermark used will be explained in Section 
2.6.4.  
2.6.2 Watermark Message 
Watermark message can be a simple text or an image depending upon the application 
requirements. In watermarking process for WSN applications, most often plain texts are used, 
because using images as watermarks will strain the network resources too much. Examples of 
some possible watermark messages have been given in Figure 2.18. 
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Watermark message 
Message (text), e.q.
“This belong to me” 
     Image
 
Figure 2.18 Watermark message 
The watermark message „this belong to me‟ is encoded by MD5 and  this operation results in a 
message digest. This digest is then encoded by RC5 and this operation results in a binary stream. 
This binary stream is the watermark message that is to be communicated. It is shown in Figure 
2.19. 
 
1011011110110111110110111 11101010   10110111 11101010  101101111011011110110111 11101010 ... 10101010 
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Figure 2.19 Encoded watermark message 
A comparative evaluation of different kinds of messages to be protected using watermarking 
technique in WSNs follows next. Overall, all these different approaches have been presented in 
Table 2.4. Although most of the works do not mention the specific watermark message used by 
them (Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 2004),  (Zhang, Liu, and Das 2008), (Xuejun 2010), (Rong, 
Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Xiaomei and Xiaohua 2009), Fang (Jessica and Potkonjak 2003), 
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Koushanfar (Koushanfar and Potkonjak 2007), two specify using text as their watermark message. 
(Jessica and Potkonjak 2003).  
Table 2.4  Watermark messages used in literature 
Author  Year  Wateramrk message  
Feng et al.  2003 Plain text (e.g. this belongs to me) 
Sion et al.   2004 --- 
Koushanfar et al.  2007 Plain text (e.g. this belongs to me) 
 Albath et al. 2007 ---   
Zhang  et al.  2008 --- 
Juma et al.  2008 --- 
Xiao et al.   2008 --- 
Xiaomei et al.    2009 --- 
Xuejun  2010 --- 
Wang  et al.  2011 --- 
Kamel et al.   2011 --- 
 
2.6.3 Sensed Data 
The term sensed data means the phenomena captured from the environment by the sensor nodes of 
a WSN and communicated to the sink, e.g. atmospheric temperature and humidity, wind speed and 
direction, light intensity, etc. These sensed data constitute the information to be secured through 
watermarking. The sensed data are analogue in nature and, hence, need to be converted to digital 
format before transmission. The digitized information is then encoded by a hash function MD5 to 
generate a fixed length binary stream. As shown in Figure 2.20, this stream is the sensed data to be 
communicated. The binary stream consists of one or more bytes of arbitrary information. The 
binary matrix is a matrix with entries 0 and 1 (Akyildiz, Pompili, and Melodia 2005).   
A comparative evaluation of different kinds of messages to be protected using watermarking 
technique in WSNs follows next. Overall, all these different approaches have been presented in 
Table 2.5. Most of the works use „binary stream‟ as the sensed data (Kamel and Juma 2011), 
(Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 2004), (Xuejun 2010), (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Xiaomei and 
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Xiaohua 2009), (Wang, Sun, and Ruan 2011). One mentions „binary matrix‟ used as the sensed 
data (Zhang, Liu, and Das 2008). Others, however, make no mention of the sensed data used 
(Xiangqian 2009), (Jessica and Potkonjak 2003), (Koushanfar and Potkonjak 2007).  
For our purposes, binary stream is better than binary matrix to be used as sensed data, because it is 
a small chunk of the whole data and, therefore, the sensor node does not need too much energy to 
transmit it (Wuyungerile, Bandai, and Watanabe 2010). On the other hand, binary matrix is a 
pseud-orandom code generated as a modulation pulse for the purpose of spreading signals across 
the entire band, and there is no mention of the amount of energy required by it (Zhang, Liu, and 
Das 2008).  
1011011111101010  
 
10110111 11101010  101101111011011110110111 11101010  ... 10101010
Sensed data (16 bits)  e.q.
Temperature
Hash function,e.q. 
MD5
Header (32 bits)
1011011111101010  
1001010110101110  
DATA(65497 bits)
Header (32 bits) DATA ( 65503 bits )
1011011111101010  
1001010110101110  
1011011111101010  1011011111101010    10110111 11101010  101101111011011110110111 11101010  ... 10101010
  
Figure 2.20 An example of sensed data encoded by hash function 
Table 2.5 Sensed data used in literature 
Author  Year  Sensed data  
Feng et al.  2003  ---    
Sion et al.   2004 Binary stream (101010 … )  
Koushanfar et al.  2007 ---    
 Albath et al. 2007 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Zhang  et al.  2008 
Binary matrix  














1..10
.....
...
....1
1..01
 
Juma et al.  2008 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
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Xiao et al.   2008 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Xiaomei et al.    2009 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Xuejun  2010 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Wang  et al.  2011 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Kamel et al.   2011 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
2.6.4 Type of Watermarks 
A pattern of bits inserted into a cover medium used to identify illegal copies, examine the 
authenticity of the document, or detect tampering of digital content, is called a watermark. There 
are different types of watermark, such as watermark constraints, binary stream, and watermark 
decimal matrix. Examples of these watermarks are given in Figure 2.21 
Type of watermarks
Watermark constraints
   
    
    Watermark 
Matrix decimal  
Binary stream 
(10101010... )
1321   DCDBt
 yxw ,
 
Figure 2.21 Types of watermarks used in WSN 
Following is a comparative evaluation of different types of watermarks used in WSNs, as found in 
the existing literature. Overall, all these different approaches have been presented in Table 2.6.  
In most of these approaches, „binary stream‟ has been used as the watermark signal (8, 16, 64, 128 
bits) (Kamel and Juma 2011), (Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 2004), (Xiangqian 2009), (Xuejun 2010), 
(Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Xiaomei 2009, Xiaomei and Xiaohua 2009),  (Juma, Kamel, 
and Kaya 2008),  (Wang, Sun, and Ruan 2011). Two of them use watermark constraints (Jessica 
and Potkonjak 2003), (Koushanfar and Potkonjak 2007), while one suggests using a watermark 
decimal matrix ),( yxw .  
Watermark binary stream proves itself better than other watermark signals because it is possible to 
produce it through a calculation of the watermark bit of MSB, which is the most significant bit of 
the hash function (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Xiaomei and Xiaohua 2009). Additionally, it 
is also possible to compute it using the hash function by concatenating all the individual data 
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elements in the group and applying this function. Kamel and Juma (2011) and Xuejun (2010) have 
used the hash function to produce the binary stream. This approach uses less energy and shows 
greater computational efficiency than watermark bitshigh cost energy and computationally less 
efficient than the binary stream. 
Table 2.6  Types of watermark used in literature 
Author  Year  Type of watermark 
Feng et al.  2003 Watermark constraint 
DB + 2 + 3 4   
Sion et al.   2004 Binary stream (101010 … )  
Koushanfar et al.  2007 Watermark constraint 
DB + 2 + 3 4   
 Albath et al. 2007 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Zhang  et al.  2008 Watermark decimal matrix  











4..51
....
3..32
),( yxw  
Juma et al.  2008 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Xiao et al.   2008 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Xiaomei et al.    2009 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Xuejun  2010 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Wang  et al.  2011 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Kamel et al.   2011 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
 
However, even though  watermark binary streams are better than watermark constraints, we have 
used watermark constraints in our algorithm because they can be embedded in NLSP while binary 
streams cannot. .  
2.6.5 Watermark Key 
The key K in a watermarking procedure is a means to build a parameterized set of embedding and 
detection method. It should not be confused with the cryptography key used to encrypt and decrypt 
the messages carried by the watermarking channel. It is used in both embedding and detection 
processes in the watermarking techniques in WSNs.  
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The two main watermark keys found in the literature are (1) pseud-orandom sequences, and (2) 
binary streams. Examples of watermark keys are shown in Figure 2.22 
Watermark keys
   Pseudorandom sequence Binary stream 
(10101010... )
}1,1{),( yxs
 
Figure 2.22 Type of watermark keys 
Following is a comparative evaluation of the different types of watermark keys found in the 
literature. Overall, all these different approaches have been presented in Table 2.7. Most of them 
use „binary stream‟ for watermark key (Kamel and Juma 2011, Xiangqian 2009), (Xuejun 2010), 
(Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Xiaomei 2009, Xiaomei and Xiaohua 2009). A few use 
pseudo-random sequence (Potdar, Sharif, and Chang 2011), while others make no mention of the 
watermark keys used by them (Xuejun 2010), (Jessica and Potkonjak 2003), (Koushanfar and 
Potkonjak 2007), (Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 2004).  
Genrerally speaking, binary streams score over pseudo-random sequences  yxs ,  as watermark 
keys, becuase they are more energy efficient. Additionally, it is possible to easily produce a 
watermark signal using binary streams, by adding them to a hash function. On the other hand, 
pseudo-random sequences  yxs ,  are computationally exhaustive and less energy efficient. 
Additionally, a pseudorandom sequence  yxs , generated by the sink LiSi ,...,2,1    requires the 
sinks to be non-overlapping with each other, spreading each single watermark bit Libi ,...,2,1    
onto each LiSi ,...,2,1    
Table 2.7 Watermark keys used in literature 
Author  Year  Watermark Key  
Feng et al.  2003 --- 
Sion et al.   2004 --- 
Koushanfar et al.  2007 --- 
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 Albath et al. 2007 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Zhang  et al.  2008 Pseudorandom sequence  yxs ,  
Juma et al.  2008 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Xiao et al.   2008 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Xiaomei et al.    2009 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
Xuejun  2010 --- 
Wang  et al.  2011 --- 
Kamel et al.   2011 Binary stream (101010 … ) 
 
We also use binary stream (101010 …  ) as the watermark key to generate watermarks in this 
thesis.  
2.6.6 Watermark Generator 
A mathematical function used to generate watermark signals through a watermark message and 
watermark key is called watermark generator. Literature on watermarking in WSNs reveals two 
kinds of watermark generators, i.e. (1) hash function, and (2) product function.  
A product results from multiplying two factors, or is an expression that identities the factors to be 
multiplied. A product function consists of two or more functions that have to be multiplied.   
The product function of   ),( and ),(,1,1 yxsyxbi   produces the watermark decimal matrix  
 yxw ,  (Potdar, Sharif, and Chang 2011), where  1,1ib
 
 are the watermark bits to be 
embedded  in the sensor nodes, the random value  yx,
 
is equal to the amplitude of the watermark 
for the node  yxs ,
, 
 and  yxs ,   are the 2-D coordinates representing the position of the sensor 
node (Zhang 2008). A comparative evaluation of the different watermark generators is given 
below. Overall, all these different approaches have been presented in Table 2.8. 
Most of the works in WSN watermarking literature use „hash function‟ for watermark generation, 
e.g. MD5 and SHA (Kamel and Juma 2011), (Jessica and Potkonjak 2003), (Koushanfar and 
Potkonjak 2007), (Xiangqian 2009), (Ming-Kuei 1962), (Xiaomei 2009, Xiaomei and Xiaohua 
2009). One of them (Zhang, Liu, and Das 2008) uses the product function of  
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  ),( and ),(,1,1 yxsyxbi    to generate a watermark decimal matrix, while others make no 
mention of the watermark generator used by them (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Juma, 
Kamel, and Kaya 2008).  
However, being a deterministic procedure taking arbitrary blocks of data, e.g. binary stream, and 
returning a fixed-size bit string, hash function may be said to be better than the product function of 
  ),( and ),(,1,1 yxsyxbi  . The hash function encodes the binary stream and turns it into the hash 
value, also known as the message digest. Using hash function as the watermark generator has four 
significant advantages: 1) computing the hash value is easy for any given binary stream, 2) 
generating message is not feasible for a given hash, 3) modifying a message is not possible unless 
the hash is changed, and 4) modifying a message is not feasible unless the hash is changed. 
Depending on their properties, the hash function is generally found suitable as the watermark 
generator for WSNs (Elkamchouchi, Emarah, and Hagras 2006, Subash and Divya 2011), with 
another advantage of being energy efficient, while the product function of 
  ),( and ),(,1,1 yxsyxbi   incurs high computational costs.  
Table 2.8 Watermark generatortors used in literature 
Author  Year  Watermark generator  
Feng et al.  2003 Hash function (MD5), RSA, RC4  
Sion et al.   2004 Hash function 
Koushanfar et al.  2007 Hash function (MD5), RSA, RC4  
 Albath et al. 2007 Hash function 
Zhang  et al.  2008 Product function of  
  and ),(, yxbi  ),( yx  
Juma et al.  2008 Hash function 
Xiao et al.   2008 Hash function 
Xiaomei et al.    2009 Hash function 
Xuejun  2010 --- 
Wang  et al.  2011 Hash function 
Kamel et al.   2011 Hash function 
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Our algorithm uses LFSR and Kolmogorov rule as watermark generators to produce watermark 
constraints.   
2.6.7 Watermark Embedding Technique 
The process of inserting watermark signal into a cover medium is known as watermark embedding. 
This process has already been explained in detail in Section 1.4. Below, we critically evaluate 
various embedding techniques for WSNs proposed in the literature. All these are summarized in 
Table 2.9. Most of the works use „Least Significant Bits (LSB)‟ as embedding technique (Kamel 
and Juma 2011), (Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 2004), (Albath 2007), (Zhang 2007), Juma (2008), 
(Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Xiaomei 2009), (Xuejun 2010), (Ren 2011). Two of them 
have used „MSB‟ (Sion, Atallah Mikhail, and Prabhakar Sunil, 2004 )  (Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 
2004), Xiaomei 2009), and one has used the DSSS system, which involves the generation of a 
pseudo-random code that serves as the modulation pulse spreading the signals throughout the band 
(Zhang, Liu, and Das 2008). „Adding watermark constraint to the processing step during the 
network operation‟ has also been used as an embedding technique by two (Jessica and Potkonjak 
2003), (F. Koushanfar Auerbach publications 2007).   
This latter approach and also the DSSS system have certain advantages over LSB and MSB. The 
DSSS system can survive attacks like false distribution imposition on the whole sensor, false 
distribution imposition on a part of the sensor, and remnant check transformation. Similarly, 
watermark constraints added to the processing step during the network operation can resist attacks 
like ghost signatures, removing the author‟s signature, adding new signatures, and de-
synchronization.   
On the other hand, LSB and MSB have the advantages of being  the simplest methods for 
embedding watermarks and suit the low-powered wireless sensor nodes very well. These 
techniques use a simple replacement procedure for embedding watermark signal, viz. replacinge 
LSB from the cover medium. 
As these methods use the whole cover medium for transmission, utilizing the high capacity of the 
WSN channel, they allow multiple embedding of a watermark signal. Thus, even if most signals 
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are removed by the attackers, some would remain to prove ownership. Even a single watermark 
signal is enough for the purpose.  
Table 2.9 Watermark embedding techniques used in literature 
Author  Year  Watermark embedding technique   
Feng et al.  2003 Adding watermark constraint to 
processing step during network 
operation 
Sion et al.   2004 Selection criteria using MSB 
Koushanfar et al.  2007 Adding watermark constraint to 
processing step during network 
operation 
 Albath et al. 2007 generating the one-time pad by 
repeatedly concatenating the substring 
Zhang  et al.  2008 The waterark sensory data  
),(),(),( yxoyxwyxd 
 w(x,y) is the 
watermark for sensor node and O(x,y) is 
sensory data  
Juma et al.  2008 Concatenation of the current group hash 
value group gi and next group hash 
value group gi+1. 
W = HASH ([K||gi||gi+1)])gi| 
Xiao et al.   2008 By modification the embedding bit of 
each packet.  LSB 
Xiaomei et al.    2009 The random value of each send data and 
time  was calculated by inputting the 
collection time and its MSB and the key 
K into random function. 
Xuejun  2010 IIS = input integer stream 
IBs=input binary stream 
T = Threshold 
If  IIS ≥T 
 “IBS=1” become “IBS=0” 
else 
 “IBS=0” become “IBS=0” 
Wang  et al.  2011 Embed bit of watermark by changing 
the parity of its LSB. 
Kamel et al.   2011 Concatenation of the current group hash 
value group gi and next group hash 
value group gi+1. 
Wi = HASH (K || gi || SN)  
SN = serial number 
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Our algorithm adds watermark constraints to the processing step during the network operation 
because our technique aims at surviving attacks that modify and remove data, such as false data 
insertion, data modification and Sybil attack. 
2.6.8 Watermark Detecting Technique 
As mentioned in Section 1.4.2.4, watermarking technique consists of two processes, embedding 
and extraction or detection. This section explains the process of extraction or detection. This 
process determines whether the given cover medium contains a particular watermark or not. 
Following is a comparative evaluation of different detection techniques used for watermarking in 
WSNs as found in the literature. Overall, all these different approaches have been presented in 
Table 2.10.  
Most of these approaches use „statistical correlation‟ for detection of watermarks, e.g. probability, 
similarity, mean deviation, standard deviation, and Gaussian hypothesis (Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 
2004), (Albath and Madria 2007), (Zhang, Liu, and Das 2008), (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), 
(Xiaomei 2009), (Xuejun 2010). Some have used synchronization points (Juma, Kamel, and Kaya 
2008), manipulation of embedding bit (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), and comparison of the 
hash calculated between the sender and the receiver (Kamel and Juma 2011). Others do not 
mention the detection technique used by them (Jessica and Potkonjak 2003), (F. Koushanfar 
Auerbach publications 2007), (Xuejun 2010), Wang  et al. (Wang, Sun, and Ruan 2011).   
In our estimation, statistical correlation is a better method for watermark detection than the 
manipulation of the embedding bit or the comparison of the hash calculated between the sender 
and the receiver, as it does not need to use the original cover medium sent from the sensor node in 
order to detect the watermark (Wenjun and Liu 1999). Usually, detecting the watermark in a cover 
medium requires first extracting the watermark signal, which normally necessitates using the 
original cover medium. The extracted watermark signal is then compared with the original 
watermark signal. Next, the similarity index between the two is compared with a threshold, which 
determines whether the tested cover medium is the original cover medium‟s watermarked version 
or not (Wenjun and Liu 1999). However, in case of WSNs, the watermark signal is invisible, and 
so it is not possible to use the original cover medium for the detection process. Therefore, using 
statistical correlation is a better approach to detect the watermark signal in the cover medium for 
WSNs.     
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Table 2.10 Watermarking detection techniques used in literature 
Author  Year  Watermark detection technique   
Feng et al.  2003 DB + 2 + 3 4   
Sion et al.   2004 Similarity 
Koushanfar et al.  2007 --- 
 Albath et al. 2007 Calculate MAC over p(xi) and compare 
to MAC received with packet.   
Zhang  et al.  2008 A Gaussian of hypothesis testing on 
correlation coefficient 
Juma et al.  2008 synchronization point  or not 
Xiao et al.   2008 Manipulation embedding bit and 
decrypt with key 
Xiaomei et al.    2009 Mean and standard deviation 
Xuejun  2010 --- 
Wang  et al.  2011 By judging the parity of the LSB of 
each data.  
Kamel et al.   2011 Comparison hash calculated between 
sender and receiver   
 
2.6.9  Noise  
Noise is the name given to any agent or incident which deteriorates the quality of communication 
between the sender and the receiver. Noise in WSN communication channels may be of many 
different kinds, e.g. failure of the node, probability of collusion, incoming data rate, and dropped 
packet data. Various types of noise used in the literature have been summarized in Table 2.11.  
In the literature, most of the works do not mention the noise in their experiments (Kamel and Juma 
2011), (Juma, Kamel, and Kaya 2008), (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Xuejun 2010), Wang 
et al. (Wang, Sun, and Ruan 2011), (Jessica and Potkonjak 2003), (F. Koushanfar Auerbach 
publications 2007). In others, the noises mentioned are incoming quality data rate (Radu, Mikhail, 
and Sunil 2004), dropped packet data (Albath and Madria 2007), (Zhang, Liu, and Das 2008), and 
decrease in the quality of the transmitting data (Xiaomei and Xiaohua 2009). In our estimation, 
dropped packet data is a more dangerous type of noise than decrease in the quality of the 
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transmitting data or the incoming data rate, because it can cause the communication between the 
sender and the receiver to stop altogether.   
Table 2.11 Different types of noise in literature 
Author  Year  Noise 
Feng et al.  2003 --- 
Sion et al.   2004 Incoming data rate 
Koushanfar et al.  2007 --- 
 Albath et al. 2007 --- 
Zhang  et al.  2008 Node failure  
Juma et al.  2008 --  
Xiao et al.   2008 ---  
Xiaomei et al.    2009 Decrease in the quality of the 
transmitting data 
Xuejun  2010 ---- 
Wang  et al.  2011 ---  
Kamel et al.   2011 ---  
 
2.6.10 Vulnerability Attacks 
Vulnerability attacks are performed in watermark testing to estimate the strength of the 
watermarked cover medium, and then demodulate it by subtracting the estimated strength from 
some constant strength factor. The determination of strength factor is based on either of the two 
conditions – removal of maximum watermark energy, or minimization of the attacked cover 
medium‟s cross-correlation coefficient with the watermark signal. Following is a comparative 
evaluation of different vulnerability attacks used to test watermarking techniques in WSNs. All 
these have been summarized in Table 2.12.  
Most of the works test their algorithms against „man-in-the-middle attack‟, e.g. forgery, 
impersonation, modification of data, or insertion of false data (Kamel and Juma 2011), (Radu, 
Mikhail, and Sunil 2004), (Juma, Kamel, and Kaya 2008), (Xiaomei 2009), Wang et al. (Wang, 
Sun, and Ruan 2011). Ghost signature and de-synchronization (F. Koushanfar Auerbach 
publications 2007), and statistical attacks  (Zhang, Liu, and Das 2008), (Xiaomei 2009), (Wang, 
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Sun, and Ruan 2011) are some other vulnerability attacks used. In the rest, no mention of the 
attacks used is found  (Jessica and Potkonjak 2003), (Albath 2007), (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 
2008), (Xuejun 2010). In our estimation, securing the algorithm against man-in-the-middle attacks 
is more important because these are the most often seen attacks on wireless sensor networks with 
the attackers trying to interfere with the communication channel in an attempt to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of the channel. 
Table 2.12 Attack used in literature  
Author  Year  Attacks 
Feng et al.  2003 ---- 
Sion et al.   2004  Sampling 
 Segmentation 
 Linear changes 
 Addition stream 
Koushanfar et al.  2007  Ghost Signature 
 Addition new signature 
 Removal of the author‟s signature 
 De-synchronization 
 Albath et al 2007 --- 
Zhang  et al  2008  False distribution imposition all 
sensor 
 False distribution imposition part of 
sensor 
 Remnant check 
 
Juma et al.  2008  Modify data 
 Adding data false 
Xiao et al.   2008 --- 
Xiaomei et al.    2009  Personate 
 Forgery 
 Sampling 
 Summarization 
Xuejun R  2010 --- 
Wang  et al.  2011  Forgery  attack 
 Selective forward 
 Data replication 
 Packet transfer delay 
 Packet tempering 
Kamel et al.   2011 ---  
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This section gave a detailed survey and evaluation of various digital watermarking techniques for 
WSNs. The next section will do the likewise for WMSNs.   
2.7  Survey of Literature on Digital Watermarking 
Technique in WMSNs 
With the emergence of WMSNs, the focus in wireless communication networks has shifted from 
WSNs dealing with the typical scalar data to the networks that can gather multimedia data from the 
external environment. Most of the numerous applications of WMSNs are image-based. e.g. traffic 
monitoring and enforcement. Obviously, the multimedia sensor nodes in WMSNs have to capture, 
process and transmit huge amounts of data.  
However, due to the technical specifications of WMSNs, these multimedia applications sometimes 
also create bottle-necks in the network traffic (Baowei Wang 2011). Moreover, as WMSNs share a 
common physical medium without any central management, and with limited computational 
resources, they are particularly vulnerable to security attacks.   
Many approaches have been experimented with to ensure security in WMSNs, watermarking being 
one of them. In this technique, some data for identification, called watermark, is inserted in the 
cover medium, and later on extracted to identify and authenticate it (Wang 2010). Many 
researchers have proposed the concept and confirmed their watermarking techniques through 
simulation and/or experiments. However, different researchers have used different experiments 
with different settings in terms of sensed data, type of watermark used, type of domain and type of 
attack.  
This section carries out a survey of the current literature on digital watermarking techniques for 
WMSNs, and evaluates the techniques proposed. To adequately analyse the existing literature, we 
evaluate all the algorithms on 10 parameters. These are, cover medium, sensed data, watermark 
signal, embedding key, transform domain, watermark generator, watermark embedding technique, 
watermark detection technique, noise, and attack.  
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Figure 2.23    The 10 parameters for the evaluation of digital watermarking techniques in WMSNs 
The 10 parameters for the evaluation of the digital watermarking techniques in WMSNs have been 
shown in Figure 2.23. The idea behind adopting this approach is to carry out an independent and 
thorough evaluation of each algorithm by clearly studying each aspect independently. We will 
study 6 different algorithms on these 10 parameters, beginning with cover medium. 
2.7.1 Cover Medium 
Cover medium is one of the key components of the watermarking technique, and is used for 
inserting a watermark signal. There are different types of cover media, such as texts, images, audio 
or video signals, and packet data, as presented in Figure 2.24. 
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 Figure 2.24 Cover media used in WMSN literature 
Packet data and signals are used as cover media for watermarking techniques in WMSNs. 
Following is a comparative evaluation of different cover media. All of them have been shown in 
Table 2.13.  Majority of these use „packet data‟ as the cover medium (Honggang Wang, Dongming 
Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009), (Wang 2010), 
(Masood, Haider, and Sadiq ur 2010). However, some have used „audio signal‟ (Padmavathi, 
Shanmugapriya, and Kalaivani 2010), (Kaur 2010). In this case, we cannot decide which one is 
better because it depends on the main objective of inserting the watermark signal. For example, 
Kaur (2010) uses a signal for inserting binary stream in which the binary stream is generated by an 
8-bit chirp signal. This signal is used to protect the patient from the ECG signal. On the other hand, 
Honggang et al. (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008) and Wang et al. 
(Xiangjun, Shaodong, and Le 2008) use packet data as the cover medium for embedding an image 
logo. The image logo is not produced by watermark generator, but it can be used to protect the 
cover medium. Both of them only consider the location of the image logo in the cover medium by 
using DWT.  
Table 2.13  Cover media used in literature 
Author  Year Cover medium  
Honggang et al.  2008 Packet data   
Pingping et al.  2009 Packet data   
Wang et al. 2010 Packet data   
Padmavathi et al.  2010 Audio signal 
Kaur et al.   2010 Audio signal 
Masood et al.  2011 Packet data   
  
96 LITERATURE REVIEW 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.7.2 Sensed Data 
As mentioned in Section 2.5.3, the sensed data, like the watermark message, have to be 
communicated through an unsecure channel. However, a multimedia sensor node is more capable 
than a scalar sensor node, since it can retrieve not only scalar data but also video, audio, images 
and signals (Almalkawi, Guerrero Zapata, and Al-Karaki 2010). Here the sensed data generated by 
the multimedia sensor node need copyright protection as they are to be communicated to the other 
multimedia sensor nodes via an unsecure channel.  
Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang (2008) and Wang (2010) implement the image 
data authentication with „the image‟ as the sensed data. The optimized values in selective 
LH3/HL3 coefficients‟ locations have been pursed by them to embed the watermark logo in the 
host multimedia. Pingping (2009) also implements copyright protection of the image with „the 
image‟ as the sensed data. However, he has embedded the logo watermark in the low-frequency 
coefficients of DCT.   
Masood, Haider, and Sadiq-ur (2010) implement security  in WMSNs with „the image‟ as the 
sensed data, encoded by a rate 5/8 encoder and then decoded by Viterbi decoder. Masood, Haider, 
and Sadiq-ur (2010) also use the watermarking technique to make communication between the 
sensor nodes secure.  
Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, and Kalaivani (2010) use „audio acoustic signal‟ as the sensed data 
for identifying the category of the vehicle, by embedding the signal, while Kaur (2010) has 
embedded a patient‟s identification signal for  increasing the security of an ECG signal, with „the 
ECG signal‟ as the sensed data.  
Different kinds of sensed data have been compared over all the different approaches in Table  2.14. 
As can be seen, the majority of the approaches use „image‟ as the sensed data (Honggang Wang, 
Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009), (Wang 
2010), (Masood, Haider, and Sadiq ur 2010). However, some have also used „signal‟ as the sensed 
data (Kaur 2010 ), (Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, and Kalaivani 2010). In this case also, we cannot 
state which one is better, since it depends on whether the multimedia sensor node has captured 
image or signa. 
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Table 2.14 Sensed data used in literature  
Author  Year Sensed Data  
Honggang et al.  2008 image  
 
Pingping et al.   2009 Image   
 
Wang et al. 2010 image  
 
Padmavathi et al.  2010 audio acoustic signal 
  
 
Kaur et al.   2010 ECG Signal  
 
Masood et al.  2011 Image  
 
 
2.7.3 Type of Watermarks  
As mentioned in Section 2.5.4, a pattern of bits inserted in a cover medium is used as watermark. A 
watermark may consist of not only watermark constraints, watermark bits and binary streams, but 
also image logos, binary matrices and signals. Examples of these watermarks are given in Figure 
2.25 
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Type of watermarks
Image Logo Signal 
Binary stream 
(10101010... )
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Figure 2.25 Types of watermarks for WMSNs 
Following is a comparative  evaluation of different types of watermarks in cover media meant for 
WMSNs. All the approaches have been summarized in Table  2.15.   
The majority of these use „signal‟ as a watermark (Masood, Haider, and Sadiq-ur 2010), 
(Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, and Kalaivani 2010), while some use „image logo‟ (Honggang 
Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Wang 2010). Only a few have used „binary matrix‟  
as watermark signal (Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009), while one has used „binary 
stream‟ for the purpose (Kaur 2010).   
In our estimation, image logo is better than binary matrix as a watermark, because it can easily be 
detected and extracted. Statistical approaches, such as NC, Mean Squared Error (MSE) and Peak 
Signal Noise ratio  (PSNR), can detect the image logo (Wenjun and Liu 1999), while IDWT, IFFT 
and IDCT can invert their domains. The image logo can also be separated from the cover medium 
and can be seen with naked eye. In addition, the image logo is a meaningful watermark because 
people can detect whether there is a watermark and identify it by visual observation. 
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Table 2.15 Types of watermark data used in literature 
Author  Year Type of watermarks 
Honggang et al.  2008 Image logo 
 
 
Pingping et al.   
 
2009 Binary matrix 










1..10
.....
...
....1
1..01
 
Wang et al.  2010 Image logo 
 
Padmavathi et al.   
 
2010 signal 
 
 
Kaur et al.   2010 Signal  
  
Masood et al. 2011 Signal 
 
 
2.7.4 Watermark Key 
Recalling Section 2.5.5, the embedding and detection processes use a key, called the watermark 
key, when the watermark signal is inserted into the cover medium. This key is also used to make 
the watermark secure, that is, prevent unauthorized parties from retrieving and changing the 
watermark. The watermark keys are the two adaptive threshold, the weight coefficient of the 
watermark,  the user‟s insertion key and ID. Examples of the watermark keys have been given in 
Figure 2.26. The thresholds 1T  and 2T  have been selected at LH3/HL3 location. Filtering and 
deciding the appropriate embedding position has been done by two adaptive thresholds  
2
,
1
TT  
(Hani, Ernest, and Juan Gonzalez 2008). Thus, the embedding positions depend on these positions 
of the watermark. ID is 
th
j jb   bits of the patient ID in binary format where Kaur (2010 ) has 
used a patient ID. This ID has been used to modulate the chirp signal.  
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Watermark keys
The  two adaptive threshold The weight coefficient 
ID 
the user‟s insertion key  
 
Figure 2.26 Types of watemark keys used in WMSNs 
Following is a comparative evaluation of different types of watermark keys used in the literature. 
All of these have been summarized in Table  2.16. Two of the works surveyed use „the two 
adaptive threshold‟ as the watermark key (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 
2008), (Wang 2010). Others have used the coefficient of the watermark signal  (Pingping, Yao 
Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009), the user‟s insertion key (Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, and 
Kalaivani 2010) and patient ID (Kaur 2010 ), while one does not mention the watermark key used 
(Masood, Haider, and Sadiq-ur 2010). We believe that the two adaptive threshold  
2
,
1
TT  is better 
than the coefficient of the watermark because it can filter and decide the appropriate embedding 
position (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), while the coefficient of the 
watermark can‟t be used for this purpose. On the other hand, the two adaptive threshold and the 
user ID cannot be compared because they have different purposes. 
Table 2.16 The watermark keys used in literature 
Author Year Watermark key 
Honggang et al.  2008 Two adaptive threshold (Threshold key ) 
Pingping et al.   
 
2009 Weight  coefficient  of the watermark signal 
Wang et al.  2010 Two adaptive threshold (Threshold key) 
Padmavathi et al.  
 
2010 The user‟s insertion key 
Kaur et al.   2010 Patient ID binary digit (15 bit) 
Masood et al.  2011 --- 
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2.7.5 Transform Domain  
The transform domain of digital watermarking techniques is normally classified into three types, 
i.e. Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) and Discrete Wavelet 
Transform (DWT). Below, we provide a comparative evaluation of different types of transform 
domains used in the literature. All these have been summarized in Table 2.17. „DWT‟ has been 
used as the transform domain by Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang (2008) and 
Wang (2010), „DCT‟ by Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye (2009) and Kaur (2010), and 
„FFT‟ by Masood, Haider, and Sadiq-ur (2010). Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, and Kalaivani 
(2010), on the other hand, do not mention the transform domain used by them (Padmavathi, 
Shanmugapriya, and Kalaivani). In our estimation, DWT is more robust than DCT and FFT, 
because it can embed a watermark in the selective coefficients of the middle frequency bands of an 
image frame at the three-level Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT), based on the network 
conditions. 
Table 2.17 Transform domains used in literature 
Author  Year Domain 
Honggang et al. 2008 DWT 
Pingping et al.   
 
2009 DCT 
Wang et al.  2010 DWT 
Padmavathi et al.   
 
2010 -- 
Kaur et al.   2010 DCT 
Masood et al.  2011 FFT 
 
2.7.6 Watermark Generator 
As elaborated in Section 2.5.6, creating any kind of watermark requires a watermark generator.  
Here, we evalurate different watermark generators used in the literature over all our paramenters. 
All the approaches have been summarized in Table 2.18. A watermark generator for watermarking 
in WMSNs consists of a median filter, an 8-bit chirp signal, and a 5/8 encoder block. The median 
filter relies on data, instead of means, the 8-bit chirp signal is a „quadratic function‟ with the 
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frequency sweep 2)( toftif   , and the 5/8 encoder block is a non-recursive encoder, in which 
the input is encoded and included in the output sequence. The majority of the works surveyed do 
not mention the generator used (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), 
(Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009), (Wang 2010). Others have used median filter 
(Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, and Kalaivani 2010), the 8-bit chirp signal (Kaur 2010 ) and the 5/8 
encoder block (Masood, Haider, and Sadiq ur 2010). However, it is not possible to meaningfully 
compare these watermark generators as all are used for different purposes. The median filter 
generator produces a watermark signal with the signal and user key insertion as input. On the other 
hand, a watermark binary stream (Masood, Haider, and Sadiq ur 2010) is generated by the 8-bit 
chirp form with signal and patient ID as input. The 5/8 encoder block generator produces a 
watermark signal from image. However, this generator only uses images as input and there is no 
mention of the watermark key used either.   
Table 2.18 Watermark generators used in literature 
Author  Year Watermark generator  
Honggang et al.  2008 --- 
Pingping 2009 --- 
Wang et al.  2010 --- 
Padmavathi et al.   
 
2010 Median filter is used to 
denoise the signal 
Kaur et al.  
 
2010 The 8-bit chirp signal  
 
Masood et al. 2011 (5/8 Encoder Block) 
 
2.7.7 Watermark Embedding Technique 
As discussed in Section 2.5.7, there are four techniques for watermark embedding in WMSNs, i.e., 
using an LSB, using an MSB, using the DSSS system and adding watermark constraints. However, 
watermarking techniques for WMSNs differ from those for WSNs. Below, we provide a 
comparative evaluation of different kinds of watermarking techniques for WMSNs used in the 
literature. All these techniques have been summarized in Table 2.19.  
In two of the works, „the two filter adaptive threshold‟ has been used as an inserting technique 
(Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Wang 2010) in DWT. Others have 
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used varied techniques, viz. the weight coefficient of the watermark in DCT (Pingping, Yao 
Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009), Orthogonal Frequency Davison Multiplexing (OFDM) in FFT 
(Masood, Haider, and Sadiq-ur 2010) and the Wiener Filter (Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, and 
Kalaivani 2010).  Figure 2.27  (a) shows the two filter adaptive threshold, Figure 2.27  (b) shows 
the DCT with the weight coefficient of the watermark information and  location, and Figure 2.27 
(c) shows the OFDM 
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Figure 2.27 (a) The two adaptive threshold (Honggang et al. 2008), (b) the weight coefficient of 
the watermark in DCT (Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009) and (c) Orthogonal 
Frequency Davison Multiplexing (OFDM) in FFT (Masood, Haider, and Sadiq-ur 2010) 
The desired or targeted random process is estimated using the Wiener Filter, by filtering another 
random process through it. The input for the Wiener filter is taken to be a signal , corrupted by 
an additive noise . The output  is calculated by means of a filter , using the following 
convolution:  
     ( 2.17) 
We find „the  two filter adaptive threshold‟ better as an inserting technique than  others, like the 
weight coefficient of the watermark and OFDM, because the two filter adaptive threshold 
technique uses the three level DWT and is, therefore, energy efficient, as the adaptive threshold 
positions to insert watermark are dynamically chosen according to network conditions (Wang 
2010).    
Table 2.19 Watermarking embedding technique used in literature 
Author Year Watermark embedding technique 
Honggang et al.  2008 
wF is the watermarking function and ),...,2,1{ mxwppp  is 
a set of positions where the watermark is embedded 
under the specific watermarking schema. The two 
adaptive threshold }2,1{ TT is  used to filter 
the appropriate embedding process. PLR is the packet 
loss ratio. So, the function is  
),2,1(1({ TTpwateramrkFD  ))},2,1(,.., PLRTTip  
Pingping et al.   
 
2009 The embedding algorithm has the watermark equation 
),
*
()),((),(
'
wqpDCTsignqpDCT   
where w is the watermark data,  is the weight 
coefficient of the watermark information and  ),( qp  is 
the location. 
Wang et al. 2010 The function 
))},2,1(),..,2,1(2
),2,1(1({},{
RPLTTipTTp
TTpwFdQwQ 
 
Padmavathi et al.  
 
2010 The process of embedding digital data  in the form of 
X'= Ek(X'W), where X is the pre-processed original 
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signal, W is the 
watermark information being embedded, k is the user's 
insertion key 
Kaur et al.   
 
2010 The function is 2)( t
o
ft
i
f   where 1
2
)01(

 tff . 
IDpatient  is 
1)(*mod,
j
b
j
bf
chirp
y
chirp
y 
 
y is the watermarked signal 
Masood et al.  2011 The embedding process is ),,( wk
o
dE
w
d  . 
do original 
w watermark message 
k security key 
 
2.7.8 Watermark Detection Technique 
As mentioned in Section 2.5.8, the detection process consists of an extraction unit to first extract 
the watermark signal and later compare it with the cover medium. The process of extraction or 
detection is used for checking whether there is a watermark signal in the cover medium or not. 
Below, we provide a comparative evaluation of this process used for watermarking in WMSNs, as 
found in the literature. All the different approaches have been summarized in Table 2.20.  
As can be seen from the table, most of the works use „statistical approach‟ for detection, e.g. 
Normalized Correlation (NC) and Peak Signal-to Noise Ratio (PSNR) (Honggang Wang, 
Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Wang 2010), (Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 
2009), (Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, and Kalaivani 2010). However,  „the 8-bit chirp signal‟ has 
also been used. In our estimation, the statistical approach scores over the 8-bit chirp signal because 
it is a more common and valid method used for detection of the watermark, without medium 
signal. Using the medium signal for detection is not possible in WMSNs, because the watermark 
image is invisible to the naked eye.   
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Table 2.20  Watermark detecting technique used in literature  
Author  Year Watermark detection  technique 
Honggang et al. 2008 To detect the watermark image, the normalized 
correlation (NC) coefficient is used to measure 
similarity of original watermarks and extracted 
watermark 
Pingping et al.   
 
2009 Peak signal-to Noise ratio (PSNR) and  
 the extracted watermark is obtained by 
comparing d with 0, i.e.,  0d   0
0   0
' '
'


 w
dw
w . 
Wang et al.  2010 Normalized correlation  
( NC)    









w
i
m
j
jiw
w
i
m
j
jiwjiw
NC
1 1
2
)],([
1 1
),(
*
).,(  
Padmavathi et al.   
 
2010 Mean Square Error ( MSE ) and  
Peak Signal-to Noise ratio (PSNR) 
Kaur et al.   2010 --- 
Masood et al.  2011 The watermark detection process is defined 
as ),,,(
o
dwk
w
dD
e
W  watermarked data 
original data  andwatermark w; 
Key k; 
2.7.9  Noise  
As mentioned in Section 2.5.8, noise can be defined as anything that interferes with the 
communication channel, deteriorating the quality of communication. Kinds of noise include packet 
loss, decrease in the quality of transmission, and packet drop. Below, we provide a comparative 
evaluation of different types of noise for watermarking in WMSNs as found in the literature. All of 
these are summarized in Table 2.21. 
Two of the researchers use „dropped packet data‟ as the noise in their experiments (Honggang 
Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Wang 2010), while one has used „ pepper salt‟ 
(Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009). Others do  not mention the type of noise used by 
them (Masood, Haider, and Sadiq ur 2010). We believe that the dropped packet loss is a more 
dangerous type of noise because it can cause the communication between the sender and the 
receiver to stop altogether. To overcome this noise, the sender has to retransmit the packet data 
which, however, wastes energy.  
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Table 2.21 Different types of noise used in literature 
Author  Year Noise  
Honggang et al.  2008 Packet loss 
Pingping et al.   2009 Paper salt noise  
Wang et al.  2010 Packet loss 
Padmavathi et al.   2010 --- 
Kaur et al.   2010 Any undesirable noise 
Masood et al. 2011 Noise communication 
 
2.7.10 Vulnerability  Attacks 
The main objective of vulnerability attacks is to modify, delete or remove any watermark signal 
from the cover medium. There are two types of attacks: intentional and accidental. Intentional 
attacks include cryptanalysis, image processing technique, and removing the existing watermark. 
On the other hand, some undesirable consequences of standard image processing, e.g. resizing, 
filtering or compressing, are parts of accidental attacks. The different attacks used for testing the 
watermarking techniques in WMSNs belong to the category of accidental attacks, such as 
cropping, filtering and compression. Below, we provide a comparative evaluation of different 
vulnerability attacks used by different researchers. All these have been summarized in Table 2.22. 
In the works of most of these, „accidental‟ attacks, such as cropping and compressing, have been 
used (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Wang 2010), (Pingping, Yao 
Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009), while in one of these „filtering‟ has been used (Kaur 2010 ). Others 
do not mention the kind of attack used for their watermarking techniques (Padmavathi, 
Shanmugapriya, and Kalaivani 2010). We believe that cropping and compressing have greater 
possibility to occur than filtering, since they belong to the category of accidental attacks. 
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Table 2.22  Different types of attack used in literature 
Author  Year Attack  
Honggang et al.  2008 Cropping and compression 
Pingping et al.   2009 Cropping and compression 
Wang et al.  2010 Compression 
Padmavathi et al.   2010 --- 
Kaur et al.   2010 Filtering  
Masood et al.  2011 --- 
 
This concluses the survey and evaluation of digital watermarking technique for WMSNs found in 
the literature. The next section provides a summary of approaches and issues in digital 
watermarking technique for both WSNs and WMSNs. 
2.8  Summary of Issues in Digital Watermarking  
for WSNs and WMSNs 
As previously sated, the main aim of this study is to develop a digital watermarking technique for 
both WSNs and WMSNs. To be able to do this, we evaluated the literature on digital watermarking 
techniques for both WSNs and WMSN. This comparative evaluation on five security parameters 
has been shown in Table 2.23.  
Table 2.23 Comparison of different issues in secure communication between sensor nodes for 
WSNs 
Author  Year   
Secure 
Communication 
 
Data 
Authentication 
 
Integrity 
 
Copyright 
Protection 
 
Privacy 
 
Feng et al.  2003 X X X √ X 
Sion et al.   2004  
X 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Koushanfar et al.  2007  
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
X 
Albath et al 2007  
√ 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Zhang  et al  2008  
X 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Juma et al.  2008  
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
X 
Xiao et al.   2008  
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
X 
Xiaomei et al.    2009 X  √ X X  X 
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Xuejun R  2010 X  √ X X  X 
Wang  et al.  2011  
√  
 
X 
 
X 
 
X  
 
√ 
Kamel et al.   2011  
X  
 
X 
 
√ 
 
X  
 
X 
 
                √    Yes       X   No   
 
As can be seen from Table 2.25, Xiangqian (2009) and Wang, Sun, and Ruan (2011) present issues 
in secure communication between sensor nodes in WSNs, while Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil (2004), 
Zhang, Liu, and Das (2008), (iaomei and Xiaohua (2009), and Xuejun (2010) provide issues of 
data authentication in WSNs. Xuejun (2010) and Kamel et al. (2011), on the other hand, present 
issues of data integrity in WSNs. The issue of copyright protection has been taken up by Jessica 
and Potkonjak (2003), Koushanfar and Potkonjak (2007) and Rong, Xingming, and Ying (2008), 
while the issue of  privacy has been discussed by Wang et al. (2011).   
Thus, we made a comparative evaluation of the different aspects of digital watermarking technique 
for WSNs along 11 different algorithms on 10 different parameters. This evaluation can be 
summarized across each parameter as follows:  
1. Cover medium: Most of the researchers have used „packet data‟ as the cover medium  (Kamel 
2011), (Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 2004), (Xiangqian 2009),  (Zhang, Liu, and Das 2008), 
(Juma, Kamel, and Kaya 2008), (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Xiaomei and Xiaohua 
2009), (Xuejun 2010), (Wang, Sun, and Ruan 2011). 
2. Watermark message: Most often text messages have been converted into binary streams using 
„text‟ as the watermark message (Jessica and Potkonjak 2003), (Koushanfar and Potkonjak 
2007). We find „text‟, such as „do not mention anything‟ to be a better watermark message.   
3. Sensed data: Most of the researchers have used „sensed data‟ of binary stream with 8 bits and 
16 bits as the  message (Kamel and Juma 2011), (Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 2004),  (Juma, 
Kamel, and Kaya 2008), (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Xiaomei 2009), (Xuejun 2010), 
Wang et al. (Wang, Sun, and Ruan 2011). 
4. Type of watermark signal: Most of the works use „binary stream‟ as the watermark signal ( 8, 
16 , 64 , 128 bits) (Kamel and Juma 2011), (Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 2004), (Albath 2007), 
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(Juma, Kamel, and Kaya 2008), (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Xiaomei 2009), (Xuejun 
2010), Wang et al. (Wang, Sun, and Ruan 2011). 
5. Watermark key: Most of the works use „binary stream‟ for watermark key (Kamel and Juma 
2011), (Albath and Madria 2007), (Juma, Kamel, and Kaya 2008), (Rong, Xingming, and 
Ying 2008), (Xiaomei 2009). Some of them suggest using positive integer (Radu, Mikhail, 
and Sunil 2004), and amplitude (Zhang, Liu, and Das 2008). 
6. Watermark generator: Most of the reseachers use „hash function‟ for watermark generation, 
such as MD5 and SHA (Kamel and Juma 2011), (Fang Jessica 2003), (F. Koushanfar 2007), 
(Albath 2007), (Juma, Kamel, and Kaya 2008), (Xiaomei and Xiaohua 2009). 
7. Watermark embedding technique: „Least Significant Bits‟ (LSB) has been used as the most 
frequent embedding technique (Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 2004), (Albath and Madria 2007), 
(Zhang, Liu, and Das 2008), (Juma, Kamel, and Kaya 2008),  (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 
2008), (Xiaomei 2009), (Xuejun 2010), Wang  et al. (Wang, Sun, and Ruan 2011), (Kamel 
and Juma 2011). 
8. Watermark detection technique: „Statistical correlation‟, e.g. probability, similarity, mean 
deviation, standard deviation, and Gaussian hypothesis, have been used by most for detection 
(Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 2004), (Albath and Madria 2007), (Zhang, Liu, and Das 2008),  
(Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Xiaomei 2009), (Xuejun 2010). 
9. Noise: Most researchers make no mention of the noise used in their experiments (Kamel and 
Juma 2011), (Juma, Kamel, and Kaya 2008), (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008), (Xuejun 
2010), Wang  et al. (Wang, Sun, and Ruan 2011), (Fang Jessica 2003), (F. Koushanfar 2007). 
However, we consider the dropped packet data as the most dangerous. 
10.  Vulnerability attacks: „Man-in-the-middle attack‟, e.g. impersonation, forgery, modification 
of data or insertion of false data, are the vulnerability attacks most frequently used (Juma, 
Kamel, and Kaya 2008), (Radu, Mikhail, and Sunil 2004), (Kamel and Juma 2011), (Xiaomei 
and Xiaohua 2009), (Wang, Sun, and Ruan 2011). Ghost signature, de-synchronization 
(Koushanfar and Potkonjak 2007), and statistical attack  (Zhang, Liu, and Das 2008), 
(Xiaomei and Xiaohua 2009) (Wang, Sun, and Ruan 2011) have also been used 
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We also made a comparative evaluation of different aspects of digital watermarking technique in 
WMSNs on different parameters. This comparitive evaluation has been summarized in Table 2.23 
pertaining to the issues in secure communication between multimedia sensor nodes in WMSNs.  
As can be seen in Table 2.26,  Kaur (2010 ) and Masood, Haider, and Sadiq-ur (2010) present 
issues in secure communication between multimedia sensor nodes in WMSNs. While Honggang 
Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang (2008) and Wang et al. (2010) discuss the issue of image 
authentication, Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, and Kalaivani (2010) raise the issue of signal 
authentication. The issue of copyright protection has been taken up by Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and 
Zhang Ye (2009), and the issue of privacy only by Kaur (2010). 
Table 2.26 Comparison of different issues in secure communication between multimedia sensor 
nodes for WMSNs 
 
Author  
 
Year 
 
Secure 
Communication 
 
 
Authentication 
 
 
Copyright 
Protection 
 
Privacy 
 
 
Image 
 
Signal 
Honggang, et.al  2008  
X 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Pingping et.al  . 2009  
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
X 
Wang et.al 2010  
X 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Padmavathi, et al  2010  
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
X 
Kaur, S et al   2010  
√ 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
√ 
Masood, et al 2011  
√ 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
   
√    Yes       X   No 
 
We surveyed 6 works in the literature on watermarking technique for WMSNs across 10 different 
parameters. A summary of this evaluation on each parameter is as follows: 
1. Cover medium: Most researchers have used „packet data‟ as the cover medium (Honggang 
Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009), 
(Wang et al. 2010), (Masood, Haider, and Sadiq-ur 2010). 
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2. Sensed data: Most have used „image‟ of binary stream with 8 bits and 16 bits as the sensed 
data (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and 
Zhang Ye 2009), (Wang et al. 2010), (Masood, Haider, and Sadiq-ur 2010). 
3. Type of watermark: The majority of the researchers have used „signal‟ as the watermark 
(Masood, Haider, and Sadiq-ur 2010), (Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, and Kalaivani 2010), 
(Kaur 2010 ).   
4. Watermark key: „The two adaptive threshold‟ has most commonly been used  as the 
watermark key (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Wang et al. 2010). 
However, some researchers suggest using a weight coefficient of the watermark (Pingping, 
Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009), the user‟s insertion key (Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, and 
Kalaivani 2010), and patient ID  (Kaur 2010). 
5. Transform domain: As we saw, „DWT‟ is the most commonly used transform domain 
(Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Wang et al. 2010). 
6. Watermark generator: Unfortunately, most researchers do not mention the generator used by 
them (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and 
Zhang Ye 2009), (Wang et al. 2010).   
7. Watermark embedding technique: In two of the works, „the two filter adaptive threshold‟ has 
been used as an inserting technique (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), 
(Wang et al. 2010) in DWT. 
8. Watermark detection technique: Most works have utilized the „statistical approach‟, such as 
Normalized Correlation (NC) and  Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR), for watermark 
detection (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang (2008), (Wang et al. 2010), 
(Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009), (Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, and Kalaivani 
2010). 
9. Noise: The majority uses „dropped packet data‟ as the noise for their experiments (Honggang 
Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Wang 2010), (Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, 
and Kalaivani 2010).  
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10. Vulnerability attacks: Most of the works have utilized „accidental‟ vulnerable attacks, such as 
cropping and compressing (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), (Wang 
2010), (Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009), while one of them suggests using 
„filtering‟ (Kaur 2010). 
2.9  Conclusion 
This chapter presented the mathematical background to be used in chapters 5, 6 and 7. It also 
presented a detailed survey of the current state-of-the-art digital watermarking techniques for 
WSNs and WMSNs. It further covered the issues in secure communication between sensor nodes 
for WSNs, and multimedia sensor nodes for WMSNs. It outlined the major issues with attempted 
solutions and paved the way for further investigation. Chapter 3 will now provide the problem 
definition and the research issues to be addressed in the rest of the thesis.  
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Chapter 3    
PROBLEM DEFINITION  
 
This chapter covers: 
► problem definition for copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs,  
► problem definition for copyright protection of images in WMSNs, 
► research issues to be taken into account, 
► research methodology to be adopted in order to systematically address the research issues 
identified. 
3.1  Introduction 
The first chapter of the paper highlighted the major security issues in the copyright protection of 
scalar data as well as images. On the other hand, the second chapter provided an introduction to the 
mathematical background, the security services in WSNs and WMSNs and preliminary digital 
watermarking techniques, as well as a comprehensive survey and detailed evaluation of the latest 
digital watermarking techniques in both WSNs and WMSNs. It identified the weaknesses inherent 
in the current approaches addressing these issues. It also brought out the fact that, although there 
have been some significant contributions aiming to address these issues, no approach resolves the 
issues to any significantl extent. While no single approach completely resolves the issue of 
copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs, very little work has been done for copyright 
protection of multimedia data (such as images) in WMSNs.  
This chapter clearly delineates the problems which this research sets out to resolve, i.e., copyright 
protection of scalar data in WSNs and of images in WMSNs.  
CHAPTER THREE  
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3.2  Problem definition 
This section outlines the main problems and challenges in digital watermarking approaches as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. While Figure 3.1 shows the approach for copyright 
protection of scalar data between the sensor nodes of WSNs, Figure 3.2 shows the approach for 
copyright protection of images between the sensor nodes of WMSNs.  
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Figure 3.1  Copyright protection of scalar data between sensor nodes in WSNs 
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Figure 3.2 Copyright protection of images between multimedia sensor nodes in WMSNs 
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The problems and challenges associated with the security issues will be dealt with under the 
following two heads:  
 Problems with copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs 
 Problems with copyright protection of images  in WMSNs  
Both of these problems will be dealt with in the light of the economic and social concerns, the 
existing solutions, and the technical problems that these solutions involve, because these will be 
the key requirements for any effective and viable solution. 
3.2.1 Problems with copyright protection of scalar data 
in WSNs  
Economic and social concern 
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) collects and stores the data sent to other nodes or servers. For 
example, suppose an electricity company wants to prevent electricity from being stolen. Now, 
since electricity is measured as scalar data, the company needs to protect  it by adding a watermark 
signal to this scalar data. So, the company uses a WSN which is equipped with a watermark signal. 
The WSN is used to capture and store the scalar data in the areas suspected of rampant electricity 
theft. The data is then sent to the state electricity company data server through wireless networks 
installed in hostile, unattended environments. However, since WSNs are vulnerable to several 
different types of attacks, such as data insertion, data modification, and data repetition, security 
becomes an important issue with them. The traditional algorithms are not suitable for WSNs and 
cannot protect the copyright of the valuable scalar sensor data. The watermark acts as a second line 
of defence to ensure that the data is still valid. Therefore, the electricity company would hire a 
commercial entity with the aim of getting the original data from the consumers. The commercial 
interests of this entity will propmpt it to ensure that it maintains the original data and is able to 
prove its authenticity.  
Existing solutions  
Several schemes have been proposed with a view to ensuring that the scalar data received is 
exactly as it was sent by the originator, with no tampering during the transit through the 
communication channels (Adrian, Szewczyk J. D. Tygar Victor, and Wen David 2002, Ahmed et 
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al. 2002, Agah, Basu, and Das 2006) (Jian and Xiangjian 2005) (Ajay Jangra 2010 ) (Jessica and 
Potkonjak 2003)  (Koushanfar and Potkonjak 2007) (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008) (Pingping, 
Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 2009). The majority of them use a digital watermarking technique that 
works through the Internet, and the peer-to-peer infrastructure that uses an unlimited amount of 
energy (Adrian, Szewczyk J. D. Tygar Victor, and Wen David 2002, Ahmed et al. 2002, Agah, 
Basu, and Das 2006) (Jian and Xiangjian 2005) (Ajay Jangra 2010 ), although some of them work 
on WSNs that use limited power and capability (Jessica and Potkonjak 2003) (Koushanfar and 
Potkonjak 2007) (Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008). One of the existing copyright protection 
models of scalar data, proposed by Rong, Xingming, and Ying (2008), has been described below to 
explain how a generic watermarking scheme works for WSN scalar data. Consider the copyright 
protection of scalar data scheme as shown in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3  Copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs 
This scheme needs several packets of sensory scalar data before embedding watermarks into these 
packets. These watermarks are encrypted by using secret keys to get cipher watermarks before they 
are embedded into these packets. They are then placed in a covert embedding position in sensing 
the scalar data packet. After this, all the packets that have the chipper watermark inserted are 
transmitted through a communication channel. The received scalar data is extracted using the 
embedded key to get the cipher watermark. Finally, the cipher watermarks are decrypted by using 
the secret key to get the watermarks.   
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Technical Problems  
However, the scalar data in a WSN are transmitted from unattended and sometimes even hostile 
environments. So, it needs to be ensured for copyright protection that the data received through the 
sensor nodes have not been manipulated or modified during transit through the communication 
channel. The security systems traditionally used are computationally exhausting because of the 
overheads they impose, shortening the lives of the sensor nodes (Adrian, Szewczyk J. D. Tygar 
Victor, and Wen David 2002, Ahmed et al. 2002, Agah, Basu, and Das 2006). In comparison, the 
digital watermarking techniques are computaionally light, neither imposing too many overheads 
nor requiring too much energy. However, the main drawback with this approach, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.3, is that the watermarks are encrypted before they are embedded into the packets of 
scalar data in WSNs. These encrypted watermarks need to execute thousands or even millions of 
instructions of multiplication to become the chipper watermark that can be embedded into the 
packets and sent through the wireless networks in hostile or unattended environments. Apart from 
this, the approach suffers from these shortcomings. 
 Inability to overcome the problem of duplicate sensory scalar data: The copyright of 
the sensory scalar data needs protection against adversaries who can easily duplicate the 
sensor scalar data through the communication channel.    
 Inability to overcome the severe constraints on the sensory scalar data: The 
mechanism of the copyright protection of scalar data, as shown in Figure 3.3, does not take 
into account the severe constraints on security, such as different types of attacks during 
transmission through the communication channel, e.g., replication, modification, and Sybil 
attacks. Therefore, the mechanism needs to be developed further against these attacks.   
3.2.2 Problem with copyright protection of images in 
WMSNs  
Economic and Social Concerns 
Surveillance and remote monitoring is one of the applications of WMSNs. The system is managed 
by a commercial entity, with commercial interests, that captures the images of the people involved 
in unlawful activities in the business area using a WMSN. However, since the images are 
transmitted from unattended and sometimes even hostile environments, there is a high likelihood of 
these people, or others with malicious intent, accessing and modifying, manipulating, or deleting 
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these images from the WMSN. Therefore, the commercial entities managing such systems are 
paying greater attention to the issue of copyright protection of images in WMSNs. They embed 
watermarks to the images to ensure the authenticity of these images as well as prove their 
ownership in a court of law.   
Existing Solutions  
The current technology allows validation during transit but not after the image has reached its 
destination. Therefore, one of the challenges with these technologies is to ensure that the source of 
image is preserved after it has left the WMSN. Several schemes have been worked on for 
authentication of images in WMSNs (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008) 
(Xiangjun, Shaodong, and Le 2008) and authentication of signals (Padmavathi, Shanmugapriya, 
and Kalaivani)  (Kaur 2010 )  (Masood, Haider, and Sadiq ur 2010) to ensure secure 
communication in WMSNs. However, there is no significant work as yet on copyright protection 
of images in WMSNs. Following is the existing model for copyright protection of images proposed 
by Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye (2009) in WSNs (Figure 3.4):  
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Figure 3.4 The architecture of CMOS image sensor system performing in the transform. 
We now explain how a generic watermarking scheme works for copyright protection of images in 
WSNs (Pingping 2009). Consider the CMOS image sensor system architecture performing in the 
transform domain, as shown in Figure 3.4. Besides CMOS imager and transform domain, it 
consists of a Quantizer, watermark embedder, watermark scrambler and Huffman encoder. The 
CMOS imager produces an imager sensory array giving out a large number of pixels. The  images 
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are formed by the sequences of digital values of the raw pixel data coming from these pixels. The 
sequences of digital values are transformed  into the transform domain in order to get the 
coefficient transform domain. The coefficient transform domain is then quantized according to the 
quantization table in order to get the quantizer. The watermark being a binary matrix, the 
watermark data is first scrambled by the watermark scrambler using an initial secret key. Next, the 
watermark data is embedded by the watermark embedder using the quantizer. The watermark of 
the coefficient transform domain of the image is encoded using Huffman encoder in order to get a 
compressed watermarked image. The process of the extraction of watermark is the reverse of the 
process of embedding it. First, the detector decodes the watermarked and compressed image to get 
the watermarked image. The watermarked image is then extracted by comparing the coefficient 
transform domain with 1. Now, the low frequency coefficient in the transform domain is modified 
and the trade-off between imperceptibility and robustness is determined to obtain the location and  
, the weight coefficient of the watermark, in order to test the algorithm. As a result, the algorithm 
develops a stronger robustness against various attacks, e.g., compression, cropping, or noise 
insertion. 
Technical Problem  
Since the images are sent from unattended and sometimes even hostile environments, there is a 
high risk of intruders accessing the image sensors through wireless networks. Pingping (2009) 
embedded the watermark in the low-frequency coefficient of the transform domain. However, the 
main drawback with this approach, illustrated in Figure 3.4, is that it is not clear where the process 
of embedding or extracting the watermark is undertaken.  
In summary, the key problems are:   
 Lack of clarity: It does not make it clear as to how and where the process of embedding 
and extracting are to be undertaken during the image transmission between the sensor 
nodes. 
 Inability to overcome the problem of duplicate images: The copyright protection of the 
image has to be developed in a way to protect against adversaries who can easily duplicate 
segments of the images.    
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 Inability to overcome the constraints on the copyright protection of the images: The 
copyright protection of image model has been developed using a system of CMOS image 
sensors. This mechanism does not take into account the severe secrurity constraints, such 
as different kinds of attacks during image transmission in the communication channel, e.g. 
replication, modification, and manipulation.  
3.3  Research Issues 
We have so far discussed two areas of the problem definition as explained above. For each of these 
areas, we defined the economic and social concerns, the currently available solutions, and the 
unresolved technical problems with these solutions. The technical problems form the basis of the 
research issues, and it is crucial to determine how they can be addressed and what the requirements 
for their solutions are. This section outlines the issues that the development of any new solution 
needs to take into account, and then, from Chapter 4 onwards, the solutions that attempt to address 
these research issues and objectives have been pursued.  
3.3.1 Research Issue 1: Developing Copyright Protection 
of Scalar data in WSNs using Watermarking 
Technique 
 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.5) presented a survey of the existing schemes for the copyright protection of 
scalar data in WSNs using digital watermarking and discussed three of these, while the problem of 
copyright protection itself was discussed in Section 3.2.2. Based on the discussion of this problem, 
we can identify two technical problems with the existing copyright protection mechanisms as 
follows:  
 Inability to securely  add  or embed a robust  watermark signal to the data sensed by a 
WSN deployed in a hostile, unattended environment. 
 Inability to make the WSN sensed data robust against severe constraints, such as 
modification, manipulation, Sybil attack and forwarding attack, during the process of data 
transmission through the communication channel.  
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These technical problems give rise to a number of research questions to be addressed, in order to 
develop effective copyright protection of scalar data during communication between sensor nodes. 
For example, the following questions need to be answered: 
a. How to add or embed a robust watermark to the WSN sensed data in a hostile, unattended 
environment. 
b. How to make the WSN sensed data robust against severe malicious attacks, such as 
modification, manipulation, Sybil attack, and selective forwarding attack to scalar sensor 
node, during transmission between sensor nodes.  
 
3.3.2 Research  Issue 2: Developing Copyright Protection 
of Images in WMSNs using Watermarking 
Technique 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.7) presented a survey of the existing copyright protection schemes in 
WMSNs, using digital watermarking. However, the majority of them work on the authentication of 
the image and the signal. Some of them work on the secure communication of the image. There is 
only one scheme for copyright protection of images in WSNs, and no such scheme for WMSNs. 
The problem of copyright protection was discussed in Section 3.2.3. Based on this discussion, three 
technical problems can be identified with the existing authentication mechanism, as follows: 
 
 Inability to explain when and where the process of embedding and extraction are to be 
undertaken.  
 Inability to add or embed a robust watermark to the multimedia data from WMSNs deployed  in 
hostile, unattended environments. 
 Inability to make the WMSN multimedia data robust against severe constraints, such as 
modification, manipulation, Sybil attack and forwarding attack, during data transmission 
through the communication channel.  
 
The technical problems outlined above give rise to a number of research questions to be addressed, 
in order to provide for copyright protection of images transmitted between sensor nodes. For 
example, the following questions need to be answered: 
a. How to explain when and where the embedding and extraction processes are to be undertaken. 
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b. How to add or embed a robust watermark to the multimedia data from a WMSN deployed in a 
hostile, unattended environment. 
c. How to make the WMSN multimedia data robust against severe constraints, such as 
modification, manipulation, Sybil attack and forwarding attack, during data transmission 
through the communication channel. 
3.4  Research Methodology 
A science and engineering-based research approach will be adopted for this research. Science and 
engineering research leads to the development of new techniques, architecture, methodologies, 
devices or a set of concepts, which can be combined to form a new theoretical framework. This 
research approach commonly identifies problems and proposes solutions to these problems.  
The science and engineering approach that has been utilised in this research consists of: problem 
definition, conceptual solution, implementation, experimentation, testing and validation of 
prototypes against existing solutions. It consists of three main stages: 
 Problem definition 
 Conceptual solution 
 Implementation, testing and evaluation 
3.4.1 Problem definition 
In the problem definition stage, the aim is to highlight the significance of the research questions. 
This problem definition stage has been covered in this chapter. Problems secure valuable sensor 
scalar and the image during communication between sensor nodes by digital watermarking 
technique in WMSNs has been grouped into two categories.  For each category, the discussion was 
carried out from three perspectives: a formal definition of the category, the socio-economic, and 
the technical concerns. The problems associated with the technical concerns led to the research 
issues for the new solution development.  
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3.4.2 Conceptual solution 
Design is one of the most important parts of a system development process. It involves the study 
and understanding of the domain, the application of subject matter knowledge and experience to 
solve the problem and the creation and evaluation of a proposed solution.   
In this stage, a conceptual framework is designed for the proposed solution. A conceptual 
framework is an abstract model of the practical solution. It provides a road map for building the 
actual solution for the system and can be regarded as a blueprint for the implementation of the 
system.  
3.4.3 Implementation, test and evaluation 
In this stage, testing and validation are carried out through experimentation with real-world 
examples and field testing. The process of testing and validating a working system provides unique 
insights into the benefits of the proposed concepts, frameworks and alternatives. 
By building a prototype system, implementing, testing and evaluating, a better insight into the 
feasibility and functionality of the conceptual framework as well as the whole solution is provided.  
3.5  The Objective of the Research 
In the previous discussion, we defined two main problem areas, and raise two research issues. In 
this section, we will discuss the two research objectives for the solution development that address 
these research issues. The two objectives are: 
Objective 1 
To develop a watermarking algorithm to address the issue of copyright protection of scalar sensed 
data in WSNs. The proposed watermarking technique is aimed to robust against various types of 
attack, such as scalar data modification, scalar data insertion and scalar data repetition. The 
watermarking technique is satisfy all the watermarking properties i.e. robustness and informed 
detection.  
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Objective 2 
To develop a watermarking algorithm to address the issue of copyright protection of sensed image 
in WMSNs. The proposed watermarking technique is aimed to robust against severe constraints on 
security such as kinds of attacks during the image in communication channel such as replication, 
modification, and manipulation.  
3.6  Summary the problem Definition   & Research 
Issues 
In this chapter, we have identified two major research issues that are aimed at solving information 
security problem associated with copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs and copyright 
protection of the image in WMSNs. In this section, we will provide a brief summary of each the 
following research issues:  
o Problem with copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs 
o Problem with copyright protection of image  in WMSNs 
Research Issue 1 
In the first part of the theses, we intend to develop a watermarking solution that is robust against 
the duplicate of the scalar sensed data and the severe constraints attack of the sensory scalar data 
on security such as modification and Sybil attack. 
The proposed solution will offer the following features: 
 It provides securely  add  or embed    a robust  watermark signal to WSN sensed data   
 It provides robust  WSN sensed data against severe constraints on security such as kinds of 
attacks during the image in communication channel such as modification, manipulation, 
Sybil and forwarding attack. 
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Research Issue 2 
In the second part of theses we intend to develop a watermarking solution that is robust against the 
duplicate of the image during transmission on the image and the severe constraints attack of the 
sensory scalar data on security such as modification and Sybil attack. 
Hence, we intend to develop a watermarking technique which can offer the following features:  
 It provides  when and where  the process of embedding and extracting are undertaken. 
 It provides add or embed a robust watermark to WMSN multimedia data which is 
deployed  in hostile unattended environments.  
 It provides WMSN multimedia data against  the following severe constraints attacks to 
WSN sensed data such as modification, manipulation, Sybil and forwarding attack during 
the data transmission through a communication channel. 
3.7  Conclusion 
This chapter provides a problem definition for securing valuable sensor scalar and the image 
during communication between sensor nodes in WMSNs by digital watermarking techniques and 
approaches. Based on the socio-economic and technical problems of existing solutions, two 
research issues have been defined. For each research issue, a number of research questions have 
been proposed. These research questions need to be addressed in the development of any new 
digital watermarking techniques in WMSNs. To address each research issue, two research aims 
have been proposed. Furthermore, the research methodology for this research has been discussed. 
In the next chapter, an overview of the proposed solution along with its conceptual framework will 
be provided. The conceptual framework is designed to address all the issues that have been 
discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4    
AN OVERVIEW OF THE  SOLUTION AND 
THE  CONCEPTUAL PROCESS 
 
This chapter presents 
► an overview of the proposed solutions, 
► a conceptual framework for the proposed solutions, 
► the conceptual process adopted in the development of the proposed solutions.  
4.1  Introduction 
As seen in Chapter 2, a number of works have addressed the issue of secure transmission, 
authentication, integrity and copyright protection between sensor nodes in WMSNs. However, few 
of them have been able to resolve the problems in their entirety. Therefore, Chapter 3 presented 
two major research issues pertaining to the existing solutions proposed in this research. This 
chapter will have a look at these proposed solutions. 
4.2  The Proposed Solution : Overview  
Chapter 3 gave the problem definition listing two main problems regarding information security: 
 Problems with copyright protection of the scalar data in WSNs using digital watermarking 
technique.  
 Problems with copyright protection of images in WMSNs using digital watermarking 
technique. 
CHAPTER FOUR   
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Chapter 3 further identified the research issues emanating from these problems. As it pointed out, 
in order to provide for copyright protection of scalar data, the solution intended to be developed 
should have the following features:  
 Ability to securely add or embed a robust watermark signal to the data sent by a WSN 
which is deployed in hostile, unattended environments. 
 Ability to make the WSN sensed data robust against the severe constraints on its security, 
such as modification, manipulation, Sybil attack and forwarding attack, during data 
transmission through the communication channel. 
The proposed watermarking technique (LKR Watermarking technique), as the solution that 
addresses these issues, is presented in Chapter 5. This approach to copyright protection of scalar 
data using digital watermarking technique for WSNs addresses the following two issues: to 
securely add or embed a robust watermark signal to the WSN sensed data, and the ability to make 
the WSN sensed data robust against the severe constraints on its security. The LFSR and 
Kolmogorov rule provide for these features, as Figure 4.1 shows. 
The next problem is how to protect the copyright of images in WMSNs. In order to address the 
issue of determining where the process of embedding and extraction are undertaken and how to 
overcome the malicious attacks, we propose another watermarking technique (GPKR 
Watermarking technique) for the copyright protection of images. The solution to be developed 
should have the following features:  
 Ability to explain when and where the process of embedding and extraction are to be 
undertaken. 
 Ability to add or embed a robust watermark to the multimedia data from a WMSN deployed in 
hostile, unattended environments. 
 Ability to make the WMSN multimedia data robust against the severe constraints on the 
security of the sensed data, such as modification, manipulation, Sybil attack and forwarding 
attack. 
 
The model for copyright protection of images in WMSNs using digital watermarking technique has 
been proposed in Chapter 6, which does it by reducing and expanding the image using the 
Gaussian pyramid and Kolmogorov rule, as shown in Figure 4.1.  
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Conceptual Solution 
LFSR and Kolmogorov rule 
Watermarking Technique For 
Protecting Scalar data in WSNs
Pyramids transform and Kolmogorov 
rule Watermarking Technique for 
Protecting an Image in WMSNs  
Protect scalar data againts duplicate, 
manipulate, modification and sybil 
attacks in WSNs 
Protect an image data againts 
segmentation duplication, manipulation 
in WMSNs 
 
Figure 4.1  An overview of the conceptual solution  
 
The thesis is organized from this chapter onwards as shown in Figure 4.1. The conceptual solutions 
proposed to address the two main problems of information security have been discussed in this 
chapter. The next chapter describes these solutions in greater detail.  
4.3  Solution Description  
This section looks at the solutions developed to resolve the issues discussed in earlier chapters. The 
two proposed solutions are follows: 
 LKR Watermarking Technique: This is a technique to protect copyrights of WSN sensed 
scalar data using LFSR and Kolmogorov rule.  
 GPKR Watermarking Technique: This is a technique to protect copyrights of WMSN 
sensed images using the Gausian Pyramids transform and Kolmogorov rule. 
Each of these solutions will now be explained in detail, beginning with the watermarking technique 
using LFSR and Kolmogorov rule for copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs. 
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4.3.1 LFSR and Kolmogorov Rule for Copyright 
Protection of Scalar Data  in WSNs (LKR 
Watermarking Technique)  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, an algorithm for copyright protection of scalar data should satisfy the 
following properties:  
 Embedding effectiveness  
 Imperceptibility 
 Informed  detection 
 Robustness   
The watermarking solution (LKR Watermarking technique) proposed in this thesis satisfies these 
properties. To generate the cover medium, we introduce atomic trilateration which was used for 
generating the cover medium in section 2.1.1.  The sensed scalar data, i.e. the phenomena from the 
external environment captured by the sensor nodes, is protected against severe malicious attacks by 
embedding a watermark signal. Watermark signal is a kind of signal or pattern that can be inserted 
into the cover medium. It is generated by LFSR by converting the scalar data and the message 
sensed data into binary sequence , i.e. the information that is conveyed by the watermark signal. 
This message sensed data is used to communicate from the sender to the receiver. The watermark 
constraints are generated by the watermark signal incorporating the Kolmogorov rule. To test the 
embedding effectiveness, the LKR watermarking technique embeds the message sensed data and 
the watermark constraints into the cover medium and immediately detects their presence before 
applying any attacks. The LKR watermarking technique operates in the spatial domain. The 
imperceptibility of the watermarked cover medium is maintained by embedding the watermark 
constraints into the cover medium and immediately detecting their presence before applying any 
attacks. Non-blind detection and robustness is achieved by measuring the normalized difference 
error between the watermarked solution and the solution obtained without watermark. This 
algorithm is robust against the following attacks:  deletion, packet replication, and Sybil attack. 
Figure 4.2 shows how LKR watermarking technique works for the copyright protection of scalar 
data in WSNs.   
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Figure 4.2 Working  LKR Watermarking technique for copyright protection of scalar data in 
WSNs 
After this discussion on the LKR watermarking technique in this section, the next section explains 
the GPKR watermarking technique for copyright protection of images in WMSNs. 
4.3.2 Gaussian Pyramids and Kolmogorov Rule for 
Copyright Protection of Images in WMSNs               
(GPKR Watermarking Technique)   
As mentioned in Chapter 2, an algorithm for the copyright protection of images should satisfy the 
following properties:  
 Embedding effectiveness 
  Imperceptibility 
 Informed detection 
 Robustness   
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The watermarking solution (GPKR Watermarking technique) proposed in this thesis satisfies these 
properties. Atomic trilateration was used to generate the cover medium in Section 2.1.1. However, 
WMSNs deal with more complex data gathered from the targeted area, e.g. images, and audio and 
video streaming. Therefore, a WMSN has the image as the main sensor. This image refers to the 
sensed image by a multimedia sensor node and is then reduced by the Gaussian pyramid 
transforms to become the reduced image. The Gaussian pyramid transform is a technique used for 
reducing and extending images, as described in section 2.2.4. The reduced image is converted into 
sequences of binary streams, called watermark signals. The watermark constraints are obtained by 
generating these watermark signals, incorporating the Kolmogorov rule. To test the embedding 
effectiveness, the GPKR watermarking technique embeds watermark constraints into the cover 
medium, and immediately detects its presence before applying any attacks. The GPKR 
watermarking technique operates in the spatial domains of the images. The imperceptibility of the 
watermarked cover medium is maintained by embedding watermark constraints. Non-blind 
detection and robustness is achieved by measuring the normalized difference error between the 
watermarked solution and the solution obtained without watermark. This algorithm is robust 
against  insertion and packet replication attacks. Figure 4.3 shows how GPKR watermarking 
technique works for the copyright protection of images in WMSNs. 
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Figure 4.3 Working GPKR Watermarking technique for  copyright protection of  images  in 
WMSNs 
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This section explained the GPKR watermarking technique for the copyright protection of images in 
WMSNs. The next section describes the approach adopted in this research, explaining the 
conceptual process followed in the solution development. As mentioned earlier, the research 
follows a science- and engineering-based approach, and system design and development 
methodology which is discussed next.  
4.4  Conceptual process  
The overview of the proposed solution has been discussed in Section 4.2. However, developing the 
solution requires strictly following a conceptual process. This involves clearly eliciting the 
requirements and enunciating the design rationale, proposing a theoretical foundation that 
addresses the requirements, building a prototype system that can verify the theoretical foundation, 
and finally validating and verifying the solution.  
This section outlines the conceptual process followed consistently throughout the entire research 
that includes two projects covered by this thesis. The main steps of the conceptual process are 
illustrated in Figure 4.4.  
As already mentioned, the research adopts a science- and engineering-based research approach and 
follows the system design and development methodology (T.M. Salvatore 1995), in order to 
develop a technologically advanced solution, as illustrated in Figure 4.4 
Requirement 
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Design 
Rationale
Theoretical 
Foundation  
Prototype
Implementation 
Experimental 
Setting
Result and 
Observation 
Validation and 
Comparative Analysis 
 
Figure 4.4 Conceptual process followed in  this thesis 
Each of these main stages will now be explained in detail, listing the activities carried out at each 
stage. 
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4.4.1 Requirements, Elicitation and Prioritization  
This stage begins with a survey of the existing solutions, and identification of the main issues 
relevant to these solutions. These issues are then prioritised according to their importance. For 
example, the issues in the copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs are: how to overcome the 
duplication of the scalar sensory data during transmission, and how to handle the severe malicious 
attacks during the transmission of scalar data. Similarly, the issues in the copyright protection of 
images in WMSNs  are: how can the process of embedding and extraction be made clear, and how 
can it be determined as to when these processes are to be undertaken? The issues higher up on the 
list are given a high  priority while designing the solution, while it offers the flexibility to address 
other issues if desired. 
4.4.2 Design rationale  
The second stage in the conceptual process is design rational. Once the requirements elicitation and 
prioritization stage is finished, the next stage (i.e. design rationale) describes the basic design 
decisions to meet the requirement elicited in Stage 1. Each and every listed requirement contributes 
to the design process. We relate each and every requirement to a design, thereby that all the 
requirements are considered when finalizing the design process.  
4.4.3 Theoretical foundation 
The stage of theoretical foundation emanates from the design rationale. It proposes a solution to 
address all the requirements listed in Stage 1 by analysing the design rationale determined in Stage 
2. A detailed algorithm is proposed to cover all the needs. 
The feasibility, computational complexity, scalability, real time deployment, and reliability of each 
design decision are investigated and the final algorithm incorporates all the design decisions that 
meet these criteria.  
The final algorithm needs to be tested for the functionality purposes and, later on, the results of the 
tests can be used as insights to optimise the initial algorithm. This test implementation is carried 
out in the next stage of prototype implementation, as described below. 
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4.4.4 Prototype Implementation  
This stage provides for an implementation of the theoretical foundation and prototype algorithm, 
designed in any development environment that suits the needs. For instance, watermarking 
technique can be implemented using MATLAB and TOMLAB, development platforms which have 
been used in a large number of scientific projects requiring a high degree of precision, for example, 
precision up to 8 decimal points. Further, these are quite stable environments offering many built-
in functions that remove the necessity of testing the basic functions (e.g. reducing of the image or 
expanding the image, and converting decimal to binary or binary to decimal), allowing the 
developer to focus on algorithm development. Experiments and tests are performed on the 
prototype and observations recorded to validate the theoretical foundation. However, before 
carrying out experiments on the prototype, it is necessary to identify the test cases, thereby 
finalising the experimental setting which is the next stage explained below.   
4.4.5 Experimental Setting  
At this stage, the experiments run on the prototype are discussed to analyse its performance in 
different conditions in the real world situations. Since each experiment is different from others, this 
stage finalizes the experimental settings, defining the minutest details, like the coordinate position 
of the  two-dimensional sensor networks using the random position of a sensor node, the scalar 
sensed data, and the vulnerability to the attacks, to ensure that the results obtained from the 
prototype are reliably and consistently estimated.  
The experiments are carried out over a limited scalar data pool. In case of watermarking technique, 
at least 32 two-dimensional positions using random 50 and 75 postions of the sensor node are 
tested in order to get reliable results. The sensed scalar data and images vary a lot in their position 
in the tests. After the experiments are over, tabulation of results is done for further analysing and 
improving the prototype, as explained below.  
4.4.1 Results and Observations  
This stage is concerned with anlysing results and observations. At this stage, the experiments run 
on the prototype are discussed and observations described. In case of watermarking, the 
watermarked cover medium is attacked by several types of attacks, such as deletion, replication or 
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modification of data, insertion of false data, Sybil attack and selective forwarding attack. After 
each attack, the watermark constraints are extracted from the watermarked cover medium to check 
for their presence, in order to identity the watermark constraints that are still robust against the 
attack. The results are then validated by cross-relating the observations with the theoretical 
foundation, as described below. 
4.4.2 Validation and Comparative Analysis 
In this final stage, the actual results (results from the experiments) are compared with the expected 
results (results from the theoretical model), which might be similar to, or quite different from, the 
actual results. In case of differences, the theoretical model is adjusted and all the steps from stages 
1 to 6 are amended. After the validation of the expected results, the proposed solution is compared 
with the existing solutions to discover its strong and weak points. This comparative analysis 
provides new avenues for future research.  
4.5  Conclusion  
In Chapter 2, a survey of the literature on watermarking techniques for WSNs and WMSNs was 
carried out. Based on the survey, in Chapter 3, the existing issues in the field were identified and 
outlined. It was also noted that, although several watermarking techniques have been proposed in 
the literature, none of them addresses all the issues outlined.  
Therefore, two watermarking techniques, termed copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs ( 
LKR watermarking technique) and copyright protection of images in WMSNs (GPKR 
watermarking technique) were proposed as possible solutions.  
Further, in Chapter 3, it was shown how each of these solutions addresses the issues identified. The 
LFSR and Kolmogorov rule were applied to address the issue of copyright protection in WSNs, 
and the Gaussian pyramids and Kolmogorov rule were applied to address the issue of copyright 
protection of images in WMSNs.  
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Chapter 5   
LKR  WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE  
 
This chapter presents: 
► an introduction to the LKR Watermarking Technique for copyright protection of scalar 
data in WSNs, 
► a general overview of the proposed LKR watermarking technique as the proposed solution 
for copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs, 
► experimentation and testing of the proposed LKR watermarking technique for copyright 
protection of scalar data in WSNs, 
► evaluation, validation and a comparative study of the proposed LKR watermarking 
technique for copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs. 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter addresses the problem of copyright protection of scalar data by ensuring that the 
proprietary information (i.e., the watermark) remains secure between the sensor nodes in a WSN. It 
particularly considers the issue of copyright protection of scalar data for applications like 
intellectual property protection. It presents a novel LFSR (Linear Feedback Shift Register) and 
Kolmogorov Rule (KR) based watermarking scheme, termed LKR, that embeds the message 
sensed data and watermark constraints into the cover medium (NLSP). What sets this 
watermarking scheme apart from other such schemes is the use of message sensed data and 
watermark constraints derived from the sensed data by LFSR and Kolmogorov Rule, leading to its 
nomenclature as LKR watermarking technique.  
CHAPTER FIVE    
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5.2  Proposed LKR Watermarking Technique 
This section provides a general overview of the proposed watermarking technique, and then 
outlines the requirements to address the problem.  
5.2.1 General overview of LKR 
The primary functions of a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) are collecting and storing data, and 
forwarding them to other nodes and/or servers. Current technologies allow validation of data 
during transit, but not after the data has reached its destination. One of the challenges with these 
technologies is to ensure that the source of the data is preserved, once it has left the WSN. This is 
important as the data can be used by other applications or distributed to other parties without the 
consent of the owner. Therefore, it needs to be ensured that the data source is identifiable. 
However, data sensed by a WSN can be deleted or modified, or false data can be inserted into it, by 
malicious attackers. Sensors can even be physically captured and replaced by them. Hence, 
security becomes an important issue with WSNs. The proposed watermarking technique aims to 
ensure that the copyright information is securely embedded within the source data, so that the 
owner of the data can be identified, if required. 
5.2.2 Requirements  
To tackle the issue of copyright infringement of valuable scalar sensor data, the following 
requirements have been laid down for the proposed LKR watermarking technique. This represents 
the first stage of the conceptual process described in section 5.4  where the requirements are 
elicited and prioritized. Although the proposed algorithm has been implemented for scalar sensor 
data, it can be further extended to images and audio. The requirements are as follows:     
1.  Coverage: The LKR algorithm should be able to operate on a minimum of 75 nodes over a 
500 square meter area.  
2. Cover Medium: The LKR should only have scalar data for the cover medium. 
3. Copyright protection: The LKR should be able to securely embed the copyright 
information into the cover medium. 
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4. Message sensed data: The LKR should use message sensed data because the message 
sensed data can provide subjective extraction. The message sensed data is a signal or 
pattern  which is  embedded into the cover medium.  
5. Watermark constraints: The LKR should use a watermark constraint rather than a binary 
watermark because the watermark constraints can provide subjective detection.   
6. Robustness: The watermark should be embedded robustly to handle watermark attacks.    
7. Informed detection: The LKR should offer informed extraction and detection.   
Based on the requirements outlined above, Section 5.2.3 discusses the design rationale of the LKR 
watermarking technique, incorporating each of these requirements in the design rationale. It also 
shows how the design decision addresses each requirement. This discussion concludes stage one of 
the conceptual process and paves the way for the next stage which is design rationale.  
5.2.3   Design Rationale 
This stage represents the second step of the conceptual process referred to in Section  4.4.2 , in 
which all the requirements are addressed by finalising the design decision. The theoretical 
foundation of the proposed LKR watermarking technique satisfies the requirements outlined in 
Section 5.2.2, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The following design decisions are proposed in the 
framework  
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Figure 5.1 Theoretical foundation of LKR watermarking technique in WSNs 
1. The network setting consists of 75 sensor nodes placed randomly within a 500 square 
meter area. This network provides random positions to three sensor nodes that are used to 
start up the cover medium generation process (Req. 1).    
2. The cover medium is generated by using the theory of atomic trilateration, as discussed in 
Section 0. This cover medium is used to embed the watermark constraints and message 
sensed data ( Req. 2, Req. 3 ).  
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3. The message sensed data is originally generated using the scalar data, and then this scalar 
data is converted to 8 binary bits, which are further expanded to 28 bits by LFSR, and the 
message sensed data results from partitioning it to 4 binary bits, which are then converted 
into decimals ( Req. 4). Figure 5.2  shows  how the message sensed data is created:       
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Figure 5.2 The process of the creation of message sensed data 
4. Watermark constraints are generalted from the original scalar data captured by the WSN 
node. The scalar data is converted into 8 binary bits, these bits are then expanded to 28 
binary bits by LFSR and, using the Kolmogorov rule, the watermark constraints are 
created, as illustrated in Figure 5.1 ( Req.  5)). 
5. Robustness of the watermark constraints is measured using the normalized difference error 
between the watermarked solution and the solution obtained without watermark (Req. 6). 
6. The cover medium is required for watermark signal detection because  the watermark 
signal can produce message sensed data, and then the message sensed data is converted 
and merged to get the sensed data ( Req. 7 ).  
5.3  Theoretical Foundation for LKR 
Watermarking Technique 
This section proposes the theoretical foundation for copyright protection of scalar data. This 
represents the third stage of the conceptual process described in Section 4.4.3 where the design 
decisions are analysed and algorithm is presented. The proposed scheme offers robustness against 
data deletion, packet replication and Sybil attack, which are not tackled in the literature  (Zhang, 
Liu, and Das 2008) (Kamel 2011). Compared to this scheme, Zhang, Liu, and Das (2008) have put 
forward a statistical watermark approach to authenticate data which is end-to-end and inherently 
supports in-network processing. In this technique, watermark is actually the modulated 
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authentication information, embedded in the sensory data at sensor nodes. This technique resists 
attacks like false distribution or imposition on the part of the sensor nodes, remnant check in the 
spatial domain, coefficient value forgery, and non-zero coefficient position switch in the frequency 
domain. This technique is robust against false distribution on the part of the sensor nodes and 
remnant attack in the spatial domain. However, although it can detect coefficient value forgery and 
non-zero coefficient position switch in the frequency domain, the authors do not discuss whether 
this technique is robust against these or not. A communication protocol for WSNs has been 
introduced by Xuejun (2010) to authenticate sensitive data transmission. The technique uses 
sensitive information as the watermark. The watermark is then embedded in the sensory data in the 
sensor nodes. A threshold is used to avoid the alteration of the lowest bit "1", append "1" into the 
Output Binary system (OBS), or otherwise append "0" to it, and  make a big influence on the 
precision of the sensory data. However the author does not discuss what kind of attacks have been 
used and whether the technique is robust against attacks. Kamel and Juma (2011) have introduced 
a technique to provide for data integrity. This technique, based on distortion free watermarking, 
embeds the watermark in the order of the data element, so that it does not cause distortion of the 
data. This technique uses “man-in-the-middle attack” as the vulnerabitlity attack, and other attacks, 
such as modification of data or insertion of false data. It is robust against modification and false 
data attacks. Our scheme embeds watermark constraints and the message sensed data in the cover 
medium. Our watermark constraints are generated by using the Kolmogorov rule and the message 
sensed data, by partitioning and converting them into decimals. Both watermark constraints and the 
message sensed data are added to the cover medium only.   
The novel feature of the LKR watermarking technique is that it uses the LFSR and Kolmogorov 
Rule for copyright protection of scalar data. The LFSR is used to generate the watermark signal, 
and the Kolmogorov rule is used to generate the watermark constraints. The  LKR watermarking 
comprises four steps: 
 Cover medium generation 
 Watermark generation  
 Watermark embedding 
 Watermark extraction  & detection.  
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5.3.1 Cover Medium Generation 
This section explains the process of generating the cover medium by using the atomic trilateration 
process. The pseudo-code for generating the cover medium is shown in Pseudo Code 5.1 and the 
flowchart in Figure 5.3. 
Pseudo Code  5.1  Generating cover medium 
Input:  
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Position of two-dimensional three sensor network
 
cT  Temperature of the propagation media  
DCDBDA ttt   ,,  Time for transmission between node D to A, D to B and D to 
C  
Vs Speed of the acoustic signal 
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Error in the measurement between the Euclidean measurement 
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Step 1: Getting all input Data  
Position of the two-dimensional, three-sensor network   ),(,, BBAA yxyx , and   cC yx , . 
Temperature of the propagation media ( cT ), Time for transmission between node D to A, D to B, 
and D to C , Error in the measurement of the temperature ( ,DAt ,DBt ,DCt  ), Error in measurement 
of the timer from D to A , D to B, and D to C ( DA , DB , DC ), and Error in measurement between 
the Euclidean measurement and the measurement using time differences of the optimal D to A, D 
to B, and D to C ( 321 ,,  ). 
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Step 2: Computing the speed of the acoustic signal and adding the error of temperature, 
because this speed is one of the requirements for measuring the distance between two sensor 
nodes.  
Compute the speed of the acoustic signal using )( 6.04.331 tcs TV     
 
Step 3: Computing the distance between the node D and the sensor nodes A, B and C, using 
time differences of arrival (TDoA) and adding the error of measurement of the timer 
respectively. 
Compute the distance of )(* DADAsDA tVd  , )(* DBDBsDB tVd  , and 
)(* DCDCsDC tVd  .   
Step 4: Computing the distance between the node D and the sensor nodes A, B and C, using 
the Euclidean theorem.  
Compute the distance of 
22 )()( ADADDA yyxxd  , 
22 )()( BDBDDB yyxxd  , and  
22 )()( CDCDDC yyxxd   
 
Step 5: Computing the difference between the distance using (TDoA) and the distance using 
the Eucliden theorem, and adding the error in measurement between the Euclidean 
measurement and the measurement using time differences of the optimal D to A, D to B, and 
D to C. 
 
Use step (2) to step (3) to compute the difference between step (4) and (3) and add the error 
between step (4) and step (3). 
1
22 )(*))( 6.04.331()()(  DADAtcADAD tTyyxx  
2
22 )(*))( 6.04.331()()(  DBDBtcBDBD tTyyxx  
3
22 )(*))( 6.04.331()()(  DCDCtcCDCD tTyyxx  
 
Step 6: Computing and minimizing the errors in the system of equations (step 5).   
Compute and minimize the objective function 321min   DCDBDAtf  
Step 7: Generating Cover medium  
Append step 5 and step 6 to get a Non-Linear System Programming  
 
 
  
145 LKR  WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Begin 
  ),(,, ByBxAyAx  ,, cC yx
cT ,DAt ,DBt ,DCt
 DD yx , t DA DB  DC  
21 ,
 
3
End
321min   DCDBDAtf
2)( 6.04.331 tcs TV 
)(* DADAsDA tVd 
)(* DBDBsDB tVd 
)(* DCDCsDC tVd 
22 )()( ADADDA yyxxd 
22 )()( BDBDDB yyxxd 
22 )()( CDCDDC yyxxd 
1
1
22 )(*))( 6.04.331()()(  DADAtcADAD tTyyxx
2
22 )(*))( 6.04.331()()(  DBDBtcBDBD tTyyxx
3
22 )(*))( 6.04.331()()(  DCDCtcCDCD tTyyxx
3
4
5
6
7
3)(*))( 6.04.331(
2
)(
2
)(
2)(*))( 6.04.331(
2
)(
2
)(
1)(*))( 6.04.331(
2
)(
2
)(
sConstraint
321min








DCDCttcTCyDycxDx
DBDBttcTByDyBxDx
DADAttcTAyDyAxDx
DCDBDAtf
 
 
Figure 5.3  Flowchart of the generation of Cover Medium 
5.3.2 Watermark Generation   
This subsection explains the process of generation of the watermark signal. The generation process 
is the first and a very crucial step in the process, with unique and complex requirements. The 
information contained in the watermark message, such as text and/or sensed data, must be unique 
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so that it can be used for ownership identification. Both the watermark message and the watermark 
key generator are inputs, processed in the watermark generator to produce a watermark signal. The 
process of generating watermark signal consists of four steps: 
1. Converting sensitive data into binary sequences,  
2. Using LFSR  to create  watermark signal,   
3. Producing watermark constraints using Kolmogorov rule  
4. Partitioning and converting the watermark signal to decimal numbers in order to produce 
the message sensed data.  
Each of these steps will now be described in detail.  
5.3.2.1 Converting sensitive data into binary   
The first step involves the conversion of the sensitive data into binary sequences. The term 
sensitive data refers to the information which is to be protected to prevent undesirable disclosures, 
restricting access to it to authorized agencies only. The reasons to protect such information may be 
legal or ethical, e.g., personal privacy. For example, WSNs telemonitor the patients‟ physiological 
data and track doctors and/or nurses in the hospital in many healthcare applications (Kahn, Katz, 
and Pister 1999, Noury, Mercier, and Porcheron 2000). In these applications, small sensor nodes 
are attached to the patients with varying functions. For example, one sensor node may monitor the 
heart rate while the other detects any abnormalities in blood pressure. The pseudo-code for 
converting sensitive data is shown in Pseudo Code 5.2 and the flowchart in Figure 5.4. 
Pseudo Code  5.2  Converting sensitive data into binary sequences 
Input: 
d Sensitive data  
 
Output  
B Binary sequence   
Q Quotient 
R Remainder 
   
 
Step 1: Getting input Data 
d is  the sensitive data  
Step 2: Dividing data sensitivity by 2 to get quotient and remainder  
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Sensitive data d is divided by 2  
Step 3:  Recording quotient and remainder  
Record quotient (Q) and Remainder (R) from step 1 
Step 4: Conditional   
If reminder Q = 0 then go to  5, else go to step 1. 
Step 5: Collecting remainder R 
Collect Rs into desired binary number with the first R as LSB and last as MSB 
Step 6: Collecting remainder and concatenate 
B = concatenation (R)  
 
Get sensitive data d
 d divide by 2
Record quantient(Q) and Remainder ( R )
Collect R‟s into desired binary Number with first 
B = concatenation (R) 
Begin
Is Q=0 ? 
End
No
1
6
5
3
Yes
4
2
 
 
Figure 5.4 Flowchart for conversion of decimal data into binary digits 
5.3.2.2 LFSR  to create  watermark signal 
The second step is to generate the watermark signal by using LFSR. The term LFSR refers to a 
shift register with its input bit as a linear function of its own previous state. Exclusive-or (XOR) is 
one of the most widely used linear functions of single bits. Thus, most often, LFSR is a shift 
register with its input bit driven by the XOR of some of the bits from the overall shift register 
value. Details about LFSR can be found in Section 2.2.2.  
The pseudo-code for generating watermark signal is shown in Pseudo Code 5.3 and the flowchart 
in Figure 5.5. 
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Pseudo Code  5.3 Generating watermark signal 
Input  
B Binary sequence  from pseudo code 5.2 
kici ,...,2,1,0,   Coefficient Feedback constants of polynomial  
kk
k xxcxccxf 


1
110 ...)( as Watermark key 
coefficients 
Output  
W Watermark signal 28 bit 
 
Step 1: Getting input Data 
B is  the binary sequence produced using pseudo code 5.2 
Step 2: Applying initial value as seed   
Use binary sequence B as the initial value, B is called the seed  
Step 3: Applying watermark key  
Use kici ,...,2,1,0,   as feedback constants of polynomial 
kk
k xxcxccxf 


1
110 ...)( as watermark key coefficients  
Step 4: Generating an infinite binary sequence  
Generate an infinite binary sequence with B as seed and ci  as watermark key by using LFSR.   
Step 5: Cutting the infinite binary sequence 
Cut the infinite binary sequence from 1 to 28  
Step 6: Producing watermark signal (W) 
Cut the infinite binary sequence from 1 to 28  
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Begin 
B binary sequence 
Watermark key 
Apply B as the initial value as seed 
End
Cut the infinity binary stream from 1 to  28 
W = Watermark signal 28 bit
Use                                              feedback constant as 
watermark key 
Generate an infinity binary stream using  LFSR
kic i ,...,2,1,0, 
kic i ,...,2,1,0, 
1
6
2
4
5
3
 
Figure 5.5 Flowchart for generation of watermark signal 
5.3.2.3 Kolmogorov Rule to Create Watermark Constraints 
This subsection explains how to create watermark constraints using Kolmogorov rule, already 
introduced in Section 2.2.3. The rule used here can be seen in Table 5.1 
Table 5.1 The particular of the Kolmogorov rule 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
t  DA  DB  DC  1  2  3  
 
The pseudo-code for generating watermark constraints is shown in Pseudo Code 5.4 and the 
flowchart in Figure 5.6 
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Pseudo Code  5.4  Generating watermark constraints 
Input  
W Watermark signal 28 bit 
Output  
WC Watermark constraint   
 
Step 1: Getting input Data 
Watermark signal 28 bits 
Step 2: Grouping watermark signals  
Group 28 bits watermark signals into groups of 7 bits each  
Step 3: Matching, using Table 5.1  
Match the bit number with corresponding variable number using Kolmogorov rule       (Table 5.1 )   
Step 4: Deciding variable included or not included 
If a bit is assigned a variable within a group and that variable is included in the linear, go to step 4. 
Else, if a bit zero is assigned to a variable within a group and that variable is not included in the 
linear, then go to step 2.  
Step 5: Generating watermark constraints  
Print WC watermark constraint 
 
Begin 
 W watermark signal 28 bits
  
Group 28 bit watermark signals into groups of 7 bits each.
End
Match the bit number with corresponding variable number from 
table of Kolmogorof rule  
Watermark constraints   
a bit one is assigned a variable with in a group that 
variable is included in the linear
YES
NO 
5
1
3
4
2
 
 
Figure 5.6  Flowchart for the generation of watermark constraints 
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5.3.2.4 Partition and convert to create message sensed data   
This section explains the process of creating the message sensed data. This is actually a sensed data 
that comes from a 28 bit watermark binary, resulting from the generation of the watermark signal. 
The pseudo-code for generating the message sensed data is shown in Pseudo Code 5.5  and the 
flowchart in Figure 5.7. 
Pseudo Code  5.5  Generating message sensed data   
Input  
W Watermark signal 28 bit 
Output 
 MSD Message sensed data 
 ( ,1Msd ,2Msd ,3Msd ,4Msd ,5Msd 6Msd , 7Msd ) 
 
Step 1: Getting input data 
Watermark signal 28 bits 
Step 2: Dividing 28 bit watermark signal   
Divide 28 bit watermark signal into groups of 4 bits each. 
Step 3: Converting each group 
Convert each of the groups into decimal numbers 
Step 4 : Generating message sensed data  
Message sensed data ( ,1Msd ,2Msd ,3Msd ,4Msd ,5Msd 6Msd , 7Msd ) 
 
Begin 
Group W into groups of 4 bits each
End
Convert each group into decimal number to get 
weight factors
Message sensed data 
W is  28 bits watermark 
signal
7,6,5,4,3,2,1 MsdMsdMsdMsdMsdMsdMsd
4
3
2
1
 
 
Figure 5.7  Flowchart for the generation of message sensed data 
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5.3.3 Watermark Embedding Algorithm 
This sub section explains the process of embedding the message sensed data and the watermark 
constraints. The process of embedding forms the second stage in the watermark system. This 
process is undertaken by an embedder which combines the cover medium, the watermark 
constraints and the message sensed data. It, then, creates a watermarked cover medium which is 
perceptibly identical to the cover medium.  
The pseudo-code for embedding the message sensed data and the watermark constraints is shown 
in Pseudo Code 5.6, and Figure 5.8 shows the watermark embedding process 
 Pseudo Code  5.6 Embedding watermark constraints  
Input  
WC Watermark constraints 
MSD Message sensed data 
  ),(,, BBAA yxyx
,  cC yx ,  
Position of two-dimensional sensor networks 
cT  Temperature of the propagation media  
 
4321 ,,,   The values are selected such that the feasibility of the solution 
space of  the optimization problem is not harmed 
,DAt ,DBt  DCt  
Time transmission between node D to A, D to B and D to C 
 
Output  
 
 DD yx ,  Position of two-dimensional sensor networks 
DCDBDA  ,,  The  error in the measurement of the timer from   D to A , D to 
B and    D to C 
321 ,,   The error in the measurement between the Euclidean 
measurement and the measured using time differences of 
optimal D to A, D to B and D to C. 
t  The error in the measurement of the temperature  
f 
 
Minimum of the function of objective  
 
 
 
  
153 LKR  WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Step 1: Getting all input data  
The three positions      CCBBAA yxyxyx ,,,,,  are obtained randomly to form networks of 75 
positions of two-dimensional sensor nodes. The temperature of the propagation  media 
 
( cT ) is 
obtained by using  uniform distribution on interval [0,75]. Time transmission of DCDBDA ttt   and ,,  
are obtained by using gauss distribution on interval [0,1]. The values of 321 ,,   and 4  are also 
obtained using gauss distribution on interval [0,1]. The watermark constraints (WC) are obtained 
by applying the pseudo code 5.5.    
Message sensed data (MSD) are obtained by applying the pseudo code 5.6. 
 
Step 2: Using the cover medium  
Obtain cover medium by applying the pseudo code 5.1. This cover medium is called NLSP which 
has an objective function, consisting of coefficient objectives.  
Step 3: Changing the coefficient objectives to the message sensed data  
Change each of the coefficient objectives to the message sensed data respectively.  
 
Step 4: Appending watermark constraints (WC)  
Append watermark constraints to the cover medium 
 
Step 5: Computing the new cover medium to solve a new coordinate position, the error in in 
the measurement of the timer, in the measurement of distance, in in the measurement of the 
temperature and Minimum of the function of objective.    
Compute a new cover medium in which the message sensed data and the watermark constrains are 
added. TOMLAB is used to solve it, and then 321 ,,,,,,),,( DCDBDAtDD yx  and min f are 
obtained.  
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Start
WC  Watermark Constraints  
MSD Message Sensed data 
   ),(,, ByBxAyAx cT
31 ,2,  4
,DAt ,DBt DC
t
 ,, cC yx
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Figure 5.8  Flowchart for watermark embedding algorithm 
5.3.4 Watermark Extraction & Detection Algorithm 
The last stage in copyright protection system through watermarks is the process of extraction and 
detection which is a crucial part because the sender identifies and provide information to the 
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intended receiver using it. The process of detection and extraction is undertaken by a detector. The 
detection process uses an extraction unit to first extract the watermark signal, and later compare it 
with the cover medium. The extraction process consists of two parts, watermark location and 
watermark information recovery. Detection can be of two types based on the requirement of cover 
medium, or otherwise, in the detection process. If cover medium is required, it is informed 
detection; if not, it is blind detection. The LKR watermarking technique uses informed detection to 
detect the watermark.  
5.3.4.1 Watermark Extraction Process 
The extraction process is also undertaken in the watermark detector as the message sensed data has 
to be recovered from the cover medium. The pseudo-code for extracting the watermark signal is 
shown in Pseudo Code 5.7 and the process of watermark extraction in Figure 5.9. 
 Pseudo Code  5.7 The process of extracting watermark signal  
Input  
MSD Message sensed data 
 ( ,1Msd ,2Msd ,3Msd ,4Msd ,5Msd 6Msd , 7Msd ) 
Output  
W Watermark signal 28 bit 
 
Step 1: Getting all input data      
Get the message sensed data ( ,1Msd ,2Msd ,3Msd ,4Msd ,5Msd 6Msd , 7Msd ) 
 as shown in the coefficient objective function of the cover medium  
Step 2: Converting the coefficient objective  
Convert the message sensed data ( ,1Msd ,2Msd ,3Msd ,4Msd ,5Msd 6Msd , 7Msd ) 
into 4 bits respectively  
Step 3: Merging all these 4 bits  
Merge all of these 4 bits respectively to make 28 bits 
Step 4: Generating watermark signal  
Generate watermark signal of 28 bits 
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Begin 
Convert 
Into 4 bits respectively 
Merge all of these 4 bits respectively 
End
7,6,5,4,3,2,1 MsdMsdMsdMsdMsdMsdMsd
7,6,5,4,3,2,1 MsdMsdMsdMsdMsdMsdMsd
Watermark signal 28 bits 
1
2
3
4
 
Figure 5.9 Flowchart for extraction of message sensed data 
5.3.4.2 Watermark Detection Process 
The end of the watermark system is the detection process, which is a crucial part as it allows the 
sender to identify and provide information to the intended receiver. The detection process is 
undertaken by a detector. Based on the requirement of the cover medium, or otherwise, detection 
can be of two types. If a cover medium is required, it is informed detection; if not, it is blind 
detection. The process of detecting watermark has not been explained in Feng et al. (Jessica and 
Potkonjak 2003) or Koushanfar et al.  (Koushanfar and Potkonjak 2007). Both of them only 
explain the process of embedding the watermark. Here, we adopt the approach of Cox et al. (Cox, 
Kilian, and Leighton 1997) for verifying if the watermark is present. A parallel can be drawn 
between the approaches of these authors and the spread-spectrum communication technology, as 
the watermark spreads over frequency components that are visually important. Let x be the error of 
the optimal solution with the message sensed data, x’ the error of the optimal solution with the 
message sensed data and the watermark constraints, and x‟‟ the error of the optimal solution with 
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the message sensed data and the watermark constraint attacks. For detecting the watermark, a 
correlation value or similarity measure is used in most of these methods. Here, for verifying 
whether the watermark signal is present, the difference measure between the normalized difference 
error of the optimal solution with the message sensed data and the watermark constraints, and the 
optimal  solution with the message sensed data, is ( xxc  ' ). The similarity measure between the 
normalized difference error of the optimal solution with the message sensed data and the 
watermark constraint attacks, and the optimal  solution with the message sensed data, is 
( xxc  '
'
). The similarity measure is obtained from the normalized correlation coefficient 
''
''
'' ),(
XX
XC
XCSM 
.  
The pseudo-code for detecting the watermark signal is shown in Pseudo Code 5.10 and the process 
of watermark detection in Figure 5.10. 
Pseudo Code  5.8 The process of detecting watermark signal 
Input 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Output   
      Detect whether watermark signal 28 bits (W) is robust or not    
Step 1: Getting all input data      
],,,,,,[ 321 DCDBDAtx  , ],,,,,,[
'
3
'
2
'
1
'''
'
'' DCDBDAtx  , 
],,,,,,[ "3
"
2
"
1
'"'"'""" DCDBDAtx  and ,1Msd  ,2Msd  ,3Msd ,4Msd   ,5Msd 6Msd , 7Msd  
Step 2: Applyinge  pseudo code 5.7 to get a watermark signal of  28 bits  
],,,,,,[ 321 DCDBDAtx   the error of the optimal 
solution  
with message sensed data 
],,,,,,[ '3
'
2
'
1
'''
'
'' DCDBDAtx   
the error of the optimal 
solution with the message 
sensed data and watermark 
constraints 
],,,,,,[ "3
"
2
"
1
'"'"'""" DCDBDAtx   
the error of the optimal 
solution       with the 
message sensed data and 
watermark constraints 
attacks 
,1Msd ,2Msd ,3Msd ,4Msd ,5Msd
6Msd , 7Msd  
Coefficients of objective 
function 
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Convert the message sensed data ,1Msd  ,2Msd  ,3Msd  ,4Msd  ,5Msd  6Msd , 7Msd  into 4 bits 
respectively, and then merge all of these to get a watermark signal of 28 bits.  
 
Step 3: Computing the difference error of the optimal solution with the message sensed data 
and the watermark constraints, computing threshold, and computing similarity. 
xxcxxc 
"'
 and   
'
   Compute ,  
''
'
  threshold
xx
cx
  and  
""
"
 similarity
xx
cx
 . 
Step 4: Deciding whether the watermark signal of 28 bits is robust 
If  similarity          threshold  , go to the watermark signal of 28 bits is robust 
Step 5: Deciding whether the watermark signal of 28 bits is not robust 
If  similarity        threshold  , go to the watermark signal of 28 bits is not robust 
Begin 
End
7,6,5,4,3,2,1 MsdMsdMsdMsdMsdMsdMsd
1
2
]3,2,1,,,,[ DCDBDAtx 
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'
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"
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"
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"
1,
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,
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,
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,
"
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"
DCDBDAtx 
Applying  pseudo code 5.7 to get watermark signal 28 bits 
 
""
"
 similarity  Compute
xx
cx

 
''
'
  d  thresholCompute
xx
cx

xxcxxc 
"'
 and   
'
   Compute
Watermark signal 28 bits 
 similarity          threshold 
3
4
5
watermark signal 28 bits is robust watermark signal 28 bits is not robust
yes
No
 
Figure 5.10  Flowchart for the process of detection of watermark signal 
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5.4  Implementation of the Prototype  
With a view to testing the applicability of the proposed algorithm, this section describes the 
experimental set-up used for an extensive testing of the copyright data protection model, based on 
the LKR watermarking technique. This experimental set-up uses MATLAB and TOMLAB. 
MATLAB includes TOMLAB within it as a broad spectrum development environment for 
conducting researches on, and finding practical solutions of, the optimization problems. It got 
developed when a need came to be felt for an advanced, robust and reliable tool for developing 
algorithms and software, to provide solutions to various problems relating to applied optimization. 
This represents the fourth stage of the conceptual process described in Section 4.5.4, where the 
theoretical foundation was implemented as a prototype. Here, the network set-up for copyright 
protection, cover medium set-up, watermark generation, embedding the message sensed data, and 
embedding the watermark constraints and the message sensed data, have been modelled through 
the process of extracting watermark signal using MATLAB and TOMLAB. Some attacks to this 
model copyright protection scheme that attackers often use have also been modelled, such as 
modifying different watermark constraints using the LKR watermarking technique. The overall 
process of copyright protection through watermark has been modelled using MATLAB files. These 
are:   
 menuLKR.m 
 
SetUPnetworksCopyrightWSNs.m 
GenerateCoverMedium.m 
Watermarkgeneration.m  
 
EmbeddingMessageD.m 
EmbeddingMsdWConstraints.m 
Extract.m 
Detecting.m  
The operations are governed by menuLKR.m, which initializes all the required variables, such as 
the path to the network set-up, the cover medium set-up, and external applications, and passes the 
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embedded and the extracted parameters to the Extract.m file to be processed. Also, attacks are 
performed on the menuLKR.m as elaborated in Section 5.4.5. For verifying whether the watermark 
signal is present, the similarity found between the normalized difference error from the optimal 
solution and the watermarked solution X', and the solution obtained without watermark X, is 
applied and modeled, using the file detecting.m.  
5.4.1 Source Code : Network Set-Up Generation 
The process of network setting is modelled using the file SetUPnetworksCopyrightWSNs.m. The 
call to SetUPnetworksCopyrightWSNs.m from menuLKR.m passes to the location of the network 
setting. The pseudo code for network setting process has been explained in greater detail in Section 
5.5.1.  
5.4.2 Source Code:  Cover Medium Generation 
The process of cover medium generation is modelled using theg file GenerateCoverMedium.m. 
The call to GenerateCoverMedium.m from menuLFSKR.m passes to the location of the cover 
medium, and the parameters for the cover medium to perform the embedding operation are 
determined. The pseudo code for the cover medium generation has been explained in Section 5.3.1. 
Figure 5.11 shows the screenshot of the cover medium generation process using the MATLAB 
Code  
 
Figure 5.11  Screenshot of the cover medium generation process using MATLAB code 
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5.4.3 Soure Code : Watermark Generation   
The process of watermark generation consists of four steps, i.e., converting the sensitive data 
modelled through the MATLAB  function „de2bi.m ’,  generating the watermark signal modelled 
using the file LFSR.m, producing watermark constraints modelled through the file 
KolmogorovRule.m, and generating the message sensed data modelled using the file 
MessageSenseData.m. The pseudo code for the watermark generation process has been explained 
in Section 5.3.2. Figure 5.12  shows the screenshot of the process of generating the watermark 
signal and the watermark constraints using the MATLAB code. 
 
Figure 5.12  Screenshot of the process of generating watermark signal and water,arl constraints 
using MATLAB code 
5.4.4 Source Code : Embedding Watermark Signal 
The process of embedding a watermark signal consists of  two steps - embedding watermark 
constraints and embedding message sensed data. The process of embedding watermark constraints 
is modelled using the file EmbeddingMsdWConstraints.m, while the process of embedding 
message sensed data is modelled using the file EmbeddingMessageD.m.  
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The call to both EmbeddingMsdWConstraints.m and EmbeddingMessageD.m from menuLKR.m  
passes to the location of the cover medium, and the parameters to perform the embedding operation 
are determined. The pseudo code for embedding watermark constraints and message sensed data 
have been elaborated in Section 5.3.3.  Figure 5.13 shows the screenshot of the process of 
embedding the watermark signal using the MATLAB code.  
 
Figure 5.13 Screenshot of the process of embedding watermark signal using MATLAB code 
5.4.5 Source Code: Extracting Watermark  
The process of extracting watermark signal is modelled using the file Extract.m. The pseudo code 
for the process of extracting the watermark signal has been elaborated in Section 5.3.4.  Figure 
5.14 shows the screenshot of extracting the watermark signal using the MATLB code.  
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Figure 5.14 Screenshot of the process of extracting watermark signal using MATLAB code 
5.4.6 Source Code: Attacks 
We assume that the attacker can estimate the watermark constraints, which, therefore, should be 
modified and changed. The corresponding watermark constraint attacks carried out in our 
experiment are:  
1. Inserting a number of different watermark constraints, generated using the LFSR and 
Kolmogorov rule, hoping to find new results for the error of cover medium that will be 
mapped into the existing solution. This process of insertion of a number of different attacks is 
modelled using the file Attack_data_False_Insertion.m. 
2.  Deleting a number of watermark constraints hoping to find new results for the error of cover 
medium that will be mapped into the existing solution. This process of deletion of a number 
watermark attacks is modelled using the file Attack_data_Deletion.m. 
3.  Replicating different watermark constraints, generated using the LFSR and Kolmogorov rule, 
hoping to find new results for the error of cover medium that will be mapped into the existing 
solution. This process of replication of watermark constraints is modelled using the file  
Attack_data_replication.m. 
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4. Presenting more than one attacker identity within the network by creating more than one 
watermark constraint, hoping to find new results for the error of cover medium that will be 
mappped into the existing solution. This process of presenting more than one identity attacker 
is modelled using the file Attack_data_Sybil.m.  
 
All the implementation details of  Attack_data_False_Insertion.m,  Attack_data_Deletion.m, 
Attack_data_replication.m and Attack_data_Sybil.m have been provided in Section 5.5.3. 
5.5  Experimental Setting  
This section describes the experimental set-up used for an extensive testing of our copyright data 
protection model. In it, 75 nodes were placed randomly within a 500 square meter area, as shown 
in Figure 5.10.  
5.5.1 Network Set -Up 
This section explains the process of setting up the wireless sensor network using MATLAB 
simulation. The network consists of 75 sensor nodes placed randomly within a 500 square meter 
area. In all, 32 positions of      CCBBAA yxyxyx , and ,,,,  were generated, using the random 
positions of 75 sensor nodes,  generating 32 of cT  using gauss distribution on interval [0,1], 32 of  
DCDBDA ttt   and ,,   
using uniform distribution on interval [0.1], and 32 of 321 ,,   and 4  using 
gauss distribution on interval  [0,1], in order to avoid the possibility of these values hampering a 
feasible cover medium solution.  
The pseudo-code for setting up the network is shown in Pseudo Code 5.9.  
Pseudo Code  5.9 Network Set-up for LKR Watermarking Technique  
Input 
N Number of Sensor Nodes
 
L Placing area  within a unit square of sensor nodes 
R Maximum range of two sensor nodes communicate 
 
Output  
 
  75,...,1,, iiyxi   Coordinate Position of two-dimensional sensor nodes 
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cT  Temperature of the propagation media  
 
DCDBDA ttt   and ,,  Generate time transmission between two sensor nodes 
21
, and 
3
  Errors between the Euclidean distances measured 
the feasibility of the solution space of the optimization 
321 ,,  , 4  
The value of the feasibility of the solution space of the 
optimization 
 
Step 1: Setting up all data  
N=75, L = 500 and R=50 
Set N number of sensor nodes randomly within an L square meter area and set the maximum range 
of two sensor nodes communicate as R  communicating as R. 
 
Step 2: Positioning and plotting coordinates  
Generate coordinates of 75 sensor nodes‟ positions of x, y and plot these coordinates 
 
Step 3:  Plotting a link between two sensor nodes using Euclidean Theorem  
 
Compute distance between two sensor nodes using Euclidean Theorem. If distance is less than R  
then there is a link between the two sensor nodes, else there is no link between the two sensor 
nodes 
 
Step 4: Generating parameters of time transmission, temperature, errors between two 
Eucliden distances and the value feasibility of the solution space   
 
Generate time transmission between two sensor nodes based on uniform distribution (0,1), generate 
temperature of the propagation media based on random between  (1,75), generate errors between 
the Euclidean distance measures based on uniform distribution (0,1), and the feasibility of the 
solution space of the optimization based on uniform distribution (0,1)  
 
Step 5: Printing coordinate position, temperature, time transmission, error between two 
distance measures, and the value of the visibility  
Print coordinate position  ,75,...,3,2,1),,( iyx ii temperature cT , time transmission DCDBDA ttt ,, , 
and the value of the visibility 4321    and ,,,   
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Start
N = 75 ( Number of sensor node) 
L = 500 meter ( placing area with in a unit 
square)
R = 50 ( maximum range of two senso rnodes 
communicate)    
End
2
1
5
Generate coordinate of N sensor node of x, y and plot these coordinate to L 
meter square. 
3Plot a link between two sensor node using Euclidean theorem and constraints R 
4
Generate parameters of time transmission, temperature, errors between two 
eucliden distances and the value feasibility of the solution space  
 ,75,...,3,2,1),,( iiyix cT DC
tDBtDAt ,,
 
4   and ,3,2,1 
 
 
Figure 5.15 Flowchart for seting up LKR watermarking technique
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The network set-up for the LKR watermarking technique was implemented through pseudo code 
5.6 using MATLAB. Figure 5.15 shows the  screenshot of the network setting of the LKR 
Watermarking Matlab Code, and Figure 5.16 shows the 75 nodes randomly deployed within a 500 
square meter area.  
   
 
Figure 5.16  Screenshot of the network setting for LKR Watermarking Technique using MATLAB 
Code 
 
 
Figure 5.17    The 75 nodes randomly deployed within a 500 meter square area 
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Based on Figure 5.16, the coordinates of 75 nodes can be listed, as given in Table 5.2 
Table 5.2  Coordinate positions of  75 nodes 
No X Y  No X Y  No X Y  
1 475.0646 351.37 26 202.7652 970.8449 51 193.4312 451.4248 
2 115.5693 273.2856 27 198.7217 990.0826 52 682.2232 43.89533 
3 303.4213 222.4401 28 603.7925 788.8617 53 302.7644 27.18512 
4 242.9912 347.2836 29 272.1879 438.6585 54 541.6739 312.685 
5 445.6495 310.6551 30 101.3826 291.3958 55 96.71558 485.4225 
6 381.0484 397.4105 31 99.36087 211.7481 56 341.1116 495.0413 
7 228.2338 478.4217 32 301.8962 257.7559 57 151.3822 394.4308 
8 9.251822 261.2952 33 136.094 166.9757 58 270.8369 219.3293 
9 410.7036 440.0711 34 99.40713 216.4533 59 75.43649 249.1557 
10 222.3517 86.47807 35 7.636964 112.9749 60 348.9492 106.9817 
11 307.7162 489.8734 36 373.3928 289.9034 61 189.1865 321.7461 
12 395.9685 135.7236 37 222.5482 380.1825 62 430.0058 160.0178 
13 460.9065 126.1647 38 465.9073 264.9116 63 426.8276 480.0493 
14 369.1036 437.8709 39 232.9972 320.2632 64 296.7815 363.3159 
15 88.13307 368.653 40 209.3247 104.5347 65 248.2762 205.9766 
16 202.8531 68.25937 41 423.1107 189.9092 66 449.8846 372.2829 
17 467.7348 5.878344 42 262.5762 391.6643 67 410.8146 133.9736 
18 458.4522 446.949 43 101.3237 340.4229 68 322.4552 219.9622 
19 205.1351 99.56903 44 336.0687 230.5476 69 408.9872 466.6901 
20 446.8248 149.3615 45 419.0592 283.9144 70 330.1138 341.6662 
21 28.94565 330.7213 46 9.819757 397.1053 71 170.9853 106.2799 
22 176.4341 142.2043 47 340.6386 29.5913 72 144.8629 419.6191 
23 406.5832 234.6121 48 189.7405 301.4345 73 170.5968 314.3923 
24 4.93065 32.39056 49 415.898 25.1344 74 267.0395 66.88637 
25 69.44544 494.1675 50 251.4064 207.6874 75 363.5566 103.5664 
 
 
 
Now that we  have obtained a network setting and a list of the coordinates of 75 random points 
within a 500 square, we will generate a cover medium.  
The experimental setting of the cover medium uses a cover medium algorithm based on Pseudo 
Code 5.2, which was explained in Section 2.2.1. We obtained the cover medium NLSP as follows: 
3
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We next obtain all the data input to be used for preparing the cover medium. In all, we 32 data 
inputs by:  
1. generating 32 ),( and   ),(),,(
C
y
C
x
B
y
B
x
A
y
A
x using the random positions of 75 sensor 
nodes within a 500 square meter area, 
2. generating 32 of 
DC
t
DB
t
DA
t  and  
 
,
 
using a uniform distribution on interval [0.1], 
3. generating 32 of cT  using gauss distribution on interval [0,1], 
4. generating 32 of 321 , ,  and   4  using gauss distribution on interval [0,1], in order to 
aviod these values hampering a feasible cover medium solution.  
 
Table 5.3 shows 32 experiments of data input for copyright protection in WSNs.  
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In the next experimental setting, we obtain sensitive scalar data. It is this scalar data which is to be 
protected using the LKR watermarking technique. The scalar data have been captured by the 
sensor nodes and number 120. We use the code of watermark generation as elaborated in Section 
5.4.3. Figure 5.18 shows the screenshot of the process of producing the watermark signal (W), 
watermark constraints (WC) and Message Sensed Data (MSD). 
 
Figure 5.18  Screenshot of generating watermark signal MATLAB Code 
====================================================== 
             MAIN MENU GENERATE WATERMARK              
            LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE              
      Gathering data by WSNs into binary sequence      
      Generating Watermark stream using LFSR         
      Watermark Constrints using Kolmogorov rule        
      Generating Message Sensed Data              
------------------------------------------------------ 
Which one do you want =  1 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 Gathering data by WSNs into binary sequence           
 Converting the data sensory decimal to binary sequence 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Capture scalar data node =120 
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s =    1     1     1     1     0     0     0 
------------------------------------------------------  
 Initial state of LFSR from converting  binary sequnce  
 Watermark Key  is a tap position                       
------------------------------------------------------  
Watermak Key is like tap position of f(x) is =[ 1 3 5 6 ] 
cutting the infinity binary stream 
st = 
     0     1     0     1     1     0     1 
     0     1     1     0     1     1     0 
     0     1     1     0     1     1     0 
     1     0     1     1     0     1     1 
 
-----------------------------------------------------  
Watermark dividing using Kolmogorov rule           
----------------------------------------------------  
The particular low of kolmogorof rule  
 ----------------------------------- 
 1     2    3     4     5    6     7  
 ----------------------------------- 
 x     y    z     r     s    t     u  
------------------------------------ 
 et   eda  edb   edc   d1    d2   d3  
 ----------------------------------- 
The watermark constrains of = 
d1 + d2 + eda + edb + edc 
eda + edb + et 
d1 + d2 + d3 
d1 + d2 + d3 + eda + edb + edc 
message sensed data is  
MSD = 
     1    14     7     9    14     7     9 
 
At the end of the experiment, we partition and convert the Message Sensed Data (MSD)  into 
watermark signal. We use Pseudo Code 5.7 to convert the MSD into watermark signal. Figure 5.19 
shows the screenshot of the processes of generating and extracting the signal using MATLAB 
Code. 
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Figure 5.19 Screenshot of generating and extracting the signal using MATLAB Code 
     ====================================================== 
               LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE              
  Copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs      
   1. Partitioned and convert to create MSD            
   2. Menu LKR Watermarking technique                  
====================================================== 
Read Message Sensed Data(MSD) is =   
Message  sensed data is  
     1    14     7     9    14     7     9 
We need to return back as watermark Signal 28 bits  
0     0     0     1     1     1     1     0     0     1     1 
1     1     0     0     1     1     1     1     0     0     1 
1     1     1     0     0     1   
 
5.5.2 Parameters  
 lists all the parameters and their associated values used for capturing the results from the 
algorithm. 
Table 5.4 Parameter and its associated values used in the LKR watermarking technique lists all the 
parameters and their associated values used for capturing the results from the algorithm. 
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Table 5.4 Parameter and its associated values used in the LKR watermarking technique 
Parameter Description Metric  
N  Number of sensor node  Integer 
 
nji
yx ji
,...2,1
,,

 
Position of two-dimensional sensor networks Coordinate  
cT  Temperature of the propagation media Degree  
,DAt ,DBt  DCt  Time transmission between node D to A, D to B and D 
to C 
second 
 sV  Speed acoustic signal  (m/s) 
t  Error in the measurement of the temperature  - 
DCDBDA  ,,  Error in the measurement of the timer from   D to A , D 
to B and    D to C 
- 
321 ,,   the error in the measurement between the Euclidean 
measurement and the measured using time differences of 
optimal D to A, D to B and D to C. 
- 
321 ,,   4  Values are selected such that the feasibility of the 
solution space of  the optimization problem is not 
harmed  
- 
Sensed data  Data sensed by a sensor node  Bit  
treshold  
Normalized correlation the results of error the cover 
medium with watermark constraints 
- 
 
),( '' XCSM  
Normalized correlation the results of error the cover 
medium with watermark constraints attack 
- 
Watermark signal  Result from LFSR Bit  
Message sensed 
data  
Result from pseudo code 4 Integer 
Watermark 
constraints  
Result from pseudo code  - 
5.5.3 Attacks Characterization  
Because of the nature of the transmission medium that broadcasts data, WSNs are quite susceptible 
to security attacks. Additionally, the nodes are often deployed in unattended or even hostile 
environments and cannot be physically protected. An attack is said to have succeeded if the 
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receiver is not able to detect it. This section discusses different kinds of attacks possible on a WSN, 
and explains how our protection scheme resists them. 
 Consider the general model of a watermarking technique for copyright protection for WSNs, 
according to a communication formulation, with its block diagram as shown in Figure 5.1. We 
consider in detail the corresponding weaknesses of the LKR watermarking technique that could be 
used by the attacker. Figure 5.20 shows the categorization of attacks that affect communication. 
Attack in communication   
Routing attack Attack in transit
Sinkhole
Selective Forwarding
Sinkhole
Wromholee
Hello Flood 
Interuption
Interception
Modification
False data insertion
SpoofedSybil
  replayed 
 
Figure 5.20 The categorization of attacks that affect communication. 
Assume that the watermarks constraints are estimated by the attacker that should be change, 
modify, manipulation, replayed and remove. The corresponding attacks are: 
5.5.3.1 False Data Insertion Attack  
 
In false data insertion attack, an attaker compromises certaint nodes and inserts false data into the 
network. Insertion refers to gradually of the attaker‟s presence. It is called true if the attacker can 
attack the network at the level of sensor nodes, otherwise false. The attacker fools the cover 
medium to make a wrong security decision by creating misleading contexts. A false data insertion  
attack is like cheating the network: the data set up into it in the form of constraints are false, yet 
convincing. The cover medium‟s response would have been right had the data been real, but it is 
not, because the data is not real. False data insertion attack can be carried out if the attacker is 
somehow able to compromise the existing nodes‟ security in order to inject false message sensed 
data carrying false information. Figure 5.21 shows the insertion of false watermark constraints into 
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the cover medium. The objective of this attack is to try a number of different watermark constraints 
generated by the LFSR, hoping to get new results of error of the cover medium that will be mapped 
into the existing solution.  
 
 ATTACK 
FALSE DATA 
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Figure 5.21 Insertion of false watermark constraints into the cover medium 
5.5.3.2 Data Deletion Attack  
Data deletion attack is similar to the spoofed data attack in the sense that deleting watermark 
constraints makes the error results of the cover medium invalid. So, the watermark signal is also 
invalid because it does not approximate to the results of errors of cover medium without attack. If 
the attacker deletes watermark constraints, the receiver will not get appropriate results of errors. To 
carry out such an attack, the attacker drops the individual watermark constraint readings, or some 
of the watermark constraints. These constraints are, thus, unable to reach the intended recipient. 
Figure 5.22 shows deletion of watermark constraint data from the cover medium. 
  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
177 LKR  WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
W
a
te
rm
a
rk
C
o
n
s
tra
in
t 
Delete watermark
 Constraints 
4
2
3
1
3
0
2
0
1
0
3))))((6.04.331(
2)(2)((
2))))((6.04.331(
2)(2)((
1
))))((6.04.331(2)(2)((
:sConstraint
971497141min
31
21
31
21
321






















DCDBDA
DBt
DCDA
DCDB
DCDBDAt
DCDCttcTCyDyCxDx
DBDBttcTCyDyCxDx
DADAttcTCyDyCxDx
f
4
3
2
4
2
3
1
30
2
0
1
0
3))))((6.04.331(
2)(2)((
2))))((6.04.331(
2)(2)((
1
))))((6.04.331(2)(2)((
:sConstraint
971497141min
32
31
32
31
21
31
21
321




























DCDBDA
DA
DCDA
DCDBDA
DBt
DCDA
DCDB
DCDBDAt
DCDCttcTCyDyCxDx
DBDBttcTCyDyCxDx
DADAttcTCyDyCxDx
f
Delete 
 
 
 ATTACK 
DATA DELETION 
-, 
 
Figure 5.22 Deletion of watermark constraint data from the cover medium 
5.5.3.3 Data Replication Attack 
In this attack, the attacker adds some new constraints to the cover medium by replicating the 
existing constraints. These new replicated constraints can seriously hamper the cover medium‟s 
performance:  the new results of errors of cover medium cannot be approximated to the results of 
errors of cover medium before the attack. Particular parts of the network can easily be 
manipulated, or even completely disconnected by the attacker, by inserting the replicated 
constraints along with the new constraints into the existing constraints. Figure 5.23 shows 
replication of watermark constraint data from the cover medium. 
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Figure 5.23 Watermark constraints data replication attack in the cover medium 
5.5.3.4 Sybil Data Attack 
The rapid growth of communication networks, such as the Internet and WSNs, has spurred the 
development of numerous collaborative applications. Reputation network system plays a pivotal 
role in these application by enabling multiple parties to establish relationships for mutual benefits. 
A Sybil data attack occurs when the attacker creates multiple identities and exploits them in order 
to manipulate a reputation score. The manipulated reputation score is computed and published by a 
reputation network system for a set of objects within a community using a WSN. A Sybil data 
attack occurs when an unauthorized attacker takes on multiple data identities. It subverts a 
reputation network system by introducing more than one identity constraints in the cover medium. 
The attacker uses these identities to acquire a larger influence than what he would normally have. 
A reputation network system becomes vulnerable to a Sybil attack depending on many factors. For 
example, the ease of generating constraint identities, the inclination or otherwise of the reputation 
network system to accept input from entities without a chain of trust that links them to a trusted 
entity, and the tendency or otherwise of the reputation network system to treat all the entities 
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identically. The objective of the Sybil data attack here is to find the results of errors of cover 
medium. Figure 5.24 shows the watermark constraints in the cover medium in Sybil data attack. 
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Figure 5.24  Watermark constraints in the cover medium in Sybil data attack 
5.6  Results and Observations  
This section discusses the experiments conducted and results observed on running the prototype. 
This is the sixth stage of the conceptual process described in Section 4.4.6.  
First, we provide the results of the message sensed data embedding process. This process was 
undertaken by an embedder. Figure 5.25  shows the screenshot of the watermark embedding 
process. 
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Figure 5.25 Screenshot of watermark embedding process Matlab Code 
In this process, we use the first row of Table 5.3 as an input to the cover medium (NLSP)  as 
follows: 
Xa Ya Xb Yb Xc Yc Tda 
475.064
6 
351.37 242.991
2 
347.2836 228.233
8 
478.421
7 
0.77162
5 
       
Tdb Tdc Temp Delta1 Delta2 Delta3  Theta1 
0.10679
2 
0.09282 57.6720
7 
0.833677
4 
0.18659
9 
0.03997
7 
0.94113 
       
Theta2 Theta3 Theta4     
0.26914
9 
0.15718
9 
0.03181
7 
    
       
The cover medium is as follows:   
 
toms xd yd et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3  
f = 
msd1*abs(et)+msd2*abs(eda)+msd3*abs(edb)+msd4*abs(edc)+msd5*d1+msd6*d2+ms
d7*d3  
c = { 
    -d1<= sqrt((xd-xa)^2+(yd+ya)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tda+eda) <= d1 
    -d2<= sqrt((xd-xb)^2+(yd-yb)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdb+edb) <= d2 
    -d3<= sqrt((xd-xc)^2+(yd-yc)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdc+edc) <= d2 
     0<=d1 
    0<=d2 
    0<=d3   }; 
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    solution = ezsolve(f,c) 
 
To solve this equation we use TOMLAB, and get following results:   
====================================================== 
         MAIN MENU GENERATE WATERMARK                  
         LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                   
   1. Embedding watermark message sensed data ( MSD )  
   2. MenuLKR Watermarking technique                  
====================================================== 
Message Sensed Data(MSD) is =   
     1    14     7     9    14     7     9 
 What do you want the input data which you will compute by original 
problem = 1 
Problem type appears to be: lpcon 
Time for symbolic processing: 0.44676 seconds 
Starting numeric solver 
=================================================================== * * * 
TOMLAB - Curtin University Ac. single user  501077. Valid to 2100-01-01 
========================================================================= 
Problem: ---  1: Problem 1        f_k      19.202759341488743000 
                              constr|)      0.000000819372765304 
                 f_k) + sum(|constr|)      19.202760160861509000 
                              f(x_0)      0.000000000000000000 
  
Solver: snopt.  EXIT=0.  INFORM=1. 
SNOPT 7.2-5 NLP code 
Optimality conditions satisfied 
  
FuncEv    1 ConstrEv   22 ConJacEv   22 Iter   20 MinorIter   48 
CPU time: 0.031200 sec. Elapsed time: 0.032000 sec.  
  
solution =  
        d1: 0 
       d2: 0 
       d3: 0 
      eda: 1.1349 
      edb: 5.5511e-017 
      edc: 0.3683 
       et: 0 
    symb5: 0.3683 
    symb6: -5.5511e-017 
    symb7: 0 
    symb8: 1.1349 
       xd: 261.8514 
       yd: 313.0482 
 
et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 
0 |1.13489 5.55112e-017 0.368257 0 0 0 
 
 
We next compute all the input of Table 5.3. The results obtained are shown in Table 5.5 while 
Figure 5.26 shows the behaviour of error in the measurement of temperature, measurement of 
timer, and the measurement of error between the Euclidean measurement and that measured using 
TDoA. 
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. 
Table 5.5 The results of error for message sensed 
data in WSN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.26 The value of error in the 
cover medium  process  
In the next step, we provide the results of the message sensed data and watermark constraints 
embedding process. The cover medium consists of the watermark constraints and the message 
sensed data.  
toms xd yd et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 
 f = 
msd1*abs(et)+msd2*abs(eda)+msd3*abs(edb)+msd4*abs(edc)+msd5*d1+msd6*d2+ms
d7*d3;  
c ={ -d1<= sqrt((xd-xa)^2+(yd+ya)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tda+eda) <= d1 
-d2<= sqrt((xd-xb)^2+(yd-yb)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdb+edb) <= d2 
    -d3<= sqrt((xd-xc)^2+(yd-yc)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdc+edc) <= d2  
    0<= edb+edc+d1+d3 <=thou1       
    0<= eda+edc+d1+d2 <= thou2             
    0<= et+edb+d1+d2 <= thou3    
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    0<= eda+edb+edc+d1+d3 <= thou4       
    0<=d1 
    0<=d2 
    0<=d3 }; 
    solution = ezsolve(f,c) 
 
To solve this equation (5.2), we use TOMLAB, and get the following results:   
 
==================================================== 
             MAIN MENU GENERATE WATERMARK              
               LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE              
   1. Embedding MSD and Watermark Constraints          
   2. Menu LKR Watermarking technique                  
====================================================== 
Message Sensed Data(MSD) is =   
     1    14     7     9    14     7     9 
  
Problem type appears to be: lpcon 
Time for symbolic processing: 0.57675 seconds 
Starting numeric solver 
=================================================================== * * * 
TOMLAB - Curtin University Ac. single user  501077. Valid to 2100-01-01 
=========================================================================
== 
Problem: ---  1: Problem 1             f_k      12.790230275978020000 
                              sum(|constr|)    225.412070598005900000 
                     f(x_k) + sum(|constr|)    238.202300873983920000 
                                     f(x_0)      0.000000000000000000 
  
Solver: snopt.  EXIT=4.  INFORM=13. 
SNOPT 7.2-5 NLP code 
Nonlinear infeasibilities minimized 
 Optimality conditions satisfied 
 FuncEv    1 ConstrEv   48 ConJacEv   48 Iter   31 MinorIter  100 
CPU time: 0.062400 sec. Elapsed time: 0.047000 sec.  
solution =  
        d1: 0 
        d2: 0 
        d3: 0 
       eda: 0.6203 
       edb: -0.0927 
       edc: 0.2657 
        et: 1.0656 
    symb10: 0.0927 
    symb11: 1.0656 
    symb12: 0.6203 
     symb9: 0.2657 
        xd: 248.0065 
        yd: 348.4703 
 
 
et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 
1.06556 0.620304 -0.0927369 0.265695 0 0 0 
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We next compute all the input of Table 5.3. The results obtained are shown in TTable 5.6 while 
Figure 5.23 shows the behaviour of error in the measurement of temperature measurement of timer, 
and the measurement of error between the Euclidean measurement and that measured using TDoA. 
Table 5.6 The results of error for message sensed 
data and watermark constraints in WSNs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.27 The value of error in 
watermark constraints embedding 
process 
 
We next consider and evaluate the corresponding attack for LKR  watermarking technique that can 
be used by the attacker in detail. There are four kinds of watermark constraint attacks:  
5.6.1.1 False Data Insertion  
As pointed out in Section 5.5.3.1, in this type of attack the attacker creates a number of different 
watermark constraints generated by the LFSR, hoping for new results of error that will map into 
the cover medium. The process of watermark constraint data insertion can be seen as follows:   
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===================================================== 
      LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                       
 COPYRIGHT OF SCALAR DATA IN WSNs                 
   1. DETECT FALSE DATA INSERTION                      
   2. Menu LKR Watermarking technique                  
====================================================== 
What Do you want =  1 
Message Sensed Data(MSD) is =   
     1    14     7     9    14     7     9 
 
What do you want the input data which you will compute by original 
problem = 1 
Problem type appears to be: lpcon 
Time for symbolic processing: 1.8735 seconds 
Starting numeric solver 
 
=================================================================== * * * 
TOMLAB - Curtin University Ac. single user  501077. Valid to 2100-01-01 
 
Problem: ---  1: Problem 1          f_k     227.612639313463430000 
                            m(|constr|)      0.000033961644652664 
                   x_k) + sum(|constr|)    227.612673275108080000 
                                f(x_0)      0.000000000000000000 
 
Solver: snopt.  EXIT=0.  INFORM=1. 
SNOPT 7.2-5 NLP code 
Optimality conditions satisfied 
 
FuncEv    1 ConstrEv   23 ConJacEv   23 Iter   20 MinorIter   62 
CPU time: 0.265202 sec. Elapsed time: 0.796000 sec.  
solution =  
 
       d1: 6.5226e-015 
       d2: 0 
       d3: 0 
      eda: 0.7127 
      edb: -0.0927 
      edc: 0.1733 
       et: 215.4258 
    symb1: 0.1733 
    symb2: 0.0927 
    symb3: 215.4258 
    symb4: 0.7127 
       xd: 249.8575 
       yd: 348.4319 
 
 
et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 
215.426 0.712744 -0.0927369 0.173255 6.52256e-015 0 0 
 
 
We next compute all the input data of Table 5.3 to get the results of the error for false data attack 
which can be seen in Table 5.7, and the value of the error for false data attack which is depicted in 
Figure 5.28. The figure shows the behaviour of error in the measurement of temperature 
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measurement of timer, and the measurement of error between the Euclidean measurement and that 
measured using TDoA. 
Table 5.7 The results of error for false data attack in 
WSNs 
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Figure 5.28 The value of error for false data 
attack in WSNs 
 
The robustness can be computed as follows: 
===================================================== 
          LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                 
   1. Detecting Process False Insertion             
   2. Menu LKR Watermarking technique                
===================================================== 
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CASES of FALSE DATA INSERTION  
 
The value of threshold is    7.69725  
--------------------------------------------------------- 
The value of similarity is   10566  
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Whether the watermark constraints changes or not  
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Attack False data insertion change watermark constraints  
because  7.697 < 1.057e+004  
NO Robust against watermark constraints attacks false data Insertion 
 
5.6.1.2 Data Deletion  
As discussed in Section 5.5.3.2, in this type of attack the attacker deletes a number of watermark 
constraints generated by the LFSR, hoping that the new results of error will not approximate to the 
results of error of the cover medium without attack. The process of watermark constraint data 
deletion can be seen as follows:   
====================================================== 
      LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE              
 COPYRIGHT OF SCALAR DATA IN WSNs                 
   1. DETECT DATA DELETION                       
   2. Menu LKR Watermarking technique                  
====================================================== 
What Do you want =  1 
Read Message Sensed Data(MSD) is =   1    14     7     9    14     7     
9 
How many experiment what do you want = 32 
Problem type appears to be: lpcon 
Time for symbolic processing: 0.53121 seconds 
Starting numeric solver 
=========================================================================  
TOMLAB - Curtin University Ac. single user  501077. Valid to 2100-01-01 
=========================================================================
= 
Problem: ---  1: Problem 1       f_k     226.318410905678920000 
                           (|constr|)      0.000395269642641704 
               f(x_k) + sum(|constr|)    226.318806175321550000 
                               f(x_0)      0.000000000000000000 
 
Solver: snopt.  EXIT=0.  INFORM=1. 
SNOPT 7.2-5 NLP code 
Optimality conditions satisfied 
 
FuncEv    1 ConstrEv   30 ConJacEv   29 Iter   24 MinorIter  102 
CPU time: 0.031200 sec. Elapsed time: 0.031000 sec.  
 
 
solution =  
          d1: 0 
          d2: -2.0247e-015 
          d3: 4.8647e-016 
         eda: 0.8116 
         edb: 0 
         edc: 0.0744 
          et: 214.2862 
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    symb1421: 0.0744 
    symb1422: 0 
    symb1423: 214.2862 
    symb1424: 0.8116 
          xd: 252.2038 
          yd: 399.2915 
 
 
et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 
214.2862     0.811643   0 0.074356 0 -2E-15     4.86E-16   
 
 
We next compute all the inputs of Table 5.3 to get the results of the error for false data attack 
which can be seen in Table 5.8, and the value of the error for false data attack which is depicted in 
Figure 5.29. The figure shows the behaviour of error in the measurement of temperature 
measurement of timer, and the measurement of error between the Euclidean measurement and that 
measured using TDoA. 
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Table 5.8 The results of error for data deletion 
attack in WSNs 
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Figure 5.29 The value of error data deletion 
attack in WSNs 
The robustness can be computed as follows: 
===================================================== 
          LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                 
   1. Detecting Process attack data deletion             
   2. Menu LKR Watermarking technique                
===================================================== 
The value of threshold is   7.69725  
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--------------------------------------------------------- 
The value of similarity is   8208.81  
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Whether the watermark constraints changes or not  
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Attack False data deletion  change watermark constraints  
because  7.697 < 8209  
NO Robust against watermark constraints attacks data deletion 
 
5.6.1.3 Data replication  
As discussed in Section 5.5.3.3, in this type of attack, the attacker seeks to add new constraints to 
the cover medium by replicating the existing constraints generated by the LFSR, hoping that the 
new results of error of the cover medium will not approximate to the results of error of the cover 
medium before attack. The process of watermark constraint  replication can be seen as follows; 
 
===================================================== 
      LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                       
 COPYRIGHT OF SCALAR DATA IN WSNs                 
   1. DETECT REPLICATION ATTACK 
   2. Menu LKR Watermarking technique                  
====================================================== 
What Do you want =  1 
Message Sensed Data(MSD) is =   
     1    14     7     9    14     7     9 
 
Problem type appears to be: lpcon 
Time for symbolic processing: 0.75766 seconds 
Starting numeric solver 
=================================================================== * * * 
TOMLAB - Curtin University Ac. single user  501077. Valid to 2100-01-01 
=========================================================================
== 
Problem: ---  1: Problem 1          f_k      12.919039775614825000 
                           sum(|constr|)    241.222696246146140000 
                  f(x_k) + sum(|constr|)    254.141736021760980000 
                                  f(x_0)      0.000000000000000000 
 
Solver: snopt.  EXIT=4.  INFORM=13. 
SNOPT 7.2-5 NLP code 
Nonlinear infeasibilities minimized 
FuncEv    1 ConstrEv   19 ConJacEv   19 Iter   15 MinorIter   45 
CPU time: 0.046800 sec. Elapsed time: 0.031000 sec.  
solution =  
 
          d1: 0 
          d2: 0.0464 
          d3: 0 
         eda: 0.7933 
         edb: -0.0464 
         edc: 0.0464 
          et: 0.7469 
    symb1805: 0.0464 
    symb1806: 0.0464 
    symb1807: 0.7469 
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    symb1808: 0.7933 
          xd: 264.2858 
          yd: 353.5212 
 
et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 
0.746893833 0.793262273 -0.04636844   0.074356 0 -0.04636844 0   
 
We next compute all the input data of table 5.3 to get the results of error for false data attack which 
can be seen in Table 5.9, and the value of error for false data attack which is given in Figure 5.30. 
The figure shows the behaviour of error in the measurement of temperature measurement of the 
timer, and the error in measurement between the Euclidean measurement and that measured using 
TDoA. 
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Table 5.9 The results of the error data replication 
attack in WSNs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.30 The value of error data 
replication  attack in WSNs 
The robustness can be computed as follows:  
===================================================== 
          LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                 
   1. Detecting Process attack data replication             
   2. Menu LKR Watermarking technique     
            
   The value of threshold is    7.69725  
   ----------------------------------------------------- 
   The value of similarity is   1.03848  
   ----------------------------------------------------- 
   Whether the watermark constraints changes or not  
   --------------------------------------------------------- 
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   Attack False data replication do not change the watermark  
   Because 7.697 => 1.038   
      Robust against watermark constraints attacks replication 
5.6.1.4 Data Sybil 
As discussed in Section 5.5.3.4, the attacker creates multiple identities and exploits them, in order 
to manipulate the reputation score computed by the reputation network system. Data Sybil is 
defined  as a malicious device illegitimately taking on multiple data identities. The watermark 
constraints in data Sybil can be seen as follows: 
 
===================================================== 
      LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                       
  COPYRIGHT OF SCALAR DATA IN WSNs                 
   1. DETECT DATA SYBIL  
   2. Menu LKR Watermarking technique                  
====================================================== 
What Do you want =  1 
Message Sensed Data(MSD) is =   
     1    14     7     9    14     7     9 
 
Problem type appears to be: lpcon 
Time for symbolic processing: 0.95299 seconds 
Starting numeric solver 
===== * * * 
============================================================ 
TOMLAB - Curtin University Ac. single user  501077. Valid to 2100-01-
01 
======================================================================
== 
Problem: ---  1: Problem 1        f_k      12.268989178202528000 
                          sum(|constr|)   481.983101398175900000 
                f(x_k) + sum(|constr|)    494.252090576378410000 
                               f(x_0)      0.000000000000000000 
 
Solver: snopt.  EXIT=4.  INFORM=13. 
SNOPT 7.2-5 NLP code 
Nonlinear infeasibilities minimized 
 
FuncEv    1 ConstrEv   36 ConJacEv   36 Iter   25 MinorIter   68 
CPU time: 0.078001 sec. Elapsed time: 0.047000 sec.  
 
solution =  
          d1: 0 
          d2: 0.0464 
          d3: 0 
         eda: 0.6181 
         edb: -0.0464 
         edc: 0.2216 
          et: 0.9728 
    symb2189: 0.2216 
    symb2190: 0.0464 
    symb2191: 0.9728 
    symb2192: 0.6181 
          xd: 264.2864 
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          yd: 353.5479 
 
et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 
0.972823517 0.618066216 -
0.04636844 
0.221564496 0 0.04636844 0   
 
 
We next compute all the input data of Table 5.3 to get the results of error for data Sybil which can 
be seen in Table 5.10,  and the value of error for data Sybil which is given in Figure 5.31. The 
figure shows the behaviour of error in the measurement of temperature measurement of timer, and 
error in measurement between the Euclidean measurement and that measured using TDoA. 
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Table 5.10 The results of error of Sybil data 
attack in WSNs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.31 The value of error of Sybil data 
attack in WSNs 
===================================================== 
      LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                       
   1. DETECT ATTACK SYBIL DATA 
   2. Menu LKR Watermarking technique                  
====================================================== 
The value of threshold is    7.69725  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
The value of similarity is   4.30362  
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Whether the watermark constraints changes or not  
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Attack data Sybil do not change the watermark  
Because 7.697 => 4.304   
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Robust against watermark constraints attacks Sybil 
 
5.7  Validation and discussion  
Herein, we advanced a robust watermarking technique, termed LKR watermarking technique. The 
watermark constraints were embedded into the cover medium NLSP. The embedding process was 
based on equation constraints. The scalar decimal data was converted into binary bits. The LFSR 
was used to expand the binary bits into a sequence of binary sequence,  using its characteristic 
polynomial. The bit numbers were matched with the corresponding variable numbers using the 
Kolmogorov rule, to generate the watermark constraints. If a variable within the group got the bit 
one assigned to it, the linear included it; on the other hand, if a variable within the group got the bit 
zero assigned to it, the linear did not include it. By testing several watermark constraint attacks, we 
found that the proposed technique works well in the cover medium NLSP. The robustness is 
achieved by embedding watermark constraints into NLSP. The normalized difference in error from 
the optimal solution between the watermarked solution and the solution obtained without 
watermark verifies that the watermark constraints are present. The threshold measure is given by 
the normalized correlation coefficient between the normalized difference error from the optimal 
solution between the watermarked solution X', and the solution obtained without watermark. 
Threshold is measured by 
''
'
*
*
XX
XC
 where XXC  ' . The normalized coefficient of 
correlation of the normalized difference error from the optimal solution between the watermarked 
solutions X‟, and the solution obtained with watermark constraints X”, gives the similarity 
measure. The similarity is measured by 
""
''
*
*
XX
XC
 where XXC  "' . If the value of threshold 
is greater than the value of similarity, it  means the watermark constraints are robust against 
watermark constraint attacks.   
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a. False data insertion attack b. Data deletion attack 
  
c. Data replication attack d. Sybil attack  
Figure 5.32  All watermark constraint attacks 
From the experiments conducted, following observations were made:  
1. In false data insertion attack on watermark constraints, the false data insertion changes the 
watermark constraint (as shown in Figure 5.35. a) because 7.697 < 1.057e+004. It means 
that the model is not robust against false data insertion attack. 
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2. In data deletion attack on watermark constraints, the data deletion changes the watermark 
constraints (as shown in Figure 5.35 b) because 7.697 < 8209. It means that the mosel is 
not robust against data deletion attack. 
3. In data replication attack on watermark constraints, the data replication does not change 
the watermark constraints (as shown in Figure 5.35 c) because 7.697 > 1.038. It means that 
the model is robust against data replication attack. 
4. In data Sybil attack on watermark constraints, the data Sybil does not change the 
watermark constraints (as shown in Figure 5.35 b) because 7.697 >  4.304. It means that 
the model is robust against data Sybil attack. 
Thus, the proposed scheme is shown to be robust against the replication of different watermark 
constraints and creation of multiple identities for watermark constraints. However, it is not robust 
against other watermark constraint attacks, such as insertion of one or more false watermark 
constraints and deletion of one or more watermark constraints. 
The robustness of the proposed technique can be further improved by adding more constraints in 
the case of false data insertion attack, so that we get the value of similarity as 4.81673. This 
similarity is less than the threshold of 7.697. However, there are some weaknesses in the case of 
data deletion attack because, when we delete one and three watermark constraints, we get  the 
value of similarity as 8208.81 and 317.16 respectively. These similarities are greater than the 
threshold of 7.697. One drawback of the proposed approach is that it needs not only scalar data but 
also images. This issue has been dealt with in Chapter 6, where we propose the GPKR 
watermarking technique.   
5.8  Comparative analysis  
This is the last stage of the conceptual process described in Section 4.5.6, where the proposed 
solution is compared with the existing solutions form the literature, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Therefore, this chapter carries out a comparative analysis of this model with other such models 
proposed by different researchers. The results of this comparative analysis are given in Table 5.7.    
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Table 5.11 A comparative analysis with other approaches copyright protection in WSNs 
 
Kind of 
attacks 
Feng,J.P et 
al 
 
 
 (Jessica 
and 
Potkonjak 
2003) 
 
F 
Koushanfar, 
F et al  
 
 
(Koushanfar 
and 
Potkonjak 
2007) 
 
Julia albath 
et.al   
 
 
(Xiangqian 
2009) 
Zhang  
et al. 
 
 
 
   
(Zhang, 
Liu, and 
Das 
2008),     
Xiao et.al 
 
 
 (Rong, 
Xingming, and 
Ying 2008) 
 
Xuejun 
et al 
 
 
(Xueju
n 2010)  
Kame
l et al.  
 
(Kam
el 
2011) 
Harjito, B 
 
 
 
False data 
insertion 
X X X X X X X X 
Data deletion X X X X X X √ X 
Packet 
replication. 
X X X X X X X √ 
Sybil attack X X X X X X X √ 
 
√ provides copyright data protection ,   x does not provide copyright data protection 
 
In this analysis, 8 approaches have been compared, in terms of false data insertion, data deletion, 
packet replication, and Sybil attack. Feng, J. P. et al. (Jessica and Potkonjak 2003), Koushanfar, F. 
et al. (Koushanfar and Potkonjak 2007), Julia Albath et Al. (Albath 2007),  Zhang et al., Xiao et al. 
(Rong, Xingming, and Ying 2008),  and Xuejun et al. (Xuejun 2010). Juma, Kamel and Kaya 
(2008) do not provide solution for data deletion, packet replication and Sybil attacks. Kamel et al. 
(Kamel and Juma 2011) provide solution for data deletion but not for packet replication and Sybil 
attacks. Our approach provides copyright data protection against packet replication and Sybil 
attacks. 
In table 5.11 8 approaches have been compared: Albath, J. et al., Feng, J. P. et al., Koushanfar, F. 
et al., Zhang et al., and Xio et al. do not explain security attacks. The feasibility of  false data 
insertion and data deletion can only be determined by the Forward  Chaining Watermark (FWC) 
method proposed by Kamel et al. However this method only  withstands data deletion, not false 
data insertion.   
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5.9  Conclusion  
In this paper, we have proposed the LKR watermarking technique for copyright protection of data 
in WSNs. Our strategy aims at copyright protection of scalar data during transmission between 
sensor nodes in WSNs, against a variety of attacks, such as  data deletion, data  replication, data 
modification, Data Sybil attack, false data insertion, and selective forwarding. We have not 
discussed some types of attacks, such as physical attack, node malfunction and Daniel service 
attack. We have verified that our technique can protect copyright data against packet replication 
and Sybil attacks. However, it does protect this data against false data insertion, data deletion, data 
modification and selective forwarding. Therefore, we still need to improve our technique 
considering various circumstances in which attackers launch different kinds of attacks for the 
future work.    
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Chapter 6    
GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE 
 
This chapter presents: 
► an introduction to the GPKR watermarking technique for copyright protection of images 
inWMSNs, 
► a general overview of our GPKR watermarking technique for copyright protection of 
images in WMSNs, 
► experimentation and testing of our GPKR watermarking technique for copyright protection 
of images in WMSNs,  
► evaluation, validation and comparative study of our technique for copyright protection of 
images in WMSNs.  
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter addresses the problem of copyright protection of images by ensuring that the 
watermark is secure during transmission between sensor nodes in WMSNs. It considers the issue 
of copyright protection of images in WMSNs for various purposes, such as intellectual property 
protection. It presents a novel Gaussian Pyramids Kolmogorov Rule (GPKR) watermarking 
scheme that embeds watermark constraints in the cover medium NLSP. The novelty of this 
watermarking scheme lies in the use of watermark constraints derived from the sensed multimedia 
data by Gaussian Pyramids and Kolmogorov rule. We name this technique as GPKR watermarking 
technique. 
6.2  The Proposed GPKR Watermarking 
Technique  
This section provides a general overview of the GPKR watermarking technique as our solution for 
copyright protection of images, and then outlines the requirements to address the problem.  
CHAPTER SIX    
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6.2.1 A General Overview of GPKR Watermarking 
Technique  
WMSNs are an emerging type of sensor networks consisting of sensor nodes equipped with 
microphones, cameras, and other sensors that produce multimedia content. These networks have 
not only changeed and improved the existing sensor applications, such as tracking and environment 
monitoring, they have also enabled several new applications ranging from military to modern 
healthcare. These networks collect and store multimedia data and then send them to other 
multimedia nodes or servers. 
The new technologies allow validation of multimedia data during transit, but not after the data have 
reached their destination. One of the challenges with these technologies is to ensure that the source 
of the data, i.e. the image, is preserved even after it leaves the WMSN node. This is important as 
the image can be used by other unauthorized applications. 
With the demanding constraints of nodes‟ limited computational capability, the key issue for 
WMSNs is designing viable security mechanisms to ensure confidentiality, integrity and 
authentication, to prevent malicious attacks. Besides the inherent limitations of communication and 
computing in WMSNs, the nature of their deployment makes them even more vulnerable to 
various attacks. Most of the prior works on securing sensor networks have used traditional security 
solutions based on public key cryptography algorithm and digital signatures. These techniques 
usually execute thousands of operations. Further, these security mechanisms are only useful in 
ensuring security during communication; once the data reach their destination and are decrypted, 
they can be used by anyone without permission. Thus, cryptography does not address the problem 
of copyright protection. Hence, research in the area of watermarking and WMSNs is becoming 
increasingly important. Watermarking technique is a technique traditionally used for providing 
copyright protection to multimedia data, like images and video clips. It can also be incorporated in 
WMSNs to ensure copyright protection of digital images and video footages.  
6.2.2 Requirements  
Following requirements are laid down for the proposed watermarking technique for copyright 
protection, in order to address the issue of copyright infringement of valuable sensory multimedia 
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data, like images. This represents the first stage of the conceptual process described in Chapter 1  
in which the requirements are elicited and prioritized. The proposed algorithm is to be 
implemented on valuable sensory data; however, it can be extended to images and audio. The 
requirements are as follows:  
1. Coverage: The GPKR algorithm should operate on a minimum of 50 nodes randomly 
deployed within 200 meter of length and 100 meter of width.   
2. Cover medium: The GPKR algorithm should only use scalar data as cover medium 
generated through atomic trilateration process (shown in Figure 6.1). 
3.  Copyright protection: The GPKR algorithm should be able to ensure that the copyright is 
securely embedded in the cover medium.  
4. Watermark constraints: The GPKR algorithm should use watermark constraints rather than a 
binary matrix watermark, because watermark constraints provide subjective detection. 
5. Robustness: The watermark should be embedded robustly to handle watermark attacks. 
6. Non-blind detection: The algorithm should offer non-blind extraction and detection. 
Section 6.2.3 discusses the design rationale for copyright protection of images in WMSNs, 
incorporating each of the requirements outlined above. It also shows how each requirement has 
been addressed in the design decision. This concludes stage one of the conceptual process and 
paves the way for the next stage.  
6.2.3  Design Rationale  
This sub-section proposes the design rationale for the GPKR watermarking technique to protect 
images in WMSNs, satisfying the requirements outlined in Section 6.2.2. This represents the 
second stage of the conceptual process described in Section 4.4.2 , in which all the requirements 
are addressed by finalising the design decision. We propose the following design decisions in the 
framework, as shown in Figure 6.1.  
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Figure 6.1 The general model of GPKR watermarking technique for copyright protection of images 
in WMSNs 
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1. The network setting consists of 50 sensor nodes randomly deployed within 200 meter of 
length and 100 meter of width. This  network provides random positions for  three 
multimedia sensor nodes used to start up the cover medium (Req. 1)    
2. The cover medium is generated by using the theory of atomic trilateration as  discussed in 
Section 0. This cover medium is used to insert watermark constraints (Req. 2, Req. 3).  
3. The watermark constraints are generated using the Kolmogorov rule on the reduced image 
in an RGB colour (Req. 4).     
4. Robustness of the watermark constraints is measured using the normalized difference error 
from the solution between the watermarked solution and the solution obtained without 
watermark (Req. 5).  
5. The cover medium is required for the detection of watermark constraints The watermark 
constraints can be used to produce binary matrix, which is then converted into decimal 
matrix to get the reduced image. The sensory image is generated by expanding the reduced 
image (Req. 6 ). 
6.3  Theoretical Foundation for  GPKR 
Watermarking  Technique.  
This sub-section proposes a theoretical foundation for our GPKR watermarking technique for 
copyright protection of images. This represents the third stage of the conceptual process described 
in Section 4.4.3  in which the design decisions are analysed and an algorithm presented.  
The proposed scheme offers robustness against false data insertion and data replication. However it 
is not robust against data deletion and data modification, which are also not tackled in the literature 
(Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008) (Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye 
2009) (Wang 2010). 
Looking at similar other schemes, Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye (2009) embed the 
watermark into the low-frequency coefficients of DCT. The embedding process consists of 
dividing the image into 8×8 blocks, performing DCT of each block, selecting the coefficient at the 
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location (p, q) in each block of the blue component, and finally replacing the chosen coefficient 
with the new robust watermarked coefficient:  DCT '( p,q) = sign(DCT ( p,q)) + (α *w). This 
scheme is robust against cropping, jpg q=20, and paper salt noise.  
Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang (2008), on the other hand, use adaptive 
watermarking positions dynamically chosen to embed watermark according to network conditions, 
to achieve both energy efficiency and security. The two adaptive thresholds (T1, T2) are used to 
filter and decide the appropriate embedding positions for watermarking. This scheme is robust 
against jpg compression, using the quality parameter 90. Meanwhile, Xiangjun, Shaodong, and Le 
(2008) embed the watermark intoe two adaptive thresholds (T1,T2) under the specified 
watermarking scheme. The two adaptive thresholds (T1,T2) are used to filter and decide the 
appropriate embedding positions for watermarks. The embedding positions are functions of these 
two thresholds. This scheme is robust against compression, using the quality parameter 90. The 
novel feature of the GPKR watermarking technique is that it uses Gaussian Pyramid Transforms 
for reducing the original image to get a reduced image, and then expand the reduced image to get 
the original image. It also uses Kolmogorov rule for numbering the variables of the linear equation 
to get watermark constraints. Thus, the GPKR watermarking technique uses Gaussian Pyramids 
and Kolmogorov rule for copyright protection of images, and hence the name GPKR. 
The GPKR watermarking technique comprises four steps: 
 Cover medium generation 
 Watermark generation  
 Watermark embedding 
 Watermark extraction & detection  
6.3.1 Cover Medium Generation 
This sub-section explains the process of generating cover medium using the atomic trilateration 
process. The pseudo-code for generating cover medium is shown in Pseudo Code 6.1 and the 
flowchart in Figure 6.2.  
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Pseudo Code  6.1  Generating cover medium 
Input:  
 
  ),(,, BBAA yxyx
,  cC yx ,  
Position of two-dimensional three sensor network 
 
 
cT  Temperature of the propagation media  
,DAt ,DBt ,DCt  Time for transmission between nodes D to A, D to B and D to C  
Vs Speed of the acoustic signal 
 
t  Error in the measurement of temperature   
DCDBDA  ,,  Error in the measurement of the timer from D to A , D to B and    
D to C   
321 ,,   
 
4  
Error in the measurement between the Euclidean measurement 
and the measurement using time differences of optimal D to A, 
D to B, and D to C  
Auxiliary variables to the cover medium 
 
Output  
    The cover medium  
   
3)(*))( 6.04.331(
2
)(
2
)(
2)(*))( 6.04.331(
2
)(
2
)(
1)(*))( 6.04.331(
2
)(
2
)(
sConstraint
4321min








DCDCttcTCyDycxDx
DBDBttcTByDyBxDx
DADAttcTAyDyAxDx
DCDBDAtf
 
Step 1: Getting all input data  
Position of the two-dimensional, three sensor network   ),(,, BBAA yxyx , and   cC yx ,  
Temperature of the propagation media ( cT ), Time for transmission between the nodes D to A, D to 
B, and D to C, Error in the measurement of temperature ( ,DAt ,DBt ,DCt  ), Error in the measurement 
of the timer from D to A, D to B, and D to C ( DA , DB , DC ), and error in the measurement 
between the Euclidean measurement and the measurement using time differences of optimal D to 
A, D to B, and D to C ( 321 ,,  ). 
 
Step 2: Computing the speed of acoustic signal and adding the error of  temperature, as 
speed is one of the requirements for measuring the distance between two sensor nodes  
Compute the speed of acoustic signal using )( 6.04.331 tcs TV     
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Step 3: Computing the distance between the node D and the sensor nodes A, B and C, using 
time differences of arrival (TDoA) and adding the error of measurement of the timer 
respectively 
Compute the distance of )(* DADAsDA tVd  , )(* DBDBsDB tVd  , and 
)(* DCDCsDC tVd  .   
 
Step 4: Computing the distance between the node D and the sensor nodes A, B and C, using 
the Euclidean theorem  
 
Compute the distance of 
22 )()( ADADDA yyxxd  ,  
22 )()( BDBDDB yyxxd  , and  
22 )()( CDCDDC yyxxd   
 
Step 5: Computing the difference between the distance using TDoA and the distance using 
the Eucliden theorem, and adding the error in the measurement between the Euclidean 
measurement and the measurement using time differences of optimal D to A, D to B, and D 
to C. 
Use step (2) into step (3), compute difference between step (4) and step (3) and add error between 
step (4) and step (3). 
1
22 )(*))( 6.04.331()()(  DADAtcADAD tTyyxx  
2
22 )(*))( 6.04.331()()(  DBDBtcBDBD tTyyxx  
3
22 )(*))( 6.04.331()()(  DCDCtcCDCD tTyyxx  
 
Step 6: Computing the minimized error in the system of equations ( step 5)   
Compute the minimized objective function 4321min   DCDBDAtf  
Step 7: Generating cover medium  
Append step (5) and step (6) to get Non Linear System Programming.  
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  ),(,, ByBxAyAx  ,, cC yx
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Figure 6.2 Flowchart for generation of cover medium in GPKR watermarking technique 
6.3.2 Watermark Generation  
This subsection explains the process of generating watermark constraints. The requirements for 
watermark generation process are unique and complex. First, the image is reduced using Gaussian 
pyramid transforms in order to create the reduced image. Next, the reduced image is converted to a 
decimal matrix. The decimal matrix  is then  converted to a binary matrix. The binary matrix 
contains information that can be used for ownership identification. To generate watermark 
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constraints, the variables of the binary matrix are numbered using the Kolmogorov rule. These 
watermark constraints are then embedded into the cover medium. The process of generating 
watermark consists of three steps:   
1. reducing the image using Gaussian pyramid transforms to create a decimal matrix,   
2. converting the decimal matrix of the reduced image to a binary matrix, and 
3. producing watermark constraints using Kolmogorov rule.  
Each of these steps will now be explained in detail. 
6.3.2.1 Reducing the Image using  Gaussian Pyramids 
Transforms 
The first step reduces the image captured from the environment by the WMSN nodes to produce 
the pixels of reduced image. We consider the reduced image in an RGB colour image. The RGB 
colour image is an 3MxNx  array of colour pixels, where each colour is a triplet corresponding to 
the red, green and blue components of the RGB image. The RGB colour image is of the class of 
values [0,1]. The similarity range of the value is [0, 255] or [0, 65535] for an RGB image of class 
uint 8 or uint 16 respectively. The low pixel image can be generated by using the pyramid 
transforms by implementing the algorithm given below: 
Pseudo Code  6.2  Reduction of image by Gaussian Pyramid Transforms 
Input: 
 
 
The sensory image   
N Number of reducing the image  
M Number is used to bound the reduced image  
 
Output : 
 
 
The reduced image    
  
    
Step 1: Getting all input data  
Prepare the sensory image N, M.  
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Step 2: Representing the image to the array    
The sensory image is represented by the array og  consisting of R rows and C columns of pixels, in 
order to become the zero level of the Gaussian Pyramids  
Step 3:  Getting level 1 of the pyramid transforms  
 
Low-pass filter the array og  to get the level of the pyramid transforms by computing as a weighted 
average of values in the level 0.  
Step 4:  Getting level 2 of the pyramid transforms using the function PYR reduce  
Obtain each value within level 2, representing 2g , from the values within level 1 by applying the 
same pattern of weights. The function PYR reduce is )2,2().(),( 1
2
2
2
2
njmignmwjig i
n m
i  
 
  
for level Nl 0 and nodes iCiji 0  ,, , pRj 0 . N refers to the number of levels in the 
pyramids, while pR and jC are the dimensions. 
Step 5: Deciding the number of reduction  
If N, the number of reducing the image, is less than M, go to step 4, else go to Step 6. 
Step 6: Printing the result of the function PYR reduce  
Represent each value within n obtained from level n-1 and  print the reduced image obtained  
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Begin 
Represented the image by the array which consist of R rows and 
C columns to get zero level of the pyramids transform
Low-pass filtered to the array  to get the level 1 of the pyramids 
transform 
End
Use the function PYR reduce to get level 2 that is obtained from 
level 1 
The reduce image 
The sensory image
N = number of the reduced of 
image
M= number is to use to 
bounded 
N >M
Yes 
1
2
3
4
5
6
 
Figure 6.3   Flowchart for getting the reduced image using the Gaussion pyramids 
6.3.2.2 Converting  the Reduced Image to Binary Matrix    
The second step is to convert the reduced image to a binary matrix using the function decimal to 
binary. 
Pseudo Code  6.3 Converting the reduced image to binary   
Input: 
 
    The reduced image  
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Output  
  
 
Binary matrix     
  
    
Step 1: Getting all input data  
Obtain the reduced image using Pseudo Code 6.2 
Step 2: Reading the reduced image into a decimal matrix   
Read the array pixel of the reduced image to get the matrix decimal array  
Step 3: Converting the array pixel of the matrix into binary    
Use Pseudo Code 6.4   to convert the decimal matrix into the binary matrix    
Step 4: Printing binary matrix   
Print binary matrix 
Begin 
The reduce image 
Read the reduce image into a decimal matrix  
End
Binary matrix
Convert the array pixel of  matrix into binary   
1
2
3
4
 
Figure 6.4 Flowchart for converting the reduced image to binary matrix 
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6.3.2.3 Numbering the Watermark Stream using Kolmogorov 
Complexity Rule 
This sub-section explains the creation of watermark constraints using Kolmogorov rules introduced 
in Section 2.1.2. The rule used here can be seen in Table 6.1. 
Table .6.1 The expanded Kolmogorov rule 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
t  DA  DB  DC  1  2  3  4  
 
The binary matrix produced using the pseudo code is numbered using the Kolmogorov rule given 
in Table 6.1 
If a bit one is assigned to a variable within a group, that variable is included in the linear of 
variables from the group. If a bit zero is assigned to a variable within a group, that variable is not 
included. According to this rule, we add some new constraints into the linear combination of 
variables. 
The pseudo-code for generating watermark constraints is shown in Pseudo Code 6.3 and the 
flowchart in Figure 6.5.  
Pseudo Code  6.4  Generating watermark constraints 
 
Input: 
 
    Binary matrix 
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Output  
 
   Watermark constrains  
Step 1 : Getting input data 
Read binary matrix.  
Step 2: Matching, using table 6.1  
Match the bit number with the corresponding variable number using Kolmogorov rule (Table 6.1 ).   
Step 3: Deciding whether a variable is included or not 
If a bit one is assigned to a variable within a group, include that variable in the linear and go to step 
4. Else, if a bit zero is assigned to a variable within a group, do not include that variable in the 
linear and go to step 2.  
Step 4: Generating watermark constraints  
Print WC (watermark constraints).  
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Begin 
Binary matrix
End
Match the bit number with corresponding variable number from 
table of Kolmogorof rule  (table 6.1)
Watermark constraints   
a bit one is assigned a variable with in a group that 
variable is included in the linear
yes
No
4
1
2
3
 
Figure 6.5  Flowchart for generating watermark constraints 
6.3.3 Watermark Embedding Algorithm  
This sub-section explains the process of embedding watermark constraints. This is the second step 
of the watermarking system and is undertaken by an embedder. The embedder combines the cover 
medium and creates a watermarked cover medium. The watermarked cover medium is perceptibly 
identical to the cover medium.  
Pseudo Code  6.5 Embedding watermark constraints  
Input  
WC Watermark constraints 
  ),(,, BBAA yxyx
,  cC yx ,  
Position of two-dimensional sensor networks 
cT  Temperature of the propagation media  
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4321 ,,,   The values are selected such that the feasibility of the solution 
space of  the optimization problem is not harmed 
,DAt ,DBt  DCt  
Time transmission between node D to A, D to B, and D to C 
Output  
 DD yx ,  Position of two-dimensional sensor networks 
321 ,,   Error in the measurement between the Euclidean measurement 
and that measured using time differences of optimal D to A, D to 
B, and D to C 
DA , DB ,  
DC  
Error in the measurement of the timer from D to A, D to B, and 
D to C 
4  Auxiliary variable 
t  Error in the measurement of temperature 
min f 
 
Minimum function of the objective 
 
Step 1 : Getting all input Data  
Obtain the three positions      CCBBAA yxyxyx ,,,,,  randomly from the network of 75 positions 
of two dimensional sensor nodes. Obtain the temperature of the propagation media ( cT ) by using 
uniform distribution on interval [0,50]. Obtain time transmission of DCDBDA ttt   and ,,  by using 
Gauss distribution on interval [0, 1]. Obtain the values of ,,, 321   and 4  using Gauss 
distribution on interval [0, 1]. Watermark constraints (WC) are obtained by applying Pseudo Code 
6.4.    
 
Step 2: Using the cover medium  
Obtain cover medium by applying Pseudo Code 6.1, called NLSP, with the objective function 
consisting of the coefficient objective.  
Step 3:  Appending watermark constraints (WC)  
Append watermark constraints to the cover medium. 
Step 4: Computing new cover medium to solve  
Add the message sensed data and watermark constraints to compute a new cover medium, use 
TOMLAB to solve it, and then obtain 4321   ,,,,,,,),,( DCDBDAtDD yx  and min f . 
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Figure 6.6 Watermark constraints and digital message image embedding process 
6.3.4 The  Process of Extraction and Detection of the 
Watermark 
This sub-section explains the process of extracting and detecting the watermark which is 
undertaken by a detector. The extraction process can be divided into two phases: locating the 
watermark and recovering the watermark information. There are two types of detection: informed 
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detection and blind detection depending on whether the cover medium is required or not in the 
detection process. The GPKR watermarking technique uses blind detection to detect watermark.  
6.3.4.1 Watermark Extraction 
The extraction process is also undertaken in watermark detector as the reduced image needs to be 
expanded. The extraction process uses a function PYR_EXPAND. This function is the reverse of 
PYR_REDUCE. This function expands an (M + 1)-by-(N + 1) array into a (2M + 1)-by-(2N + 1) 
array by interpolating new node values. So PYR_EXPAND applied to array 1g  of the Gaussian 
pyramid would result in an array 1,lg which is of the same size as 1lg .  
The process of extracting the image can be depicted in Pseudo Code 6.6 
Pseudo Code  6.6   Expanding the reduced image by the pyramid transforms to get the sensory 
image 
Input: 
4321  ,,,,,,,),,( DCDBDAtDD yx 
 
4
, 
3
,
2
,
1
  
All of the errors of measurement  
WC Watermark constraints  
 
The reduced image    
 
Output  
 
The sensory  image 
  
  
Step 1: Getting all input data      
Get all of the errors of measurement 
4321  ,,,,,,,),,( DCDBDAtDD yx  4321 ,,,  , 
WC (watermark constraints) and the reduced image. 
    
Step 2: Detecting all of the errors of measurement   
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Use 
4321  ,,,,,,,),,( DCDBDAtDD yx   and 
4
, 
3
,
2
,
1
 to detect whether the watermark 
constraints satisfy all the requirements. If they satisfy all the errors of measurement, go to Step 3, 
otherwise go to Step 1.   
 
Step 3: Converting coefficient watermark constraints into binary matrix 
 
Convert coefficient watermark constraints into binary matrix using the inverse Kolmogorov rule, 
and then convert the binary matrix to decimal matrix. 
Step 4: Expanding the reduced image using the function PYR_Expand to get the original 
image  
Apply array 1g  of the Gaussian pyramid to the reduced image, in order to get the array 1,lg which 
is of the same size as 1lg .  
Let nlg  be the result of expanding ig n times.  
10, gg l   and )1,(_,  ngEXPANDPYRg lnl . PYR_REDUCE means for level Nl 0 , N0 and 
nodes iCiji 0  ,,  , pRj 0    








 

2
2
1,
2
2
,
2
,
2
),(4),(
m
nl
n
nl
njmi
gnmwjig        
Step 5: Applying function PYR_Expand to get the same size as the original image 
Apply the function PYR_EXPAND n times to the image lg  to obtain llg , which is of the same 
size as the original image.  
Step 6: Printing the sensory image  
Print the sensory image.  
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Figure 6.7 Flowchart for extraction process  
6.3.4.2 Watermark Detecting Process  
This sub-section explains the detection process. There are two types of detection: informed 
detection and blind detection, depending on whether the cover medium is required or not in the 
detection process. To verify the presence of the watermark  constraints, we adopt the concept of 
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Cox et al. (Cox, Kilian, and Leighton 1997). Let x be the error of the optimal solution without  
watermark constraints, x’ the error of the optimal solution with watermark constraints, and x‟‟ the 
error of the optimal solution with watermark constraint attacks. For detecting the watermark, a 
correlation value or similarity measure is used in most of these methods. Here, to verify the 
presence of the watermark constraints, the difference  measure between the normalized difference 
errors of the optimal solution without watermark constraints and with watermark constraints 
( xxc  ' ) is obtained. The similarity measure between the normalized difference errors of the 
optimal solution without watermark constraints and with watermark constraint attacks is 
( xxc  '
'
). The similarity measure is given by the normalized correlation coefficient 
'.'
'.
'
)','(
XX
XC
XCSM  .  
The pseudo-code for detecting watermark signal is shown in Pseudo Code 6.7 and the process of 
watermark detection is shown in Figure 6.8. 
Pseudo Code  6.7  The process of detecting watermark constraints  
Input 
 
Output   
     Detecting whether the watermark constraints (WC) are robust or not   
 
Step 1: Getting all input data      
],,,,,,,[ 4321 DCDBDAtx  , ],,,,,,,[
'
4
'
3
'
2
'
1
'''
'
'' DCDBDAtx  , 
],,,,,,,[
"
4
"
3
"
2
"
1
'"'"'""" DCDBDAtx   and Wateramrk Constraints.   
 WC  Watermark constraints 
],,,,,,,[ 4321 DCDBDAtx   Error of the optimal solution without  watermark 
constraints 
],,,,,,,[
'
4
'
3
'
2
'
1
'''
'
'' DCDBDAtx 
 
Error of the optimal solution with watermark 
constraints  
],,,,,,,[
"
4
"
3
"
2
"
1
'"'"'""" DCDBDAtx 
 
Error of the optimal watermark constraint attacks 
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Step 2: Computing the difference errors of the optimal solution with watermark constraints, 
computing threshold and similarity. 
xxcxxc 
"'
 and   
'
   Compute ,  
''
'
  threshold
xx
cx
  and  
""
"
 similarity
xx
cx
 . 
Step 3: Deciding whether watermark constraints are robust 
If  similarity          threshold  , go to watermark constrainst is robust. 
Step 4: Deciding whether watermark constrints are not robust 
If  similarity        threshold  , go to watermark constrainst is not robust.  
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Figure 6.8 Flow chart for the detection process of the GPKR watermarking  technique 
6.4  Implementation of the Prototype  
This section describes the experimental set-up used for an extensive testing of the model, to check 
whether the proposed algorithm is feasible. MATLAB and TOMLAB were used in the 
experimental set-up. This represents the fourth stage of the conceptual process described in Section 
4.4, in which the theoretical foundation was implemented as a prototype. We modelled network 
set-ups for the processes of generating watermark, embedding watermark constraints, and 
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extracting watermark signal, in the overall set-up for copyright protection of images in WMSNs. 
We also modelled some attacks to this copyright protection model often used by attackers, such as 
modifying the different results of the embedding process. The overall process of copyright 
protection using watermark was modelled using MATLAB files as given below:   
MenuGPKR.m 
NetworkSetupWMSNs.m 
GenerateCoverMedium.m 
GenerateWatermark.m (pyr_reduce.m, Kolmogov_rule_WMSN) 
ComputationCoverMedium.m 
EmbeddingWithCONSTRAINTS.m 
ExtractWMSN.m 
DetectingProcessWMSNs.m 
DetecAttackDelete.m 
 DetectAttackFalseInsert.m 
 DetectAttackModification.m 
DetectAttackReplication.m   
The operations were governed by menGPKR.m which initialized all the required variables, such as 
the path to network set-up, cover medium set-up and external applications, and passed the 
embedded and extracted parameters to the file Extract.m for processing. Attacks were performed 
within the file menuGPKR.m and are described in Section 6.4.5. For verifying whether the 
watermark signal was present, the similarity between the normalized difference error from the 
optimal solution between the watermarked solution X' and the solution obtained without watermark 
X was applied, and was modelled using the file DetectingRobustWateramrk.m  
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6.4.1  Source Code : Network Set -Up Generation  
The process of network setting was modelled using the file NetworkSetupWMS.m. The call to 
NetworkSetupWMSNs.m from menuGPKR.m passed to the location of the network setting. The 
pseudo code for the network setting process and further details have been given in Section 6.5.1.   
6.4.2 Source Code : Cover Medium Generation  
The process of cover medium generation was modelled using the file GenerateCoverMedium.m. 
The call to GenerateCoverMedium.m from menuGPKR.m passed to the location of the cover 
medium and the parameters for the cover medium to perform the embedding operation. The pseudo 
code for the cover medium generation has been explained in Section 6.5.1.  
Figure 6.9 shows the screenshot of cover medium generation using MATLAB Code. 
 
Figure 6.9 Screenshot of cover medium generation using MATLAB Code 
6.4.3 Source Code : Watermark Generation  
The process of watermark generation consists of four steps: the process of reducing image was 
modelled using the MATLAB  function pyr_reduce.m, the process of converting the RGB colour 
image to decimal matrix signals was modelled using the file de2bi.m and the process of producing 
watermark constraints was modelled using the file  GenerateWatermark.m (pyr_reduce.m, 
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Kolmogov_rule_WMSN).  The pseudo code for watermark generation has been given in Section 
6.3.2.  The  screenshot for cover medium generation using MATLB Code has been shown in 
Figure 6.10. 
 
Figure 6.10 Screenshot of cover medium generation using MATLB Code 
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6.4.4 Source Code : Embedding Watermark  
The process of embedding watermark constraints was modelled using the file  
EmbeddingWithCONSTRAINTS.m. The call to EmbeddingWithCONSTRAINTS from 
menuGPKR.m  passed to the location of the cover medium and the parameters to perform the 
embedding operation. The pseudo code for the process of embedding watermark constraints has 
been described in Section 6.3.3.   
Figure 6.11  shows the screenshot of the process of embedding watermark constraints. 
 
Figure 6.11  Screenshot of the process of embedding watermark constraints 
6.4.5 Source Code : Extracting and Detecting 
The process of extracting the watermark signal was modelled using the file ExtractWMSN.m. The 
pseudo code for the process of extracting the watermark signal has neem described in section 6.3.4.  
Figure 6.12 shows the screen shot of the process of extracting the watermark signal 
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Figure 6.12 Screenshot of the process of extracting the reduced  image 
The process of detecting watermark constraints was modelled using the file 
DetectingProcessWMSNs.m. The pseudo code for the process of detecting watermark constraints 
has been given in Section 6.3.4.   
Figure 6.13 shows the screenshot of the process of detecting the watermark constraints. 
   
Figure 6.13 Screenshot of the process of detecting the watermark constraints 
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6.4.5.1 Source Code: Attacks 
We assume that the results of the process of embedding watermark constraints are estimated by an 
attacker, and can be removed, manipulated, modified or changed. The corresponding attacks on the 
embedding process are: 
1. Deleting a number of the results of the embedding process in the hope that the receiver will 
not get an appropriate expanded image. The process of deleting a number of results was 
modelled by the file AttackDELETEimageWMSN.m.  
2. Inserting false results of the embedding process in the hope that the  new  results of the 
watermark constraints embedding process will map into the results of the watermark 
embedding process. The process of inserting false results was modelled by the file 
DetectAttackFalseInsert.m. 
3. Modifying the results of the watermark embedding process in the hope to find new results 
of watermark embedding process that will map into the results of the watermark 
embedding process. The process of modifying the results was modelled by the file 
DetectAttackModification.m. 
4. Replicating different results of the watermark constraints embedding process in the hope to 
find new results of error of the watermark constraints embedding process  that will map 
into the existing solution. This process of replicating watermark constraints was modelled 
using the file DetectAttackReplication.m. 
All the implementation details of different types of attack, viz. deletion, false insertion, 
modification and replication, have been given in Section  6.5.3. 
6.5  Experimental Setting  
This section describes the experimental set-up used for an extensive testing of the model. In this 
case, we did not use a square shaped area for deploying the multimedia sensor nodes. Instead, we 
deployed the multimedia sensor nodes over a rectangular shaped area. One reason for using a 
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rectangular area was to find out diffrencess, if any, from the use of square meter. We randomly 
placed 50 nodes within a 200 meter  length and 100 meter width, as shown in Figure 6.16.  
6.5.1 Network Set-Up 
This section describes the process of setting the network for testing our model of copyright 
protection of images in WMSNs. We generated 32 positions of 
),( and   ),(),,(
C
y
C
x
B
y
B
x
A
y
A
x   using random positions of 50 multimedia sensor nodes. We 
further generated cT  using Gauss distribution on interval [0, 1], 32 DC
t
DB
t
DA
t  and  
 
,
 
using 
uniform distribution on interval [0, 1], and 31 ,2,  and 4  using Gauss distribution on interval  [0,1], 
so that these values do not harm the feasibility of solution of the cover medium.  
The pseudo code for setting the network is shown in Pseudo Code 6.8.  
Pseudo Code  6.8   Network set-up for GPKR watermarking technique 
 
Input 
N  Number of Multimedia sensor nodes 
L Unit length of multimedia sensor nodes  
M Unit width of multimedia sensor nodes  
R Maximum range of two sensor nodes communicating with 
each other 
 
 
Output  
 
  50,...,1,, iiyxi   Coordinate positions of two-dimensional sensor nodes 
cT  Temperature of the propagation media  
 
DC
t
DB
t
DA
t  and  
 
,
 
Generation of time transmission between two sensor nodes 
21
, and 3  
Errors between the Euclidean distances measured from 
the feasibility of the solution space of optimization 
4  
Auxiliary variables to the cover medium  
4321  and ,,,   Value of the feasibility of the solution space of optimization 
 
Steps 1: Setting all data  
N = 50, L = 200, M=100 and R = 30  
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Set 50 multimedia sensor nodes randomly within a 200 meter length and 100 meter width, and set 
maximum range of two sensor nodes communicating with each other at R=30. 
 
Step 2: Positioning and plotting the coordinates  
Generate the coordinates of 50 multimedia sensor nodes‟ position of x, y, and plot these 
coordinates. 
 
Step 3: Plotting a link between two sensor nodes using Euclidean Theorem  
 
Compute the distance between two multimedia sensor nodes using Euclidean Theorem. If distance 
is less than R, there is a link between the two multimedia sensor nodes, else there is no link 
between the two multimedia sensor nodes. 
Step 4: Generating parameters of time transmission, temperature, errors between two 
Eucliden distances, and the value of feasibility of the solution space   
 
Generate time transmission between two sensor nodes based on uniform distribution over the 
interval [0, 1], Generate the temperature of the propagation media based on random distribution 
over the interval [1, 50], Generate errors between the Euclidean distances measured based on 
uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1] and the feasibility of the solution space of optimization 
based on uniform distribution over the interval [0,1].  
 
Step 5: Printing coordinate positions, temperature, time transmission, error between two 
distances measured, and the value of the visibility  
Print coordinate positions  ,50,...,3,2,1),,( iyx ii temperature cT , time transmission 
DCDBDA ttt ,, , and the value of visibility 4321    and ,,,   
Figure 6.14 Shows the flowchart for network set-up of the GPKR watermarkingtechnique 
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Start
N = 50 ( Number of multimedia sensor node) 
L = 200 meter ( length of rectangular )
M = 100 meter ( wide of rectangular  
R = 30 ( maximum range of two senso rnodes 
communicate)    
End
2
1
5
Generate coordinate of N sensor node of x, y and plot these coordinate to L 
meter square. 
3Plot a link between two sensor node using Euclidean theorem and constraints R 
4
Generate parameters of time transmission, temperature, errors between two 
eucliden distances and the value feasibility of the solution space  
 ,50,...,3,2,1),,( iiyix cT DC
tDBtDAt ,,
 
4   and ,3,2,1 
 
Figure 6.14 Flowchart for network set-up of GPKR watermarking technique  
 
We implemented the network set-up for the GPKR watermarking technique through Pseudo Code 
5.6, using MATLAB given in Figure 6.15. The network setting is illustrated in Figure 6.16.  
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Figure 6.15 Screenshot of network setting for GPKR watermarking technique using  MATLAB 
Code 
 
 
Figure 6.16 50 nodes randomly deployed within a 200 meter length and 100 meter width 
ased on Figure 6.16, we can list the coordinates of 50 nodes, as shown in Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2 Coordinate positions of 50 nodes 
No X Y  No X Y  
1 190.0259 19.34312 26 40.55304 70.27399 
2 46.2277 68.22232 27 39.74435 54.65712 
3 121.3685 30.27644 28 120.7585 44.48802 
4 97.19649 54.16739 29 54.43758 69.45672 
5 178.2598 15.0873 30 39.76285 62.13101 
6 152.4194 69.78985 31 3.054785 79.48211 
7 91.29353 37.8373 32 149.3571 95.68434 
8 3.700729 86.00116 33 89.01929 52.25903 
9 164.2814 85.36551 34 186.3629 88.01422 
10 88.94067 59.35629 35 93.19887 17.29561 
11 123.0865 49.65524 36 83.72989 97.97469 
12 158.3874 89.97692 37 169.2443 27.14473 
13 184.3626 82.16292 38 105.0305 25.23293 
14 147.6414 64.49104 39 40.52947 87.57419 
15 35.25323 81.79743 40 134.4275 73.7306 
16 81.14124 66.02276 41 167.6237 13.65187 
17 187.0939 34.19706 42 3.927903 1.175669 
18 183.3809 28.97259 43 136.2554 89.3898 
19 82.05404 34.11936 44 75.8962 19.91381 
20 178.7299 53.4079 45 166.3592 29.8723 
21 11.57826 72.71132 46 100.5626 66.14426 
22 70.57363 30.92902 47 141.8943 28.44086 
23 162.6333 83.8496 48 85.77847 46.92243 
24 1.97226 56.80725 49 60.92347 6.478112 
25 27.77818 37.04136 50 37.93075 98.83349 
 
The next step of experimental setting is the generation of cover medium algorithm by using Pseudo 
Code 6.8, which was explained in Section 2.2.1. We obtain the NLSP as follows:
 
4
3)(*))( 6.04.331(
2
)(
2
)(
2)(*))( 6.04.331(
2
)(
2
)(
1)(*))( 6.04.331(
2
)(
2
)(
sConstraint
4321min
0
0
0
0
3
2
1
















DCDCttcTCyDycxDx
DBDBttcTByDyBxDx
DADAttcTAyDyAxDx
DCDBDAtf
   
 
 
We then provide all the data input which is used for preparing the NLSP. To provide all the data 
we:  
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1. generate 32 of ),( and   ),(),,(
C
y
C
x
B
y
B
x
A
y
A
x using random positions of 50 sensor 
nodes within 200 meter length and 100 meter width. 
2. generate 32 
DC
t
DB
t
DA
t  and  
 
,
 
using uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1]. 
3. generate 32 cT  using Gauss distribution on interval [0, 1]. 
4. generate 32 31 ,2,  and 4 using Gauss distribution over the interval [0, 1], so that these 
values do not harm the feasibility of the solution of cover medium .  
 
Table 6.3  shows all the data input for our model of copyright protection of images in WMSNs 
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.
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In the next stage of experiment setting, we provide the image. It is this image which is to be 
protected using the GPKR watermarking technique. The image is a  Lena  picture. Such pictures 
have been most widely used as standard images to test the embedding and extraction process. The 
Lena is shown in Figure 6.17.  
 
Figure 6.17  The Lena figure  (http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~chuck/lennapg/lenna.shtml) 
GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE 
Copyright protection of Images in WMSNs 
Applied Pyramid Transforms for reducing image 
Generating Watermark Binary Matrix 
Watermark Constraints and Kolmogorov Rule 
Image reduction and Kolmogorov rule 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Which one do you want =  1 
Image that the multimedia Sensor node has captured? imread('len_std.jpg') 
How  many times will be it reduced? 6 
 
n = 6 
 
Matrix decimal from an image 
 
ans = 
 
  181  187  196  205   94  100  109  118  102  108  117  126 
  179  185  195  203   92   98  108  116  100  106  116  124 
  176  182  192  200   89   95  105  113   97  103  113  121 
  172  179  188  196   85   92  101  109   93  100  109  117 
 
Convert Matrix decimal to Matrix binary  
 
st = 
 
    1    0    1    1    0    1    0    1 
    1    0    1    1    0    0    1    1 
    1    0    1    1    0    0    0    0 
    1    0    1    0    1    1    0    0 
    1    0    1    1    1    0    1    1 
    1    0    1    1    1    0    0    1 
    1    0    1    1    0    1    1    0 
    1    0    1    1    0    0    1    1 
    1    1    0    0    0    1    0    0 
    1    1    0    0    0    0    1    1 
    1    1    0    0    0    0    0    0 
    1    0    1    1    1    1    0    0 
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    1    1    0    0    1    1    0    1 
    1    1    0    0    1    0    1    1 
    1    1    0    0    1    0    0    0 
    1    1    0    0    0    1    0    0 
    0    1    0    1    1    1    1    0 
    0    1    0    1    1    1    0    0 
    0    1    0    1    1    0    0    1 
    0    1    0    1    0    1    0    1 
    0    1    1    0    0    1    0    0 
    0    1    1    0    0    0    1    0 
    0    1    0    1    1    1    1    1 
    0    1    0    1    1    1    0    0 
    0    1    1    0    1    1    0    1 
    0    1    1    0    1    1    0    0 
    0    1    1    0    1    0    0    1 
    0    1    1    0    0    1    0    1 
    0    1    1    1    0    1    1    0 
    0    1    1    1    0    1    0    0 
    0    1    1    1    0    0    0    1 
    0    1    1    0    1    1    0    1 
    1    0    1    0    1    1    1    0 
    1    0    0    1    1    1    1    0 
    0    0    1    1    1    1    1    0 
    0    1    1    1    1    1    1    0 
    1    0    1    1    0    1    1    0 
    1    0    0    0    1    1    1    0 
    0    0    1    0    1    1    1    0 
    1    0    1    0    1    1    1    0 
    0    0    1    0    0    1    1    0 
    1    1    1    0    0    1    1    0 
    0    1    0    1    0    1    1    0 
    0    0    1    1    0    1    1    0 
    1    0    1    1    1    0    1    0 
    1    0    0    0    0    1    1    0 
    0    0    1    0    0    1    1    0 
    0    1    1    0    0    1    1    0 
 
 Watermark Matrix Signal to become 2 Rows x 1 column   
 Convert watermark constraint using Kolmogorov rule  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 6.18  The process of reducing the Lena image 
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Figure 6.18  shows the process of reducing the Lena image. 
We now generate watermark constraints as follows:  
====================================================== 
GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE 
Copyright protection of Images in WMSNs 
                    1. Dividing watermark using Kolmogorov rule 
                    2. Menu GPKR Watermarking technique 
====================================================== 
Which one do you want =  1 
Kolmogorov rule  
 ---------------------------------------- 
 1     2    3     4     5    6     7   8  
 ---------------------------------------- 
 x     y    z     r     s    t     u   v 
----------------------------------------- 
 et   eda  edb   edc   d1    d2   d3  d4 
 --------------------------------------- 
Watermark constrains of the Lena image  
How many rows do you want to create watermark constrints = 8 
Watermark constraints are as follows 
Watermark   
Watermark  = 
  
d2 + d4 + edb + edc + et 
d3 + d4 + edb + edc + et 
edb + edc + et 
d1 + d2 + edb + et 
d1 + d3 + d4 + edb + edc + et 
d1 + d4 + edb + edc + et 
d2 + d3 + edb + edc + et 
d3 + d4 + edb + edc + et 
d2 + eda + et 
d3 + d4 + eda + et 
eda + et 
d1 + d2 + edb + edc + et 
d1 + d2 + d4 + eda + et 
d1 + d3 + d4 + eda + et 
d1 + eda + et 
d2 + eda + et 
d1 + d2 + d3 + eda + edc 
d1 + d2 + eda + edc 
d1 + d4 + eda + edc 
d2 + d4 + eda + edc 
d2 + eda + edb 
d3 + eda + edb 
d1 + d2 + d3 + d4 + eda + edc 
d1 + d2 + eda + edc 
d1 + d2 + d4 + eda + edb 
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d1 + d2 + eda + edb 
d1 + d4 + eda + edb 
d2 + d4 + eda + edb 
d2 + d3 + eda + edb + edc 
d2 + eda + edb + edc 
d4 + eda + edb + edc 
d1 + d2 + d4 + eda + edb 
d1 + d2 + d3 + edb + et 
d1 + d2 + d3 + edc + et 
d1 + d2 + d3 + edb + edc 
d1 + d2 + d3 + eda + edb + edc 
d2 + d3 + edb + edc + et 
d1 + d2 + d3 + et 
d1 + d2 + d3 + edb 
d1 + d2 + d3 + edb + et 
d2 + d3 + edb 
d2 + d3 + eda + edb + et 
d2 + d3 + eda + edc 
d2 + d3 + edb + edc 
d1 + d3 + edb + edc + et 
d2 + d3 + et 
d2 + d3 + edb 
d2 + d3 + eda + edb 
 
The watermark constraints will be embedded into the cover medium. The next part explains how to 
expand the reduced image.  
=============================================================== 
             MAIN MENU FOR GENERATING WATERMARK              
               GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE             
                Extracting WMSNs                     
 This Program applied Pyramid Transforms to expand THE image  
 -------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Expanding should equal the reduced image  
=============================================================== 
 
st = 
 
  181  187  196  205   94  100  109  118  102  108  117  126 
  179  185  195  203   92   98  108  116  100  106  116  124 
  176  182  192  200   89   95  105  113   97  103  113  121 
  172  179  188  196   85   92  101  109   93  100  109  117 
 
 
 How many times do you want to expand the image? 6 
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Figure 6.19  The Lena image expansion process 
Figure 6.19 shows the Lena image expansion process 
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6.5.2 Parameters 
Table 6.4  lists all the parameters and their associated values, used for capturing results from the 
algorithm.  
Table 6.4  Parameters and their associated values used in the GPKR watermarking technique 
Parameter Description  Metric  
N  Number of sensor node  Integer 
 
nji
yx ji
,...2,1
,,

 
Position of two-dimensional sensor networks Coordinate  
cT  Temperature of the propagation media Degree  
,DAt DBt DCt  
 
Time transmission between nodes D to A, D to B, 
and D to C 
Second 
Vs  Speed acoustic signal  (m/s) 
t  Error in the measurement of temperature  - 
DA , DB ,  DC  Error in the measurement of the timer from D to A, D 
to B, and D to C 
- 
21
, , 
3
  Error in measurement between the Euclidean 
measurement and that measured using time 
differences of optimal D to A, D to B, and D to C 
- 
4  
Auxiliary variable  - 
31 ,2,   4  The values are selected such that the feasibility of the 
solution space of  the optimization problem is not 
harmed  
- 
Image data  Image sensed by a multimedia sensor node  Bit  
treshold  Normalized correlation of the results of the errors of 
cover medium with watermark constraints 
- 
)','( XCsim  Normalized correlation of the results of the error of 
cover medium with watermark constraint attacks 
- 
Watermark 
constraints  
Result from pseudo code  - 
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6.5.3 Attack Characterization  
This section discusses how WMSNs can be attacked in different ways and how the security scheme 
proposed by us thwarts these attacks. Consider the general model of a watermarking technique for 
copyright protection for WMSNs according to a communication formulation. Its block diagram is 
shown in Figure 6.1. We consider in detail the corresponding weaknesses for the GPKR  
watermarking technique that can be used by an attacker. Assuming that the results of  the 
watermark constraints embedding process are estimated by the attacker and can be changed, 
modified and removed, the corresponding attacks are: 
6.5.3.1 Deletion of the Results of Embedding Watermark 
Constraints 
In this type of attack the attacker drops a number of results of the watermark embedding process, 
hoping that the received results will not approximate to the results of the errors of watermark 
constraint embedding process and the receiver will not be able to expand the reduced image. Table 
6.5 shows the results of data deletion attack.      
Table 6.5   Results of data deletion attack 
No.  et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 d4 
1 -368.559 0.871006 -0.69507 -0.15576 1.1E-15 8.27E-15 0.022656 0 
2 -354.786 0.067108 0.016251 -2.4E-15 0 0 -2.4E-15 0 
3 -366.574 0.314889 -0.20552 -0.83653 1.46E-16 0 0 0 
4 -91715.1 -4.14155 -3.84053 -4.25654 0.33915 0.01285 4.136199 0 
5 -1.9E+07 -16.2954 -16.1894 -15.9747 -1.2E-09 6.03E-09 0 0 
6 -5.1E+09 -1.79293 -1.27421 -1.83895 0.051088 1.698487 0.000274 0 
7 -46.896 0.202836 0.03697 0.09217 0 0 0 0 
8 -9E+09 -1.01671 -1.43204 -1.78229 -2.9E-08 7.47E-09 8.27E-06 0 
9 -2.8E+09 -2.2487 -1.97941 -1.39631 6.73E-10 0.000684 0.000813 0 
10 -2.8E+08 -4.34846 -3.9838 -4.64823 1.56E-09 0 9.96E-12 0 
11 -415.921 0.352388 -0.29101 -0.29101 -1.2E-17 0 0 0 
12 -1.3E+08 -3.89156 -3.927 -3.9082 0.01307 3.54E-09 -4.4E-11 0 
13 -132.978 0.436673 -0.32304 -0.81604 0 0.166699 0 0 
14 -387.543 0.344457 -0.18912 -0.18912 -3.3E-14 0 1.61E-17 0 
15 -154.952 0.031489 -0.02911 -0.0606 0 0.031489 0 0 
16 -3.4E+08 -0.88494 -0.3738 -0.54307 0.22836 0.007178 0.492283 0 
17 -320.099 -0.13532 -0.18463 0.141574 0 0 0 0 
 
Delete  
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18 -7.2E+09 -4.45188 -3.61675 -3.72001 0.008996 0.043237 0.048432 0 
19 -2.8E+09 -2.92602 -2.6478 -2.93585 5.54E-08 0 0 0 
20 -498499 -1.36528 -0.60926 -1.33542 0.000118 0 4.73E-12 0 
21 -413.476 0.344074 -0.11566 -0.11566 -1.4E-15 2.66E-14 0 0 
22 -4.7E+09 -4.30285 -4.5395 -4.52744 0 0 7.87E-12 0 
23 -2883228 -9.5167 -10.2117 -9.72239 0.039146 0.971274 0.000217 0 
24 -6.6E+08 -5.70813 -5.31959 -5.74334 0 -1.7E-09 0 0 
25 -385.615 -0.27625 5.93E-14 0.36251 -1.4E-14 3.34E-14 -7.5E-19 0 
26 -261.886 0.180011 -1.8E-13 0.099421 0 -4.4E-14 1.01E-17 0 
27 -89.9681 0.288105 -0.23769 -0.00453 -7.4E-16 -3.2E-15 8.76E-18 0 
28 -1.5E+09 -7.08853 -6.71907 -7.01849 -1.8E-07 -1.4E-07 0 0 
29 1.39E-17 0.007553 -1.2E-16 -0.71373 -1.3E-17 0 0 0 
30 -357.668 0.106291 -0.08042 -0.27835 0 0.02717 1.45E-15 0 
31 -571.535 -3.1E+08 -3.3E+08 -3.4E+08 -4.9E-07 257.0846 -2.4E-11 0 
32 -201.677 0.373617 -0.30245 -0.58946 8.33E-17 0.287014 5.62E-25 0 
 
6.5.3.2  False Data Insertion for the Results of Embedding 
Watermark Constraints 
In this type of attack, the attacker inserts some false yet convincing data into the results from the 
watermark embedding process, hoping to find new results of error of the watermark constraint 
embedding process that will map into the existing solution. Table 6.6 shows the results of false 
data insertion attack. 
Table 6.6 Results of false data insertion attack 
No.  et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 d4 
1 -368.559 0.871006 -0.69507 -0.15576 1.1E-15 8.27E-15 0.022656 0 
2 -354.786 0.067108 0.016251 -2.4E-15 0 0 -2.4E-15 0 
3 -366.574 0.314889 -0.20552 -0.83653 1.46E-16 0 0 0 
4 -91715.1 -4.14155 -3.84053 -4.25654 0.33915 0.01285 4.136199 0 
5 -1.9E+07 -16.2954 -16.1894 -15.9747 -1.2E-09 6.03E-09 0 0 
6 -5.1E+09 -1.79293 -1.27421 -1.83895 0.051088 1.698487 0.000274 0 
7 -46.896 0.202836 0.03697 0.09217 0 0 0 0 
8 -9E+09 -1.01671 -1.43204 -1.78229 -2.9E-08 7.47E-09 8.27E-06 0 
9 -2.8E+09 -2.2487 -1.97941 -1.39631 6.73E-10 0.000684 0.000813 0 
10 -2.8E+08 -4.34846 -3.9838 -4.64823 1.56E-09 0 9.96E-12 0 
11 -415.921 0.352388 -0.29101 -0.29101 -1.2E-17 0 0 0 
12 -1.3E+08 -3.89156 -3.927 -3.9082 0.01307 3.54E-09 -4.4E-11 0 
13 -132.978 0.436673 -0.32304 -0.81604 0 0.166699 0 0 False data Insertion    
Delete 
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14 -387.543 0.344457 -0.18912 -0.18912 -3.3E-14 0 1.61E-17 0 
15 -154.952 0.031489 -0.02911 -0.0606 0 0.031489 0 0 
16 -3.4E+08 -0.88494 -0.3738 -0.54307 0.22836 0.007178 0.492283 0 
17 -320.099 -0.13532 -0.18463 0.141574 0 0 0 0 
18 -7.2E+09 -4.45188 -3.61675 -3.72001 0.008996 0.043237 0.048432 0 
19 -2.8E+09 -2.92602 -2.6478 -2.93585 5.54E-08 0 0 0 
20 -498499 -1.36528 -0.60926 -1.33542 0.000118 0 4.73E-12 0 
21 -413.476 0.344074 -0.11566 -0.11566 -1.4E-15 2.66E-14 0 0 
22 -4.7E+09 -4.30285 -4.5395 -4.52744 0 0 7.87E-12 0 
23 -2883228 -9.5167 -10.2117 -9.72239 0.039146 0.971274 0.000217 0 
24 -6.6E+08 -5.70813 -5.31959 -5.74334 0 -1.7E-09 0 0 
25 -385.615 -0.27625 5.93E-14 0.36251 -1.4E-14 3.34E-14 -7.5E-19 0 
26 -261.886 0.180011 -1.8E-13 0.099421 0 -4.4E-14 1.01E-17 0 
27 -89.9681 0.288105 -0.23769 -0.00453 -7.4E-16 -3.2E-15 8.76E-18 0 
28 -1.5E+09 -7.08853 -6.71907 -7.01849 -1.8E-07 -1.4E-07 0 0 
29 1.39E-17 0.007553 -1.2E-16 -0.71373 -1.3E-17 0 0 0 
30 -357.668 0.106291 -0.08042 -0.27835 0 0.02717 1.45E-15 0 
31 -571.535 -3.1E+08 -3.3E+08 -3.4E+08 -4.9E-07 257.0846 -2.4E-11 0 
32 -201.677 0.373617 -0.30245 -0.58946 8.33E-17 0.287014 5.62E-25 0 
          
Results of some convincing number data insertion are shown in Table 6.7.  
Table 6.7 New results of false data insertion 
 
11 -9.6E+09 -1.8512 -1.48655 -2.15098 0 2.46E-07 0 0 
12 
-1.3E+08 -1.24105 -1.23832 -1.41508 0 -7.5E-09 0 0 
13 -1.2E+08 -1.3061 -1.36171 -1.3362 1539375 114142.6 587841.1 0 
14 -2.7E+09 -1.14176 -1.4127 -1.87087 0 -9.6E-08 4.77E-07 0 
15 -1.8E+08 -1.45655 -1.21897 -1.27356 962489.5 4799116 45258.39 0 
16 -1.8E+09 -1.35223 -1.287 -1.60741 56765374 2082626 2082763 0 
17 -6.8E+08 -1.3432 -0.83204 -1.00135 -5.8E-09 -9.5E-10 -9.8E-10 0 
18 -4.6E+08 -1.1628 -0.7516 -0.56458 4.07E-09 -1.2E-08 1.76E-09 0 
19 -4739296 -2.26086 -1.51799 -1.59013 110916.1 115844.1 115557.1 0 
20 -2.1E+09 -2.63393 -1.93231 -2.2161 5.4E+08 962600.7 5763527 0 
New data Insertion   
False data Insertion    
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6.5.3.3  Modification of the Results of Embedding Watermark 
Constraints 
In this type of attack, the attacker gains access to the data paths in the network and successfully 
interprets the traffic. Having read the data, the attackers alters it by modifying the results of the 
watermark constraint embedding process, hoping to find new results of the embedding process that 
will map into the existing solution. Results of data modification attack are shown in Table 6.8 
Table 6.8 Results of  data modification attack 
o.  et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 d4 
1 -368.559 0.871006 -0.69507 -0.15576 1.1E-15 8.27E-15 0.022656 0 
2 -354.786 0.067108 0.016251 -2.4E-15 0 0 -2.4E-15 0 
3 -366.574 0.314889 -0.20552 -0.83653 1.46E-16 0 0 0 
4 -91715.1 -4.14155 -3.84053 -4.25654 0.33915 0.01285 4.136199 0 
5 -1.9E+07 -16.2954 -16.1894 -15.9747 -1.2E-09 6.03E-09 0 0 
6 -5.1E+09 -1.79293 -1.27421 -1.83895 0.051088 1.698487 0.000274 0 
7 -46.896 0.202836 0.03697 0.09217 0 0 0 0 
8 -9E+09 -1.01671 -1.43204 -1.78229 -2.9E-08 7.47E-09 8.27E-06 0 
9 -2.8E+09 -2.2487 -1.97941 -1.39631 6.73E-10 0.000684 0.000813 0 
10 -2.8E+08 -4.34846 -3.9838 -4.64823 1.56E-09 0 9.96E-12 0 
11 -415.921 0.352388 -0.29101 -0.29101 -1.2E-17 0 0 0 
12 -1.3E+08 -3.89156 -3.927 -3.9082 0.01307 3.54E-09 -4.4E-11 0 
13 -132.978 0.436673 -0.32304 -0.81604 0 0.166699 0 0 
14 -387.543 0.344457 -0.18912 -0.18912 -3.3E-14 0 1.61E-17 0 
15 -154.952 0.031489 -0.02911 -0.0606 0 0.031489 0 0 
16 -3.4E+08 -0.88494 -0.3738 -0.54307 0.22836 0.007178 0.492283 0 
17 -320.099 -0.13532 -0.18463 0.141574 0 0 0 0 
18 -7.2E+09 -4.45188 -3.61675 -3.72001 0.008996 0.043237 0.048432 0 
19 -2.8E+09 -2.92602 -2.6478 -2.93585 5.54E-08 0 0 0 
20 -498499 -1.36528 -0.60926 -1.33542 0.000118 0 4.73E-12 0 
21 -413.476 0.344074 -0.11566 -0.11566 -1.4E-15 2.66E-14 0 0 
22 -4.7E+09 -4.30285 -4.5395 -4.52744 0 0 7.87E-12 0 
23 -2883228 -9.5167 -10.2117 -9.72239 0.039146 0.971274 0.000217 0 
24 -6.6E+08 -5.70813 -5.31959 -5.74334 0 -1.7E-09 0 0 
25 -385.615 -0.27625 5.93E-14 0.36251 -1.4E-14 3.34E-14 -7.5E-19 0 
26 -261.886 0.180011 -1.8E-13 0.099421 0 -4.4E-14 1.01E-17 0 
27 -89.9681 0.288105 -0.23769 -0.00453 -7.4E-16 -3.2E-15 8.76E-18 0 
28 -1.5E+09 -7.08853 -6.71907 -7.01849 -1.8E-07 -1.4E-07 0 0 
29 1.39E-17 0.007553 -1.2E-16 -0.71373 -1.3E-17 0 0 0 
Modification    
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30 -357.668 0.106291 -0.08042 -0.27835 0 0.02717 1.45E-15 0 
31 -571.535 -3.1E+08 -3.3E+08 -3.4E+08 -4.9E-07 257.0846 -2.4E-11 0 
32 -201.677 0.373617 -0.30245 -0.58946 8.33E-17 0.287014 5.62E-25 0 
          
Results of some convincing number modifications are as shown in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9  Results of new data modification attack 
11 -1.3E+08 -1.24105 -1.23832 -1.41508 0 -7.5E-09 0 0 
12 -1.2E+08 -1.3061 -1.36171 -1.3362 1539375 114142.6 587841.1 0 
13 -2.7E+09 -1.14176 -1.4127 -1.87087 0 -9.6E-08 4.77E-07 0 
14 -1.8E+08 -1.45655 -1.21897 -1.27356 962489.5 4799116 45258.39 0 
15 -1.8E+09 -1.35223 -1.287 -1.60741 56765374 2082626 2082763 0 
16 -6.8E+08 -1.3432 -0.83204 -1.00135 -5.8E-09 -9.5E-10 -9.8E-10 0 
17 -4.6E+08 -1.1628 -0.7516 -0.56458 4.07E-09 -1.2E-08 1.76E-09 0 
18 -4739296 -2.26086 -1.51799 -1.59013 110916.1 115844.1 115557.1 0 
19 -2.1E+09 -2.63393 -1.93231 -2.2161 5.4E+08 962600.7 5763527 0 
20 -1.5E+09 -2.18338 -1.42707 -2.15306 1.16E-12 -1.2E-07 -1.2E-07 0 
 
6.5.3.4 Replication of the Results of Embedding Watermark 
Constraints 
In this type of attack, data resulting from the watermark embedding process are replicated and the 
replicated data is inserted into the existing constraints. In this way, the attacker manipulates a 
particular part of the network, and may even disconnect it completely.  
Table 6.10  Results of data replication attack 
No.  et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 d4 
1 -368.559 0.871006 -0.69507 -0.15576 1.1E-15 8.27E-15 0.022656 0 
2 -354.786 0.067108 0.016251 -2.4E-15 0 0 -2.4E-15 0 
3 -366.574 0.314889 -0.20552 -0.83653 1.46E-16 0 0 0 
4 -91715.1 -4.14155 -3.84053 -4.25654 0.33915 0.01285 4.136199 0 
5 -1.9E+07 -16.2954 -16.1894 -15.9747 -1.2E-09 6.03E-09 0 0 
6 -5.1E+09 -1.79293 -1.27421 -1.83895 0.051088 1.698487 0.000274 0 
7 -46.896 0.202836 0.03697 0.09217 0 0 0 0 
8 -9E+09 -1.01671 -1.43204 -1.78229 -2.9E-08 7.47E-09 8.27E-06 0 
9 -2.8E+09 -2.2487 -1.97941 -1.39631 6.73E-10 0.000684 0.000813 0 
New modification   
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10 -2.8E+08 -4.34846 -3.9838 -4.64823 1.56E-09 0 9.96E-12 0 
11 -415.921 0.352388 -0.29101 -0.29101 -1.2E-17 0 0 0 
12 -1.3E+08 -3.89156 -3.927 -3.9082 0.01307 3.54E-09 -4.4E-11 0 
13 -132.978 0.436673 -0.32304 -0.81604 0 0.166699 0 0 
14 -387.543 0.344457 -0.18912 -0.18912 -3.3E-14 0 1.61E-17 0 
15 -154.952 0.031489 -0.02911 -0.0606 0 0.031489 0 0 
16 -3.4E+08 -0.88494 -0.3738 -0.54307 0.22836 0.007178 0.492283 0 
17 -320.099 -0.13532 -0.18463 0.141574 0 0 0 0 
18 -7.2E+09 -4.45188 -3.61675 -3.72001 0.008996 0.043237 0.048432 0 
19 -2.8E+09 -2.92602 -2.6478 -2.93585 5.54E-08 0 0 0 
20 -498499 -1.36528 -0.60926 -1.33542 0.000118 0 4.73E-12 0 
21 -413.476 0.344074 -0.11566 -0.11566 -1.4E-15 2.66E-14 0 0 
22 -4.7E+09 -4.30285 -4.5395 -4.52744 0 0 7.87E-12 0 
23 -2883228 -9.5167 -10.2117 -9.72239 0.039146 0.971274 0.000217 0 
24 -6.6E+08 -5.70813 -5.31959 -5.74334 0 -1.7E-09 0 0 
25 -385.615 -0.27625 5.93E-14 0.36251 -1.4E-14 3.34E-14 -7.5E-19 0 
26 -261.886 0.180011 -1.8E-13 0.099421 0 -4.4E-14 1.01E-17 0 
27 -89.9681 0.288105 -0.23769 -0.00453 -7.4E-16 -3.2E-15 8.76E-18 0 
28 -1.5E+09 -7.08853 -6.71907 -7.01849 -1.8E-07 -1.4E-07 0 0 
29 1.39E-17 0.007553 -1.2E-16 -0.71373 -1.3E-17 0 0 0 
30 -357.668 0.106291 -0.08042 -0.27835 0 0.02717 1.45E-15 0 
31 -571.535 -3.1E+08 -3.3E+08 -3.4E+08 -4.9E-07 257.0846 -2.4E-11 0 
32 -201.677 0.373617 -0.30245 -0.58946 8.33E-17 0.287014 5.62E-25 0 
 
Results of some convincing new data replication are as shown in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.11 Results of new data replication 
11 
-9.6E+09 -1.8512 -1.48655 -2.15098 0 2.46E-07 0 0 
12 
-1.3E+08 -1.24105 -1.23832 -1.41508 0 -7.5E-09 0 0 
13 
-1.2E+08 -1.3061 -1.36171 -1.3362 1539375 114142.6 587841.1 0 
14 
-2.7E+09 -1.14176 -1.4127 -1.87087 0 -9.6E-08 4.77E-07 0 
15 
-1.8E+08 -1.45655 -1.21897 -1.27356 962489.5 4799116 45258.39 0 
16 
-9.6E+09 -1.8512 -1.48655 -2.15098 0 2.46E-07 0 0 
17 
-1.3E+08 -1.24105 -1.23832 -1.41508 0 -7.5E-09 0 0 
18 
-1.2E+08 -1.3061 -1.36171 -1.3362 1539375 114142.6 587841.1 0 
19 
-2.7E+09 -1.14176 -1.4127 -1.87087 0 -9.6E-08 4.77E-07 0 
20 
-1.8E+08 -1.45655 -1.21897 -1.27356 962489.5 4799116 45258.39 0 
 
Replication 
 
Delete Replication 
repliREPLICATIO
N 
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6.6  Results and Observations  
This section discusses the experiments carried out and the results observed on running our 
prototype. This is the sixth stage of the conceptual process described in Section 4.4.6, in which 
observations are made by analysing the results gathered from the prototype.  
First we provide the results of the cover medium generation process. This process was undertaken 
by an embedder. In this process, we used the first row of Table 6.9 as the input to NLSP, as 
follows: 
Table 6.12 The three positions, exact time and temperature 
No 
 
Position of three sensor nodes 
Xa Ya Xb Yb Xc Yc 
190.0259 19.34312 97.19649 54.16739 91.29353 37.8373 
 
The exact time  temperature 
Tda Tdb Tdc Tc 
0.118738 0.845702 0.155561 8.354350415 
 
The NLPS is as follows: 
toms xd yd et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 d4 
f = et+ eda+edb+edc+d1+d2+d3+d4;  
c ={ 
    -d1<= sqrt((xd-xa)^2+(yd+ya)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tda+eda) <= d1 
    -d2<= sqrt((xd-xb)^2+(yd-yb)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdb+edb) <= d2 
    -d3<= sqrt((xd-xc)^2+(yd-yc)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdc+edc) <= d3 
    0<=d1 
    0<=d2 
    0<=d3 
    0<=d4 }; 
    solution = ezsolve(f,c) 
 
 To solve equation 6.1, we run TOMLAB and get:  
PKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE 
   1. Computation of Cover Medium 
       2. Checking results of this computation using Cover Medium 
   3. Menu GBKR Watermarking technique 
===================================================== 
What Do you want =  1 
How many experiments do you want = 1 
Problem type appears to be: lpcon 
Time for symbolic processing: 0.3743 seconds 
Starting numeric solver 
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========================================================================== 
TOMLAB - Curtin University Ac. single user  501077. Valid to 2100-01-01 
========================================================================== 
Problem: ---  1: Problem 1                      f_k -
1395459274.506037700000000000 
                                       sum(|constr|)2923472.012154981500000000 
                              f(x_k) + sum(|constr|)-
1392535802.493882700000000000 
                                              f(x_0)      0.000000000000000000 
Solver: snopt.  EXIT=1.  INFORM=32. 
SNOPT 7.2-5 NLP code 
Major iteration limit reached 
FuncEv    1 ConstrEv 4833 ConJacEv 4833 Iter 1000 MinorIter 1059 
CPU time: 1.950013 sec. Elapsed time: 1.934000 sec.  
solution =  
 
     d1: 7.7103e+007 
     d2: 7.7112e+007 
     d3: 7.7113e+007 
     d4: 0 
    eda: -1.4175 
    edb: -2.1445 
    edc: -1.4543 
     et: -1.6268e+009 
     xd: 1.1653e+009 
     yd: 2.3929e+008 
 
The solution of this system is  
 
No.  et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 d4 
1 -1.6E+09 -1.4175 -2.14447 -1.45433 77102579 77112026 77113163 0 
         
 
We next compute all the input of Table 6.1 and get results as shown in Table 6.10.  
Table 6.13 Results of cover medium generation process 
No.  et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 d4 
1 -1.6E+09 -1.4175 -2.14447 -1.45433 77102579 77112026 77113163 0 
2 -2.8E+10 -0.64031 -0.97124 -1.04626 0 -4.8E-07 1E-06 0 
3 -1.2E+09 -1.54416 -1.22948 -2.0166 499597.2 498406.3 498402.4 0 
4 -2.9E+08 -1.23326 -0.93291 -1.34914 -4.4E-09 1.14E-16 0 0 
5 -3.2E+09 -2.0883 -1.89529 -1.75606 1.69E+08 29562.19 1.47E+08 0 
6 -6.2E+07 -1.9259 -0.88668 -1.45208 10685646 11066710 11045492 0 
7 -3.9E+08 -0.56401 -0.51392 -0.67747 0 3.33E-09 -3.7E-09 0 
8 -2.2E+09 -2.29202 -2.73079 -3.06812 9427720 40271307 23271481 0 
9 -1.6E+09 -1.86471 -1.59543 -1.01232 -1.9E-09 -1E-09 0 0 
10 -9.6E+09 -1.8512 -1.48655 -2.15098 0 2.46E-07 0 0 
11 -1.3E+08 -1.24105 -1.23832 -1.41508 0 -7.5E-09 0 0 
12 -1.2E+08 -1.3061 -1.36171 -1.3362 1539375 114142.6 587841.1 0 
13 -2.7E+09 -1.14176 -1.4127 -1.87087 0 -9.6E-08 4.77E-07 0 
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14 -1.8E+08 -1.45655 -1.21897 -1.27356 962489.5 4799116 45258.39 0 
15 -1.8E+09 -1.35223 -1.287 -1.60741 56765374 2082626 2082763 0 
16 -6.8E+08 -1.3432 -0.83204 -1.00135 -5.8E-09 -9.5E-10 -9.8E-10 0 
17 -4.6E+08 -1.1628 -0.7516 -0.56458 4.07E-09 -1.2E-08 1.76E-09 0 
18 -4739296 -2.26086 -1.51799 -1.59013 110916.1 115844.1 115557.1 0 
19 -2.1E+09 -2.63393 -1.93231 -2.2161 5.4E+08 962600.7 5763527 0 
20 -1.5E+09 -2.18338 -1.42707 -2.15306 1.16E-12 -1.2E-07 -1.2E-07 0 
21 -1.4E+08 -1.5288 -1.50403 -1.60774 1200849 126533.7 126534.3 0 
22 -5.3E+08 -1.17576 -1.41226 -1.32107 101232.3 148138.5 24649266 0 
23 -3681655 -1.39077 -2.71227 -1.88307 806427.6 781379.8 774145.4 0 
24 -4.1E+09 -1.17725 -0.78871 -1.21246 7.14E-08 -5.7E-12 -5.2E-08 0 
25 -9.6E+09 -1.50935 -1.4615 -0.73569 69794763 69794664 69794859 0 
26 -4.5E+08 -0.67583 -0.51549 -0.48101 0 0 1.82E-12 0 
27 -2.2E+09 -2.07901 -1.56794 -1.20901 1.12E+09 279434.4 233119.8 0 
28 -5E+09 -1.88663 -1.51717 -1.81659 3.76E-09 -3.7E-09 4.75E-07 0 
29 -3.6E+10 -1.19362 -1.32114 -1.92966 0 0 0 0 
30 -8E+08 -2.08051 -1.09995 -1.86525 85821095 24272349 85819407 0 
31 -3.7E+09 -1.61236 -1.36074 -1.37073 0 -8.4E-08 0 0 
32 -2.7E+07 -1.03225 -1.28812 -1.5396 409971.6 435740.6 279742.7 0 
 
In the next step, we provide the results of the watermark constraint embedding process. This 
process was also undertaken by an embedder. In this process, we used the first row of Table 6.3 as 
the input to NLSP, as follows: 
Table 6.14  The three positions, exact time and temperature, and feasibility of the value 
No 
 
 
Position of three sensor nodes The exact time  
Xa Ya Xb Yb Xc Yc Tda Tdb Tdc 
190.0259 19.34312 97.19649 54.16739 91.29353 37.8373 0.118738 0.845702 0.155561 
 
temperature The feasibilty of value  
Tc thou1 thou2 thou3 thou4 
8.354350415 0.181278 0.796183 0.737905 0.715248 
 
toms xd yd et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 d4 
f = et+ eda+edb+edc+d1+d2+d3+d4;  
c ={ 
    -d1<= sqrt((xd-xa)^2+(yd+ya)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tda+eda) <= d1 
    -d2<= sqrt((xd-xb)^2+(yd-yb)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdb+edb) <= d2 
    -d3<= sqrt((xd-xc)^2+(yd-yc)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdc+edc) <= d3 
       d2 + d4 + edb + edc + et <=thou1 
       d3 + d4 + edb + edc + et <=thou2 
                 edb + edc + et <=thou3 
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             d1 + d2 + edb + et <=thou4 
  d1 + d3 + d4 + edb + edc + et <=thou1  
       d1 + d4 + edb + edc + et <=thou2 
       d2 + d3 + edb + edc + et <=thou3 
       d3 + d4 + edb + edc + et <=thou4 
                  d2 + eda + et <=thou1  
             d3 + d4 + eda + et <=thou2 
                       eda + et <=thou3 
       d1 + d2 + edb + edc + et <=thou4 
        d1 + d2 + d4 + eda + et <=thou1 
        d1 + d3 + d4 + eda + et <=thou2 
                  d1 + eda + et <=thou3 
                  d2 + eda + et <=thou4 
       d1 + d2 + d3 + eda + edc <=thou2 
            d1 + d2 + eda + edc <=thou3 
            d1 + d4 + eda + edc <=thou4 
            d2 + d4 + eda + edc <=thou2 
                 d2 + eda + edb <=thou1 
                 d3 + eda + edb <=thou2 
  d1 + d2 + d3 + d4 + eda + edc <=thou3 
            d1 + d2 + eda + edc <=thou4 
       d1 + d2 + d4 + eda + edb <=thou1 
            d1 + d2 + eda + edb <=thou2 
            d1 + d4 + eda + edb <=thou3 
            d2 + d4 + eda + edb <=thou4 
      d2 + d3 + eda + edb + edc <=thou1 
           d2 + eda + edb + edc <=thou2 
           d4 + eda + edb + edc <=thou3 
       d1 + d2 + d4 + eda + edb <=thou4 
        d1 + d2 + d3 + edb + et <=thou1 
        d1 + d2 + d3 + edc + et <=thou2 
       d1 + d2 + d3 + edb + edc <=thou3 
 d1 + d2 + d3 + eda + edb + edc <=thou4 
       d2 + d3 + edb + edc + et <=thou1 
              d1 + d2 + d3 + et <=thou2 
             d1 + d2 + d3 + edb <=thou3 
        d1 + d2 + d3 + edb + et <=thou4 
                  d2 + d3 + edb <=thou1 
       d2 + d3 + eda + edb + et <=thou2 
            d2 + d3 + eda + edc <=thou3 
            d2 + d3 + edb + edc <=thou4 
       d1 + d3 + edb + edc + et <=thou1 
                   d2 + d3 + et <=thou2   
                  d2 + d3 + edb <=thou3 
            d2 + d3 + eda + edb <=thou4 
    0<=d1 
    0<=d2 
    0<=d3 
    0<=d4 }; 
solution = ezsolve(f,c) 
 
To solve equation 6.1, we run TOMLAB and get: 
====================================================== 
GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE 
1. Embedding Watermark Constraints 
2. Main Menu GPKR Watermarking technique 
====================================================== 
What Do you want =  1 
How many experiment do you want = 1 
Problem type appears to be: lpcon 
Time for symbolic processing: 1.188 seconds 
Starting numeric solver 
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=====** ============================================================= * * 
* 
TOMLAB - Curtin University Ac. single user  501077. Valid to 2100-01-01 
=========================================================================
== 
Problem: ---  1: Problem 1              f_k    -368.516004950792880000 
                               sum(|constr|)      0.000000000099486691 
                      f(x_k) + sum(|constr|)   -368.516004950792880000 
                                      f(x_0)      0.000000000000000000 
Solver: snopt.  EXIT=0.  INFORM=1. 
SNOPT 7.2-5 NLP code 
Optimality conditions satisfied 
FuncEv    1 ConstrEv  310 ConJacEv  310 Iter   95 MinorIter  102 
CPU time: 0.156001 sec. Elapsed time: 0.156000 sec. solution =  
 
     d1: 1.1033e-015 
     d2: 8.2746e-015 
     d3: 0.0227 
     d4: 0 
    eda: 0.8710 
    edb: -0.6951 
    edc: -0.1558 
     et: -368.5588 
     xd: 91.2935 
     yd: 37.8373 
The solution of this system is  
 
No 
 
et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 d4 
-368.559 0.871006 -0.69507 -0.15576 1.1E-15 8.27E-15 0.022656 0 
 
We then compute all the input of Table 6.1 and get results as shown in Table 6.15. 
Table 6.15 Results of watermark constraint embedding  process 
No.  et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 d4 
1 -368.559 0.871006 -0.69507 -0.15576 1.1E-15 8.27E-15 0.022656 0 
2 -354.786 0.067108 0.016251 -2.4E-15 0 0 -2.4E-15 0 
3 -366.574 0.314889 -0.20552 -0.83653 1.46E-16 0 0 0 
4 -91715.1 -4.14155 -3.84053 -4.25654 0.33915 0.01285 4.136199 0 
5 -1.9E+07 -16.2954 -16.1894 -15.9747 -1.2E-09 6.03E-09 0 0 
6 -5.1E+09 -1.79293 -1.27421 -1.83895 0.051088 1.698487 0.000274 0 
7 -46.896 0.202836 0.03697 0.09217 0 0 0 0 
8 -9E+09 -1.01671 -1.43204 -1.78229 -2.9E-08 7.47E-09 8.27E-06 0 
9 -2.8E+09 -2.2487 -1.97941 -1.39631 6.73E-10 0.000684 0.000813 0 
10 -2.8E+08 -4.34846 -3.9838 -4.64823 1.56E-09 0 9.96E-12 0 
11 -415.921 0.352388 -0.29101 -0.29101 -1.2E-17 0 0 0 
12 -1.3E+08 -3.89156 -3.927 -3.9082 0.01307 3.54E-09 -4.4E-11 0 
13 -132.978 0.436673 -0.32304 -0.81604 0 0.166699 0 0 
14 -387.543 0.344457 -0.18912 -0.18912 -3.3E-14 0 1.61E-17 0 
15 -154.952 0.031489 -0.02911 -0.0606 0 0.031489 0 0 
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16 -3.4E+08 -0.88494 -0.3738 -0.54307 0.22836 0.007178 0.492283 0 
17 -320.099 -0.13532 -0.18463 0.141574 0 0 0 0 
18 -7.2E+09 -4.45188 -3.61675 -3.72001 0.008996 0.043237 0.048432 0 
19 -2.8E+09 -2.92602 -2.6478 -2.93585 5.54E-08 0 0 0 
20 -498499 -1.36528 -0.60926 -1.33542 0.000118 0 4.73E-12 0 
21 -413.476 0.344074 -0.11566 -0.11566 -1.4E-15 2.66E-14 0 0 
22 -4.7E+09 -4.30285 -4.5395 -4.52744 0 0 7.87E-12 0 
23 -2883228 -9.5167 -10.2117 -9.72239 0.039146 0.971274 0.000217 0 
24 -6.6E+08 -5.70813 -5.31959 -5.74334 0 -1.7E-09 0 0 
25 -385.615 -0.27625 5.93E-14 0.36251 -1.4E-14 3.34E-14 -7.5E-19 0 
26 -261.886 0.180011 -1.8E-13 0.099421 0 -4.4E-14 1.01E-17 0 
27 -89.9681 0.288105 -0.23769 -0.00453 -7.4E-16 -3.2E-15 8.76E-18 0 
28 -1.5E+09 -7.08853 -6.71907 -7.01849 -1.8E-07 -1.4E-07 0 0 
29 1.39E-17 0.007553 -1.2E-16 -0.71373 -1.3E-17 0 0 0 
30 -357.668 0.106291 -0.08042 -0.27835 0 0.02717 1.45E-15 0 
31 -571.535 -3.1E+08 -3.3E+08 -3.4E+08 -4.9E-07 257.0846 -2.4E-11 0 
32 -201.677 0.373617 -0.30245 -0.58946 8.33E-17 0.287014 5.62E-25 0 
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Figure 6.20 The value of error in watermark constraint embedding process 
We next consider and evaluate in detail the corresponding attacks for GPKR watermarking 
technique that can be used by an attacker, as discussed in Section 6.5.3. There are four kinds of 
watermark constraint attacks. The results of detection of these attacks are given below:  
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6.6.1.1 Detection of the Result of Deletion Attack  
As discussed in Section 6.5.3.1, the attacker can delete data by dropping a number of results of the 
embeding process. The process of detecting data deletion is as follows:  
===================================================== 
          GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                 
   1. Process of Detecting Deletion Attack              
   2. Menu GBKR Watermarking technique                
======================================================== 
The value of threshold is =    8.578698153250081e+010 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
The value of similarity is =    9.626896789263084e+010 
The watermark constraints change  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
-1E+10
-8E+09
-6E+09
-4E+09
-2E+09
0
2E+09
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
Th
e
 v
al
u
e
 o
f 
e
rr
o
rs
Number of experiments 
Watermark Constraints : attack data deletion 
et
eda
edb
edc
d1
d2
d3
d4
 
Figure 6.21  Value of the error of data deletion attack 
6.6.1.2 Detection of the Result of False Data Insertion Attack 
 
As discussed in Section 6.5.3.2, the attacker sets up false data by inserting a number of results of 
the embeding process. The process of detecting data insertion is as follows: 
 
===================================================== 
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          GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                 
   1. Process of Detecting False Data Insertion             
   2. Menu GBKR Watermarking technique                
===================================================== 
The value of threshold is =   8.578698153250081e+010 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
The value of similarity is    7.850046307403270e+010 
False data insertion does not change the watermark  
--------------------------------------------------- 
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Figure 6.22 Value of the error of false data insertion attack 
6.6.1.3 Detection of the Result of Modification Attack 
 
As discussed in Section 6.5.3.4, the attacker alters data by modifying the results of the embedding 
process. The process of detecting data modification is as follows: 
 
===================================================== 
          GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                 
   1. Process of Detecting Data Modification           
   2. Menu GBKR Watermarking technique                
===================================================== 
The value of threshold is =     8.578698153250081e+010 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
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The value of similarity is     8.659658844907098e+010 
The watermark constraints change  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
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Figure 6.23 Value of the error of data modification attack 
6.6.1.4 Detection of the Result of Replication Attack   
 
As discussed in Section 6.5.3.4, the attacker replicates a number of results of the embedding 
process. The process of detecting data replication is as follows: 
======================================================== 
          GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                 
   1. Process of Detecting Data Replication            
   2. Menu GBKR Watermarking technique                
======================================================== 
The value of threshold is =     8.578698153250081e+010 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
The value of similarity is    3.108274290703391e+010 
Replication attack does not change the watermark  
--------------------------------------------------------- 
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Figure 6.24 Value of the error of replication attack 
6.7  Validation and Discussion 
Herein, a robust watermarking technique, termed GPKR watermarking technique, was proposed. 
We embedded the watermark constraints into the cover medium NLSP. The embedding process 
was based on equation constraints. The image captured by the WMSN nodes was reduced using 
pyramid transforms to get a reduced image. The reduced image was then quantified to get a 
decimal matrix. The decimal matrix was then converted into binary matrix. Kolmogorov rule was 
used to generate the watermark constraints by matching the bit numbers with the corresponding 
variable numbers. The variables in the group assigned the bit one were included in the linear while 
the variables in the group assigned the bit zero were not included. By testing several watermark 
constraint attacks, we found that the proposed technique worked well in the cover medium NLSP. 
For verifying whether the watermark constraints were present, the normalized difference error 
from the optimal solution between the watermarked solution and the solution obtained without 
watermark was used. The threshold measure was from the normalized correlation coefficient 
between the normalized difference error from the optimal solution between the watermarked 
solution X' and the solution obtained without watermark. The threshold was measured by 
''
'
*
*
XX
XC
 where XXC  ' . The similarity measure was obtained from the normalized 
correlation coefficient between the normalized difference error from the optimal solution between 
the watermarked solution X‟ and the solution obtained with watermark constraint attacks X”. The 
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similarity was measured by 
""
''
*
*
XX
XC
 , where  XXC  "' . The results of all watermark 
constraint attacks are shown in Figure 6.25. 
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a. Data deletion attack b. False data insertion attack 
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c.  Data modification attack d. Data replication attack 
Figure 6.25 All watermark constraint attacks 
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From the experiments carried out, we make following observations: 
1. In data deletion attack, data deletion changes the watermark constraints (as shown in 
Figure 6.26.a), because 8.578698153250081e+010 <  9.626896789263084e+010. This 
means that the watermark constraints are not robust against data deletion, so the reduced 
image cannot be extracted or expanded.   
2. In false data insertion attack, false data insertion changes the watermark constraints (as 
shown in Figure 6.26.b), because 8.578698153250081e+010 <  
7.850046307403270e+010. It means that the watermark constraints  are  robust against 
false data insertion, so the reduced image can be extracted and expanded. 
3. In data modification attack, data modification changes the watermark constraints (as 
shown in Figure 6.26.c), because 8.578698153250081e+010  <  
8.659658844907098e+010.  This means that the watermark constraints are not robust 
against false data insertion, so the reduced image cannot  be extracted or expanded. 
4. In data replication attack, data replication does not change the watermark constraints (as 
shown in Figure 6.26.d), because 8.578698153250081e+010  >  
3.108274290703391e+010. This means that the watermark constraints are robust against 
data replication, so the reduced image can be extracted and expanded.  
Thus, our model is robust against insertion of a number of results of different watermark 
constraints, and replication of different watermark constraints. However, it is not robust against 
other watermark constraint attacks, such as deletion of a number of results of watermark 
constraints, or modification of a number of results of watermark constraints.   
6.8  Comparative Analysis  
This is the last stage of the conceptual process described in section 4.5.6,  in which the proposed 
solution is compared with the existing solutions form the literature which we discussed in Chapter 
2. Here, we carry out a comparative analysis of our technique with other techniques proposed by 
different researchers, as shown in Table 6.16.    
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Table 6.16 A  comparative analysis with other approaches to copyright protection in WMSNs 
 
Kind of  
attacks 
 
Honggang, 
et.al 
 
 
Honggang 
Wang, 
Dongming 
Peng , and 
Wei Wang 
2008) 
 
Pingping et.al 
 
(Pingping, Yao 
Jiangtao, and 
Zhang Ye 2009) 
 
Wang 
et.al  
 
(Wang 
2010) 
 
Padmavathi  
 
(Padmavathi, 
Shanmugapriya, 
and Kalaivani 
2010), 
 
Kaur, S  
 
(Kaur 2010 
) 
 
Masood, et al    
 
(Masood, 
Haider, and 
Sadiq ur 2010) 
 
Harjito, B 
( 2012) 
 
 
Data deletion X X X X X X X 
False data 
 insertion 
X X X X X X √ 
Data 
Modification. 
X X X X X X X 
Packet 
replication 
X X X X X X √ 
 
We compare 7 approaches in terms of false data insertion, data deletion, replication, and data 
modification.  Honggang, et al.  (Honggang Wang, Dongming Peng, and Wei Wang 2008), Wang 
(2010), Pingping, Yao Jiangtao, and Zhang Ye (2009), Padmavathi et al. (Padmavathi, 
Shanmugapriya, and Kalaivani 2010), Kaur (2010 ) and Masood et al. Masood, Haider, and Sadiq-
ur (2010) do not provide protection against data deletion, false data insertion, data replication, and 
data modification. Our approach provides copyright  protection to images against false data 
insertion and data replication. However, it is not robust against data deletion and data modification. 
6.9  Conclusion  
This chapter introduced and formulated a GPKR watermarking technique for copyright protection 
of multimedia data, or images, in WMSNs. The fundamental advantage of our approach is that it 
shares the results of the watermark signal in detection, as the watermark constraint attacks can be 
generated by modifying the results of watermark signal. However, our approach is robust against 
only 2 types of attacks. Therefore, we still need to improve our technique to make it more robust, 
considering various circumstances in which attackers launch different kinds of attacks.    
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Chapter 7   
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This chapter covers: 
► the current issues and problems with watermarking technique in WSNs and WMSNs,  
► contribution of this research, 
► conclusion of the thesis and indications for future work in the field. 
7.1  Introduction 
Watermarking techniques have been shown to be useful in addressing issues, such as copyright 
protection, tamper detection, content authentication and integrity. A number of researchers have 
studied watermarking techniques in the field of multimedia. However, in spite of their widespread 
use in the field of multimedia, it is often not feasible to adopt them directly to WSNs or WMSNs.  
Several proposals associated with watermarking technique in WSNs and WMSNs have made 
significant advances in addressing the issue of secure communication, authentication, integrity and 
copyright protection. However, it is evident from a survey of the literature in the field that very few 
of them have addressed all the problems in their entirety.  
The main purpose of this research was to address and develop a watermarking technique for WSNs 
and WMSNs, as the security mechanisms based on traditional cryptography algorithms are very 
expansive in terms of storage and energy consumption, as well as unsafe in terms of secure 
invisible communication and copyright protection.  
This chapter provides a summary of the issues and problems addressed by the study, along with its 
main contributions. The next section elaborates the main problems with which the study was 
concerned. 
CHAPTER SEVEN  
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7.2  Problems and Issues 
This thesis addressed two main challenges associated with watermarking techniques in WSNs and 
WMSNs. These are:  
 Problems with copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs 
 Problems with copyright protection of images in WMSNs  
In the following section, we summarize the problems and issues we faced while developing the 
solution and then highlight the main contribution of this thesis. We first discuss the main problems 
we addressed, followed by how we solve them.  
7.2.1 Problems with Copyright Protection of Scalar Data 
in WSNs 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 and 2, copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs has become a major 
security concern as both governments and businesses in Indonesia, as well as the world, are losing  
billions of Indonesian rupiah (IDR) every year due to scalar data theft or unauthorized use. 
Watermarking technique can help by adding copyright protection to identify the real owner of the 
content. However, currently even the most advanced watermarking techniques prove to be very 
fragile when used in WSNs. The main socio-economic and technical problems with the existing 
solutions, outlined in Chapter 3, include: 
 Inability to securely add or embed a robust watermark signal to the data sent by a WSN 
deployed in hostile, unattended environments. 
 Inability to make the WSN sensed data robust against severe watermark constraint attacks, 
such as modification, manipulation, Sybil and forwarding attack, during data transmission 
through a communication channel.  
 
Thus, there was an urgent need for a more reliable and robust watermarking technique. Hence, we 
decided to develop an advanced watermarking technique for WSNs to address these technical 
difficulties.  
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7.2.2 Problems with Copyright Protection of Images in 
WMSNs  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, copyright protection of images captured by WMSNs has become a 
major security concern for the commercial entities dealing with multimedia data. They need to 
ensure that the footages they own can be identified and the ownership can be proved in a court of 
law. Watermarking technique can help in it by adding a watermark to the images which is difficult 
to remove and can be used to identify the real owner of the content. However, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, currently even the most advanced watermarking techniques prove to be very fragile in 
WMSNs. The main socio-economic and technical problems associated with the existing solutions, 
outlined in Chapter 3, are as follows: 
 Inability to explain when and where the processes of embedding and extracting are to be 
undertaken.  
 Inability to add or embed a robust watermark to multimedia data captured by a WMSN 
deployed in hostile, unattended environments. 
 Inability to make the multimedia WMSN data robust against severe watermark constraint 
attacks, such as modification, manipulation, Sybil and forwarding attack, during data 
transmission through a communication channel.  
 
Thus, there was a need for a more reliable and robust watermarking technique. Hence, we decided 
to develop an advanced watermarking technique for WMSNs to address these technical difficulties. 
7.3  Contributions of the Thesis 
This thesis contributed to two major areas of watermarking technique in WSNs and WMSNs which 
are increasingly becoming important, both socially and economically. It carried out:  
  a comprehensive survey of watermarking techniques for WSNs, and   
 a comprehensive survey of watermarking techniques for WMSNs. 
 
To address the problems outlined in Chapter 3, the thesis proposed and evaluated the following 
solutions: 
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 LKR watermarking technique for copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs.  
 GPKR watermarking technique for copyright protection of images in WMSNs.  
7.3.1.1 Contribution 1: A State-of-the-art Watermarking 
Technology for WSNs  
The thesis first gave an overview of the literature and investigated the efforts made so far in the 
field of watermarking techniques for WSNs, as well as evaluated them on different parameters of 
digital watermarking techniques for WSNs.  
The study evaluated 11 different works and made a comparative study on 10 different parameters 
representing the key aspects of watermarking technique. 
Technically, the key parameters are: (1) cover medium, (2) sensed data (3) watermark generation, 
(4) types of watermark, (5) watermark key, (6) watermark embedding technique, (7) watermark 
detecting technique, (8) attack, (9) noise, and (10) transform domain. Based on these parameters, 
the evaluation is summarized below. 
Most of the approaches in literature use „packet data‟ as the cover medium and „text message‟, as 
the watermark message which is converted into binary stream. Most of them use „sensed data‟ as 
the message.   
Binary stream has also been used as the watermark key by most of these approaches and the hash 
function for watermark generation, e.g. MD5 or SHA. Further, in most of the works, the „noise‟ 
has not been mentioned. The „man-in-middle attack‟ has been used by most as the vulnerability 
attack, e.g. false data insertion, data modification, forgery, or impersonation. „Least Significant 
Bits‟ (LSB) has been used as the embedding technique by most, and finally, „statistic correlation‟ 
has been used as the detecting technique, e.g. similarity, probability, mean deviation, standard 
deviation, and Gaussian hypothesis 
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7.3.1.2 Contribution 2: A State-of-the-art Watermarking 
Technology for WMSNs 
The second important contribution of this thesis is investigating and providing a detailed insight 
into currently the most advanced watermarking techniques for WMSNs, as well as evaluating them 
on different parameters of watermarking techniques for WMSNs. We evaluated 6 existing works 
on watermarking technique for WMSNs on 10 different parameters, viz. (1) cover medium, (2) 
sensed data (3)  watermark generator, (4) types of watermark, (5) watermark key, (6) watermark 
embedding technique, (7) watermark detecting technique, (8) attack, (9) noise, and (10) transform 
domain. Based on these parameters, the evaluation is summarized below: 
Most of these approaches use „packet data‟ as the cover medium, and „image‟ as the sensed data. 
Most of them use „signal‟ as the watermark, and the „two adaptive threshold‟ as the watermark key.  
Most of the works do not mention the watermark generator used. Two of these use the „two filter 
adaptive threshold‟ as the inserting technique. Further, most of them use the „statistic approach‟ as 
detecting technique, e.g. normalized correlation, and „dropped packet data‟ as the noise. Finally, 
most of these approaches use „accidental‟ vulnerable attacks, such as cropping and compressing  
7.3.1.3 Contribution 3: LKR watermarking technique  
The thesis developed the LKR watermarking technique for copyright protection of scalar sensed 
data, presented in Chapter 5. It developed a robust watermarking scheme that operates in the 
spatial domain. The main features of this scheme are as follows: 
a. It can operate on a minimum of 75 nodes over a 500 square meter area. 
b. It uses a cover medium generated by using the theory of atomic trilateration. 
c. It embeds message sensed data generated by LFSR.  
d. It embeds watermark constraints generated by LFSR and Kolmogorov rule.  
e. It is robust against packet replication and Sybil attacks, although not against false data 
insertion and data deletion. 
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This solution can be useful in reducing electricity theft in residential areas by automatically 
reporting it to the State Electricity Company .  
7.3.1.4 Contribution 4: GPKR watermarking technique  
The thesis developed the GPKR watermarking technique for copyright protection of images in 
WMSNs, presented in Chapter 6. It developed a robust watermarking scheme that operates in 
spatial domain. The main features of this scheme are follows: 
a. It can operate on a minimum of 50 nodes randomly placed within 200 meter length and 
100 meter width.   
b. It uses the Gaussian pyramid transforms to reduce the sensory image in order to produce 
the reduced image in an RGB colour. 
c. It embeds the watermark constraints generated using Kolmogorov rule. 
d.  It provides copyright protection to images against false data insertion and packet 
replication, although not against data deletion and data modification. 
This technique can be used to prove the ownership of images by inserting an invisible or visible 
watermark when a WMSN node captures the image.    
7.4  Future Works 
The work undertaken in this thesis has been presented in peer reviewed international conferences. 
Over the course of the research, 5 papers were published in different international conferences, as 
mentioned in the Appendix. However, although a significant amount of effort has gone into this 
research, there is still scope for further improvements. The future research may aim at the 
following: 
 LKR watermarking technique: Since this technique is robust against only two types of 
attacks, there is a need for further research to improve it, so as to be robust considering 
various other circumstances in which attackers carry out attacks. 
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 GPKR watermarking technique: Since this technique is robust against only two types of 
attack, i.e. false data insertion and packet replication, there is a need for further research to 
improve it, so as to be robust considering various other circumstances in which attackers 
carry out attacks.   
 Development of fragile watermarking technique for tampering detection in scalar WSN 
data and multimedia WMSN data. Embedding a fragile watermark can be used to detect 
the digital content in WSNs and WMSNs.  
 Development of a watermarking technique for data authentication in WSNs and WMSNs. 
This technique would verify whether the data has been exchanged with some malicious 
entry data that can be used to insert undesirable or unauthorized content, or send the same 
data back into the network.  
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APPENDIX  I 
 
APPENDIX I  A  :  LKR Watermarking Technique  Matlab Code  
 
1.  menuLKR.m 
 
lagi='y'; 
while lagi=='y' | lagi=='Y'; 
disp('======================================================') 
disp('             MAIN MENU GENERATE WATERMARK             ') 
disp('               LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE            ') 
disp('====================================================') 
disp('1. SetUPnetworksCopyrightWSNs ') 
disp('2. GenerateCoverMedium ') 
disp('3. Generate stream watermark ') 
disp('4. Cover medium with data message  ') 
disp('5. Cover medium with data message with constraints  ') 
disp('6. Extract  ') 
disp('7. Attack_data_False_Insertion and detect ') 
disp('6. Attack_data_Deletion and detect')  
disp('8. Attack_data_replication aand detect') 
disp('9. Attack_data_Sybil and detect') 
disp('10. Menu ') 
disp('11.Exit  ') 
disp('====================================================') 
 pilih = input ('Which one do you want =  '); 
if  pilih==1 
    SetUPnetworksCopyrightWSNs 
elseif pilih==2 
    GenerateCoverMedium 
elseif pilih==3 
   Watermarkgeneration 
elseif pilih==4 
   EmbeddingMessageD 
elseif pilih==5 
   EmbeddingMsdWConstraints 
elseif pilih==6 
   Extract 
elseif pilih==7 
    DetectAttackFalseInsert 
elseif pilih==8 
    DetectAttackDataDeletion 
 elseif pilih==9 
    DetectAttackDataReplication 
elseif pilih==10 
    DetectAttackDataSybill    
elseif pilih==11 
 MenuLKR 
else  
   exit 
end  
lagi=input('Anda ingin mengulangi lagi ? (Y/N)','s') 
end 
disp('') 
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disp('Copyright protection of data in WSN  using LKR watermarking  ') 
disp('') 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
2. SetUPnetworksCopyrightWSNs.m 
 
lagi='y'; 
while lagi=='y' | lagi=='Y'; 
disp('======================================================') 
disp('               LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE             ') 
disp('      Copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs     ') 
disp('                   NETWORK SET UP                    ') 
disp('======================================================') 
d=[ ]; 
noOfNodes = 75; 
rand('state', 0); 
figure(1); 
clf; 
hold on; 
L = 500; 
R = 100; % maximum range; 
netXloc = rand(1,noOfNodes)*L; 
netYloc = rand(1,noOfNodes)*L; 
  
Coordinate1 =[ ]; 
 for i = 1:noOfNodes 
plot(netXloc(i), netYloc(i), 'o',... 
                'MarkerEdgeColor','k',... 
                'MarkerFaceColor','r',... 
                'MarkerSize',10); 
xlabel(' Coordinate  of X axis') 
ylabel(' Coordinate  of Y absis  ') 
title('EXPERIMENT SET UP COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN WIRELESS  SENSOR 
NETWORKs') 
text(netXloc(i), netYloc(i), num2str(i)); 
  
for j = 1:noOfNodes 
distance = sqrt((netXloc(i) - netXloc(j))^2 + (netYloc(i) - 
netYloc(j))^2); 
Coordinate1(i,1)= netXloc(i) 
Coordinate1(j,2)= netYloc(j)  
disp(sprintf('%.4g | %.4g | %.4g ',i, netXloc(i), netYloc(j)')); 
if distance <= R 
matrix(i, j) = 1; % there is a link; 
line([netXloc(i) netXloc(j)], [netYloc(i) netYloc(j)], 'LineStyle', ':'); 
else 
matrix(i, j) = inf; 
end; 
end; 
end;  
 xlswrite('Coordinate1.xls',Coordinate1) 
s1=xlsread ('D:\Gambar Thesis Bambang\Program Matlab untuk secure data 
WSNs\CopyrightprotectionOfWSNs\Coordinate1.xls',1,'A4:B75');  
s2=xlsread ('D:\Gambar Thesis Bambang\Program Matlab untuk secure data 
WSNs\CopyrightprotectionOfWSNs\Coordinate1.xls',1,'A1:B3'); 
Coordinate2= [ s1 ; s2 ] 
xlswrite('CoordinateWSN1.xls',Coordinate2) 
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s3=xlsread ('D:\Gambar Thesis Bambang\Program Matlab untuk secure data 
WSNs\CopyrightprotectionOfWSNs\Coordinate1.xls',1,'A7:B75');  
s4=xlsread ('D:\Gambar Thesis Bambang\Program Matlab untuk secure data 
WSNs\CopyrightprotectionOfWSNs\Coordinate1.xls',1,'A1:B6'); 
Coordinate3= [ s3 ; s4 ] 
xlswrite('CoordinateWSN2.xls',Coordinate3) 
  
DATAposisi = [ Coordinate1 Coordinate2 Coordinate3 ]; 
xlswrite('threeOtherNodesWMSNs.xls', DATAposisi );  
  
disp('Generate time arrival and departure sensor  ')  
time=[]; 
for j = 1:noOfNodes  
  
    disp('--------------------------------------------------------') 
    disp('No    |   tDA   |  tDB   |  tDC    ')  
    disp('------------------------------------------------------') 
    for i=1:noOfNodes 
    disp(sprintf('%.4g   | %.4g | %.4g  | %.4g |',i, random('unif',0,1) , 
random('unif',0,1) ,random('unif',0,1))); 
    time(i,1)= random('unif',0,1); 
    time(i,2)= random('unif',0,1);   
    time(i,3)= random('unif',0,1); 
    end 
end  
disp('Generate Temperature of the propagation media ')  
xlswrite('time123.xls',time) 
 temp=[ ]; 
Max_Temp=noOfNodes; 
temp=rand(Max_Temp,1)*Max_Temp 
xlswrite('temp.xls',temp) 
  
disp( ' Generate the feasiblity of value ')  
fisible=[]; 
for j = 1:noOfNodes 
    disp('-----------------------------------------------') 
    disp('No    |  thou1  | thou2   | thou3   | thou4  ')  
    disp('-----------------------------------------------') 
    for i=1:noOfNodes 
    disp(sprintf('%.4g   | %.4g | %.4g  | %.4g |%.4g ',i, 
random('unif',0,1) , random('unif',0,1) ,random('unif',0,1), 
random('unif',0,1))) ; 
    fisible(i,1)=random('unif',0,1) ;  
    fisible(i,2)=random('unif',0,1) ;  
    fisible(i,3)=random('unif',0,1) ;  
    fisible(i,4)=random('unif',0,1) ;  
    end 
end  
xlswrite('Fisible1234.xls',fisible) 
DATAlengkap = [ DATAposisi time temp fisible ]; 
xlswrite('datalengkapWSNs.xls',DATAlengkap ); 
A=xlsread ('D:\Gambar Thesis Bambang\Program Matlab untuk secure data 
WSNs\CopyrightprotectionOfWSNs\datalengkapWSNs.xls',1,'A1:Q32');  
xlswrite('data32nodesWSNs.xls',A)  
lagi=input('Do you want to return  ? (Y/N)','s') 
end 
disp('') 
disp('Copyright protection of data in WSN  using LKR watermarking  ') 
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disp('') 
MenuLKR 
 
3. Watermarkgeneration.m  
clc 
lagi='y'; 
while lagi=='y' | lagi=='Y'; 
disp('======================================================') 
disp('             MAIN MENU GENERATE WATERMARK             ') 
disp('               LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE             ') 
disp('      Copyright protection of scalar data in WSNs     ') 
disp('      Gathering data by WSNs into binary sequence     ')  
disp('        Generating Watermark stream using LFSR        ')  
disp('      Watermark Constrintsusing Kolmogorov rule       ')  
disp('           Generating Message Sensed Data             ') 
disp('------------------------------------------------------') 
pilih = input ('Which one do you want =  '); 
if   pilih==1 
disp('------------------------------------------------------')   
disp(' Capturing data by WSNs into binary sequence          ')  
disp(' Converting the data sensory decimal to binary sequence')  
disp('------------------------------------------------------')    
sensornode=input('Capture scalar data node will be protected ='); 
ori=de2bi(sensornode); 
[m1 n1 ]=size(ori); 
oriseq=[]; 
for i=1:m1 
for j=1:n1 
oriseq(1,j)=ori(1,j); 
end 
end 
s=fliplr(oriseq) 
%elseif pilih==2  
disp('------------------------------------------------------ ') 
disp(' Initial state of LFSR from converting  binary sequnce ')  
disp(' Watermark Key  is a tap position                      ')  
disp('------------------------------------------------------ ')            
%s= input ('Implement sensor data to formed such as [ 1 0 ... 1 ] =');  
t = input('Watermak Key is like tap position of f(x) is =');  
n=length(s); 
    c(1,:)=s'; 
    m=length(t); 
    for k=1:2^n-2; 
        b(1)=xor(s(t(1)), s(t(2))); 
    if m>2; 
        for i=1:m-2; 
        b(i+1)=xor(s(t(i+2)), b(i)); 
        end 
    end 
    j=1:n-1; 
    s(n+1-j)=s(n-j); 
    s(1)=b(m-1); 
    c(k+1,:)=s; 
    end 
    seq=c(:,n)'; 
    %A = seq; 
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    [ row col]=size(seq); 
    disp('cutting the infinity binary stream')  
    A = seq(1,1:28); 
    [row1 col1]=size(A); 
   disp('Lengh of column cutting the binary = '); fprintf('%6.4 \t',col1)  
   st=[]; 
   di= input ('How many rows do you want create for dividing binary = ');  
   for k=1:4  
        st(k,:)=A(1,((k-1)*col1/di)+1:(k *col1)/di); 
   end 
    st 
    %disp('Save to xls')    
    xlswrite('Signal.xls',st) 
%elseif pilih==3 
  
disp('--------------------------------------------------------------- ') 
disp(' Watermark dividing using Kolmogorov rule          ')                            
disp('--------------------------------------------------------------- ')   
kolomogorof  
x='et';   y='eda';  z='edb'; 
r='edc';  s='d1';   t='d2';  u='d3'; 
disp('The watermark constrains of ='); 
[ m n ]=size(st);    
 ff=[]; 
 ff=fopen('gen.txt','w'); 
 for i=1:m; 
    fprintf('  \n');  
for j=1:n; 
if st(i,j)==1; 
   if j==1; 
     fprintf(ff,'%6.3s \t',x );  
      elseif j==2;     
     fprintf(ff,'%6.3s \t',y );  
  elseif j==3; 
     fprintf(ff,'%6.3s \t',z );  
  elseif j==4; 
    fprintf(ff,'%6.3s \t',r );  
  elseif j==5; 
   fprintf(ff,'%6.3s \t',s );  
  elseif j==6; 
  fprintf(ff,'%6.3s \t',t );  
      else 
  fprintf(ff,'%6.3s \t',u );  
  end 
else st(i,j)==0; 
  fprintf(ff,'%6.3s \t','0' );  
end 
end 
disp(''); 
end 
fclose(ff); 
fid1 = fopen('gen.txt'); 
tline = fgetl(fid1); 
while ischar(tline); 
    disp(tline); 
    tline = fgetl(fid1); 
end 
de=textread('gen.txt','%s'); 
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deA=sym([de']);  
[row2 col2]=size(deA); 
t1= input ('How many rows do you want create watermark constrints = ');  
WC=reshape(deA,t1,[]); 
disp('Watermark Constraints are  ')  
for i=1:4 
   disp(sum(WC(i,:)))    
end 
[ m n ]=size(WC);    
 ffw=[]; 
 ffw=fopen('WaCons.txt','w'); 
 for i=1:m; 
    fprintf('  \n')  
for j=1:n; 
if st(i,j)~=1; 
   if j==1; 
     fprintf(ffw,'%6.3s \t',x ) ; 
      elseif j==2;     
     fprintf(ffw,'%6.3s \t',y );  
  elseif j==3; 
     fprintf(ffw,'%6.3s \t',z );  
  elseif j==4; 
    fprintf(ffw,'%6.3s \t',r );  
  elseif j==5; 
   fprintf(ffw,'%6.3s \t',s );  
  elseif j==6; 
  fprintf(ffw,'%6.3s \t',t );  
      else 
  fprintf(ffw,'%6.3s \t',u );  
  end 
else st(i,j)==0; 
  fprintf(ffw,'%6.3s \t','0' ) ; 
end 
end 
disp(''); 
end 
fclose(ffw); 
else 
   MenuLKR 
end  
lagi=input('Do you want to repeat ? (Y/N)','s') 
end 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
4. DetectAttackFalseInsert.m 
clc 
lagi='y'; 
while lagi=='y' | lagi=='Y'; 
disp('======================================================') 
disp('      LKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                      ') 
disp('      COPYRIGHT OF SCALAR DATA IN WSNs                ') 
disp('   1. DETECT FALSE DATA INSERTION                     ') 
disp('   2. Menu LKR Watermarking technique                 ')                                           
disp('======================================================') 
pilih=input('What Do you want =  ');   
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if pilih==1 
disp(' Read Message Sensed Data(MSD) is =  '); 
%Msd= xlsread( 'C:\Users\Bambang\Desktop\Gambar Thesis Bambang\Program 
Matlab untuk secure data 
WSNs\CopyrightprotectionOfWSNs\MSD.xls',1,'A1:G7'); 
Msd= xlsread( 
'C:\Users\Bambang\Dropbox\Photos\CopyrightprotectionOfWSNs\AllAttack\XLS\
MSD.xls',1,'A1:G7'); 
disp(Msd) 
msd1=Msd(1,1);msd2=Msd(1,2);msd3=Msd(1,3); 
msd4=Msd(1,4);msd5=Msd(1,5);msd6=Msd(1,6); msd7=Msd(1,7);  
N1=[]; N2=[];N3=[];N4=[];N5=[];N6=[]; N7=[]; f1=[];  
%A=xlsread ('D:\Gambar Thesis Bambang\Program Matlab untuk secure data 
WSNs\CopyrightprotectionOfWSNs\data32nodesWSNs.xls',1,'A1:Q32');  
%A=xlsread ('C:\tomlab\data32nodesWSNs.xls',1,'A1:Q32'); 
%A=xlsread('C:\Users\Bambang\Desktop\Gambar Thesis Bambang\Program Matlab 
untuk secure data 
WSNs\CopyrightprotectionOfWSNs\data32nodesWSNs.xls',1,'A1:Q32');  
A=xlsread('C:\Users\Bambang\Dropbox\Photos\CopyrightprotectionOfWSNs\AllA
ttack\XLS\data32nodesWSNs.xls',1,'A1:N32'); 
%C:\Users\Bambang\Dropbox\Photos\CopyrightprotectionOfWSNs\AllAttack 
  
n=input('How many experiment what do you want = '); 
for i=1:n 
xa = A(i,1);xb =A(i,3);xc = A(i,5);ya = A(i,2);yb = A(i,4);yc = A(i,6);Tc 
= A(i,10); 
tda = A(i,7);tdb = A(i,8); 
tdc = A(i,9);thou1 = A(i,11); thou2 = A(i,12); thou3 = A(i,13);thou4 = 
A(i,14);  
  
toms xd yd et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 
 f = 
msd1*abs(et)+msd2*abs(eda)+msd3*abs(edb)+msd4*abs(edc)+msd5*d1+msd6*d2+ms
d7*d3; %with data message  
 %f = 1*abs(et)+14*abs(eda)+0*abs(edb)+13*abs(edc)+12*d1+12*d2+7*d3; 
%with data message  
c = { 
    -d1<= sqrt((xd-xa)^2+(yd+ya)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tda+eda) <= d1 
    -d2<= sqrt((xd-xb)^2+(yd-yb)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdb+edb) <= d2 
    -d3<= sqrt((xd-xc)^2+(yd-yc)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdc+edc) <= d2 
     0<=d1 
    0<=d2 
    0<=d3   }; 
    solution = ezsolve(f,c); 
    N1(i)=subs([ et] , solution ); 
    N2(i)=subs([ eda ], solution  ); 
    N3(i)=subs([ edb ], solution ); 
    N4(i)=subs([ edc ], solution ); 
    N5(i)=subs([ d1 ], solution ); 
    N6(i)=subs([ d2  ], solution ); 
    N7(i)=subs([ d3 ], solution ); 
    f1(i)=subs([ f ], solution );  
end 
PreResultA=[  N1 ; N2; N3; N4; N5; N6; N7 ]; 
fobj1 = [ f1 ]; 
disp('    et       eda       edb     edc    d1      d2     d3    '); 
ResultsA = PreResultA'; 
disp(ResultsA); 
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disp(fobj1'); 
xlswrite('ResultsWithoutwater.xls',ResultsA); 
  
% Stop for only message data===== 
  
for i=1:n  
   xa = A(i,1);xb =A(i,3);xc = A(i,5);ya = A(i,2);yb = A(i,4);yc = 
A(i,6);Tc = A(i,10); 
tda = A(i,7);tdb = A(i,8); 
tdc = A(i,9);thou1 = A(i,11); thou2 = A(i,12); thou3 = A(i,13);thou4 = 
A(i,14);  
toms xd yd et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 
 f = 
msd1*abs(et)+msd2*abs(eda)+msd3*abs(edb)+msd4*abs(edc)+msd5*d1+msd6*d2+ms
d7*d3; %with data message  
 %f = 1*abs(et)+14*abs(eda)+0*abs(edb)+13*abs(edc)+12*d1+12*d2+7*d3; 
%with data message  
 c = { 
    -d1<= sqrt((xd-xa)^2+(yd+ya)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tda+eda) <= d1 
    -d2<= sqrt((xd-xb)^2+(yd-yb)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdb+edb) <= d2 
    -d3<= sqrt((xd-xc)^2+(yd-yc)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdc+edc) <= d2 
     0<= edb+edc+d1+d3 <=thou1      % wateramrk constraints  
    0<= eda+edc+d1+d2 <= thou2            % wateramrk constraints  
    0<= et+edb+d1+d2 <= thou3   % wateramrk constraints  
    0<= eda+edb+edc+d1+d3 <= thou4      % wateramrk constraints   
    0<=d1 
    0<=d2 
    0<=d3   }; 
    solution = ezsolve(f,c); 
    N1(i)=subs([ et] , solution ); 
    N2(i)=subs([ eda ], solution  ); 
    N3(i)=subs([ edb ], solution ); 
    N4(i)=subs([ edc ], solution ); 
    N5(i)=subs([ d1 ], solution ); 
    N6(i)=subs([ d2  ], solution ); 
    N7(i)=subs([ d3 ], solution ); 
    f1(i)=subs([ f ], solution );  
end 
PreResultB=[  N1 ; N2; N3; N4; N5; N6; N7 ]; 
fobj1 = [ f1 ]; 
disp('  et    eda   edb   edc  d1   d2    d3  '); 
ResultsB = PreResultB'; 
disp(ResultsB); 
disp(fobj1'); 
xlswrite('ResultsWithWatreamrk.xls',ResultsB); 
   
for i=1:n 
    xa = A(i,1);xb =A(i,3);xc = A(i,5);ya = A(i,2);yb = A(i,4);yc = 
A(i,6);Tc = A(i,10); 
tda = A(i,7);tdb = A(i,8); 
tdc = A(i,9);thou1 = A(i,11); thou2 = A(i,12); thou3 = A(i,13);thou4 = 
A(i,14);  
toms xd yd et eda edb edc d1 d2 d3 
 f = 
msd1*abs(et)+msd2*abs(eda)+msd3*abs(edb)+msd4*abs(edc)+msd5*d1+msd6*d2+ms
d7*d3; %with data message  
 %f = 1*abs(et)+14*abs(eda)+0*abs(edb)+13*abs(edc)+12*d1+12*d2+7*d3; 
%with data message   
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c = { 
    -d1<= sqrt((xd-xa)^2+(yd+ya)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tda+eda) <= d1 
    -d2<= sqrt((xd-xb)^2+(yd-yb)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdb+edb) <= d2 
    -d3<= sqrt((xd-xc)^2+(yd-yc)^2)-(331.4+0.6*(Tc+et))*(tdc+edc) <= d2 
      0<= edb+edc+d1+d3 <=thou1      % wateramrk constraints  
     %0<= d2+d3 <= thou2            % wateramrk constraints  
     %0<= eda+edb+edc+d3 <= thou3   % wateramrk constraints  
     %0<= et+d1+d2+d3 <= thou4      % wateramrk constraints  
     0<=eda+edc+d2+d3<=thou2        % False watermark Constraint  
     0<=eda+d1+d3<=thou3            % False watermark Constraint 
     0<=eda+edb+edc+d2+d3<=thou4    % False watermark Constraint 
      
     0<= d1+d2+d3 <= thou2            % wateramrk constraints  
     0<= eda+edc++d1+d3 <= thou3   % wateramrk constraints  
     0<= et+d2 <= thou4      % wateramrk constraints  
     0<=d1 
     0<=d2 
     0<=d3 
     }; 
solution = ezsolve(f,c); 
    N1(i)=subs([ et] , solution ); 
    N2(i)=subs([ eda ], solution  ); 
    N3(i)=subs([ edb ], solution ); 
    N4(i)=subs([ edc ], solution ); 
    N5(i)=subs([ d1 ], solution ); 
    N6(i)=subs([ d2  ], solution ); 
    N7(i)=subs([ d3 ], solution ); 
    f1(i)=subs([ f ], solution );  
end 
PreResultC=[  N1 ; N2; N3; N4; N5; N6; N7 ]; 
fobj1 = [ f1 ]; 
disp('  et       eda       edb      edc     d1        d2          d3    
'); 
ResultsC = PreResultC'; 
disp(ResultsC) 
disp(fobj1') 
xlswrite('ResultsFalsecoy3.xls',ResultsC); 
   
% To verify the presence of the watermark, the similarity between the 
normalized difference error from  
 % the optimal solution between the watermarked solution and the solution 
obtained without watermarked    
 % The similarity measure is given by the normalized correlation 
coefficient  
 % Computing the similarity between the normalized difference error from 
the optimal solution between  
 % the watermarked solution X' and the solution obtained without 
watermarked X so  C = X'-X      
 % the measure using sim(C,X')= (C*X') /sqrt(X'*X') as a threshold  
  
disp('1. Cover medium with data message ') 
disp('The solutions are ' ) 
disp(ResultsA) 
disp('2. Embedding Cover medium data message and watermark constraint') 
disp('The solutions are ' ) 
disp(ResultsB) 
disp ('3. Attack data False Insertion  ')  
disp('The solutions are ' ) 
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disp(ResultsC ) 
disp (' 4. Detecting attack data False Insertion using similarity  ') 
ALL_Data_solution = [ResultsA  ; ResultsB  ; ResultsC  ]; 
  
  
disp('The normalized difference error from the optimal solution between 
the watermarked solution X') 
disp('and the solution obtained without watermarked X')     
disp('Threshold is the value that is used to determine the watermark 
constraints changes or not ') 
  
%C = ResultsB - ResultsA ; 
%threshold = ( C.* ResultsB )/sqrt(ResultsB .*ResultsB )  
%disp('The value of threshold is = '); disp(threshold ) 
  
%disp('---------------------------------------------------------') 
%disp('The similarity use sim(C,X ) = (C*X) /sqrt(X*X) ')    
%C1 = ResultsC-ResultsA; 
%similarity = ( C1.*ResultsC )/sqrt(ResultsC .*ResultsC ) 
%CheckRobusnessInsert 
ALATCHECK 
disp('The value of similarity is '); 
disp(similarity) 
disp('To check whether the watermark cosntraints changes or not ')  
  
 if threshold >= similarity   
    disp(' The watermark constraints do not change and then check all of 
contraints ') 
 disp('---------------------------------------------------------------') 
    disp(' 1. Check watermark constraints')  
    et=ResultsA(1,1);  eda=ResultsA(1,2);edb=ResultsA(1,3); 
edc=ResultsA(1,4);  
    d1=ResultsA(1,5);d2=ResultsA(1,6);d3=ResultsA(1,7);       
    if ((  edc+d1+d2+d3 <=thou1  ) && ( d2+d3 <= thou2 ) && ( 
eda+edb+edc+d3 <= thou3) && (et+d1+d2+d3 <= thou4))==1  
       disp('watermark constraints are true ') 
    else  
       disp('watermark constraints are not true ') 
    end                 
       disp('2. Check False Insertion  ')  
      et=ResultsC(1,1);  eda=ResultsC(1,2);edb=ResultsC(1,3); 
edc=ResultsC(1,4); d1=ResultsC(1,5);d2=ResultsC(1,6);d3=ResultsC(1,7); 
                 
    if (( eda+edc+d2+d3<=thou2 )&&( eda+d1+d3<=thou3  
)&&(eda+edb+edc+d2+d3<=thou4))==1    
       disp('Attack False Insertion are true ') 
    else  
       disp('Attack False Insertion  are not true ') 
    end     
 else  
       disp('The watermark constraints change  ') 
 end 
  
else 
   MenuLKR 
end  
lagi=input('Do you want to repeat ? (Y/N)','s') 
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end  
  
 
 
APPENDIX I  B  : GPKR Watermarking Technique  Matlab Code 
1. menuGPKR.m 
 
lagi='y'; 
while lagi=='y' | lagi=='Y'; 
disp('======================================================') 
disp('             MAIN MENU GENERATE WATERMARK             ') 
disp('               GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE            ') 
disp('====================================================') 
disp('1. Set up Network GPKR watermarking technique  ') 
disp('2. GenerateCoverMedium ') 
disp('3. Generate stream watermark') 
disp('4. Computation Cover medium with out Watermark Constraints  ') 
disp('5. Cover medium with data message with Wateramrk constraints  ') 
disp('6. Extract    ') 
disp('7. Detecting  ') 
disp('8. Attack_data deletion ') 
disp('9. Attack_False data insertion')  
disp('10. Attack_data Modification') 
disp('11. Attack_data_Replication') 
disp('12. Menu ') 
disp('13. Exit ') 
disp('====================================================') 
pilih = input ('Which one do you want =  '); 
if  pilih==1 
    NetworkSetupWMSN 
elseif pilih==2 
    GenerateCoverMedium 
elseif pilih==3 
    GenerateWatermark 
elseif pilih==4 
    ComputationCoverMedium 
  elseif pilih==5 
   EmbeddingWithCONSTRAINTS 
elseif pilih==6 
   ExtractWMSN 
elseif pilih==7 
    DetectingProcessWMSNs 
elseif pilih==8 
    DetecAttackDelete 
elseif pilih==9 
   DetectAttackFalseInsert 
 elseif pilih==10 
   DetectAttackModification 
elseif pilih==11 
    DetectAttackReplication    
elseif pilih==12 
    MenuGPKR 
else  
   exit 
end  
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lagi=input('Anda ingin mengulangi lagi ? (Y/N)','s') 
end 
disp('') 
disp('Copyright protection using GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE ') 
disp('') 
 
2. NetworkSetupWMSN.m 
 
disp('=====================================================') 
disp('          GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                ') 
disp('      Copyright protection of image in WMSN          ') 
disp('                   NETWORK SET UP                    ') 
disp('======================================================') 
d=[ ]; 
noOfNodes = 50; 
rand('state', 0); 
figure(1); 
clf; 
hold on; 
L = 200; 
M = 100; 
R = 30; % maximum range; 
netXloc = rand(1,noOfNodes)*L; 
netYloc = rand(1,noOfNodes)*M; 
Coordinate1 =[ ]; 
 for i = 1:noOfNodes 
plot(netXloc(i), netYloc(i), 'o',... 
                'MarkerEdgeColor','k',... 
                'MarkerFaceColor','r',... 
                'MarkerSize',10); 
xlabel(' Coordinate  of X axis') 
ylabel(' Coordinate  of Y absis  ') 
title('EXPERIMENT SET UP COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF IMAGE WIRELESS 
MULTIMEDIA SENSOR NETWORKs') 
text(netXloc(i), netYloc(i), num2str(i)); 
for j =1:noOfNodes 
distance = sqrt((netXloc(i) - netXloc(j))^2 + (netYloc(i) - 
netYloc(j))^2); 
Coordinate1(i,1)= netXloc(i) 
Coordinate1(j,2)= netYloc(j)  
disp(sprintf('%.4g | %.4g | %.4g ',i, netXloc(i), netYloc(j)')); 
if distance <= R 
matrix(i, j) = 1; % there is a link; 
line([netXloc(i) netXloc(j)], [netYloc(i) netYloc(j)], 'LineStyle', ':'); 
else 
matrix(i, j) = inf; 
end; 
end; 
end;  
xlswrite('Coordinate1.xls',Coordinate1) 
s1=xlsread ('D:\Gambar Thesis Bambang\Program Matlab untuk secure data 
WSNs\CopyRightProtectionofimageWMSNs\Coordinate1.xls',1,'A4:B50');  
s2=xlsread ('D:\Gambar Thesis Bambang\Program Matlab untuk secure data 
WSNs\CopyRightProtectionofimageWMSNs\Coordinate1.xls',1,'A1:B3'); 
Coordinate2= [ s1 ; s2 ] 
xlswrite('Coordinate2.xls',Coordinate2) 
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s3=xlsread ('D:\Gambar Thesis Bambang\Program Matlab untuk secure data 
WSNs\CopyRightProtectionofimageWMSNs\Coordinate1.xls',1,'A7:B50');  
s4=xlsread ('D:\Gambar Thesis Bambang\Program Matlab untuk secure data 
WSNs\CopyRightProtectionofimageWMSNs\Coordinate1.xls',1,'A1:B6'); 
Coordinate3= [ s3 ; s4 ] 
xlswrite('Coordinate3.xls',Coordinate3) 
DATAposisi = [ Coordinate1 Coordinate2 Coordinate3 ]; 
xlswrite('threeOtherNodesWMSNs.xls', DATAposisi );  
disp('Generate time arrival and departure sensor  ')  
time=[]; 
for j = 1:noOfNodes  
    disp('--------------------------------------------------------') 
    disp('No    |   tDA   |  tDB   |  tDC    ')  
    disp('------------------------------------------------------') 
    for i=1:noOfNodes 
    disp(sprintf('%.4g   | %.4g | %.4g  | %.4g |',i, random('unif',0,1) , 
random('unif',0,1) ,random('unif',0,1))); 
    time(i,1)= random('unif',0,1); 
    time(i,2)= random('unif',0,1);   
    time(i,3)= random('unif',0,1); 
    end 
end  
disp('Generate Temperature of the propagation media ')  
xlswrite('time123.xls',time) 
temp=[ ]; 
Max_Temp=50; 
temp=rand(Max_Temp,1)*Max_Temp 
xlswrite('temp.xls',temp) 
disp( ' Generate the feasiblity of value ')  
fisible=[]; 
for j = 1:noOfNodes 
    disp('-----------------------------------------------') 
    disp('No    |  thou1  | thou2   | thou3   | thou4  ')  
    disp('-----------------------------------------------') 
    for i=1:noOfNodes 
    disp(sprintf('%.4g   | %.4g | %.4g  | %.4g |%.4g ',i, 
random('unif',0,1) , random('unif',0,1) ,random('unif',0,1), 
random('unif',0,1))) ; 
    fisible(i,1)=random('unif',0,1) ;  
    fisible(i,2)=random('unif',0,1) ;  
    fisible(i,3)=random('unif',0,1) ;  
    fisible(i,4)=random('unif',0,1) ;  
    end 
end  
xlswrite('Fisible1234.xls',fisible) 
DATAlengkap = [ DATAposisi time temp fisible ]; 
xlswrite('datalengkapWMSNs.xls',DATAlengkap ); 
A=xlsread ('D:\Gambar Thesis Bambang\Program Matlab untuk secure data 
WSNs\CopyRightProtectionofimageWMSNs\datalengkapWMSNs.xls',1,'A1:Q32');  
xlswrite('data32nodesWMSNs.xls',A)  
lagi=input('Do you want to return  ? (Y/N)','s') 
disp('') 
disp('Copyright protection of the image in WMSN  using GPKR watermarking  
') 
disp('') 
end 
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3. GenerateWatermark.m  
 
clc 
lagi='y'; 
while lagi=='y' | lagi=='Y'; 
disp('======================================================') 
disp('             MAIN MENU GENERATE WATERMARK             ') 
disp('              GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE             ') 
disp('   1.  Applied Pyramid Transform for reducing image   ')  
disp('       Generating Watermark Matrix biner              ')  
disp('       Watermark Constrints  Kolmogorov rule          ')  
disp('       The image reduced                              ') 
disp('   2.  Main Menu GPKR Watermarking technique                ')                                           
disp('------------------------------------------------------') 
pilih = input ('Which one do you want =  '); 
if   pilih==1 
Original = input('Image that multimedia Sensor node capture ? ');  
[g h] = size(Original); 
n = input('How  many times will be it reduced? ')  
if n==1 
    reduce1 = pyr_reduce(Original); 
    imwrite(reduce1,'lastimage.jpg','jpg','Quality',10);  
    [g h] = size('lastimage.jpg')         
elseif n==2 
    reduce2 = pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(Original)); 
     imwrite(reduce2,'lastimage.jpg','jpg','Quality',10);    
elseif n==3 
    reduce3 = pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(Original))); 
    imwrite(reduce3,'lastimage.jpg','jpg','Quality',10);    
elseif n==4 
    reduce4 = pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(Original)))); 
    imwrite(reduce4,'lastimage.jpg','jpg','Quality',10); 
elseif n==5 
    reduce5 = 
pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(Original))))); 
    imwrite(reduce5,'lastimage.jpg','jpg','Quality',10); 
elseif n==6 
    reduce6 = 
pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(Origina
l)))))); 
    imwrite(reduce6,'lastimage.jpg','jpg','Quality',10);        
elseif n==7 
    reduce7 = 
pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_red
uce(Original))))))); 
    imwrite(reduce7,'lastimage.jpg','jpg','Quality',10);   
elseif n==8 
    reduce8 = 
pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_red
uce(pyr_reduce(Original)))))))); 
    imwrite(reduce8,'lastimage.jpg','jpg','Quality',10);   
elseif n==9 
    reduce9 = 
pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_red
uce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(Original))))))))); 
    imwrite(reduce9,'lastimage.jpg','jpg','Quality',10);   
elseif n==10 
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    reduce10 = 
pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_red
uce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(pyr_reduce(Original)))))))))); 
    imwrite(reduce10,'lastimage.jpg','jpg','Quality',10);   
else  
end   
imwrite(Original,'OriginalImage.jpg','jpg','Quality',10); 
Last_x=imread('lastimage.jpg'); 
[ m1 n1 ] = size(Last_x); 
Cp = Original; 
Cp(g-100:g-100+m1-1,h-100:h-100+n1-1)= Last_x(1:m1,1:n1); 
%subplot(3,3,1) 
%subplot(3,3,2) 
subplot(3,3,3) 
%imshow(Last_x(:,:,1)) 
imagesc(Last_x(:,:,1)) 
title('View Red picture') 
subplot(3,3,4) 
imshow(Original) 
title('Original image ')  
subplot(3,3,5) 
%imshow(Last_x) 
imagesc(Last_x) 
title( 'reduced image') 
subplot(3,3,6) 
%imshow(Last_x(:,:,2)) 
imagesc(Last_x(:,:,2)) 
title('View Green picture')  
%subplot(3,3,7) 
%imshow(Cp) 
%title('Watermarked image')  
%subplot(3,3,8) 
subplot(3,3,9) 
%imshow(Last_x(:,:,3)) 
imagesc(Last_x(:,:,3)) 
title('View Blue picture')  
disp('Matrix decimal from an image')  
Last_x(:,:) 
disp(' Convert Matrix decimal to Matrix binary ')  
%Rside=de2bi(Last_x(:,:,1),8)  
% produce Digital Message Image   
%st0=reshape(Rside,8,[]); 
st0=de2bi(Last_x(:,:,1),8); 
st1=de2bi(Last_x(:,:,2),8); 
st2=de2bi(Last_x(:,:,3),8);  
  
% the key encrypting is fliplr(A) returns A with columns flipped in the 
left-right direction,  
% that is, about a vertical axis. 
% the another key is flipud(A) 
sto1=fliplr(st0) 
sta=fliplr(st1); 
stb=flipud(st2); 
disp(' Watermark Matrix Signal to be come 2 Row x Coloumn  ')  
st= [ sto1 ; sta ; stb ] 
%xlswrite('DMI.xls',st0); % used for extracting binary 
matrix%xlswrite('WatermarkMatrixSignal.xls',st);  
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xlswrite('WMatrixOriginal.xls',st); % used for extracting binary 
matrix%xlswrite('WatermarkMatrixSignal.xls',st);  
  
disp(' Convert to watermark constraint by using Kolmogorov rule ')  
disp('----------------------------------------------------------') 
KolmogorovRuleWMSN 
else 
   MenuGPKR 
end  
lagi=input('Do you want to repeat ? (Y/N)','s') 
end 
 
4. DetectingProcessWMSNs.m 
clc 
lagi='y'; 
while lagi=='y' | lagi=='Y'; 
disp('=====================================================') 
disp('          GPKR WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE                ') 
disp('   1. Detecting Process Replication           ') 
disp('   2. Menu GBKR Watermarking technique               ')                                          
disp('=====================================================') 
pilih=input('What Do you want =  ');   
if pilih==1  
ResultsA=xlsread('C:\Users\14120992\Dropbox\Photos\CopyRightProtectionofi
mageWMSNs\XLS\ResultsWithout.xls',1,'A1:H32'); 
ResultsB=xlsread('C:\Users\14120992\Dropbox\Photos\CopyRightProtectionofi
mageWMSNs\XLS\ResultsWithWC.xls',1,'A1:H32'); 
ResultsD=xlsread('C:\Users\14120992\Dropbox\Photos\CopyRightProtectionofi
mageWMSNs\XLS\ATTACKREPLICATION.xls',1,'A1:H32'); 
  
a1=sum(ResultsA,1); 
X = ResultsB-ResultsA; 
x1=sum(X,1); 
threshold = abs( ( x1.*a1 )/sqrt(a1.*a1 )) ; 
disp('The value of threshold is = '); disp(threshold ) 
disp('---------------------------------------------------------') 
disp('The similarity use sim(C,X ) = (C*X) /sqrt(X*X) ') 
c1=sum(ResultsD,1); 
X2 = ResultsD-ResultsA; 
x2=sum(X2,1); 
similarity = abs(( x2.*c1 )/sqrt(c1.*c1 )) ; 
disp('The value of similarity is '); 
disp(similarity) 
  
  
 if threshold >= similarity   
    disp(' Attack Replication do not change the wateramrk ') 
    disp('-----------------------------------------') 
 else  
    disp('The watermark constraints change ') 
    disp('---------------------------------') 
 end  
  
else 
 _________________________________________________________________________ 
 
296  APPENDIX  I 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
   MenuGPKR 
end  
lagi=input('Do you want to repeat ? (Y/N)','s') 
end 
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ABSTRACT 
7KH IXQFWLRQRI:LUHOHVV6HQVRU1HWZRUNV :61V LV WR FROOHFW
DQGVWRUHGDWDVHQWWRRWKHUQRGHVRUVHUYHUV&XUUHQWWHFKQRORJLHV
DOORZYDOLGDWLRQGXULQJWUDQVLWEXWVWRSDIWHUWKHGDWDUHDFKHVLWV
GHVWLQDWLRQ2QH RIW KH FKDOOHQJHVZLWK WKHVH WHFKQRORJLHV LV WR
HQVXUHWKDWWKHVRXUFHRIWKHGDWDLVSUHVHUYHGRQFHLWOHDYHVWKH
:61 7KLV LV LPSRUWDQW DV WKH GDWD FDQ EH XVHG E\ RWKHU
DSSOLFDWLRQVRUGLVWULEXWHGWRRWKHUSDUWLHV7KHUHIRUHLWQHHGVWR
EH HQVXUHG WKDW WKH GDWD VRXUFH LV LGHQWLILDEOH DQG WKH GDWD LV
YDOLG6HQVRUVDUHVXVFHSWLEOH WRYDULRXV W\SHVRID WWDFNVXFKDV
GDWD PRGLILFDWLRQ GDWD LQVHUWLRQ DQG GHOHWLRQ RUH YHQ SK\VLFDO
FDSWXUH DQG VHQVRU UHSODFHPHQW +HQFH VHFXULW\ EHFRPHV DQ
LPSRUWDQW LVVXHZLWK:61V7KH WUDGLWLRQDO DOJRULWKPV DUHXVHG
IRU VHFXULQJ GDWD WUDQVPLVVLRQ EHWZHHQ VHQVRU QRGHV +RZHYHU
WKHVH DOJRULWKPV QHHG PLOOLRQV RI PXOWLSOLFDWLRQ LQVWUXFWLRQV WR
SHUIRUP RSHUDWLRQV DQG FDQQRW HIILFLHQWO\ SURWHFW WKH FRS\ULJKW
RIWKHYDOXDEOHVHQVRUGDWD:DWHUPDUNLQJLVRQHRIWKHHIIHFWLYH
FKRLFHV WR RYHUFRPH WKLV FKDOOHQJH :DWHUPDUN DGGV D VHFRQG
OLQHRIGH IHQVH WR HQVXUH WKDW WKHGDWD LVYDOLG HYHQ LI VRPHRQH
FUDFNV WKH HQFU\SWLRQ 7KLV SDSHU SURSRVHV D ZDWHUPDUNLQJ
WHFKQLTXH IRU FRS\ULJKW SURWHFWLRQ RIGD WD LQ :61V ,W DOVR
SURYLGHV SHUIRUPDQFH HYDOXDWLRQ RI WKH WHFKQLTXH WR VKRZ LWV
UREXVWQHVV DJDLQVW YDULRXV W\SHV RID WWDFNV OLNH GDWD GHOHWLRQ
SDFNHWUHSOLFDWLRQDQG6\ELODWWDFNV
Categories and Subject Descriptors  
&>Network Architecture and Design@
:LUHOHVVFRPPXQLFDWLRQ
General Terms 
$OJRULWKPV6HFXULW\+XPDQ)DFWRUV
Keywords 
:61'LJLWDOZDWHUPDUNLQJ/)65.ROPRJRURY5XOH
1. INTRODUCTION 
:LUHOHVV 6HQVRU 1HWZRUNV :61V KDYH WKH FDSDELOLWLHV RI
VHQVLQJ SURFHVVLQJ DQGZLUHOHVV FRPPXQLFDWLRQ DOO EXLOW LQWR D
WLQ\HPEHGGHGGHYLFH>@

7KH SULPDU\ IXQFWLRQ RI: 61V LV WR FROOHFW DQG GLVVHPLQDWH
FULWLFDOGDWD WKDWFKDUDFWHUL]H WKHSK\VLFDOSKHQRPHQDZLWKLQWKH
WDUJHW DUHD 7KLV LV SULPDULO\ GRQH E\:61QRGHV:61QRGHV
KDYH ORZ SRZHU VXSSO\ DQG OLPLWHG FRPSXWDWLRQDO FDSDELOLW\
EHFDXVH WKH\ RSHUDWH RQED WWHULHV *LYHQ WKHLU OLPLWHG SRZHU
VXSSO\LWEHFRPHVFKDOOHQJLQJWRHQVXUHVHFXULW\:DWHUPDUNLQJ
LVDOLJKWZHLJKWVHFXULW\WHFKQLTXHWKDWKDVEHHQWUDGLWLRQDOO\XVHG
IRU SURYLGLQJ FRS\ULJKW SURWHFWLRQ WR PXOWLPHGLD GDWD OLNH
LPDJHVDQGYLGHRFOLSV+RZHYHUUHFHQWZRUNKDVLQFRUSRUDWHGLW
LQ WKH ILHOGRI:61DVZHOO >@7KHUHDUHQXPHURXVVHFXULW\
GLPHQVLRQVOLNHDXWKHQWLFLW\LQWHJULW\FRS\ULJKWSURWHFWLRQHWF
ZKLFK QHHG WR EH DGGUHVVHG WR PDNH WKH :61V VHFXUH
:DWHUPDUNLQJWHFKQLTXHVKDYHEHHQLQYHVWLJDWHGWRDGGUHVVWKHVH
LVVXHV7KHPDLQUHDVRQIRUDGRSWLQJZDWHUPDUNLQJWHFKQLTXHVLV
WKDW ZDWHUPDUNLQJ DOJRULWKPV DUH VKRZQ WR EH OHVV HQHUJ\
GHPDQGLQJ > @ $QRWKHU DGYDQWDJH RIXV LQJ ZDWHUPDUNLQJ LV
WKDW LW SURYLGHV VHFXULW\ DW DOO WLPHV DV WKH ZDWHUPDUN RQFH
HPEHGGHG EHFRPHV D UHODWLYHO\ LQVHSDUDEOH FRQVWLWXHQW SDUW RI
WKH KRVWPHGLD XQOLNH FU\SWRJUDSK\ZKLFKSURYLGHVQR VHFXULW\
RQFH WKH FRQWHQW LV GHFU\SWHG >@ +HQFH WKH UHVHDUFK LQ WKH
DUHD RIZ DWHUPDUNLQJ DQG :61V KDV EHFRPH LQFUHDVLQJO\
LPSRUWDQW  7KH REMHFWLYH RIW KLV SDSHU LV WR SUHVHQW D
ZDWHUPDUNLQJ WHFKQLTXH WR SURWHFW WKH FRS\ULJKW RI WKH VHQVRU
GDWDDJDLQVWSRVVLEOHPDOLFLRXVRUDFFLGHQWDOWDPSHULQJRIGDWD
2. BACKGROUND OF WATERMARKING 
,Q WKLVVHFWLRQZHEULHIO\H[SODLQKRZZDWHUPDUNLQJ WHFKQLTXHV
RSHUDWH :DWHUPDUNLQJ WHFKQLTXH LV WKH SURFHVV RIH PEHGGLQJ
LQIRUPDWLRQZKLFK DOORZV DQ LQGLYLGXDO WR DGGKLGGHQFRS\ULJKW
QRWLFHVRURWKHUYHULILFDWLRQPHVVDJHV WRGLJLWDO DXGLRYLGHRRU
LPDJH VLJQDOV DQG GRFXPHQW REMHFWV >@ :DWHUPDUNLQJ
WHFKQLTXHDVDFRPPXQLFDWLRQWDVNFRQVLVWVRIWKUHHPDLQVWDJHV
ZDWHUPDUN JHQHUDWLRQ SURFHVV ZDWHUPDUN HPEHGGLQJ SURFHVV
ZKLFK LQFOXGHV LQIRUPDWLRQ WUDQVPLVVLRQ DQG SRVVLEOH DWWDFNV
WKURXJK WKH FRPPXQLFDWLRQ FKDQQHO DQG ZDWHUPDUN GHWHFWLRQ
DQGUHWULHYDOSURFHVV:DWHUPDUNJHQHUDWLRQSURFHVVLVFULWLFDODV
LWVUHTXLUHPHQWVDUHXQLTXHDQGFRPSOH[7KHZDWHUPDUNPHVVDJH
PXVW FRQWDLQ LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW LV XQLTXH VXFK DV VLPSOH WH[W >@
>@7KHNH\HPEHGGLQJPXVWDOVREHXQLTXH LQRUGHU WRPDNHD
VHFUHF\NH\VXFKDVDELQDU\VWUHDP>@>@>@>@>@%RWK
WKHZDWHUPDUNPHVVDJH DQG WKH NH\ HPEHGGLQJ DUH XVHG DV WKH
LQSXW DQG SURFHVVHG LQ WKH ZDWHUPDUN JHQHUDWRU WR SURGXFH D
3HUPLVVLRQ WRPDNH GLJLWDO RU KDUG FRSLHV RI DOOR U SDUW RI WKLV ZRUN IRU
SHUVRQDO RU FODVVURRPXVH LV JUDQWHGZLWKRXW IHHSURYLGHG WKDW FRSLHV DUH
QRWPDGHRUGLVWULEXWHGIRUSURILWRUFRPPHUFLDODGYDQWDJHDQGWKDWFRSLHV
EHDUWKLVQRWLFHDQGWKHIXOOFLWDWLRQRQWKHILUVWSDJH7RFRS\RWKHUZLVHRU
UHSXEOLVKWRSRVWRQVHUYHUVRUWRUHGLVWULEXWHWROLVWVUHTXLUHVSULRUVSHFLILF
SHUPLVVLRQDQGRUDIHH
MoMM2012'HFHPEHU%DOL,QGRQHVLD
&RS\ULJKW$&0
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ZDWHUPDUN VLJQDO 7KH ZDWHUPDUN HPEHGGLQJ SURFHVV LV
XQGHUWDNHQ E\ DQ HPEHGGHU 7KH HPEHGGHU FRPELQHV WKH FRYHU
PHGLXP WKH ZDWHUPDUN VLJQDO DQG WKH VHQVHG GDWD DQG NH\
HPEHGGLQJ WR FUHDWH D ZDWHUPDUNHG FRYHU PHGLXP 'XULQJ
WUDQVPLVVLRQ WKHUH DUH PDQ\ WKLQJV WKDW LQWHUIHUH ZLWK WKH
FRPPXQLFDWLRQSURFHVVVXFKDVQRLVHWKDWGHFUHDVHVWKHTXDOLW\
RI WUDQVPLVVLRQ DQG OHDGV WR WKH ZDWHUPDUNHG FRYHU PHGLXP
EHLQJ GURSSHG 7KH RWKHU WKLQJV DUHZDWHUPDUN DWWDFNV VXFK DV
FURSSLQJFRPSUHVVLRQDQGILOWHULQJ7KHDLPRI WKHVHDWWDFNVLV
WR UHPRYH WKH ZDWHUPDUN VLJQDO IURP WKH ZDWHUPDUNHG FRYHU
PHGLXP7KHH[WUDFWLRQDQGGHWHFWLRQSURFHVVLVXQGHUWDNHQE\D
GHWHFWRU 7KH GHWHFWLRQ SURFHVV FRQVLVWV RID Q H[WUDFWLRQ XQLW WR
ILUVW H[WUDFW WKHZDWHUPDUN VLJQDO DQG ODWHU FRPSDUH LWZLWK WKH
FRYHU PHGLXP ZLWKRXW WKH ZDWHUPDUN VLJQDO 7KH H[WUDFWLRQ
SURFHVVFDQEHGLYLGHGLQWRWZRSKDVHV ORFDWLQJWKHZDWHUPDUN
DQGUHFRYHULQJWKHZDWHUPDUNLQIRUPDWLRQ
3. RELATED WORK  
2YHU WKH ODVW GHFDGH D ORW RIUH VHDUFK KDV EHHQ FDUULHG RXW RQ
GLJLWDOZDWHUPDUNLQJWHFKQLTXHVIRUWH[WVLPDJHVDXGLRVYLGHRV
DQG HYHQ UHODWLRQDO GDWDEDVHV >@2XU UHVHDUFK JURXS LWVHOI
KDV VRPH RIW KH HDUOLHVW ZRUNV WR LWV FUHGLW LQ WKH DUHDV RI
ZDWHUPDUNLQJ IRU5) ,' >@ %XW WKHUH KDYH EHHQ UHODWLYHO\
IHZZRUNVRQGLJLWDOZDWHUPDUNLQJWHFKQLTXHVIRU:16V>@>
@ )HQJ HW DO >@ GHYHORSHG WKH ILUVW V\VWHP RIZDWHUPDUNLQJ
WHFKQLTXH WR HPEHG FU\SWRORJLFDOO\ HQFRGHG DXWKRUVKLS
VLJQDWXUHV LQWR WKH GDWD DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ DFTXLUHG E\ ZLUHOHVV
HPEHGGHGVHQVRUQHWZRUNVIRUFRS\ULJKWGLJLWDORZQHUVKLS/DWHU
6LRQHWDO  >@SURYLGHGDZD\IRUFRS\ULJKWSURWHFWLRQWRGDWD
VWUHDPRZQHUVDQGWKHDXWKRUL]HGXVHUV)RUH[DPSOHFRQVLGHUD
FDVHZKHUHDVWUHDPLVJHQHUDWHGDQGVDIHO\WUDQVPLWWHGIURPWKH
VHQVRUVWRWKHEDVHVWDWLRQ$ZDWHUPDUNLVDSSOLHGWRWKHVWUHDP
DWWKHEDVHVWDWLRQ7KHGDWDDUHWKHQWUDQVPLWWHGWRDQDXWKRUL]HG
XVHU 1RZ LQ FDVH RI DQ DWWDFN WKH RZQHU DQG WKH DXWKRUL]HG
XVHUVQHHGDZD\WRSURYH WKDW WKHGDWDZHUHJHQHUDWHGE\ WKHP
DQG WKH VWUHDP ZDV LOOHJDOO\ REWDLQHG E\ WKH DWWDFNHU 2QH
FRPPRQO\DFFHSWHGZD\ WRSURYHRZQHUVKLS LVXVLQJHPEHGGHG
ZDWHUPDUNV7KLVWHFKQLTXHZRUNVE\HPEHGGLQJDZDWHUPDUNELW
LQWR PDMRU H[WUHPHV WKH H[WUHPHV WKDW VXUYLYH DQ\ XQLIRUP
VDPSOLQJ .RXVKDQIDU HW DO >@ SUHVHQW DQ DFWLYH ZDWHUPDUNLQJ
WHFKQLTXHWKDWFDQEHXVHGRQWKHGDWDWREHSURFHVVHGGXULQJWKH
FRPPRQ VHQVRU IXVLRQ DSSOLFDWLRQ XVLQJ VHQVRUV RI GLIIHUHQW
PRGDOLWLHV7KLVWHFKQLTXHKDVEHHQXVHGIRUFRS\ULJKWSURWHFWLRQ
;LDR HW DO >@  KDYH SURSRVHG D ZDWHUPDUNLQJ WHFKQLTXH IRU
SURWHFWLQJFRS\ULJKWE\ WDNLQJDGYDQWDJHRI WKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFRI
WKH VHQGLQJ WLPH %DVHG RQGL JLWDO ZDWHUPDUNLQJ =KDQJ HW DO
>@ KDYH SXW IRUZDUG DQ HQGWRHQG ZDWHUPDUN VWDWLVWLFDO
DSSURDFK IRUGD WD DXWKHQWLFDWLRQ WKDW SURYLGHV LQKHUHQW VXSSRUW
IRU LQQHWZRUN SURFHVVLQJ ,QW KLV WHFKQLTXH WKH DXWKHQWLFDWLRQ
LQIRUPDWLRQ LVPRGXODWHG DV ZDWHUPDUN DQG HPEHGGHG LQWR WKH
VHQVRU\GDWD DW WKH VHQVRUQRGHV$FRPPXQLFDWLRQSURWRFRO IRU
:61VKDVEHHQ LQWURGXFHGE\;XHMXQHWDO >@ WRDXWKHQWLFDWH
VHQVLWLYH GDWD WUDQVPLVVLRQ  7KH WHFKQLTXH XVHV VHQVLWLYH
LQIRUPDWLRQDVZDWHUPDUN7KHZDWHUPDUNLVWKHQHPEHGGHGLQWR
VHQVRU\GDWDLQWKHVHQVRUQRGHV$WKUHVKROGLVXVHGWRDYRLGWKH
DOWHUDWLRQ RIW KH ORZHVW ELW LV  DSSHQG  LQWR WKH 2XWSXW
%LQDU\ V\VWHP 2%6  RWKHUZLVH DSSHQG  WR WKH 2%6 DQG
PDNHDELJLQIOXHQFHRQWKHSUHFLVLRQRIWKHVHQVRU\GDWD.DPHO
HWDO>@LQWURGXFHDWHFKQLTXHWRSURYLGHIRUGDWDLQWHJULW\7KLV
WHFKQLTXH EDVHG RQGL VWRUWLRQ IUHH ZDWHUPDUNLQJ HPEHGV WKH
ZDWHUPDUN LQ WKH RUGHU RI WKH GDWD HOHPHQW VR WKDW LW GRHV QRW
FDXVHGLVWRUWLRQRIWKHGDWD $OEDWKHWDO>@KDYHLQWURGXFHGD
PHWKRG WR SURYLGH SURWHFWLRQ DJDLQVW SDVVLYH HDYHVGURSSLQJ E\
HPSOR\LQJ FRQILGHQWLDO WUDQVPLVVLRQ RI GDWD PHVVDJHV 7DEOH 
VKRZV D VXPPDU\ RI WKH ZDWHUPDUNLQJ WHFKQLTXHV WKDW FDQ EH
XVHGLQ:61V$OWKRXJKVRPHUHVHDUFKZRUNVKDYHDWWHPSWHGWR
DSSO\GLJLWDOZDWHUPDUNLQJWHFKQLTXHWRZLUHOHVVVHQVRUQHWZRUNV
IRU VHFXULW\ DXWKHQWLFDWLRQ DQG LQWHJULW\ SXUSRVHV PRVW RI WKH
H[LVWLQJ VWXGLHV ZHUH FRQGXFWHG IRU FRS\ULJKW SURWHFWLRQ
SXUSRVHV
Table 1 Watermark embedding approaches and their purpose 

+HUH ZH SUHVHQW D ZDWHUPDUNLQJ WHFKQLTXH IRUF RS\ULJKW GDWD
SURWHFWLRQ EDVHG RQ/ LQHDU )HHGEDFN 6KLW 5HJLVWHU /)65 DQG
.ROPRJRURY UXOH 'HWDLOV RIW KH WHFKQLTXH DUH GLVFXVVHG LQ
6HFWLRQ
4. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION  
,Q WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI ZLUHOHVV VHQVRU QHWZRUNV DOO WKH
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ EHWZHHQ GLIIHUHQW QRGHV RFFXUV LQ WKH EURDGFDVW
IDVKLRQ WKURXJK WKH WUDQVPLVVLRQ FKDQQHO ZKHUH DQ\ QRGHPD\
EHFRPHDQDWWDFNWDUJHWZLWKH[WHUQDODQGLQWHUQDOVHFXULW\ULVNV
LQFOXGLQJ HDYHVGURSSLQJ OHDN GDWD WDPSHULQJ HWF ,Q WKH
SDUWLFXODU DSSOLFDWLRQ ILHOGV LI WKH GDWD WUDQVPLVVLRQ LV QRW
UHOLDEOHWKHVHFXULW\RIWKHZKROHQHWZRUNLVDIIHFWHG,QRUGHUWR
PDNH WKH QHWZRUN VHFXUH DJDLQVW WKH DWWDFNHUV VHFXUH GDWD
WUDQVPLVVLRQ EHWZHHQ VHQVRU QRGHV LV XVHG 6HFXUH GDWD VHQVRU
QHWZRUNV XVH PDQ\ FU\SWRJUDSKLF DOJRULWKPV 7KHVH WHFKQLTXHV
QHHG D ODUJH QXPEHU RI PXOWLSOLFDWLRQ LQVWUXFWLRQV LQ RUGHU WR
SHUIRUP RSHUDWLRQV >@ +RZHYHU WKH\ FDQQRW HIILFLHQWO\
SURWHFWWKHFRS\ULJKWRIWKHYDOXDEOHVHQVRUGDWD7RDGGUHVVWKLV
LVVXH FRS\ULJKW SURWHFWLRQ IRU WKH YDOXDEOH VHQVRU\ GDWD KDV
EHFRPH DQ LPSRUWDQW LVVXH EHFDXVH D PDOLFLRXV DGYHUVDU\ FDQ
HDVLO\ GXSOLFDWH WKH VHJPHQWV RI WKH YDOXDEOH VHQVRU\ GDWD IRU
WDNLQJDGYDQWDJH >@ ,Q WKHSUHYLRXV VHFWLRQZHFRQGXFWHGDQ
LQGHSWK OLWHUDWXUH VXUYH\ RI WKH ZDWHUPDUNLQJ DSSURDFKHV LQ
:61VDQG WKHLU SXUSRVHV$V LGHQWLILHGE\XVPDQ\ UHVHDUFKHV
Author Watermark embedding 
technique  
Purpose 
)HQJHWDO>@ $GGLQJ ZDWHUPDUN FRQVWUDLQW WR
WKH SURFHVVLQJ VWHS GXULQJ WKH
QHWZRUNRSHUDWLRQ
&RS\ULJKW
6LRQHWDO>@ 6HOHFWLRQFULWHULDXVLQJ06% &RS\ULJKW
.RXVKDQIDUHW
DO>@
$GGLQJ ZDWHUPDUN FRQVWUDLQW WR
WKH SURFHVVLQJ VWHS GXULQJ WKH
QHWZRUNRSHUDWLRQ
&RS\ULJKW
;LDRHWDO
>@
0RGLILFDWLRQ RI WKH HPEHGGLQJ
ELWRIHDFKSDFNHW
&RS\ULJKW
=KDQJHWDO
>@
7KH ZDWHUPDUN VHQVRU\ GDWD
d(x,y) = w(x,y)+o(x,y), Z[\ LV
WKH ZDWHUPDUN IRU VHQVRU QRGH
DQG2[\LVWKHVHQVRU\GDWD

$XWKHQWLFDWLRQ
;XHMXQHWDO
>@
,,6   LQSXW LQWHJHU VWUHDP
,%V LQSXW ELQDU\ VWUHDP 7  
7KUHVKROG,I,,67
³,%6 ´EHFRPH³,%6 ´
(OVH³,%6 ´EHFRPH³,%6 ´
$XWKHQWLFDWLRQ
.DPHOHWDO
>@
&RQFDWHQDWLRQ RI WKH FXUUHQW
JURXS KDVK YDOXH JURXS gi DQG
QH[W JURXS KDVK YDOXH JURXS
gi+1Wi = HASH (K || gi || SN) 
SN = serial number 
,QWHJULW\
-XOLD$OEDWKHW
DO>@
JHQHUDWLQJ WKH RQHWLPH SDG E\
UHSHDWHGO\ FRQFDWHQDWLQJ WKH
VXEVWULQJ
6HFXUH
&RPPXQLFDWLRQ

209
KDYH DSSOLHG WKH GLJLWDO ZDWHUPDUNLQJ WHFKQLTXH WR :61V IRU
VHFXULW\ SXUSRVHV >@  DXWKHQWLFDWLRQ SXUSRVHV >@ >@ DQG
LQWHJULW\SXUSRVHV>@0DQ\RWKHUUHVHDUFKHV>@>@>@>@KDYH
ZRUNHG RQ FRS\ULJKW SURWHFWLRQ +RZHYHU WKHUH KDV EHHQ QR
ZRUN WKDW XVHV /)65 DQG .ROPRJRURY UXOH IRU FRS\ULJKW
SURWHFWLRQ 7KLV SDSHU ZLOO VKRZ WKDW WKH XVH RI WKH /)65 DQG
.ROPRJRURY WHFKQLTXH SURYLGHV D EHWWHU SURWHFWLRQ RI
ZDWHUPDUNVFRPSDUHGWRRWKHUZDWHUPDUNLQJWHFKQLTXHV
5. PROPOSED WATERMARKING 
TECHNIQUE    
,Q WKLV VHFWLRQ ZH JLYH D JHQHUDO RYHUYLHZ RIRXU  SURSRVHG
ZDWHUPDUNLQJWHFKQLTXHWRHQVXUHWKHUHOLDELOLW\RIFRS\ULJKWGDWD
SURWHFWLRQ 7KH FRS\ULJKW GDWD SURWHFWLRQ PRGHO EDVHG RQ
ZDWHUPDUNLQJ WHFKQLTXH FDQ EH VHHQ LQ )LJXUH  7KLV PRGHO
FRQVLVWV RIIRXUV WHSV &RYHUPHGLXPJHQHUDWLRQSURFHVV 
:DWHUPDUN JHQHUDWLRQ SURFHVV  (PEHGGLQJ  SURFHVV DQG 
'HWHFWLRQ DQG H[WUDFWLRQ SURFHVV7KH FRYHUPHGLXPJHQHUDWLRQ
SURFHVVJHQHUDWHVDFRYHUPHGLXPE\XVLQJDQDWRPLFWULODWHUDWLRQ
SURFHVV 7KH ZDWHUPDUN JHQHUDWLRQ SURFHVV FUHDWHV ZDWHUPDUN
FRQVWUDLQWV DQG PHVVDJH VHQVHG GDWD 7KLV SURFHVV UHTXLUHV D
VHQVHG GDWD WKURXJK WKH /)65 SURFHVV SDUWLWLRQHG SURFHVV DQG
.ROPRJRURY UXOH SURFHVV 7KH HPEHGGLQJ SURFHVV JHQHUDWHV D
ZDWHUPDUNHGFRYHUPHGLXPDQGWKHGHWHFWLRQSURFHVVGHWHFWVWKH
ZDWHUPDUNVLJQDO

Figure 1. Copyright data protection based on watermarking  
5.1 Cover medium generation process   
,Q WKLV VHFWLRQ ZH H[SODLQ WKH SURFHVV RIJH QHUDWLQJ FRYHU
PHGLXPE\XVLQJWKHDWRPLFWULODWHUDWLRQSURFHVV3VHXGRFRGH
:LWK UHVSHFW WR WZRGLPHQVLRQDO VHQVRU QHWZRUNV DWRPLF
WULODWHUDWLRQLVDZHOONQRZQSURFHGXUHE\ZKLFKDVHQVRUQRGHLQ
D QHWZRUN FDQ GHWHUPLQH LWV SRVLWLRQ E\ XVLQJ WKH GLVWDQFH DQG
SRVLWLRQ RI WKUHH RWKHU VHQVRU QRGHV RINQRZ Q ORFDWLRQ )URP
WKHVH GLVWDQFHV DQG SRVLWLRQV D VHQVRU QRGH ZKLFK LV WU\LQJ WR
GHWHUPLQH LWV ORFDWLRQ FDQ JHQHUDWH D QRQOLQHDU V\VWHP
SURJUDPPLQJ

Pseudocode 1. Generate Cover Medium  
Input:    ByBxAyAx ,   cC yx cT , DAt DBt DCt  
         DD yx   , tH  DAH  DBH  DCH  GG  G  
Output: The cover medium is  






V&RQVWUDLQW
PLQ 
GHH
GHH
GHH
GGGHHHH
d
d
d
 
DCDCttcTCyDyCxDx
DBDBttcTCyDyCxDx
DADAttcTCyDyCxDx
f DCDBDAt
 
Steps:   
1. Compute cTsV    
2. Compute DAtsVDAd   DBtsVDBd   DCtsVDCd   
Where DAd DBd  and DCd are between nodes D and 
the sensor nodes are then measured using TDoA. 
3. Append tH  error of measurement time to step 
(2)  
4. Append DAH , DBH , and DCH errors of 
measurement distance to step (2).  
5. Compute 
 AyDyAxDxDAd  
 ByDyBxDxDBd   
 CyDyCxDxDAd   
6. Append  GG and G  errors between the 
Euclidean distances step (3) 
 Replace DAd DBd  and DCd  from step (2) to 
step (3)and then compute them. 
 Print cover medium  

5.2 Watermark generation process  
:DWHUPDUN JHQHUDWLRQ SURFHVV LQYROYHV IRXUP DLQ VWDJHV 
VHQVLWLYH GDWD FRQYHUVLRQ ZDWHUPDUN VLJQDO JHQHUDWLRQ
ZDWHUPDUN FRQVWUDLQW JHQHUDWLRQ DQG PHVVDJH VHQVHG GDWD
JHQHUDWLRQ. 
5.2.1. Converting sensitive data into binary sequence  
7KH ILUVW VWHS LV FRQYHUWLQJ VHQVLWLYH GDWD LQWR ELQDU\ VHTXHQFH
$Q\ GDWD ZKLFK FRPSURPLVHV FRQILGHQWLDOLW\ LQWHJULW\ DQGRU
DYDLODELOLW\FRXOGKDYHDPDWHULDOO\DGYHUVHHIIHFWRQ6XFKGDWD
LVFDOOHGVHQVLWLYHGDWD7KHVHQVLWLYHGDWDLVGLUHFWO\SURSRUWLRQDO
WR WKHPDWHULDOLW\RI WKHFRPSURPLVHGGDWDZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKHVH
FULWHULD6HQVLWLYHGDWDFDQEHIRUPHGLQWKHIRUPRIYLGHRDXGLR
LPDJH DQG VFDODU GDWD 6KLK HW DO >@ SUHVHQW WKHLU ILQGLQJV RQ
VHQVLWLYHGDWDDQGSULYDF\ LVVXHVRIDSSOLFDWLRQV LQ%RG\6HQVRU
1HWZRUNV %61V ,Q%6 1V WKH DSSOLFDWLRQV FROOHFW VHQVLWLYH
SK\VLRORJLFDOGDWDRIWKHXVHUDQGVHQGWKHPWRRWKHUSDUWLHVIRU
IXUWKHU DQDO\VLV 7KH VHQVLWLYH GDWD DUH (&* VLJQDOV DQG EORRG
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SUHVVXUH 7KHVH GDWD DUH UHTXLUHG WR EH SURWHFWHG DQG FRQYHUWHG
IURPVFDODUGDWDLQWRELQDU\VWUHDP
5.2.2 Generating watermark signal using Linear 
Feedback Shift Register ( LFSR )  
2QH PHWKRG RIIRUP LQJ D ELQDU\ VHTXHQFH IRU JHQHUDWLQJ
ZDWHUPDUN LV WR DSSO\/)65ZKRVH FKDUDFWHULVWLF SRO\QRPLDO LV
SULPLWLYH > @ /)65 LV D VKLIW UHJLVWHUZKRVH LQSXW ELW LV D
OLQHDU IXQFWLRQ RIL WV SUHYLRXV VWDWH7KH RQO\ OLQHDU IXQFWLRQ RI
VLQJOH ELWV LV H[FOXVLYHRU xor) WKHUHIRUH LW LV D VKLIW UHJLVWHU
ZKRVHLQSXWELWLVGULYHQE\xorRIVRPHELWVRIWKHRYHUDOOVKLIW
UHJLVWHUYDOXH
/)65FDQEHGHILQHGE\DUHFXUUHQFHUHODWLRQ
VXFKWKDWFRQVWDQWVELQDU\DUHWKH
DQG


ZKHUH
 
¦

 
t 
ocic
Z
n
i
nkksicnKs

DVVRFLDWHGZLWKVXFKDUHFXUUHQFHUHODWLRQLVDELQDU\SRO\QRPLDO
kxkxkcxccxf 

 

 
FDOOHGWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFSRO\QRPLDORIWKH/)657KHFRHIILFLHQW
ci   LV IHHGEDFN FRQVWDQW 6XFK VHTXHQFH FDQ EHPHFKDQL]HG E\
XVLQJ DQ /)65ZKRVH WDS VHWWLQJV DUH GHILQHG E\ WKH IHHGEDFN
FRQVWDQW
Pseudo code 2. Generate watermark signal  
Input: Sensed data, coefficients ci of the binary 
polynomial as watermark key  Output:  28 bits watermark signal    Steps:   
1. Convert sensed data into binary sequence. 
2. Use the coefficients ci of the binary 
polynomial xf as watermark key 
3. Generate an infinite binary sequence using the 
coefficient ci into a LFSR ( nKs    
 Cut the infinite binary sequence from 1 to 28 
as watermark signal. 
 Print 28 bits watermark signal
5.2.3 Kolmogorov rule to create watermark 
constraints 
$QGUHZ1LNRODHYLFK.ROPRJRURY>@VWDWHVWKDWWKHFRPSOH[LW\
RI DQREMHFW LV WKH OHQJWKRI WKH VKRUWHVW FRPSXWHUSURJUDP WKDW
FDQUHSURGXFHWKHREMHFW7KH.ROPRJRURYFRPSOH[LW\LVGHILQHG
DV D SUREDELOLW\ GLVWULEXWLRQ XQGHU ZKLFK WKH ZRUVWFDVH DQG
DYHUDJHFDVH UXQQLQJ WLPH DUH WKH VDPH :H NQRZ WKDW WKH
.ROPRJRURYFRPSOH[LW\UXOHLVWKHVKRUWGHVFULSWLRQOHQJWKRIWKH
RYHUDOOGHVFULSWLRQLQWHUSUHWHGE\WKHFRPSXWHU7KHWKUHHSDSHUV
>@XVHWKH.ROPRJRURYUXOHIRUQXPEHULQJWKHYDULDEOHV
RI WKH OLQHDUFRPELQDWLRQ LQ WKHRSWLPL]DWLRQREMHFWLYH IXQFWLRQ
DQGDVHWRIFRQVWUDLQWV:HKDYHDOVRXVHGWKH.ROPRJRURYUXOH
ZKLFKFDQEHVHHQLQ7DEOH
Table 1 Kolmogorov rule 
      
tH  DAH  DBH  DCH  G  G  G 
Pseudo code 3. Generate watermark constraints   
Input : 28 bits watermark signal    Output: Watermark constraints    Steps   
1. Group 28 bit watermark signals into groups of 7 
bits each. 
2. Match the bit number with corresponding 
variable number from table 2.  
3. If a bit is assigned a variable within a group, 
that variable is included in the linear. 
4. Else a bit zero is assigned to the variable 
within the group and that variable is not 
included in the linear. 
5. Go to 2. 
6. Print watermark constraints. 
5.2.4 Partitioning and conversion to create message 
sensed data   
,Q WKLV VHFWLRQ ZH H[SODLQ KRZ DP HVVDJH VHQVHG GDWD FDQ EH
FUHDWHG 7R FUHDWH WKLV PHVVDJH VHQVHG GDWD  ELW ZDWHUPDUN
ELQDU\ UHVXOWLQJ IURP WKH JHQHUDWH ZDWHUPDUN VLJQDO KDV EHHQ
XVHG
Pseudo code 4. Generate create message data    
Input : 28 bits watermark signal    Output: message sensed data    Steps:   
1. Group 28 bit watermark signals into groups of 
4 bits each. 
2. Convert each group into decimal number to get 
weight factors.  
3. Print message sensed data  
5.3 Watermark Embedding Process 
(PEHGGLQJ SURFHVV LV WKH VHFRQG VWHS RIW KH ZDWHUPDUNLQJ
V\VWHP XQGHUWDNHQ E\ D ZDWHUPDUN HPEHGGHU 7KH HPEHGGHU
FRPELQHV WKH FRYHUPHGLXP WKHZDWHUPDUN FRQVWUDLQWV DQG WKH
PHVVDJHVHQVHGGDWDWRFUHDWHDZDWHUPDUNHGFRYHUPHGLXP7KH
ZDWHUPDUNHGFRYHUPHGLXPLVSHUFHSWXDOO\LGHQWLFDOWRWKHFRYHU
PHGLXP7KHSURFHVVRIZDWHUPDUNHPEHGGLQJFDQEHVKRZQ LQ
)LJXUH
Pseudo code 5. The process of embedding     
Input:  cover medium, 28 bits watermark signal, 
Watermark constraints, message sensed data. 
Output:  DD yx  , tH  DAH  DBH  DCH  GG  G  
 and min f  Steps :   
1. Generate    ByBxAyAx and   cC yx  using 
uniform distribution on interval [0,1]. 
2. Generate DAt DBt and DCt  using uniform distribution on interval [0.02,0.1]. 
3. Generate  GG and G  using gauss distribution 
on interval [0,1]. 
4. Generate   WWW and W  using gauss distribution 
on interval  [0,1], so that these value do not 
harm the feasibility of the solution of the  
cover medium  
5. Generate cT  using gauss distribution on 
interval [0,1]. 
6. Change coefficient objective f to weight 
factor of message sensed data respectively.  
 Append watermark constraints into cover medium
 Compute and print  DD yx  , tH  DAH 
DBH  DCH  GG  G  and min f
5.4 Watermark Extraction  
7KH H[WUDFWLRQ SURFHVV LV DOVR XQGHUWDNHQ LQ WKH ZDWHUPDUN
GHWHFWRUDVZHZDQWWRUHFRYHUWKHPHVVDJHVHQVHGGDWDIURPWKH
FRYHU PHGLXP 7KH SURFHVV RI ZDWHUPDUN H[WUDFWLQJ FDQ EH
VKRZQLQ)LJXUH

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Pseudo code 6. The process of extracting 
watermark signal 
Input : tH  DAH  DBH  DCH   GG  G 
Output : 28 bits watermark signal     Steps :   
1. Compute the value of the objective f using 
tH  DAH  DBH  DCH   GG DQG G     
2. If the value of the objective does not change 
go to 3 
3. Else go to step 1.   
4. Take the coefficients of objective f.  
5. Convert the coefficient of objective f into 4 
bits each. 
6. Merge all of these 4 bits to 28 bits 
7. Print 28 bits watermark signal.   
5.5 Watermark Detection 
7KH HQG RI WKH ZDWHUPDUNLQJ V\VWHP LV WKH GHWHFWLRQ SURFHVV
ZKLFK LV DFU XFLDO SDUW ZKLFK DOORZV WKH VHQGHU WR LGHQWLI\ DQG
SURYLGH LQIRUPDWLRQ WR WKH LQWHQGHG UHFHLYHU 7KH GHWHFWLRQ
SURFHVV LV XQGHUWDNHQ E\ D GHWHFWRU  7KHUH DUH WZR W\SHV RI
GHWHFWLRQ LQIRUPHG GHWHFWLRQ DQG EOLQG GHWHFWLRQ DFFRUGLQJ WR
ZKHWKHU WKH FRYHU PHGLXP LV QHHGHG RUQRW  LQ WKH GHWHFWLRQ
SURFHVV 7KH SURFHVV RIGH WHFWLQJ ZDWHUPDUN KDV QRW EHHQ
H[SODLQHG LQ ) HQJ HW DO  >@ RU.RXVKDQIDU HW DO  >@%RWK RI
WKHP DUH H[SODLQ WKH SURFHVV RIH PEHGGLQJ WKH ZDWHUPDUN 7R
YHULI\ WKH SUHVHQFH RIW KH ZDWHUPDUN ZH DGRSW WKH FRQFHSW RI
&R[et al>@7KH\GUDZSDUDOOHOVEHWZHHQWKHLUWHFKQRORJ\DQG
WKH VSUHDGVSHFWUXP FRPPXQLFDWLRQ VLQFH WKH ZDWHUPDUN LV
VSUHDG RYHU D VHW RIYL VXDOO\ LPSRUWDQW IUHTXHQF\ FRPSRQHQWV
/HW x EH WKH HUURU RI WKH RSWLPDO VROXWLRQZLWKPHVVDJH VHQVHG
GDWD x’ EH WKH HUURU RI WKH RSWLPDO VROXWLRQ ZLWK WKH PHVVDJH
VHQVHGGDWDDQGZDWHUPDUNFRQVWUDLQWVDQG[¶¶EHWKHHUURURIWKH
RSWLPDO VROXWLRQ ZLWK WKH PHVVDJH VHQVHG GDWD DQG ZDWHUPDUN
FRQVWUDLQWV DWWDFN )RU GHWHFWLQJ WKH ZDWHUPDUN D FRUUHODWLRQ
YDOXH RU VLPLODULW\ PHDVXUH LV XVHG LQ PRVW RIW KHVH PHWKRGV
+HUH WR YHULI\ WKH SUHVHQFH RIW KH ZDWHUPDUN VLJQDO WKH
VLPLODULW\ PHDVXUH EHWZHHQ WKH QRUPDOL]HG GLIIHUHQFH HUURUV RI
WKH RSWLPDO VROXWLRQ ZLWK PHVVDJH VHQVHG GDWD DQG ZDWHUPDUN
FRQVWUDLQWVDQGWKHRSWLPDOVROXWLRQZLWKPHVVDJHVHQVHGGDWDLV
 xxc  
  7KH VLPLODULW\ PHDVXUH EHWZHHQ WKH QRUPDOL]HG
GLIIHUHQFHHUURUVRIWKHRSWLPDOVROXWLRQZLWKPHVVDJHVHQVHGGDWD
DQGZDWHUPDUNFRQVWUDLQWVDWWDFNVDQGWKHRSWLPDOVROXWLRQZLWK
PHVVDJH VHQVHG GDWD LV  xxc  

  7KH VLPLODULW\ PHDVXUH LV
JLYHQ E\ WKH QRUPDOL]HG FRUUHODWLRQ
FRHIILFLHQW





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XX
XCXCsim  
Pseudo code 7. The process of detecting watermark 
signal    
Input: Watermark signal by  LFSR and watermark 
signal by process of extracting x=[ tH  DAH 
DBH  DCH  GG  G @  x’ >


tH  
DAH  
DBH  
DCH  

GG 


G @and x” > tH  DAH 

DBH  DCH   GG  G @ Output:  Watermark signal by LFSR robust or not 
robust        
Steps:   
1. Compute c=x’-x  
2. Compute c’=x”-x 
 
3. Compute normalized correlation the results of 
error the cover medium with watermark 
constraints 





XX
XCthreshold  )  
4. Compute normalized correlation the results of 
error the cover medium with watermark 
constraints attacks 










XX
XCXCsim  . 
5. If  

 XCsimthreshold !  go to 7  
6. Else  

 XCsimthreshold   go to 8 watermark signal 
by LFSR is not robust  
7. Print watermark signal by LFSR  is robust  
8. Print watermark signal by LFSR is not robust  
6. EXPERIMENT SETUP  
7KLVVHFWLRQGHVFULEHVWKHH[SHULPHQWVHWXSXVHGIRUDQH[WHQVLYH
WHVWLQJ IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI WKH FRS\ULJKW GDWD SURWHFWLRQ PRGHO
EDVHG RQZ DWHUPDUNLQJ WHFKQLTXH ,Q WKLV H[SHULPHQW VHWXS ZH
XVHG720/$%,WLVDJHQHUDOSXUSRVHGHYHORSPHQWHQYLURQPHQW
LQ0$7/$%IRU UHVHDUFK DQG SUDFWLFDO VROXWLRQ RIRSW LPL]DWLRQ
SUREOHPV,WKDVJURZQRXWRIWKHQHHGIRUDGYDQFHGUREXVWDQG
UHOLDEOH WRROV WR EH XVHG LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RID OJRULWKPV DQG
VRIWZDUH IRU WKH VROXWLRQ RIP DQ\ GLIIHUHQW W\SHV RID SSOLHG
RSWLPL]DWLRQSUREOHPV
6.1 Network Setup 
,QWKLVVHFWLRQZHZLOOXVHWKHVFHQDULRRIWKHDWRPLFWULODWHUDWLRQ
SURFHVVDVVKRZQLQ)LJXUH
¹¸
·
©¨
§
AyAxA   ByBxB
 DyDxD
DAd
DCd
DBdDAt
 CyCxC
DCt
DBt
Y
X

)LJXUH$WRPLFWULODWHUDWLRQ
6HQVRU1RGHD WULODWHUDWHVZLWKDQRWKHUWKUHHVHQVRUQRGHVAB
DQG C ZKRVH FRRUGLQDWHV DUH    ByBxAyAx  DQG
 cC yx   7KH GLVWDQFH LV FRPSXWHG XVLQJ WLPH GLIIHUHQFHV RI
DUULYDO 7'R$ EHWZHHQ DFRXVWLF VLJQDOV VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ ZKLFK
DUHHPLWWHGIURPDVHQVRUQRGHVDQGUHFHLYHGDW WKHQRGHD DQG
UDGLR IUHTXHQF\ 5)7KH VHQVRUQRGHD WXUQVRQD  WLPHUXSRQ
UHFHLYLQJ WKH 5) VLJQDO IURP WKH VHQVRU QRGH WR PHDVXUH WKH
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHDUULYDORIWKH5)DQGDFRXVWLFVLJQDOVIURP
WKDW VHQVRU QRGH 7KH WLPH PHDVXUHPHQWV KDYH DQ HUURU 7KH
VSHHGRIWKHDFRXVWLFVLJQDOLVDIXQFWLRQRIWKHWHPSHUDWXUHRIWKH
SURSDJDWLRQ PHGLD 7KH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH VSHHG RI WKH
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DFRXVWLFVLJQDOVs PVDQGWKHWHPSHUDWXUH cT  LVDVIROORZV: 
cTsV   
%\XVLQJWKHSVHXGRFRGHZHILQGWKDWWKHREMHFWLYHIXQFWLRQLV
WRPLQLPL]HWKHRYHUDOOHUURU LQWKHV\VWHPDQGFDQEHVWDWHGDV
VKRZQLQ(TXDWLRQ






V&RQVWUDLQW
PLQ
)XQFWLRQ2EMHFWLYH

GHH
GHH
GHH
GGGHHHH
d'
d'
d'
 
DCDCttcTCyDyCxDx
DBDBttcTCyDyCxDx
DADAttcTCyDyCxDx
f DCDBDAt

6.2 Performance Metrics 
7KH H[LVWLQJ SHUIRUPDQFH RI WKH ZDWHUPDUNLQJ WHFKQLTXH IRU
FRS\ULJKW GDWD SURWHFWLRQ LV HYDOXDWHG DJDLQVW WKH IROORZLQJ
SHUIRUPDQFHPHWULFV
3DUDPHWHU H[SODLQ 0HWULF 9DOXH
1RGH
6HQVRU
1XPEHU RI VHQVRU
QRGH
,QWHJHU 
 
nji
yx ji


  

3RVLWLRQ RI WZR
GLPHQVLRQDO
VHQVRUQHWZRUNV
&RRUGL
QDWH
ix  
iy  
cT  WKH WHPSHUDWXUHRIWKH SURSDJDWLRQ
PHGLD
'HJUHH 
DAt DBt
DCt 

WLPH WUDQVPLVVLRQ
EHWZHHQ QRGH '
WR $ ' WR % DQG
'WR&
VHFRQG  DAt 
 DBt 
 DCt 
Vs  6SHHG DFRXVWLF
VLJQDO
 PV tsV 331.4 
tH  WKH HUURU LQ WKH
PHDVXUHPHQW RI
WKHWHPSHUDWXUH
  tH 
DAH 
DBH 
DCH 
WKH  HUURU LQ WKH
PHDVXUHPHQW RI
WKHWLPHUIURP'
WR$ 'WR %DQG
'WR&
  DAH
 DBH 
 DCH 
 GG 
G 
WKH HUURU LQ WKH
PHDVXUHPHQW
EHWZHHQ WKH
(XFOLGHDQ
PHDVXUHPHQW DQG
WKH PHDVXUHG
XVLQJ WLPH
GLIIHUHQFHV RI
RSWLPDO'WR$'
WR%DQG'WR&
     GG 
  G 

  WWW 
W 
WKH YDOXHV DUH
VHOHFWHG VXFK WKDW
WKH IHDVLELOLW\ RI
WKH VROXWLRQ VSDFH
RI  WKH
RSWLPL]DWLRQ
SUREOHP LV QRW
KDUPHG

W  
W    , 
W    
W  
6HQVHGGDWD 'DWD VHQVHG E\ D
VHQVRUQRGH
%LW 
:DWHUPDUN
VLJQDO
5HVXOWIURP/)65 %LW 

0HVVDJH
VHQVHGGDWD
5HVXOWIURP
SVHXGRFRGH
,QWHJHU >@
treshold  QRUPDOL]HG
FRUUHODWLRQ WKH
UHVXOWVRIHUURUWKH
FRYHU PHGLXP
ZLWK ZDWHUPDUN
FRQVWUDLQWV
 


 XCsim  QRUPDOL]HGFRUUHODWLRQ WKH
UHVXOWVRIHUURUWKH
FRYHU PHGLXP
ZLWK ZDWHUPDUN
FRQVWUDLQWVDWWDFN
 

7. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS  
,QWKLVVHFWLRQZHGLVFXVVRXUH[SHULPHQWDQGWKHUHVXOWVREWDLQHG
:H DVVXPH WKDW WKH ZDWHUPDUN FRQVWUDLQWV HVWLPDWHG E\ WKH
DWWDFNHUDUHPRGLILHGDQGFKDQJHG7KHFRUUHVSRQGLQJZDWHUPDUN
FRQVWUDLQWDWWDFNVWKDWZHSHUIRUPLQRXUH[SHULPHQWDUH
 GHOHWLRQ RI D QXPEHU RIZ DWHUPDUN FRQVWUDLQWV LQ D KRSH WR
ILQGQHZUHVXOWVRIHUURUVRIWKHFRYHUPHGLXPUHSOLFDWLRQRI
GLIIHUHQWZDWHUPDUNFRQVWUDLQWVJHQHUDWHGE\WKH/)65KRSLQJWR
ILQGWKHQHZUHVXOWVRIWKHHUURUVRIWKHFRYHUPHGLXPWKDWZLOOEH
PDSSHG LQWR WKH H[LVWLQJ VROXWLRQ  SUHVHQWLQJPRUH WKDQRQH
DWWDFNHU LGHQWLW\ ZLWKLQ WKH QHWZRUN E\ FUHDWLQJPRUH WKDQ RQH
ZDWHUPDUNFRQVWUDLQWKRSLQJ WR ILQG IXUWKHU UHVXOWVRI WKHHUURUV
RIWKHFRYHUPHGLXP
7.1 Data Deletion Attack 
'DWD GHOHWLRQ DWWDFN LV VLPLODU WR WKH VSRRIHG GDWD DWWDFN LQ WKH
VHQVH WKDW GHOHWLQJZDWHUPDUN FRQVWUDLQWVPDNH WKH HUURU UHVXOWV
RI WKHFRYHUPHGLXP LQYDOLG7KHZDWHUPDUNVLJQDOZLOO DOVREH
LQYDOLGEHFDXVHLWZLOOQRWDSSUR[LPDWHWRWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHHUURUV
RI WKH FRYHU PHGLXP ZLWKRXW DWWDFN ,IW KH DWWDFNHU GHOHWHV
ZDWHUPDUN FRQVWUDLQWV WKH UHFHLYHU ZLOO QRW JHW DSSURSULDWH
UHVXOWV RIH UURUV. 7KH GDWD GHOHWLRQ DWWDFN FDQ WDNH SODFH E\
GURSSLQJ LQGLYLGXDO ZDWHUPDUN FRQVWUDLQW UHDGLQJV RU RQH RU
PRUHZDWHUPDUNFRQVWUDLQWV DQGSUHYHQWLQJ WKHPIURPUHDFKLQJ
WKHLQWHQGHGUHFLSLHQW

:HJHW WKH UHVXOWVRI WKHHUURURI WKHFRYHUPHGLXPE\GHOHWLQJ
ZDWHUPDUN FRQVWUDLQWV tH   DAH   
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DBH    DCH   
   GG DQG G  
,PSOHPHQWLQJ D SVHXGRFRGH  ZH FRQFOXGH WKDW WKH YDOXH RI
VLPLODULW\ LV JUHDWHU WKDQ WKH YDOXH RIW KUHVKROG WKH YDOXH RI
VLPLODULW\     WKH YDOXH RIW KUHVKROG  
 7KLV PHDQV WKDW WKH ZDWHUPDUN VLJQDO LV
UREXVWHQRXJKWRGHOHWHWKHDWWDFN
7.2 Replication Attack 
&RQFHSWXDOO\GDWD UHSOLFDWLRQDWWDFN LVTXLWHVLPSOHDQDWWDFNHU
VHHNVWRDGGQHZFRQVWUDLQWVWRWKHFRYHUPHGLXPE\UHSOLFDWLQJ
WKHQHZFRQVWUDLQWVZLWKWKHH[LVWLQJFRQVWUDLQWV1HZFRQVWUDLQWV
UHSOLFDWHGLQWKLVIDVKLRQFDQVHYHUHO\GLVUXSWWKLVVROXWLRQRIWKH
FRYHU PHGLXP¶V SHUIRUPDQFH  WKH QHZ UHVXOWV RI HUURUV RI WKH
FRYHUPHGLXPFDQQRWEHDSSUR[LPDWHGWRWKHUHVXOWVRIHUURUVRI
WKH FRYHU PHGLXP EHIRUH DWWDFN %\ LQVHUWLQJ WKH UHSOLFDWHG
FRQVWUDLQWV DORQJ ZLWK WKH QHZ FRQVWUDLQWV LQWR WKH H[LVWLQJ
FRQVWUDLQWV WKH DWWDFNHU FRXOG HDVLO\ PDQLSXODWH DV SHFLILF
VHJPHQWRIWKHQHWZRUNSHUKDSVE\GLVFRQQHFWLQJLWDOWRJHWKHU



:H JHW WKH UHVXOWV RIH UURUV RI WKH FRYHU PHGLXP ZLWK GDWD
UHSOLFDWLRQ RI ZDWHUPDUN FRQVWUDLQWV tH   DAH  
 DBH   DCH  
    GG DQG G  
,PSOHPHQWLQJ D SVHXGRFRGH  ZH FRQFOXGH WKDW WKH YDOXH RI
VLPLODULW\ LVJUHDWHU WKDQ WKHYDOXHRI WKH WKUHVKROG WKHYDOXHRI
VLPLODULW\     WKH YDOXH RI threshold    
 7KLV PHDQV WKDW WKH ZDWHUPDUN VLJQDO LV
UREXVWHQRXJKWRWKZDUWUHSOLFDWLRQDWWDFN
7.3 Sybil Attack 
$ 6\ELO DWWDFN GDWD RFFXUV ZKHQ WKH DWWDFNHU FUHDWHV PXOWLSOH
LGHQWLWLHV DQG H[SORLWV WKHP LQ RUGHU WRPDQLSXODWH D UHSXWDWLRQ
VFRUH 7KH 6\ELO DWWDFN GDWD LV GHILQHG DV DP DOLFLRXV GHYLFH
LOOHJLWLPDWHO\WDNLQJRQPXOWLSOHGDWDLGHQWLWLHV7KH6\ELODWWDFN
GDWD LQ FRPPXQLFDWLRQ FKDQQHO ZDWHUPDUNLQJ LV DQ DWWDFN
ZKHUHLQ D UHSXWDWLRQ QHWZRUN V\VWHP LV VXEYHUWHG E\ IRUJLQJ
PRUHWKDQRQHLGHQWLW\FRQVWUDLQWVLQWKHFRYHUPHGLXP7KXVLQ
D6\ELODWWDFNDQDWWDFNHUVXEYHUWVWKHUHSXWDWLRQQHWZRUNV\VWHP
E\ FUHDWLQJ PRUH WKDQ RQH FRQVWUDLQW DQG XVHV WKHP WR JDLQ D
GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\ODUJHLQIOXHQFH$UHSXWDWLRQQHWZRUNV\VWHP
V
YXOQHUDELOLW\ WR D 6\ELO DWWDFN GHSHQGV RQKRZ  WKH FRQVWUDLQW
LGHQWLWLHV FDQ EH JHQHUDWHG WKH GHJUHH WR ZKLFK WKH UHSXWDWLRQ
QHWZRUN V\VWHP DFFHSWV LQSXWV IURP HQWLWLHV WKDW GRQRW  KDYH D
FKDLQ RIW UXVW OLQNLQJ WKHP WR D WUXVWHG HQWLW\ DQGZKHWKHU WKH
UHSXWDWLRQ QHWZRUN V\VWHP WUHDWV DOO HQWLWLHV LGHQWLFDOO\ 7KH
REMHFWLYHRIWKH6\ELOGDWDDWWDFNLVWRILQGWKHUHVXOWVRIHUURUVRI
WKHFRYHUPHGLXP


:H JHW WKH UHVXOWV RI HUURUV RI WKH FRYHU PHGLXP E\ LQVHUWLQJ
IDOVH ZDWHUPDUN FRQVWUDLQWV ZKLFK DUH tH  
DAH   DBH    DCH  
   G   G  DQG
G    ,PSOHPHQWLQJ D SVHXGRFRGH  ZH
FRQFOXGH WKDW WKHYDOXHRIV LPLODULW\ LVJUHDWHU WKDQ WKHYDOXHRI
WKUHVKROG WKH YDOXH RIV LPLODULW\     WKH
YDOXH RI threshold     7KLV PHDQV WKDW WKH
ZDWHUPDUNVLJQDOLVUREXVWHQRXJKWRIRLO6\ELODWWDFN
7KHUHVXOWVRIWKHVHH[SHULPHQWVKDYHEHHQVKRZQLQ7DEOH
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Table 2.  The robustness of the watermark constraints, and 
watermark signals 
1R .LQGRIDWWDFNV :DWHUPDUN
FRQVWUDLQWV
:DWHUPDUN
6LJQDO
 'DWDGHOHWLRQ 1RWFKDQJH 5REXVW
 3DFNHWUHSOLFDWLRQ 1RWFKDQJH 5REXVW
 6\ELODWWDFN 1RWFKDQJH 5REXVW
8. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION  
1H[WZHSHUIRUPDFRPSDUDWLYHDQDO\VLVRIRXUWHFKQLTXHZLWK
RWKHU WHFKQLTXHVSURSRVHGE\GLIIHUHQWUHVHDUFKHUV7KHUHVXOWV
RIWKLVFRPSDUDWLYHDQDO\VLVDUHJLYHQLQ7DEOH

Table 3. A comparative analysis with other approaches 


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H
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'DWDGHOHWLRQ ; ; ¥ ¥
3DFNHWUHSOLFDWLRQ ; ; ; ¥
6\ELODWWDFN ; ; ; ¥
¥SURYLGHVFRS\ULJKWGDWDSURWHFWLRQ
[GRHVQRWSURYLGHFRS\ULJKWGDWDSURWHFWLRQ
,Q WKLV DQDO\VLV ZH FRPSDUHG  DSSURDFKHV LQ WHUPV RI GDWD
GHOHWLRQ SDFNHW UHSOLFDWLRQ DQG 6\ELO DWWDFN =KDQJ HWDO
DSSURDFK >@ DQG ;XHMXQ HW DO >@  GR QRW SURYLGH GDWD
GHOHWLRQ SDFNHW UHSOLFDWLRQ DQG 6\ELO DWWDFN .DPHO HW DO >@
DSSURDFK SURYLGHV GDWD GHOHWLRQ +RZHYHU LW GRHV QRW SURYLGH
SDFNHW UHSOLFDWLRQ DQG 6\ELO DWWDFN 2XU DSSURDFK SURYLGHV
FRS\ULJKWGDWDSURWHFWLRQDJDLQVWGDWDGHOHWLRQSDFNHWUHSOLFDWLRQ
DQG6\ELODWWDFNV
9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
,Q WKLV SDSHU ZH KDYH SURSRVHG D ZDWHUPDUNLQJ WHFKQLTXH IRU
FRS\ULJKW GDWD SURWHFWLRQ LQ :61V 2XU VWUDWHJ\ DLPV DW
SURWHFWLQJFRS\ULJKWRIGDWDWUDQVPLVVLRQEHWZHHQVHQVRUQRGHVLQ
:61VDJDLQVWDYDULHW\RIDWWDFNVVXFKDVGDWDPRGLILFDWLRQGDWD
GHOHWLRQSDFNHWUHSOLFDWLRQ6\ELODWWDFNIDOVHGDWDLQVHUWLRQDQG
VHOHFWLYH IRUZDUGLQJ :H KDYH QRW GLVFXVVHG VRPH W\SHV RI
DWWDFNV VXFK DV SK\VLFDO DWWDFN QRGH PDOIXQFWLRQ DQG 'DQLHO
VHUYLFH DWWDFN:H KDYH YHULILHG WKDW RXU WHFKQLTXH FDQ SURWHFW
FRS\ULJKW GDWD DJDLQVW GHOHWLRQ SDFNHW UHSOLFDWLRQ DQG 6\ELO
DWWDFNV +RZHYHU LW FDQQRW SURWHFW FRS\ULJKW GDWD DJDLQVW IDOVH
GDWD LQVHUWLRQ GDWD PRGLILFDWLRQ DQG VHOHFWLYH IRUZDUGLQJ
7KHUHIRUH ZH VWLOO QHHG WR LPSURYH RXU WHFKQLTXH FRQVLGHULQJ
YDULRXV FLUFXPVWDQFHV LQZKLFK DWWDFNHUV ODXQFK GLIIHUHQW NLQGV
RIDWWDFNVIRUWKHIXWXUHZRUN  
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ABSTRACT 
Wireless multimedia sensor networks (WMSNs) are an emerging 
type of sensor network which contain sensor nodes equipped with 
microphones, cameras, and other sensors that produce 
multimedia content. These networks have the potential to enable 
a large class of applications ranging from military to modern 
healthcare. Multimedia nodes are susceptible to various types of 
attack, such as cropping, compression, or even physical capture 
and sensor replacement. Hence, security becomes an important 
issue in WMSNs.  However, given the fact that sensors are 
resource constrained, the traditional intensive security algorithms 
are not well suited for WMSNs. This makes the traditional 
security techniques, based on data encryption, not very suitable 
for WMSNs. Watermarking techniques are usually 
computationally lightweight and do not require much memory 
resources. These techniques are being considered as an attractive 
alternative to the traditional techniques, because of their light 
resource requirements. The objective of this paper is to present a 
critical analysis of the existing state-of-the-art watermarking 
algorithms developed for WMSNs 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2.1 [Network Architecture and Design]: Wireless 
communication. C.2.0 [General]: Security and protection. C.2.2 
[Network Protocols]: Protocol architecture. 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Performance, Design, Security. 
Keywords 
Wireless sensor networks, wireless multimedia sensor networks 
and digital watermarking techniques 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have the capability of 
sensing, processing, and wireless communication, all built into a 
tiny embedded device [19, 23, 32]. This type of network has 
attracted an increasing interest in the research community over 
the last few years. This interest is driven by theoretical and 
practical problems in embedded operating systems, network 
protocols, wireless communications and distributed signal 
processing [24, 27, 30]. 
The primary function of WSNs is to collect and disseminate 
critical data that characterize the physical phenomena within the 
target area [25, 31]. Depending on the application scenario, 
WSNs can be categorized into two main streams: Wireless Scalar 
Sensor Networks (WSSNs) and Wireless Multimedia Sensor 
Networks (WMSNs) [1]. WSSNs are commonly called WSNs. 
The availability of low-cost cameras, CMOS image sensors and  
microphones, and also their broad application opportunities, 
including the ability to  ubiquitously capture multimedia content 
from the environment, has fostered the development of WMSNs, 
i.e., the networks of wirelessly interconnected devices that allow 
retrieving video and audio streams, still images, and scalar sensor 
data from the environment. Along with the ability to retrieve 
multimedia data, WMSNs also store, process in real-time, 
correlate and fuse multimedia data originating from 
heterogeneous sources [2, 26, 28]. WMSNs can not only change 
or enhance the existing sensor applications, such as tracking and 
environment monitoring [3],  they can also enable several new 
applications, e.g., localization and  recognition of services and 
users, control of manufacturing processes in industry [5], 
telemedicine, and attending to the disabled and elderly people by 
identifying the causes of the illnesses that affect them, such as 
dementia [4].   
WMSNs have some novel features stemming from the fact that 
some sensor nodes have video cameras and higher computation 
capabilities. Consequently, WMSNs bring new opportunities as 
well as new challenges of security. Security is becoming an 
important issue with WMSNs. Due to the fact that WMSNs are 
vulnerable to different intentional network attacks, like man-in-
the-middle attack [6], and also suffer from bad network channels 
[7], the authentication of the data transmitted cannot be verified. 
Man-in-the-middle attack can cause modification (insert, alter, 
delete) of the transmitted data, whereas bad network channels 
will introduce noise into the signal causing damage of data.  
Addressing these issues is important for a secure and trustworthy 
WMSN. However, the WMSN node has very limited power 
supply and computational capability, hence using a strong 
cryptographic algorithm with it becomes a challenge. Therefore, 
watermarking techniques are being investigated to address the 
issue of some of these attacks, like tempering, ownership etc [20, 
22]. 
Hence, research in the area of watermarking and WMSN is 
becoming increasingly important [21, 29].  With the concept of 
the cyber physical system, i.e., the web of things, this research is 
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coming into the main stream and has become even more 
significant [33, 34]. In this paper, we investigate the current state-
of-the art technologies in the field of watermarking and the 
WMSNs.  
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we provide an 
overview of WMSNs, section 3 overviews digital watermarking, 
section 4 describes digital watermarks in WMSNs, section 5 
outlines an evaluation framework, section 6 describes the state of 
the art technologies for watermarking  for WMSNs, and finally 
section 7 concludes the paper and indicates the lines for future 
work. 
2.   AN OVERVIEW OF WIRELESS 
MULTIMEDIA SENSOR NETWORKS  
 
During the last few years, the availability of inexpensive CMOS 
cameras and microphones, coupled with the significant progress 
in distributed signal processing and multimedia source coding 
techniques, has made possible the development of WMSNs that 
are capable of gathering the multimedia information from the 
surrounding environment. WMSNs have deflected  the main 
focus from the typical scalar WSNs to the networks with 
multimedia devices capable of retrieving video, audio, images, as 
well as scalar sensor data [8]. WMSNs are also able to deliver 
multimedia content. The general architecture of a multimedia 
sensor device may consist of several basic components, namely a 
sensing unit, a central processing unit, a communication 
subsystem, a coordination subsystem, a memory, and an optional 
mobility/actuation unit.  It can be depicted as in Fig 1. 
 
 
 
2.1 Sensing Unit 
The sensing units are composed of two subunits: sensors 
(cameras, audio and/or scalar sensors) and analog-to-digital 
converters (ADCs). The camera and the audio sensors capture 
sounds, stills, moving images and the sensed events, and 
typically have resolutions in terms of pixel/inch for the camera 
sensor, and in DB for the audio sensor. The scalar sensor senses 
the scalar data and the physical attributes, such as temperature, 
pressure, and humidity. The function of the ADCs is to convert 
the analog signals to digital signals. These analog signals are 
produced by the sensor, based on the observed phenomenon. 
2.2 Central Processing Unit 
Central Processing Unit (CPU) is the main controller of the 
multimedia sensor node. It executes the system software in 
charge of coordinating sensing and communication tasks, and this 
CPU is interfaced with a memory. 
2.3 Memory Unit 
The memory unit of the multimedia sensor node usually consists 
of both flash memory and RAM. The flash memory contains the 
programme code for the multimedia node, and the RAM stores 
information and any data required for computation. Some of the 
memory units also have non-volatile storage for off-line data 
capture for later retrieval.   
2.4  Power Unit 
The power unit is the most important component of the 
multimedia sensor node and is used to power the whole system. 
The power unit is supported by an energy scavenging unit, such 
as battery or solar cell.   
2.5 Communication Subsystem 
A communication subsystem interfaces the device to the network 
and is composed of a transceiver unit and the communication 
software. The communication software includes the 
communication protocol stack and the system software, for 
example, the operating system and the middleware.  
2.6 Coordination Subsystem  
A coordination subsystem is in charge of coordinating the 
operation of different network devices by performing operations, 
such as location management and motion control. 
2.7 Mobility Actuation Unit 
A Mobility actuation unit is optional in a multimedia sensor 
node. It can enable movement or manipulation of objects. 
 
This concludes a brief description of WSN. We now provide a 
similar introduction to digital watermarking. 
3.  AN OVERVIEW OF DIGITAL WATERMARKING  
Digital watermarking is the process of embedding information, 
which allows an individual to add hidden copyright notices or 
other verification messages to digital audio, video, or image 
signals and document objects [9-11]. Such hidden messages are 
groups of bits, describing information pertaining to the signal or 
the author of the signal. The signal may be audio, pictures or 
videos. If the signal is copied, the information is also carried in 
the copy. Watermarking seeks to embed a unique piece of data 
into the cover medium. The specific requirements of different 
watermarking techniques may vary with the applications, and 
there is no universal watermarking technique that would 
completely satisfy all the requirements for all applications. 
The watermarking system as a communication task consists of 
three main stages: watermark generation process, watermark 
embedding process which includes information transmission 
Figure 1. General hardware architecture of a multimedia  
sensor node   
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incase of possible attacks through the communication channels, 
and detecting process which consists of the watermark retrieval. 
3.1 Watermark generator  process 
Watermark generation process is the first step in the 
watermarking system, and a very critical one. The requirements 
of the watermark generation process are unique and complex. 
The sensed data that a multimedia sensor node captures may be 
an image, an audio, a signal or a video. The watermark key is 
also unique in order to make a secrecy key, such as the threshold 
key [7] [12], weight  coefficient [23], the user’s insertion key 
[13] and the ID patient key [14]. Both the watermark message 
and the watermark key generator are used as inputs, and then are 
processed in the watermark generator to produce a watermark 
signal. Examples of watermark generator are the median filter 
[13], the 8-bit chirp signal [14], and the 5/8 encoder block [15]. 
The watermark signal is a kind of signal or pattern that can be 
embedded into the cover medium. There are two types of 
watermark signals, i.e., meaningful and meaningless watermarks. 
Examples of the meaningful watermarks are image logos, spread 
spectrum sequences, and permutations of the watermarks. On the 
other hand, pseudo-random sequences, binary matrices, M-
sequences and chaotic sequences are examples of meaningless 
watermarks [16]. A generic digital watermarking system consists 
of the key components shown in Figure 2. 
   
 
Figure 2. Digital Watermarking Process 
3.2.  Watermark embedding process 
Embedding process is the second step in the watermarking 
system. This process is undertaken by an embedder, and can be 
done in the transform domain such as Discrete Cosine Transform 
(DCT), Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), Fast Fourier 
Transform (FFT) and Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT).  The 
embedder combines the cover medium, the watermark signal, the 
sensed data and the key embedding, and then creates the 
watermarked cover medium. Examples of the cover medium are 
packed data, texts, images, audio signals and videos. The 
watermarked cover medium is perceptually identical to the cover 
medium, and is transmitted by the sender through unsecure 
communication channels, such as wireless and radio channels. 
During transmission, there are many things that may interfere in 
the communication process, such as noise, decreasing the quality 
of transmission and dropping the watermarked cover medium. 
The other threats are watermark attacks such as cropping, 
compression and filtering. The aim of these attacks is to remove 
the watermark signal from the watermarked cover medium.   
3.3. Extracting & Detecting Process  
The last stage of the watermarking system is the extraction or 
detection process which is a crucial part, as it enables the sender 
to identify and provide information to the intended receiver. The 
process of extraction or detection is undertaken by a detector. 
The detecting process consists of an extraction unit to first extract 
the watermark signal from the watermarked cover medium, and 
then compare it with original watermark signal from the cover 
medium. The extracting process can be divided into two phases, 
locating the watermark and recovering the watermark 
information. There are two types of detection: informed detection 
and blind detection, depending on whether the cover medium is 
required in the detection process or not. In case of informed 
detection, which involves the use of a cover medium, such as a 
packet data, original image or original signal, the watermarking 
system is called private watermarking. In case of blind detection, 
which does not need the cover medium detection, the 
watermarking system is called public watermarking.    
This concludes the overview of digital watermarking, and  we 
now move on to describing how WMSN and watermarking work 
together.  
4. DIGITAL WATERMARKING 
TECHNIQUE IN WMSNS 
In this section, we will now explain how WMSNs and digital 
watermarking technique can work together. We will show that 
digital watermarking technique can be implemented in WMSNs. 
This technique can also be used for implementing the specific 
name of the ownership in WMSNs. To accomplish the digital 
watermarking process, a typical encoder in WMSNs requires the 
original image which is obtained by the video sensor, and then 
this image is sent to the multimedia sensor node. The WMSNs, 
managed by the user, capture this image. Here, the watermark 
message is inserted into this image in order to prove the 
ownership of the content image. The process of embedding is as 
follows: first, the image is decomposed into several bands; then a 
pseudo-random sequence is added to the large coefficients which 
are not located in the lowest resolutions. The DWT watermark 
inserted algorithm consists of four parts, namely the original 
image, calculation of multilevel threshold, watermark embedding 
process, and inverse wavelet decomposition (IDWT). The 
watermarked image obtained by the embedding process is sent to 
the multimedia sensor node by the user. This image is then 
transmitted through a communication channel to a sink. The 
watermarked image is then managed again by the user who uses 
the laptop. The process of detecting or extracting is the inverse 
procedure of the watermark insertion process. It requires the 
watermarked image and the key.  
This concludes the section on elementary concepts, and we now 
move on to an evaluation of different approaches to 
watermarking technique for WMSNs through a review of the 
literature in this field. 
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5.  EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 
To get an in-depth insight into the literature, we adopted an 
evaluation framework that critically analyses all the algorithms 
using the watermarking process, shown in Figure 3. We believe 
that this is the best approach to evaluate watermarking 
algorithms, because we can dissect the complete algorithm across 
different processes and components that form the overall 
watermarking process. From Figure 3, we can observe that there 
are three basic steps in watermarking process, as described in 
Section 3. We have further divided these three steps into eleven 
different components that form the part of the process. These 
include the following: (1) cover medium, (2) sensed data (3) 
watermark generator, (4) types of watermark, (5) watermark key, 
(6) watermarking embedding technique, (7) watermark detecting 
technique,  (8) Attack, (9) noise, and (10) Transform domain 
The main reason behind adopting this evaluation framework was 
to carry out an independent and thorough evaluation of each 
algorithm by clearly studying each watermarking aspect 
independently. In this study, we have selected six most recent and 
relevant algorithms published in the literature, which will now be 
evaluated in section 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Digital watermarking for WMSNs 
6.   DIGITAL WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE  FOR 
WMSNS : A STATE OF ART TECHNOLOGY 
In this section we provide a detailed insight into the current 
literature on watermarking techniques for WMSNs. As described 
in section 5, we will now evaluate each algorithm by studying the 
ten components individually. We want to identify the similarities 
and differences in these algorithms, try to understand the 
rationale behind the authors’ selection of a particular parameter 
for each component in their solution, and evaluate how good a 
choice it is.  
 
6.1. Watermark generator process 
We begin the discussion with the first component of the 
watermark generation process, i.e. the sensed data.  
6.1.1. Sensed data   
The sensed data, like the watermark message, has to be 
communicated through an unsecure channel. However, in this 
case, a multimedia sensor node is better than a wireless sensor 
node, since it is capable of retrieving not only scalar data, but 
also video, audio, images and signals [8]. Here, the sensed data is 
generated by the multimedia sensor node. It can be interpreted as 
a copy right protection that has to be communicated to the other 
multimedia sensor node via an unsecure channel. Different kinds 
of sensed data have been compared in all the different 
approaches, as presented in Table 1. As we found, the majority of 
these approaches have used ‘image’ as a sensed data [7], [17], 
[12], [15]. However, some of them  have used ‘signal’ as a 
message [13], [14]. In this case, we cannot say which one is 
better, since it depends on the multimedia sensor node capture, 
whether image or signal. 
Table 1. Sensed multimedia data used in WMSN literature 
Author  Year Sensed Data  
Honggang, et.al [7] 2008 image  
 
Pingping et.al  [17]. 
 
2009 Image   
 
Wang et.al [12] 2010 image  
 
 
 
Padmavathi, et al  [13] 
 
 
 
 
2010 
 
 
audio acoustic signal  
 
 
 
Kaur, S et al  [14] 
 
2010 ECG Signal  
 
Masood, et al [15] 2011 Image  
 
 
6.12  Key Embedding  
The embedding process and the detecting process use a key 
which is called a watermark key whereby the watermark signal is 
inserted into the cover medium. The key is also used to enforce 
security, that is, to prevent an unauthorized party from recovering 
and manipulating the watermark. Here, we provide a comparative 
evaluation of the different types of watermark keys used in all 
these different approaches, as presented in Table 2. We found 
that ‘the two adaptive threshold’ has been used  as a watermark 
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key in [7], [12], while some approaches have used a weight 
coefficient of the watermark [17], the user’s insertion key [13], 
and the ID patient  [14]. One of them does not mention the 
watermark key used [15]. We believe that the two adaptive 
threshold is better than a coefficient  of the watermark as  a 
watermark key, because it is used to filter and decide the  
appreciated embedding position  [7]. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of the watermark cannot be used to filter and decide 
the appreciated watermark. However, we cannot exactly compare 
the two adaptive thresholds and the user ID, because they differ 
in their purposes.  
Table 2. Keys used in WMSN literature 
Author  Year Watermark key 
Honggang, et.al [7] 2008 the two adaptive threshold 
(Threshold key ) 
Pingping et.al  [17]. 
 
2009 Weight  coefficient  of the 
watermark signal 
Wang et.al [12] 2010 the two adaptive threshold 
(Threshold key)  
Padmavathi, et al  [13] 
 
2010 The user’s insertion key  
Kaur, S et al  [14] 2010 ID patient Binary digit ( 15 bit) 
Masood, et al [15] 2011 --- 
6.13 Watermark Generator  
Creating this type of watermark requires a watermark generator. 
We evaluated the generator used in all the different approaches 
presented in Table 3. The generator watermark for watermarking 
in WMSN consists of a Median filter, the 8-bit chirp signal and 
5/8 encoder block. The majority of the authors do not mention 
what generator they have used  [7] [17] [12]. Some of them have 
used the median filter [13],  the 8-bit chirp signal  [14]  and  5/8 
encoder block [15]. We again cannot say which kind of 
watermark generator is better because all three – the Median 
filter, the 8-bit chirp signal and 5/8 encoder block – are used for 
different purposes. The median filter generator produces a 
watermark signal in which the signal and the user key insertion 
are used as an input. While the watermark binary stream [15]  is 
generated by the 8-bit chirp form, which signals an ID patient as 
an input, and the 5/8 encoder block generator produces a 
watermark signal from the image. Unfortunately, however, this 
generator can only use image as an input and cannot detect  what 
watermark key has been used.   
Table 3 Watermark generator used in WMSN literature 
Author  Year Watermark generator  
Honggang, et.al [7] 2008 --- 
Pingping et.al  [17]. 2009 --- 
Wang et.al [12] 2010 --- 
Padmavathi, et al  [13] 
 
2010 Median filter is used to denoise 
the signal 
Kaur, S et al  [14] 
 
2010 The 8-bit chirp signal  
 
Masood, et al [15] 2011 (5/8 Encoder Block) 
6.1.4 Watermark Signal 
A pattern of bits is used as a watermark, and then the watermark 
is inserted into the cover medium. Examples of watermarks are 
image logos, binary matrices, audio data and signals. These 
watermarks can be inserted into a cover medium. We give a 
comparative evaluation of the different types of watermarks 
embedded into the cover medium implemented in WMSN. All 
these different approaches are presented in Table 4. We found 
that the majority of the authors have used ‘signal’ as a watermark 
[15] [13] [14], while some of them have used ‘image logo’ [7] 
[12]. Only a few of them have used the ‘binary watermark’ as a 
watermark signal [17].  We believe that the image logo is better 
than the binary matrix as a watermark signal, since the image 
logo can easily be detected and extracted. Using statistical 
approaches, such as NC, MSE and PSNR, the image logo can be 
detected [18] and its domain can be inverted, such as in IDWT, 
IFFT and IDCT. The image logo can also be separated from the 
cover medium, and then this logo can be seen with the human 
eye. In addition, the image logo is a meaningful type of 
watermark because people can still identify it through visual 
observation. On the other hand, the binary matrix is not 
commonly used. Signal as a watermark can be compared with 
image logo, because while the former has signal as the cover 
medium, the latter has image.   
Table 4. Watermarks used in WMSN literature 
Author  Year Type of watermarks 
Honggang, et.al [7] 2008 Image logo 
 
 
Pingping et.al  [17]. 
 
2009 Binary matrix 








1..10
.....
...
....1
1..01
 
Wang et.al [12] 2010 Image logo 
 
Padmavathi, et al  [13] 
 
2010 signal 
 
 
Kaur, S et al  [14] 2010 Binary stream  
Masood, et al [15] 2011 Signal 
 
6.2 Watermark embedding  process 
We begin the discussion with the first component of the 
watermark generation process, i.e. the cover medium.  
6.2.1 Cover Medium  
The cover medium is one of the key components of watermarking 
technique, and is used for inserting a watermark signal. There are 
different types of cover mediums, such as packed data, text, 
images, audio signals and videos, as presented in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Cover medium 
From the investigated literature (Table 4), we provide a 
comparative evaluation of different cover mediums. As we found, 
the majority of them used ‘packed data’ as a cover medium  [7] 
[17] [12] [15]. However, some of them used ‘audio signal’ [13], 
[14]. In this case again, we cannot say which one is better 
because their use depends on the main objective for inserting the 
watermark signal. For example  Kaur et al [14] used a signal for 
inserting binary stream in which the binary stream was generated 
by an 8-bit chirp signal. This signal was used to protect the ECG 
signal from the patient. On the other hand,  Honggang et al  [7] 
and Wang et al [12] used packed data as the cover medium for 
embedding  an image logo. The image logo was not produced by 
watermark generator, but was used to protect the cover medium. 
Here, both of them considered only the location of the image logo 
in the cover medium by using DWT.  
Table 5. Cover mediums used in WMSN literature 
Author  Year Cover medium  
Honggang, et.al [7] 2008 Packet data   
Pingping et.al  [17]. 2009 Packet data   
Wang et.al [12] 2010 Packet data   
Padmavathi, et al  [13] 2010 audio signal 
Kaur, S et al  [14] 2010 audio signal 
Masood, et al [15] 2011 Packet data   
6.2.2 Transform Domain  
The transform domain of the digital watermarking technique can 
be divided into four categories, viz. Discrete Cosine Transform 
(DCT), Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), Fast Fourier 
Transform (FFT), and Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT). After 
investigating the literature (Table 6), we provide a comparative 
evaluation of the different types of transform domains. We found 
that the majority of them used ‘DWT’ as a transform domain [7] 
[12], while some of them used ‘DCT’ [17], [14] and ‘FFT’ [15]. 
However, one of them does not mention the transform domain  
used [13]. We believe that DWT is more robust than DCT and 
FFT because a watermark can be embedded into the selective 
coefficients at the three-level Discrete Wavelet Transform 
(DWT) middle frequency bands of an image frame, based on the 
network conditions. 
Table 6. The transform domain s used in WMSN literature 
Author  Year Domain 
Honggang, et.al [7] 2008 DWT 
Pingping et.al  [17]. 2009 DCT 
Wang et.al [12] 2010 DWT 
Padmavathi, et al  [13] 2010 --- 
Kaur, S et al  [14] 2010 DCT 
Masood, et al [15] 2011 FFT 
Table 7. Watermarking techniques used in WMSN literature 
Author  Year Watermark embedding 
technique 
Honggang, et.al [7] 2008 
wF as the watermarking function 
and ),...,2,1{ mxwppp  is a set 
of the positions where the 
watermark is embedded under the 
specific watermarking schema. 
The two adaptive threshold 
}2,1{ TT is  used to filter 
 the appreciate embedding 
process. PLR is the packet lost 
ratio. So The function  
),2,1(1({ TTpwateramrkFD 
))},2,1(,.., PLRTTip  
Pingping et.al  [17]. 
 
2009 The embedding algorithm has the 
watermark equation 
)),((),(' qpDCTsignqpDCT 
  
where w is the watermark data, 
 is the weight coefficient of 
the watermark information and  
),( qp  is location. 
Wang et.al [12] 2010 The function   
))},2,1(),..,2,1(2
),2,1(1({},{
RPLTTipTTp
TTpwFdQwQ   
Padmavathi, et al  [13] 
 
2010 The process of embedding digital 
data  in the form of X'= Ek(X'W), 
where X is the pre-processed 
original signal, W is the 
watermark information being 
embedded, k is the user's 
insertion key 
 
Kaur, S et al  [14] 
 
2010 The function is 2)( toftif   
where 1
2)01(
 tff .   
IDpatient  is 
1)(*mod,
jb
jbfchirpychirpy   
y is the watermarked signal 
Masood, et al [15] 2011 The embedding process 
is ),,( wkodEwd  . 
do original  
w watermark message 
k security key 
 
6.2.3 Watermark Embedding Technique 
Embedding a watermark signal is one part of the watermarking 
technique, the other is the process of detecting whether there is a 
watermark signal or not. We provide a comparative evaluation of 
the different kinds of watermarking techniques for WMSN. 
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While investigating the literature (Table 7), we found that two of 
the authors have used ‘the two filter adaptive threshold’ as an 
inserting technique [7] [12] in DWT, while others have used the 
weight coefficient of the watermark in  DCT [17], the Orthogonal 
Frequency Davison Multiplexing (OFDM) in FFT [15], and The 
Wiener Filter [13] as the technique for embedding. We believe 
that ‘the two filter adaptive threshold’ is better as an inserting 
technique because it uses the three level DWT. Also, the adaptive 
threshold uses less power for WSN than the other techniques, 
because its positions are dynamically chosen to insert the  
watermark according to the network conditions, so that energy 
efficiency and security can be achieved  [12].  
6.2.4 Noise  
Noise can be defined as anything that influences the 
communication channel. The different types of noise are packet 
loss, decreasing the quality of transmission and packet drop. We 
provide a comparative evaluation of the different noise types for 
watermarking in WMSN. All these different approaches are 
presented in Table 8. As we found, the majority of these 
approaches have used ‘dropped packet data’ as the noise [7], [12, 
13]. One of them has used ‘paper salt’  [17]. However, others 
have not mentioned what type of noise they have used [14, 15]. 
We believe that the drooped packet loss is more dangerous than 
decreasing the quality of transmission. Packet loss can stop the 
communication between the sender and the receiver because of 
lack of transmission. To overcome this noise, the sender 
retransmits the packet data. However, this transmission requires 
energy.  
Table 8. Example of Noise used in WMSN literature 
Author  Year Noise  
Honggang, et.al [7] 2008 Packet loss 
Pingping et.al  [17]. 
 
2009 Paper salt noise  
Wang et.al [12] 2010 Packet loss 
Padmavathi, et al  [13] 
 
2010 --- 
Kaur, S et al  [14] 
 
2010 any undesirable noise 
Masood, et al [15] 2011 Noise communication 
6.2.5 Vulnerable Attacks 
There are two types of attacks: intentional attack and accidental 
attack. Intentional attacks include cryptanalysis, steganlysis, 
image processing techniques, and the removal of the existing 
watermark. Accidental attacks include the results of the standard 
image processing, such as filtering, resizing or the compression 
procedure. The different attacks used for watermarking technique 
in WMSN belong to the category of accidental attack, such as 
cropping, compression, and filtering. Here, we provide a 
comparative evaluation of the different vulnerable attacks. All 
these different approaches have been presented in Table 9. We 
found that the majority of these approaches have used the 
‘accidental’ type as the vulnerable attack, such as cropping and 
compressing [7], [12], [17], while one of them has used ‘filtering’ 
[14]. However, some of them have not mentioned the type of 
attack used for their watermarking technique [13]. We believe 
that cropping and compressing are more possible attacks than 
filtering, since these are accidental attacks.  
 
Table 9.  Watermark Attacks used in WMSN literature 
Author  Year Noise  
Honggang, et.al [7] 2008 Compression 
Pingping et.al  [17]. 2009 Cropping and Compression 
Wang et.al [12] 2010 Compression 
Padmavathi, et al  [13] 2010 --- 
Kaur, S et al  [14] 2010 Filtering  
Masood, et al [15] 2011 --- 
 
Table 10.  Watermark detection techniques used in WMSN 
literature 
Author  Year Watermark 
extracting technique 
Honggang, et.al [7] 2008 To detect the watermark image, 
the normalized correlation (NC) 
coefficient to measure similarity 
of original watermarks and 
extracted watermark 
Pingping et.al  [17]. 
 
2009 Peak signal-to Noise ratio 
(PSNR) and  
 the extracted watermark is 
obtained by comparing d with 0, 
i.e.,  0d   0
0   0
' '
'

 w dww . 
Wang et.al [12] 2010 Normalized correlation  
( NC) 
 
  w
i
m
j
jiw
w
i
m
j
jiwjiw
NC
1 1
2)],([
1 1
),(*).,(  
Padmavathi, et al  [13] 
 
2010 Mean Square Error ( MSE ) and  
Peak signal-to Noise ratio 
(PSNR) 
Kaur, S et al  [14] 2010 --- 
Masood, et al [15] 2011 The watermark detection process 
is defined 
as ),,,( odwkwdDeW  watermarked 
data 
Do original data 
watermark w; 
Key k; 
 
6.3. Watermark Detecting Process  
The detecting process consists of an extraction unit to first extract 
the watermark signal from the watermarked cover medium, and 
then compare it with original watermark signal from the cover 
medium. The process of extracting or detecting is used to check 
whether there is a watermark signal or not in the cover medium.  
Here, we provide a comparative evaluation of this process used 
for watermarking in WMSN in the literature we surveyed. All the 
different approaches are presented in Table 10. As we found, the 
majority  of these approaches have used the ‘statistic approach’ 
as the detecting technique, such as Normalized Correlation (NC) 
and Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) [7] [12], [17], [13]. 
However, some of them have used ‘The 8-bit chirp signal’ as 
their detecting process. We believe that the statistic approach is 
better than the 8-bit chirp signal because it is more common and 
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valid method used without the medium signal. Use of the 
medium signal for detection is impossible in WMSN, because the 
watermark image is invisible to the eye.   
7.  CONCLUSION  
Using strong cryptography algorithms, such as RSA, ECC and 
digital signature are not suitable for WSN and WMSN because 
these algorithms are prohibitively expensive in terms of energy 
and storage requirements. Watermarking techniques are being 
investigated to address some of these network issues, such as 
tempering, deleting and manipulating data packet. These 
techniques are much lighter and require less battery power and 
processing capabilities than cryptography-based algorithms. In 
addition, the advantage of these techniques is that the watermark 
signal is embedded directly into the sensor data, so that there is 
no increase in the payload.  In this paper, we surveyed and 
evaluated 6 current approaches used in the existing literature for 
watermarking technique in WMSN, using 10 different 
parameters. Based on this evaluation of literature on digital 
watermarking technique for WMSNs, we have provided a 
summary of the majority of these approaches using each of the 
parameters for digital watermarking technique for WMSNs. 
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Abstract— Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are used in a 
number of different applications including military, 
environment monitoring, smart spaces etc. Security is an 
important aspect in WSN, however given scare resources; 
implementing traditional cryptographic algorithms is not 
very well suited for WSN nodes. Hence watermarking is being 
investigated as an alternative security technology in WSNs 
because of its light resource requirements.  The objective of 
this paper is to present a critical analysis of the existing state-
of-the-art watermarking algorithms developed for WSNs.  
Keywords 
Cyber-physical systems (CPS), Wireless Sensor Networks and 
Digital Watermarking. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) is one of the key 
technologies in connecting the physical and the cyber 
world as sensors monitor the physical environment and 
transmit the physical state information over a network to a 
database for further processing [1, 2, 16, 17, 18].  Such 
systems are referred to as Cyber-physical-systems (CPS). 
Security in CPS is very important. However, sensor in CPS 
are very low powered and ensuring security becomes 
challenging [1] [2]. Hence watermarking techniques is 
being considered as an alternative approach to offers some 
degree of security such as tamper detection, content 
ownership data authentication. Watermarking process 
involves four main stages: watermark generation, 
watermark embedding, communication channel and 
watermark detecting and retrieval. This paper investigates 
the current state-of-the-art in the field of watermarking for 
WSN. The paper is structured as follows: section 2 
compares different aspects parameter for watermarking 
technique WSN, and finally we have concluded and future 
works the paper in section 3.  
II.  WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE FOR WSNS: A STATE-OF-
THE-ART 
In this section we provide detailed insight into the current 
literature on watermarking techniques for wireless sensor 
networks [16, 17, 18].  
 
 
A. Watermark Generation Process 
Watermark generation process involves three main 
components i.e. watermark message, watermark key and 
the watermark generator  
1. Watermark Message  
Watermark message is a secret message embedded in a 
cover medium. In the context of watermarking for WSN, it 
would most likely be plain text, as using image as a 
watermark would drain the sensor resources very fast. 
When investigating the literature (Table 1), we found that 
majority of the approaches do not specifically mention 
what they used as a watermark message in their 
experiments [3], [4], [5] [6], [7], [8], [9].  However  Feng 
[10] & Koushanfar [11] suggested  using  “text” as a  
watermark message [10], [11].  We believe that “text as a 
watermark message” is better than using a random text 
because text based watermark will at least produce a 
legible signature which will be helpful during the detection 
process, especially in subjective detection approaches. 
2. Watermark key  
Watermark key is a secret or public key used in embedding 
and the detecting process. From the investigated literature 
(Table 1), we found that the two different types of keys are 
used as a watermark key, these include (1) pseudorandom 
sequence, (2) binary stream. We found that that majority of 
the approaches used “binary stream” as the watermark key 
such as [3]  [5]  [7] [8] [9]. However, some of them  
suggested using a pseudorandom sequence [6]  as 
watermark key. However others such as [10, 12],[11], [4] 
did not mention what kind of watermark keys they used in 
their studies. We believe that binary stream is better than 
using a pseudorandom sequence  yxs , because the binary 
stream use less energy and can be easily added to a hash 
function to produce a watermark signal. Whereas the 
pseudorandom sequence  yxs , needs high cost 
computationally and use more energy than the binary 
stream.  
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TABLE 1 STATE OF THE ART COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT WSN WATERMARKING ALGORITHMS 
Author  Watermark 
Message 
Watermark Key Watermark 
generator  
Cover medium Sensed data  Type of 
watermark 
Feng et al. [10] Plain text --- H,  (MD5), RSA, RC4 NLSP --- Watermark 
constraints 
Sion et al.  [4] --- --- H P B B 
Koushanfar et al. 
[11] 
Plain text --- H,  (MD5), RSA, RC4 NLPS --- Watermark 
constraints 
Julia Albath et al. 
[5] 
--- B H P B B 
Zhang  et al. [6] --- Pseudorandom 
sequence  yxs ,
Product function of  
 and ),(, yxbi  ),( yx  
P Matrix binary Watermark  bits  
),( yxw  
Juma et al.[7] --- B H P B B 
Xiao et al.  [8] --- B H P B B 
Xiaomei et al.  [9] --- B H P B B 
Xuejun et al. [12] --- --- --- P B B 
Ren et al. [13] --- --- H P B B 
Kamel et al. [3] --- B H P B B 
B= Binary stream ((101010 … ),  H = Hash function and  P = Packet data 
3.  Watermark Generator  
Watermark generator is a mathematical function which is 
used for generating watermark signal using watermark 
message and watermark key. Two types of watermark 
generators are found in the WSN watermarking literature 
and they are (1) hash function and (2) product function. 
When investigating the literature (Table 1), we found that 
majority of these approaches  used “hash function” as a 
watermark generator, such as MD5 and SHA  [3] [10] [11] 
[5] [7] [9].  Only one of them [6] used “product function of  
  ),( and ),(,1,1 yxsyxbi   “to generate a watermark signal. 
However, others did not mention what they used for 
generating the watermark signal [8] [12]. We believe that 
hash function is better than product function because the 
hash function can be defined as deterministic procedure 
which takes arbitrary block of data such as binary stream 
and returns a fixed-size bit string.  The binary stream is 
encoded by the hash function to become the hash value 
which is called the message digest. It uses less energy. 
Whereas product function of   ),( and ),(,1,1 yxsyxbi  needs 
high cost computationally than the hash function.  
B. Watermark Embedding Process 
Watermark embedding is the second stage in the overall 
watermarking process.  It includes: 
1.  Cover medium  
Cover medium refers to packet data, text, image, audio 
signal and video signal, as well as a Non Linear 
Programming System ( a NLPS ). When investigating the 
literature (Table 1), we found that majority of these 
approaches  use “packet data” as a cover medium  [3] [4] 
[5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [12] [13]. However some of them have 
used the NLPS as a cover medium  [10] [11].  We believe 
that packet data is better than the NLPS because the packet 
data is a basic unit of communication over a digital 
network. To transmit the whole data, the whole data is 
broken into small chunks called packets [14]. With the 
packet data, each of sensor nodes only consumes network 
resources when they are actually transferring data. The 
power consumption and the networks resource utilization 
are suitable for wireless sensor nodes because of their 
energy constraints. While the NLPS approach does not 
provide any energy consumption studies in their paper [10]  
2.  Sensed Data  
Sensed data refers to the external environment 
phenomenon captured by sensors such as temperature, 
humidity, speed, direction, movement, light etc. In WSN 
this is the crucial information which has to be secured as 
well can communicated to the sink. When investigating the 
literature (Table 1), we found that  majority of these 
approaches use “binary stream ” as a  sensed data [3], [4], 
[7], [8], [9], [12], [13]. One of them suggested using 
“matrix binary “ as sensed data [6]. However some of them 
do not mention what they used as a sensed data [5], [10], 
[11].  We believe that binary stream as sensed data  better 
than matrix binary  because the binary stream is a small 
chunk of the whole data  and need less power energy when 
it transmits by wireless sensor node [14]. While the matrix 
binary is a pseudorandom code which is generated serving 
as a modulation pulse to spread the signal across the entire 
band [6]. This matrix binary does not mention how much it 
needs energy power.   
3.  Watermark Signal  
Watermark signal is the actual copyright information that 
is embedded in the cover medium. Three different types of 
watermarks are used in WSNs (1) watermark constraint, (2) 
binary stream and (3) watermark bits.  
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TABLE 2: WATERMARK EMBEDDING TECHNIQUES, WATERMARK DETECTION, ATTACKS AND NOISE  USED IN WSN   
Author Watermark embedding technique Watermark detection 
technique 
Attacks Noise 
Feng et al. [10] Adding watermark constraint to processing 
step during network operation 
--- ---- --- 
Sion et al.  [4] Selection criteria using MSB Similarity Sampling, Segmentation, 
Linear changes, addition stream 
Incoming data rate 
Koushanfar et al. 
[11] 
Adding watermark constraint to processing 
step during network operation 
--- Ghost Signature, Removal of 
the author’s signature, De-
synchronization 
--- 
Julia Albath et al. 
[5] 
generating the one-time pad by repeatedly 
concatenating the substring 
Calculate MAC over p(xi) 
and compare to MAC 
received with packet.   
--- --- 
Zhang  et al. [6] 
The watermark sensory data , 
),(),(),( yxoyxwyxd 	

 w(x,y) is the watermark for sensor  node and 
O(x,y) is sensory data  
A Gaussian of hypothesis 
testing on correlation 
coefficient 
False distribution imposition 
all sensor , False distribution 
imposition part of sensor 
 Remnant check 
Node failure  
Juma et al.[7] Concatenation of the current group hash 
value group gi and next group hash value 
group gi+1. W = HASH ([K||gi||gi+1)])gi| 
synchronization point  or 
not 
Modify data  
Adding data false  
--  
Xiao et al.  [8] By modification the embedding bit of each 
packet.  LSB 
Manipulation embedding 
bit and decrypt with key 
---  ---  
Xiaomei et al.  [9] The random value of each send data and time 
was calculated by inputting the collection 
time and its MSB and the key K into random 
function. 
Mean and standard 
deviation 
Personate , Forgery, Sampling, 
Summarization 
Decrease the quality 
of transmitting data 
Xuejun et al. [12] IIS = input integer stream, IBs=input binary 
stream. T = Threshold,   If  IIS T 
 “IBS=1” become “IBS=0” 
Else   “IBS=0” become “IBS=0” 
--- ---  ---- 
Ren et al. [13] Embed bit of watermark by changing the 
parity of its LSB. 
By judging the parity of 
the LSB of each data.  
Selective forward, Data 
replication , Packet transfer 
delay, Packet tampering  
---  
Kamel et al. [3] Concatenation of the current group hash 
value group gi and next group hash value 
group gi+1. Wi = HASH (K || gi || SN) SN = 
serial number 
Comparison hash 
calculated between sender 
and receiver   
Data modification attack 
False data insertion  
Data deletion  
---  
 
We found that majority of them used “binary stream” as a 
watermark signal (8, 16, 64, 128 bits) [3] [4] [5][7] [8] [9] 
[12] [13]. Two of them [10] [11] used a watermark 
constraint. Only one of them suggesting used a watermark 
bit ),( yxw . We believe that watermark binary stream is 
better than using watermark constraints or watermark bit 
because  the watermark binary stream can be produced by 
calculating the watermark bit of the MSB which denotes 
the most significant bit of hash function [5] [8] [9]. In 
addition this watermark binary stream can also be 
computed by hash function which is applied to the 
concatenation of all individual data elements in the group 
[3, 7]. Generate the binary stream using the hash function 
use less energy and computationally more efficient than 
watermark constraints and watermark bits because they 
need high cost energy and computationally less efficient 
than the binary stream.   
4.  Watermark embedding technique 
Watermarking embedding refers to the process of adding a 
adding a watermark signal to the cover media. Here, we 
give critical evaluation of different embedding techniques 
proposed for WSNs. Table 2 documents these techniques. 
We found that majority of them use “Least Significant Bit 
(LSB)” as a embedding technique [3-9, 12, 13]. However 
some of them use adding watermark constraint to 
processing step during network operation [10] [11].  We 
believe that LSB is much better because LSB is the most 
straight-forward method of watermark embedding and suits 
very well especially for low powered wireless sensor nodes. 
LSB technique uses a simple replace operation to embed 
watermark signal in cover medium. Given the high channel 
capacity of using entire cover medium for transmission in 
this method, a watermark signal may be embedded 
multiple times. Even if most of these are lost due to attack, 
a single surviving watermark signal would be sufficient to 
prove.  
C. Communication Channel 
1.  Noise  
Anything that inferences in the communication channel 
between the sender and the receiver is called noise. There 
can be different types of noise in communication channel 
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in WSN such as incoming data rate, probability of 
collusions, node failure and dropped packet data etc. We 
found that majority of them do not mention the nature of 
noise [3] [7] [8] [12] [13] [10] [11]. Some of them explain 
that  incoming quality data rate [4], dropped packet data [5, 
6] , decrease the quality transmitting data [9] as a noise.  
2. Vulnerable attacks 
During data transmission there is a possibility of attacks 
which can destroy the watermark. Table 2 provides a 
comparative evaluation of different attack experienced by 
WSN. We found that majority of them use “man-in-middle 
attack” as vulnerable attack such as modification, false 
data insertion, forgery, personate[3] [4], [7] [9] [13] Ghost 
signature, de-synchronization [11], statistic attack  [6, 9, 13] 
are used as vulnerable attack. However some of them do 
not mention their attack [10] [5] [8] [12] We believe that 
man-in-middle attack is more likely than statistic attack 
because this attack is commonly used.  
D. Watermark Detection Process 
1.  Watermark detecting technique 
The detection process is used for deciding the presence of 
a watermark in the cover medium. Table 2 provides details 
about the detection techniques. We found that majority of 
them use “statistic correlation” as a detection technique 
such as similarity, probability, Gaussian hypothesis, mean 
and standard deviation [4] [5] [6] [8] [9] [12]. However 
some of them suggest using synchronization point  [7], 
manipulation embedding bit [8]  and comparison hash 
calculated between sender and receiver [3]. However some 
of them do not mention what they have used for detection 
[10] [11] [12] [13].  We believe that statistic is better than 
manipulation embedding bit and comparison hash 
calculated between sender and receiver because statistic is 
a valid method for detecting watermark without using the 
original cover medium from a wireless sensor node as a 
sender [15]. Generally, in watermark detection, given the 
test cover medium assumed to have been marked and 
whose ownership is to be determined, one first extracts the 
watermark signal from, usually making use of the original 
cover medium. Then it is compared to the original 
watermark signal signature. The similarity index is then 
compared to a threshold to determine if the test cover 
medium  is a watermarked version of the original cover 
medium [15]. However, using the original cover medium 
to detect is unrealistic and not suitable for WSN. 
III. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK  
In this paper we presented an in depth evaluation of the 
state of the art watermarking techniques for securing 
wireless sensor networks. We studied 11 different 
algorithms in this study and compared it against each other 
across 10 different dimensions, which represent the key 
components and processes of digital watermarking. This 
study was undertaken to identify research gaps in the 
literature and to develop new watermarking technique for 
wireless sensor networks. The future work involves 
developing a watermarking algorithm for WSN..  
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Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks Applications and Security 
Challenges  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract— The emergence of low-cost and mature 
technologies in wireless communication, visual sensor 
devices, and digital signal processing facilitate of 
wireless multimedia sensor networks (WMSNs). Like 
sensor networks which respond to sensory information 
such as humidity and temperature, WMSN 
interconnects autonomous devices for capturing and 
processing video and audio sensory information. 
WMSNs will enable new applications such as 
multimedia surveillance, traffic enforcement and control 
systems, advanced health care delivery, structural health 
monitoring, and industrial process control. Due to 
WMSNs have some novel features which stem the fact 
that some of the sensor node will have video cameras 
and higher computation capabilities. Consequently, the 
WMSNs bring new security of challenges as well as new 
opportunities. This paper presents WMSNs  application 
and security challenges. 
Keywords-component;  Security,  Wireless 
Multimedia Sensor Networks.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
The availability of multimedia devices such as a 
small microphones and low-cost complementary 
metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) has fostered the 
development of  wireless multimedia sensor network ( 
WMSN ). These multimedia devices can capture 
multimedia content such as scalar data, stream audio 
and video from the environment. Thereby a WMSN 
will have the ability to transmit and to receive 
multimedia information such as monitoring data, 
image, voice, and stream video. Since the ability to 
retrieve multimedia information  so the WMSN will 
also be able to store, process in real time, correlate 
and fuse multimedia information  from different 
sources. Thus, WMSNs are composed  of numerous 
type multimedia sensors which exchange sensed 
multimedia data with sink by using wireless channel 
[1]. WMSNs will not only change enhance existing 
sensor applications such as tracking, and environment 
monitoring, but they will also enable several new 
applications. For example they range over systems 
supporting telemedicine to modern military.   
In WMSNs, data harvested from the 
environmental is not only a scalar nature which is 
obtained from various internal sensor such as 
temperature, light, humidity, pressure, and acoustic 
sensor but also from multimedia data such as digital 
images, video and audio form [2]. Therefore the main 
sensor in WMSN is the imager. The visual data which 
is handled puts severe constraints on a sensor 
network. Collection, processing, and visual data 
dissemination is a processing intensive and high 
bandwidth demanding operation. WMSNs have some 
novel features which stem the fact that some of the 
sensor node will have video cameras and higher 
computation capabilities. Consequently, the WMSNs 
bring new security of challenges as well as well as 
some new opportunities.  
The paper is structured as follows:  Section 2 
explains WMSNs components, Section 3. present 
review all the aspects of WMSNs architecture  
Section 4 describes WMSNs application, Section 5 
describe security and challenges , Section 6 we 
examine a number of security design and finally we 
have concluded the paper in section 7. 
II. WIRELESS MULTIMEDIA SENSOR 
NETWORK HARDWARE  COMPONENTS   
In this section we discuss  hardware components 
of WMSN specially in the multimedia sensor node. In 
[2], it states that an enabling hardware platforms 
multimedia sensor hardware has divided in two 
categories depending on it’s resolution.   Low-
resolution imaging motes and Medium-resolution 
imaging motes based on the Star gate platform [2] 
 The low-resolution imaging motes. 
The technology of CMOS imaging sensor that capture 
and process an optical image allows integrating a lens, 
an image sensor and image processing algorithms, 
including image stabilization and image compression, 
on a single chip. Existing CMOS images is still 
developed. In [3] introduced a Cyclops which consist 
of an image CMOS Agilent ADCM-1700 CIF 
camera), a complex programmable logic device, an 
external SRAM and an external flash. The objective 
of this Cyclops is to fill a gap between computational 
devices and CMOS cameras. The design of an 
integrated mote with wireless sensor networks is 
explained in  [4]. This design is based on an adequate 
processing power and memory size for application. 
Here a new image mote is based on an ARM7 32-bit 
CPU clocked at 48 MHz, with external FRAM or 
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Flash memory, 802.15.4 compliant Chipcon CC2420 
radio and low-resolution 30 x 30 pixel optical sensors. 
 Medium-resolution imaging motes based on 
the Star gate platform 
The stargate board [5] was produced by Crossbow and 
designed by Intel. This stargate board, based on 
Intel’s PXA-255 Xscale 400MHz RISC processor,   is 
a high performance processing platform designed for 
sensor, robotic and sensor networks applications.  It 
also 32 Mbyte of flash memory, 64 Mbyte of SDRAM 
and on-board connector Crossbow’s MICAz or 
MICA2. The another prototype has developed by Intel 
such as  Imote and Imote2.  
  Suh et al  [6] introduced a novel solution for 
improving IEEE 802.15.4 performance with the 
adaptive active duration via two data traffic indication 
schemes,  designed and implemented a real sensor 
platform and its camera module for testbed 
experiments. The development of a low cost, low 
power WSN hardware platform named TelG 
embedded with an operating system called WiseOS, 
system software, and also a simple best effort JPEG 
images transmission over the network [7] 
There has been a lot of work to develop in this 
field however the growing technology  is still not 
mature and still need several technical challenges.   
III. WIRELESS MULTIMEDIA SENSOR NETWORK 
ARCHITECTURE  
In this section we survey the network architecture for 
WMSN in[1, 2, 8, 9]. The basic architecture of 
WMSN.  It can be shown in Fig.1   
 
Fig. 1 Architecture of WMSN [2] 
There are three model  depending on the targeting 
application nature i.e.,  the first  model is a single-tier 
flat homogeneous (multi-hop) camera sensor network 
where the sink is a wireless gateway connected  to a 
centralized storage hub, the second reference model is 
a single-tiered clustered network with heterogeneous 
sensors. Camera, audio and scalar sensors relay data 
to a cluster-head able to perform intensive data 
processing and the cluster-head is connected to a 
gateway as in the first model and the third model is a 
multi-tier architecture with heterogeneous sensors. In 
the first tier, scalar sensors perform simple tasks, like 
motion detection. A second tier of camera sensors 
perform more complicated tasks such as object 
detection or object recognition. At the end point, high 
end video sensors are connected to wireless gateways.  
Elhadi et al  [8] was described typical characteristics 
of WMSNs and introduced  a reference architecture 
for WMSNs similar to [2]. It can be show in Fig. 2.a. 
Grieco et al  [1] introduces an architecture of WMSN. 
It  is composed of numerous multimedia sensors that 
exchange sensed data with sinks using a wireless 
channel. It can be seen in Fig.2.b.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 2  Architecture of WMSN [8] and  [1] 
There have been many designs to develop an 
architecture for WMSNs.  The design is still similar  
to [2].  
 
IV. WIRELESS MULTIMEDIA SENSOR NETWORK 
APPLICATIONS 
 
 
The characteristic of a WMSN diverge consistently 
from traditional network paradigms, such as the 
internet and even from the WSNs. The most potential 
applications of WMSNs require  the sensor networks 
paradigm to be rethought to provide mechanisms to 
delivery multimedia contents with the predetermined 
level of Quality of Service (QoS). WMSNs will 
enable several new applications. 
 Surveillance: WMSNs are used currently in 
surveillance which need streaming multimedia 
content, advanced signal and high bandwidth. 
Such as  Audio and video sensors will be used to 
complement and enhance existing surveillance 
systems against crime attack [10]. 
 Traffic monitoring and Enforcement : WMSNs are 
low cost,  easy of deployment and ease for 
reconfiguring routes when deployment in  the 
specific location such as in big cities of highways. 
They  will be possible to monitor car traffic  and to 
service that offer traffic routing advice to avoid 
congestion [11]. 
 Personal and Health care : WMSNs,  
incorporated with  some telemedicine devices, can 
be used to remotely monitor the patient’s body 
temperature, blood and breathing activity etc. 
They can be  studied  the behavior of elderly 
people as means to identify the causes of illnesses 
that affect them such as dementia  [12].  
 Gaming: WMSNs will find applications in the 
future prototypes that enhance the effect on the 
game player. Such as virtual reality games that 
assimilate touch and sight input, of user as part of 
the player response [13]. 
 Environmental and industrial : Array of video 
sensors are used by Oceanographer to determine 
the evolution of sandbars using image processing 
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techniques [14] and multimedia content such as 
imaging, temperature, or pressure can be used for 
time-critical industrial process control.  
 
V. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN WIRELESS 
MULTIMEDIA SENSOR NETWORKS 
In this section we discuss security and challenge for 
WMSNs.  In WMSN, we know that data harvested 
from the target area is not only scalar nature such as 
humidity, temperature, light, pressure , seismic but 
also more complex such as image and streaming 
video. Therefore the energy dissipation in multimedia 
sensor nodes is dominated by the computation energy 
rather than the communication energy.  
Manel et al [9] provided a survey and analysis of 
the different security issues that will have to take  into 
account in the design of WMSNs platforms and 
protocol.  Grieco et al [1] summarize the main 
findings on secure WMSNs and forecasts future 
perspectives of such a technology. Here we address 
security according to these into four categories. 
1. Efficient management of Quality of Experience 
(QoE) and Quality of Service ( QoS).  
The requirement of the multimedia monitoring 
applications state new problems which wireless 
communication and infrastructures of processing 
have to solve to assure the QoE. Such as the 
problem of the limited power resources and 
computational capabilities [15, 16] and the 
problem of computational complexity of 
compression are considered. In addition the 
problem of aggregation, distributed processing, the 
overload to manage privacy/security and QoS are 
also considered.   
2. Privacy  
In WMSNs collect and handle a great amount of 
data of different nature, which may provide some 
kind of information on individuals in both a direct 
or indirect form. The kind of information may 
specify explicit information on individuals. 
Therefore, under some circumstances, data may be 
used to violate the privacy of individuals. Privacy 
is a key requirement for numerous application 
scenarios of WMSNs. The privacy solutions, such 
as secure data cloaking [17],  secure 
communication channel  [18, 19] and   definition 
of privacy policies [20-22] are not enough to 
provide a complete privacy solution for WMSNs. 
Due to each solution satisfies only specific 
requirements ad-hoc problems.   
3. Authentication and  Node localization  
In WSNs communications, Han et al [23] describe 
a taxonomy of attacks on WSNs. The taxonomy 
consists of six attacks i.e., communication attacks, 
attacks against privacy, sensor node targeted 
attacks, power consumption attacks, policy attacks 
and cryptology attacks on key management.  In 
communication attacks, Eavesdropping can easily 
inject messages, so the receiver needs to make 
sure that the data used any decision–making 
process originates from the correct source.  Data 
authentication prevents unauthorized parties from 
participating in the networks and legitimate nodes 
should be able to detect messages from authorized 
nodes and reject them. The authenticity of these 
data and commands is a critical requirement for 
the correct behaviour of a WMSN [1]. The 
problem of the authentication is strictly related to 
the secure node localization issue [23]. 
Authentication can be used to ensure reliable 
information. Because of the distributed nature of 
WMSNs, the localization of the multimedia 
sensors is required to assure the supply of the 
services. Therefore, the integrity and 
confidentiality of localization information are 
fundamental and it is necessary to define 
countermeasures versus possible malicious 
attacks. 
4. Development of Platform.  
The integration of existing and upcoming 
solutions, such as aggregation algorithms, 
compression technique, secure localization, 
authentication mechanisms, should be allowed by 
the platform such as sensEye    [24-26]. Here, the 
platform considers QoE, security, privacy and 
technological constraints. The reference platform 
should be hierarchical. Each level of the 
hierarchical could be use different 
protocol/algorithm and technologies. Research 
efforts should be a opportunity to foster new 
collaborations between different academic and 
industrial group.   
 
VI. DESIGN  CHALLENGES FOR  SECURITY 
SCHEMES WIRELESS MULTIMEDIA SENSOR 
NETWORKS 
In this section, we give security design challenge for 
WMSNs. Sensor nodes are often deployed in 
unattended and even harsh environments. They may 
suffer from many kinds of attacks. Wireless channels 
are low-cost and unreliable. The transmission of data 
packets may be delay or may not reach its destination. 
Indeed, security challenges and opportunities in 
WMSNs stem from these characteristics [9]. Here we 
examine a number of security design challenges: 
 
 Unattended deployment environments:  
Sensor nodes often deployed in a large unattended 
area. An attacker may compromise one or a number of 
sensor nodes without being noticed. As a 
consequence, no solution is specifically deployed for 
WMSNs. Hence, new approaches exploiting the 
characteristics of multimedia nodes should be 
developed [1]. There are many papers that explain to 
deploy sensor node. Such as designing multimedia 
sensor networks to support volcanic studies requires 
addressing the high data rates and high data fidelity 
and sparse array with high spatial separation between 
nodes [27], however in this paper is not described the 
security of the sensor node.  Tzu et al  [28]  explains  
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a procedure of  deployment for a wireless sensor 
network.  It  is addressed to guide users to complete 
the deployment tasks systematically and Younis et al  
[29] survey  on the current state of the research on 
optimized node placement in WSNs. Both of them is 
only used to deploy WSN and is not concerned to 
secure of the sensor node.   
 
 Data Privacy:   
Privacy issues are of concern in WSNs, if the 
collected data is private and sensitive. Video, image 
and audio data are typically more sensitive than scalar 
data, such as temperature.  Hence, privacy enhancing 
techniques, such as source location, hiding and 
distributed visual secret-sharing  [18, 19] may be 
crucial for WMSNs. Attacks versus privacy which 
exploit these vulnerabilities can be categories into 
distinct macro-types of techniques: Eavesdropping 
and Masquerading. The design of privacy protecting 
mechanisms is a challenging problem for the intrinsic 
characteristic of WMSNs.  
Gruteser et al [30] proposed a methodology for 
identifying, assessing and comparing location privacy 
risk in mobile computing technologies. However, this 
method cannot be used for design securing in 
WMSNs. The source location privacy problem is 
studied in [31] under the assumption of one single 
source during a specific period. However, this method 
is not specifically defined for WMSNs. 
Yi et al  [32] propose  a Proxy based Filtering Scheme 
(PFS) and a Tree-based Filtering Scheme (TFS), 
which are simple yet efficient event source 
unobservability preserving solutions for sensor 
networks. However these methods are not suitable for 
securing in WMSNs.   
 
 Data authentication:  
Wireless communications make security and privacy 
requirements critical because they increase the 
vulnerabilities and the threats on the integrity and 
confidentiality of the transmitted data. For these 
reasons, authentication mechanisms [33] are required 
to guarantee the correctness and the confidentiality of 
data. Moreover, due to the high number of sensor 
nodes, such systems could contain control units that 
broadcast commands and data to the nodes. Hence, 
the authenticity of these data and commands is a 
critical requirement for the correct behaviour of 
WMSNs. Data authentication guarantees and ensures  
that  raw data are received at the aggregators at the 
same time as they are being sensed. Zhang et al   [34] 
proposed a watermark statistical approach for data 
authentication in WSN which  provides inherent 
support for in-network processing. The data 
authentication is only work from sensor nodes to the 
data sink. However secure data authentication is not 
explained from the sink to the sensor node. In the 
literature [35, 36] provide authentication algorithm for 
data authentication however this algorithm is not 
adequately satisfy the quality of service  requirements 
of multimedia signals. 
 
 Multimedia in-network processing :  
Multimedia in networks processing is one of the 
factors influencing the design of WMSNs. WMSNs 
allow algorithm of processing of multimedia content 
from the environment. A new architecture for 
collaborative, distributed, and resource-constrained 
processing is required. This architecture allows for 
filtering and extraction of semantically relevant 
information at the edge of the sensor network. Nath et 
al [37] introduces IrisNet which uses  application-
specific filtering of sensor feeds at the source and 
reduces the bandwidth consumed, since instead of 
transferring raw data, IrisNet sends only a potentially 
small amount of processed data. Stockdon, et al [38] 
introduce distributed  filtering technique that can 
create a time-elapsed image in video security 
application. Both of them is concerned to specific 
filtering of sensor. However they do not concerned for 
securing in networks processing in WMSNs.   
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
  
In this paper, we aims to address the problem of 
secure and challenges in WMSNs . We have also 
discussed the existence hardware component and 
surveyed the network architecture for WMSNs. The 
application of WMSNs is explained. This paper is 
also figure out a number of security challenges. Based 
on this paper, we will next to try to design a 
conceptual frame work for securing in WMSNs.  
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Secure Communication in Wireless 
Multimedia Sensor Networks using 
Watermarking  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract- Wireless multimedia sensor networks (WMSNs) are an 
emerging type of sensor networks which contain sensor nodes 
equipped with microphones, cameras, and other sensors that 
producing multimedia content. These networks have the potential 
to enable a large class of applications ranging from military to 
modern healthcare. Since in WMSNs information is multimedia by 
nature and it uses wireless link as mode of communication so this 
posse’s serious security threat to this network. Thereby, the 
security mechanisms to protect WMSNs communication have found 
importance lately. However given the fact that WMSN nodes are 
resources constrained, so the traditionally intensive security 
algorithm is not well suited for WMSNs. Hence in this research, we 
aim to a develop lightweight digital watermarking enabled 
techniques as a security approach to ensure secure wireless 
communication. Finally aim is to provide a secure communication 
framework for WMSNs by developing new.   
Index terms - Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks, 
Watermark, Digital watermarking   
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have the capability for 
sensing, processing and wireless communication all built 
into a tiny embedded device. This type of network has 
drawn increasing interest in the research community over the 
last few years. This is driven by theoretical and practical 
problems in embedded operating systems, network 
protocols, wireless communications and distributed signal 
processing. The primary function of WSNs is to collect and 
disseminate critical data that characterize the physical 
phenomena within the target area. Depending on the 
application scenario WSNs can be categorized into two main 
streams: Wireless Scalar Sensor Networks (WSSNs) and 
Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks (WMSNs) [1]. In 
addition, The availability of low-cost cameras, CMOS image 
sensor and  microphones, also their broad application 
opportunities that are able to  ubiquitously capture 
multimedia content from the environment has fostered the 
development of WMSNs, i.e., networks of wirelessly 
interconnected devices that allow retrieving video and audio 
streams, still images, and scalar sensor data from the 
environment. To the ability to retrieve multimedia data, 
WMSNs will also be able to store, process in real-time, 
correlate and fuse multimedia data originated from 
heterogeneous sources. WMSNs will not only change 
enhance existing sensor applications such as tracking, and 
environment monitoring [2], but they also will enable 
several new applications. For example they range over 
systems supporting telemedicine, attendance to disabled and 
elderly people as means to identify the causes of illnesses 
that affect them such as dementia [3], localization and  
recognition of services and users, and control of 
manufacturing processes in industry [4].   
 WMSNs have some novel features which stem the fact that 
some of the sensor node will have video cameras and higher 
computation capabilities. Consequently, the WMSNs bring 
new security of challenges as well as new opportunities. 
Security is a key concern in such application like traffic 
monitoring and enforcement [2] and  monitoring process in 
industry [4]. However given   the problems including the 
limited power resources and computational capabilities, it is 
difficult to implement strong cryptography algorithm. 
Hence, this paper aims to investigate the possibility of 
digital watermarking technique as an alternative method for 
providing security. The paper is structured as follows :  
Section 2 present review all the aspects of secure WMSNs, 
Section 3 describes proposed framework for watermarking 
enabled secure communication in WMSNs, Section 4 
describe framework implementation, Section 5 evaluation 
and finally we have concluded and future work the paper in 
section 6.  
2. RELATED WORKS 
WMSNs security is still a very young research field.  Tavli 
et al [1] provided a survey and analysis of the different 
security issues that will have to take  into account in the 
design of WMSNs platforms and protocol. Grieco et al [5] 
summarize the main findings on secure WMSNs and 
forecasts future perspectives of such a technology. Both of 
them will be spurred new research ideas. Here, we integrate 
prior research results and investigate the following sub 
categories: which includes privacy, authentication 
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mechanisms, secure communication channels and Secure 
Compression and aggregation of multimedia data contents.    
2.1  Privacy  
 In WMSNs collect and handle a great amount of data of 
different nature, which may provide some kind of 
information on individuals in both an indirect or direct form. 
The kind of information may specify explicit information on 
individuals. Therefore, under some circumstances, data may 
be used to violate the privacy of individuals. Privacy is a key 
requirement for numerous application scenarios of 
WMSN[5]. WMSNs run the risk of individual privacy 
violation due to possible unauthorized access to the data that 
are handled by the network. This treat is mainly attributable 
to vulnerabilities of WMSN, for example the remote access 
data and the huge quantity of multimedia data that are 
exchanged within the network [5]. Attacks versus privacy 
which exploit these vulnerabilities can be categories into 
distinct macro-types of techniques: Eavesdropping and 
Masquerading [6]. The design of privacy protecting 
mechanisms is a challenging problem for the intrinsic 
characteristic of WMSNs. There are two different types of 
solutions that aim at hindering such as attacks: The first of 
types is privacy aware mechanisms based on data cloaking. 
The aim of data cloaking anonymity mechanisms is hiding 
the informative content of messages by perturbing data 
according to specific patterns. There are only a few more 
prior studies on the issue of data cloaking , mainly 
considering the privacy such as [7] is expressed designed to 
enable privacy in vision rich system built in WMSN, [8] 
proposed a novel paradigm for securing privacy and 
confidently in a distributed manner,  [9] presented attacks 
that affect the data privacy in visual sensor networks and 
proposed privacy-promoting security solutions established 
upon a detected-adversary using a game-theoretic analysis 
and keyless encryption. The second of types is privacy 
policy. The references of [10] propose privacy policy and 
they state who can use individuals data, which data can be 
collected, for what purpose the data can be used, and how 
they can be distributed.  A privacy-preserving video 
surveillance system that monitor subjects in an observation 
region using video cameras along with localized sensors  is 
presented in [11] . The localized sensors include RFID tags 
placed within the observation environment. The motion 
detectors are used to turn the video cameras on or off, while 
the RFIDs of the subjects provide information that specifies 
which individuals are entitled to privacy. The video data 
accommodates the information from the various sensors, and 
the result is in a video stream with only authorized subjects 
being masked through image processing. At present, the 
solutions that guarantee the privacy of data in the context of 
WMSNs are still in a primitive state and many open 
problems still exist such as lack of privacy and process data 
complements based on digital watermarking technique and 
are yet to be discovered, hence, further research work is 
required. 
2.2  Authentication mechanisms  
Wireless communications make security and privacy 
requirements critical take into account they increase the 
vulnerabilities and the threats on the integrity and 
confidentiality of the transmitted data. With these reasons, 
there are  many studies on the issue of an authentication 
mechanisms such as Honggang W et al [12] presented an 
authentication mechanisms that it is used to guarantee the 
correctness and the confidentiality of data and Zhang W et al  
[13]   proposed an end-to-end, watermark statistical 
approach for data authentication that provides inherent 
support for in-network processing. Due to the high number 
of sensor nodes, such systems could contain control units 
that broadcast commands and data to the nodes. 
Consequence, the authenticity of these data and commands 
is a critical requirement for the correct behaviour of 
WMSNs. It is really a complex problem to guarantee the 
correct broadcast authentication of the messages transmitted 
by control units, because the broadcast authentication 
algorithms that are currently available in the literature [14, 
15] do not adequately satisfy the QoS requirements of 
multimedia signals. At present there is no solution to deploy 
for WMSNs. Therefore, exploiting the characteristics of 
multimedia nodes should be developed.  
 2.3 Secure Communication Channel  
The usage of secure communication protocols to hinder 
active attacks and eavesdropping is presented.  In this case 
the cloaking is executed by means of encryption methods. 
The objective of these methods is to guarantee the 
confidentiality of data by hiding their content. There has 
been a lot work for securing routing protocol for WSN. A 
suite of security protocols for sensor networks called SPIN 
was recently proposed [16]. The SPIN family of protocols 
permits only valid key holders access to encrypted data; but 
as soon as this data is decrypted, tracking the reproduction 
or re-transmission of the data is not possible. The protocol 
SPIN originally designed for generic WSN can also be 
applied to WMSN. Like Fidaleo et al [17] introduce  the 
Networked Sensor Tapestry (NeST) architecture which is  
designed for the secure sharing, capture, distributed 
processing, and archiving of multimedia data. The 
infrastructure of the NeST is developed to facilitate the fast 
prototyping and deployment of WMSNs for a wide variety 
of surveillance applications including structural monitoring 
and battlefield assistance. In order to facilitate trust in 
WMSNs,  [5]  presents the notion of subjective privacy in 
video where the behaviour of an individual under 
surveillance is conveyed but not identify it.    
2.4.  Secure Compression and aggregation of multimedia 
data contents    
Aggregation algorithms and compression technique for 
multimedia contents are crucial to reduce the amount of 
transmitted data and to save energy and processing resources 
in WMSNs. The problem of aggregating multiple 
compressed frames coming from different video sensors 
while guaranteeing the expected security level is still open 
research area. Even though, many compression schemes  
have been proposed as described in the surveys [19]. 
Because of the complex compression operations, the 
distributed elaborate of the multimedia contents and the 
limited bandwidth and power resources of WMSN, so it is 
needed to introduce secure aggregation algorithms that 
decrease the total amount of information to transmit, 
elaborate and protect at the same time the quality of the 
multimedia message. There has been a lot of work in the 
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area of secure data aggregation such as  Hani A et al [20] 
discussed the security issue in data aggregation in the WSN. 
A novel framework for secure information aggregation in 
large sensor networks  is proposed by  Bartosz P et al [21] . 
Wang et al [22] propose a survey on the most important 
solutions, but they can be hardly applied to multimedia data. 
In the case of WMSN, aggregation is probably, only going 
to be useful with abstract information extracted from sensed 
media. This is because it is extremely complex to aggregate 
different multimedia sources into a single aggregated 
multimedia stream [6].  To take into account the cost 
deriving from the secure aggregation of multimedia 
contents, [23] proposed a methods to optimize the placement 
of aggregation node. At present, research on secure 
aggregation of multimedia contents is still separated and that 
more efforts are required to address it in a comprehensive 
way. 
2.5. Research issues for WMSNs Security   
After doing the literature review, we identify the gaps in the 
following area.  
1. Lack of privacy based on digital watermarking 
technique.   
2. Lack of data authentication based on digital 
watermarking technique.   
3. Lack of the processed data complements.  
4. Lack of secure communication model based on 
watermarking technique for WMSNs.  
In this context of this research, we will address and then 
issues. The next section will provide a conceptual 
framework to solve the open problem 
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SECURE 
COMMUNICATION IN WMSNS USING WATERMARKING  
3.1. Overview Digital Watermarking and WSNs 
The objective of digital watermarking is to protect the 
intellectual property of multimedia contents such as copy 
right protection, contents archiving, Meta-data insertion, 
broadcast monitoring, tamper detection and digital 
fingerprinting [18]. Digital watermarking techniques have 
been extensively studied in the multimedia domain [19, 20]. 
However, rarely this technique has been used in WSNs. 
Zhang W et al [13] propose a watermarking-based 
authentication schemes for WSNs. The key idea is to hide 
certain information about the multimedia material within 
that material itself. As illustrated in Fig. 1, a generic 
watermarking system is usually composed of two 
components: an embedder and a detector [13]. The 
embedder takes three inputs: (1) messages that are encoded 
as the watermark; (2) cover data that are used to embed the 
watermark; and (3) key  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1, A generic watermarking system [13] 
That is optional for enforcing secure watermark generation. 
As an embedder’s output, the watermarked data is 
distributed.  It is presented as the detector’s input, with the 
key information (depending on whether employed), the 
detector can determine whether a watermark exists and 
decode it. The watermark detection schemes can be 
categorized into two classes: informed detection and blind 
detection. The difference lies in that the original cover data 
is accessible in the former case while it is not required in the 
latter case.  Although watermarking technique has been 
widely used in the multimedia domain, its direct adoption to 
wireless sensor networks is often not feasible. First, often in 
multimedia applications, both the watermark embedder and 
detector (shown in Fig. 1) possess the knowledge of the 
whole multimedia material, which can be leveraged to 
watermark embedding. On the contrary, in sensor networks, 
each sensor node only has knowledge of its own local 
sensory data without a global view of the whole ‘‘sensory 
image’’. This requires the sensor node to embed its 
watermark in a distributed fashion [13]  Second, most 
watermarking schemes for multimedia applications operates 
in the frequency domain, for example, after certain time to 
frequency transform. However, in sensor networks, only the 
sink that performs the compression can obtain such 
information. 
3.2.  Research method 
A science and engineering based research approach is 
adopted in this research project. Science and engineering 
research leads to the development of new techniques, 
architecture, methodologies, devices or a set of concepts, 
which can be combined together to form a new theoretical 
framework. This research approach commonly identifies 
problems and proposes solutions to these problems. [21] and 
[22]  provide a concise conceptual framework for design-
science research and state that  design-science research deals 
with understanding the problem domain and design a 
solution by building application or some design artifacts. 
3.3.  Research Stages   
The work in [1] gives a vision of the research challenges 
and the future trend focusing on their security aspects in 
WMSNs and the work [5] gives a driving directions for 
future research in secure WMSNs.  In [5] shows that 
privacy, trust management and authentication mechanisms 
are not separated components of security in WMSNs.  
Digital watermarking technique is an effective vehicle to 
assure and assert the image data authentication and is not 
inherently pose risk to privacy. At the same time, it relies on 
other security services. Digital watermarking technique and 
other security services together make up security 
architecture for WMSNs. Therefore, a comprehensive 
consideration is compulsory when designing digital 
watermarking for WMSN. Here we will propose a 
conceptual framework for watermarking enabled secure 
communication in WMSNs. It can be depicted in Figure 2. 
The conceptual will provide a guideline to design 
watermarking technique for WMSNs. The concept consists 
of 8 stages.  
Stage 1 :  Application scenarios extraction.  
This step defines QoS requirement for different application 
scenarios extraction. WMSNs are application-specific 
networks. Except from some common features, a sensor 
network for a specific application has some features and the 
secure communication requirements. Suppose a multimedia 
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sensor network is deployed in the hospital surveillance 
environment [3] and the other in military [23]. Both network 
secure communication requirement should be different based 
on the resource of node can be used.   The risks they face 
with. Therefore, we have to fully understand application 
background. The acquirement information in this step 
includes the size of the network and the densities, the 
available software and hardware resources, and some special 
knowledge that can be used in a real time, for example 
location information 
Stage 2: The secure communication model.  
This step develops the secure communication model. Since 
the protocol SPIN [16] originally designed for WSN and it 
can also be applied for WMSNs. So the secure 
communication model will be developed according to 
security requirements [16].  So far we know that it is the first 
time to define secure communication model with this 
terminology. Development of metrics, measurement and 
evaluation of approach are of great importance in order to 
establish a scientific methodology for the WMSNs area. 
Stage 3: Privacy protection for WMSNs. 
This step develops a privacy protection. WMSN collect a 
great amount of data, which may be used to violate 
individual’s privacy, privacy protection is required. There 
are many existing privacy protection  [24]  but there is no 
the privacy of data in the context of WMSNs. [25] states that 
digital watermarking does not inherently pose risk to privacy 
and suggestions specific privacy principles for digital 
watermarking. One of the suggestions is privacy by design. 
Here, the privacy protection will be incorporated into the 
design of digital watermarking. The developing of digital 
watermarking considers and addresses privacy issues in the 
early design.   
Stage 4: Authentication for WMSNs: This step 
defines an authentication mechanism. Authentication is 
the process of determining whether someone or 
something is, in fact, who or what it is declared to be. 
Since data is easy to threat in wireless communication, 
so it is needed an authentication mechanism. The 
authentication mechanism rules privacy and security. [12] 
and  [13] proposed authentication mechanism based on the 
digital watermarking technique. Here, we also addressed the 
digital watermarking technique as an authentication 
mechanism. This mechanism is used to guarantee the 
correctness and the confidentiality data for WMSNs.  
Stage 5: Trust management for WMSNs. This step 
develops a trust management for WMSNs. The concept of 
trust is to increase security and reliability in sensor networks 
[26, 27]. We know that reputation is the opinion of one 
WSN node about another. The trust is a derivative of the 
reputation of an entity.  The sensor network may be 
deployed in entrusted locations. We assume that individual 
sensors network is entrusted. Using SPIN [16], we 
compromise of a node to other nodes. Here the developing 
of digital watermarking considers and addresses trust 
management. 
Stage 6: Initializes system parameter.  
This step initializes system parameter. An authentication 
mechanism, used to guarantee the correctness and the 
confidentiality of data, is fixed in this step. To assert and 
assure the data authentication digital watermarking 
technique is applied. Digital watermarking consists of two 
components: an embbeder and a detector [13]. There are two 
inputs in the embedder. ie., messages that are encoded as the 
watermark, data comes from physical world. The watermark 
detector can determine whether a watermark exist and 
decode it. A fully integrated view of the design factors 
promotes the development of protocol for WMSNs 
Stage 7: Digital watermarking technique for WMSNs : 
This step explains how digital watermarking works for 
WMSNs.  In this step, there are three stages. The first stage 
is generating watermark. Here,  a watermark binary stream 
is generated by using Linear Feed Back Shift Register [20] , 
then  it is converted to watermark constraint using a 
particular low of the kolmogorov rule [28]. The second stage 
is the process of embedding. Here, the watermark constraint 
and the original data which comes from physical world flow 
into the sensor node are processed into a format suitable for 
using multi-modal fusion. After that a non linear system 
equation is obtained using atomic acoustic trileteraton,. 
Furthermore, the non linear system equation is solved by 
using the standard non linear programming approach to get 
watermarked solution. At last, the watermarked solution 
flows from sensor node to receiver sensor node. There are 
some watermark attacks which also flows from another 
sensor node into receiver sensor node. The third stage is the 
process of detecting watermark. Watermarked solution is 
detected in receiver sensor node whether it exists or not by 
applying the blind detection.  This stage corresponds to 
perceptual level of the science and engineering research 
method. 
Stage 8: Theoretical analysis and simulation: Both 
theoretical analysis and simulation are good tools to test the 
designed schemes. Only by these tools can we prove the 
validity of the schemes and, at the same time, find 
deficiencies of the scheme. The step 6, 7, and 8 proceed in 
turn. They form a loop and perform numerous times before 
the error minimization is obtained. This stage corresponds to 
the practical level of the science and engineering research 
methods 
4. FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION 
Based on the conceptual framework proposed in the first 
research stage, the main task in this stage would be to design 
secure communication protocols in WMSNs using digital 
watermarking. Each of these schemes has some 
specialties according to watermarking attacks.   It is 
not the final aim and it is impossible to design one of 
type protocol which will outperform all other for all 
watermarking attacks. We devote to designing secure 
communication in WMSNs using digital watermarking 
which matches the abstracted model in Fig. 2. This design 
can be categorized into two paths: the process of embedding 
into sensor node, and the process of detecting from receiver 
sensor node. The process of embedding consists of two 
stages: firstly, generating a watermark binary by using 
Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)[20]. Then 
converting the watermark stream into watermarking 
constraints using a particular low of the Kolmogorov 
complexity rule [28]. Secondly, the original data, gathered  
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from physical world, flows into the sensor node and then 
process,  that data into a format suitable for multi-modal  
sensor fusion [29]. Here we use atomic acoustic 
trileteraton [30]. In order to get non linear system 
equations those consists of objective FN, constraints and 
add constraints. To get a watermarked data, we have to 
solve the non linear system equation by using a gradient 
projection or the standard non linear programming 
approach. The process of detecting watermark uses blind 
detection. The blind detection means that we do not use 
the original data for watermarking detection. Here we 
approach by statistically analyzing the relationship 
between correctness, strength of authorship and 
measurement error [31].  
5. VALIDATION 
The schemes and protocol will be evaluated by using 
experimental simulation which can be divided into three 
stages: Stage 1, Here we will verify whether the schemes 
satisfy the secure communication data requirements 
against different watermarking attacks, such as Ghost 
signature, addition of a new signature, removal of the 
author’s signature and de-Synchronization with the help 
of software Mathematica and Matlab. To this time there 
were limited references existed in experimental 
simulation, namely [30] and  [32]. Both of them 
developed the system of watermarking techniques for 
embedding signatures into data and information acquired 
by embedded WSNs. However, [30] and  [32] do not 
provide any  attempt to handle some watermarking 
attacks. Thus, this research will contribute to the source 
studies on the field, providing digital watermarking 
schemes for WMSNs through experimental simulation. 
With regards to protocols, it is necessary to have 
comprehensive guidelines for evaluating a specific 
protocol and compare it against others. Based on the 
proposed secure communication model, appropriate 
performance metrics would then be used to evaluate the 
strength and weakness of each protocol. Stage 2, The 
performance of the proposed secure communication 
schemes will be further simulated by NS-2. Stage 3, The 
security of the watermarking enabled secure 
communication schemes will be validated by 
mathematical security proof. 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper aims to address the problem of secure 
communication in wireless multimedia sensor networks 
using digital watermarking. Although some work has 
been done in this area, there is no security in application 
on wireless multimedia sensor networks. The unique idea 
proposed in this paper aims to address the problem from 
a scientific and systematic process. Our future work is to 
provide watermarking enabled secure communication 
framework in WMSNs.  This framework is focusing on 
establishing multimedia data authentication, and 
ensuring privacy perseveration in WMSNs.  
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